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ABSTRACT
From the 1990s, market-oriented housing renewal took off at extraordinary pace 
across Chinese cities, modernising the built environment and displacing millions of 
residents in the process. One prevailing view is that this has been driven by a 
“growth coalition” of local government and private businesses with the goal of 
maximising economic potentials through the intensification of land-use.
This thesis examines the evolving policies and practices of urban housing renewal 
in Shanghai since 1990. It questions whether the above perspective adequately 
captures the underlying socio-political dynamics at work. Through a comprehensive 
review of housing policies, interviews and analyses of contrasting case studies, it 
demonstrates that housing renewal had entailed a more diverse set of policies and 
mechanisms than commonly depicted. Beyond private-funded redevelopment and 
displacement, local governments have promoted some socially-oriented schemes, 
as well as recently supporting the piecemeal gentrification of neighbourhoods.
This research shows that it is useful to move beyond a monolithic conception of the 
Chinese growth coalition. The local government plays an increasingly dualistic role 
in housing renewal. Beyond its core concern to facilitate economic growth and 
‘global city’ building through comprehensive redevelopment, it has evolved socially- 
oriented housing policies, enlarged market regulation, and made concessions to 
disadvantaged groups in the interest of maintaining social harmony. Property 
developers were not a homogenous profit-seeking group in Shanghai’s urban 
growth-coalition. Various quasi-governmental enterprises played a role in delivering 
socially-oriented projects under bureaucratic command of the local government. 
Finally, although grass roots actors are politically excluded, their cumulative actions 
including neighbourhood rehabilitation and protests can sometimes influence 
policies and urban planning decisions.
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1 Introduction
1.1 China’s urban growth coalition
More than 30 years ago, Harvey Molotch (1976) introduced the concept of the 
‘growth machine’, arguing that urban development is not driven by the laws of 
supply and demand, but by a coalition of land-based elites who collectively influence 
urban planning and politics in their quest to expand the local economy and 
accumulate wealth. A large body of literature has since highlighted the pervasive 
influence of ‘growth coalitions’ -  enduring alliances of local government and private 
sector elites -  whether in the promotion of downtown redevelopment, in local policy­
making, and more broadly in the shaping of urban fortunes (Logan and Molotch, 
1987; Stone, 1989; Fainstein et al, 1986; Mollenkopf and Strom, 2007). 
Internationally, scholars have documented local variations in the composition of 
growth coalitions, their concrete agendas, the degree of opposition they faced, and 
the relative significance of national level institutions in affecting their actions (e.g. 
Jonas and Wilson, 1999; Bassett, 1996; Davies, 2001; Kulcsar and Domokos, 2005).
This thesis directs our attention to China. In recent years, the emergence of growth- 
coalitions driving China’s urban development has become a focal point of research 
(Zhu, 1999; Zhang, 2002; Fu, 2002; He and Wu, 2005; Zhang and Fang, 2004; 
Yang and Chang, 2007). Market oriented urban renewal proliferated across Chinese 
cities since around 1990, focusing upon the reconstruction of old residential 
neighbourhoods. By this time, housing marketisation, land reform and political 
decentralisation paved the way for private-funded redevelopment as a favoured 
strategy to solve long-standing problems of the city, including deficient 
infrastructures and poor quality housing.
Large-scale reconstruction of cities since then has apparently led to substantial 
land-use transformations and gentrification of the city. Older neighbourhoods 
characterised by poor quality housing have been reconstructed as modern high-rise 
apartments and commercial facilities. More often than not, state-facilitated relocation 
of original residents made way for these new upmarket developments. A class 
transformation of the city was thus under-way, with redevelopment as a force of 
instantaneous ‘state-sponsored gentrification’ (He, 2007; Wu and He, 2007).
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Figure 1.1: Aerial view of Shanghai in 2008
The physical impact of this sustained wave of urban renewal is epitomised by cities 
such as Shanghai -  one of the world’s fast growing cities at the forefront of China’s 
market oriented development. Here, the total amount of housing space more than 
quadrupled between 1990 and 2005, as some 300 million m2of new housing was 
built. Between 1992 and 2004, the city has demolished more than 42 million m2of 
old housing and in the process relocated more than 960,000 families - 
approximately one-sixth of the registered local population (SSB, 2005). From having 
a handful of high-rise buildings in the 1980s, Shanghai has redefined itself as one of 
the 'tallest' cities in the world with more than 2,000 new buildings of 20 or more 
stories now redefining the urban landscape (SSB, 2006).
What distinguished the recent dynamics of urban housing renewal from earlier 
periods in China appeared to be its extraordinary scale and pace, its clear 
economically-driven agenda, a more locally-determined rather than centrally- 
planned nature, and crucially a new relationship between the local state and private 
enterprise which seemed to reflect a pattern found in certain advanced capitalist 
economies. Scholars have sought to develop sophisticated explanations for these 
powerful patterns of change. An influential view is that local ‘growth coalitions’
17
comprising local governments, real estate developers, construction companies, and 
financial institutions in an informal alliance were formed and became key drivers of 
urban redevelopment. In the context of growing urban economies, a more 
liberalised real estate market and a pro-growth political orientation, they have been 
brought together by a shared interest to engineer urban growth and to maximise 
returns through the intensification of land-use (Zhang, 2002; Zhu, 1999; He and Wu, 
2005; Wu et al, 2007).
Figure 1.2: Defining growth coalitions
In the U.S In China
Logan and Molotch (1987) argued that a growth 
coalition (or 'growth machine') comprising 
property speculators, development 
professionals, financiers and the local 
government are the key drivers of development 
in cities. United by the vision of growth and their 
quest to maximise exchange values through 
intensifying land-use, this informal coalition can 
shape local agendas, mobilise resources and 
implement their visions, even if this becomes an 
exclusive force and conflicts with the interests of 
some members of the local community.
“The socialist growth coalition in Shanghai in the 
transitional era [is] a regime characterised by a 
strong local government followed by cooperative 
non-public sectors with excluded community 
organisations” (Zhang, 2002: 475). Pursuing 
common interests in local economic expansion 
and wealth accumulation, coalitions between 
local government, construction companies, and 
financial institutions have been formed to 
facilitate inner-city redevelopment (He and Wu, 
2005:18).
The emergence of such a coalition has been contextualised in the institutional 
changes in China’s market transition and the political decentralisation processes 
which gave rise to more autonomous growth-seeking local governments. Scholars 
argued that the authoritarian local governments proactively facilitated market- 
oriented urban renewal, assembling land, providing favourable supply-side policies 
and enforcing the relocation of residents to realise projects conducive to physical 
modernisation and economic growth. Meanwhile, urban citizens have been 
excluded from relevant decision making processes, and have been subject to 
considerable displacement pressures (He, 2007; He and Wu, 2005). This 
perspective - which may be termed the “Chinese growth coalition” perspective. 
has become a prevailing explanation of the politics of housing renewal in post­
reform China. Figure 1.2 summarises its basic characterisation, comparing it to one 
influential description of growth-coalitions in the U.S (Logan and Molotch, 1987).
18
Although this perspective has been widely accepted, it is still based on a limited 
number of studies. Furthermore, while redevelopment and relocation have been the 
core focus of most recent research (e.g. Zhang and Fang, 2003, 2004; Shin, 2007; 
Wu et al, 2007), relatively little is known about the evolving policies and practices 
concerning housing rehabilitation, historic conservation, or community retention, and 
how different approaches work together as part of China's endeavours to address 
housing problems.
To provide a more holistic understanding of housing renewal in post-reform China, 
to assess the validity of the Chinese growth-coalition perspective, and to consider 
how it might otherwise be enhanced, this thesis examines the evolving policies and 
practices of urban housing renewal in Shanghai since 1990. Adopting a broad 
approach, it explores the nature of urban housing problems in Shanghai, the 
governing agendas underlying housing renewal, the kinds of policies, interventions 
and organisational forms mobilised in the process, and impacts these had on 
targeted neighbourhoods and communities. Particular attention is paid to the 
relationships between local government, private sector actors, local communities 
and other institutions. Although redevelopment and displacement have been 
embraced by urban administrators in China, rehabilitation, community retention and 
historic conservation are also investigated as evolving political concerns.
1.2 Motivations for the research
This research emerged from my fascination as an outsider looking at the 
phenomenon of urban renewal in China. One of the most challenging problems 
faced by “post-socialist” countries is how to deal with pervasive problems of housing 
decay, shortage and the requirements for urban modernisation. Russia, Poland, 
Hungary, Vietnam and China all have staggering housing shortages and urgent 
needs to modernise their cities (Renaud, 1991). As a young architect trained in New 
Zealand and the UK, but who originated from Taiwan, I first visited mainland China 
in the winter of 2002 working on several small-scale renovation projects. During this 
time the city had well recovered from the Asian Financial Crisis (1997-8), and urban 
redevelopment appeared to be racing ahead at full steam. I witnessed the 
remarkable rebuilding of numerous run-down residential neighbourhoods and was 
intrigued by the processes and implications at stake.
19
Figure 1.3: New developments replacing dilapidated housing in Shanghai
I was perplexed by the questions that have no doubt preoccupied many others: the 
quality of life in dilapidated dwellings slated for (or neglected by) demolition, the 
merits and limits of relocation as a process of socio-spatial reorganisation, and the 
unusual distribution of power and resources in China that underpinned the ruthless 
efficiency and of such a model of urban transformation. My first visit to Shanghai 
brought me to the lavishly restored historic environment of the renowned “Xintiandi” 
development -  already by then a trendy destination with its eclectic collection of 
upscale restaurants, bars, cafes and boutiques. This icon of commercially-oriented 
historic appropriation also triggered my interest in the emerging practices of historic 
conservation in a city that is generally thought of as having little concern for history. 
In sum, these experiences fuelled a general interest to understand the drivers and 
mechanisms of housing renewal in China.
Aside from personal curiosity, the research also resonates with broader policy 
concerns. There is strong concern about improving the living conditions of the poor 
living in substandard housing worldwide. According to the goal of “appropriate 
housing for all” set out at HABITAT II, the living conditions for the 100 million people 
living in slums worldwide should be significantly improved by 2020. How different 
countries approach this challenging task and to what extent they are successful in 
their efforts are thus important issues for researchers and policy-makers to monitor.
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In China, housing renewal has become a leading edge of urban restructuring, and it 
has radically changed the lives of millions of urban citizens. Like numerous other 
developing countries, China’s housing has been well-known as overcrowded, poorly 
equipped and in poor physical condition. Related to its long history of development, 
cities often possessed a large ageing residential stock. Under the socialist regime, 
official and unofficial intensification has led to extremely high population densities, in 
spite of the buildings being predominantly low-rise (Wang, 2004; Leaf, 1995; Lee, 
1988).
According to the World Bank (1992), urban household in China at the beginning of 
the 1990s had on average only 6.84 m2of living space per person, and over 30 per 
cent of all urban households had less than 4 m2 per person. Only 45 per cent of 
urban households had water taps available for their exclusive use. About 28 per 
cent of households had no sanitary facilities, and nearly 30 per cent lacked kitchens 
for their exclusive use. Approximately 232 million m2 of China's urban housing stock 
was deemed beyond repair. It has been an urgent government task to resolve the 
acute problem of housing quantity and quality, and to provide its citizens with 
adequate living conditions. Since then, the Chinese government has deepened a 
series of market-oriented urban housing reforms and promoted rapid growth of the 
housing industry. Numerically and visibly to most citizens, the quantity and quality of 
housing in China has since increased by leaps and bounds through a combination 
of aggressive housing renewal and new building. By the end of 2002, per capita 
housing space in cities had reached 22.8 square meters (UN Human Settlement 
Report on China, 2004).
The urgency and extraordinary pace of housing modernisation in China meant that it 
has become a focal point recent academic research. Housing redevelopment in 
particular has become a focus (e.g. He and Wu, 2005; Wang, 2004; Zhang and 
Fang, 2003, 2004; Shin, 2007; Tian and Wong, 2007). Unravelling the changing 
governance of urban redevelopment, the “growth coalition” as a driving force, and 
the diverse impacts of redevelopment, these contributions have laid down a 
valuable body of knowledge. However, as noted by He and Wu (2005: 3) “the 
scarcity of research on relevant issues [has been] greatly disproportionate to the 
vastness of urban redevelopment throughout the country”. Furthermore, while 
redevelopment has been the focus of most recent research, very few studies 
examined housing renewal as a broader set of interventions. Consequently,
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relatively little is known about the evolving policies and practices concerning 
housing rehabilitation and conservation, and how these different approaches work 
together as part of China's endeavours to address housing problems.
This thesis, then, attempts to address both empirical and analytical shortcomings in 
the existing literature. While it is undeniable that redevelopment and relocation have 
become the most conspicuous, and institutionally supported, mechanisms at work, 
focusing on redevelopment alone overlooks more complex evolutions in the policies, 
agency and interventions in urban housing. Given that a key slogan for Shanghai's 
"New Round of Urban Renewal" (2001-2010) is now "demolition, conservation, 
improvement" (chai, liu, gai), it is clear that local government sees them as integral 
concerns, and a more holistic understanding of the topic must embrace these 
components.
Thus, there is scope for a more nuanced account of what actually constituted 
housing renewal over the last two decades. Deviations from the more familiar 
“redevelopment story” need to be accounted for and analysed, because they may 
shed additional light on the socio-political forces shaping urban China. A more 
holistic treatment of housing renewal can provide opportunities for questioning and 
refining existing analytical assumptions. It may in turn demand urban scholars to 
strive towards more sophisticated analyses of urban processes. Recently, Jieming 
Zhu (2009: 556) argued that the existence of growth coalitions is now “almost 
common sense in China’s academic and business communities”, and that 
“...collusion, or coalition, was evident” in much of the land transactions to the private 
sector urban development. Yet, the Chinese growth coalition perspective it is still 
based on a limited number of studies and some of its core assertions require closer 
scrutiny.
For example, the perspective asserts that both local government and property 
enterprises operate primarily in the interest of boosting local growth and wealth 
accumulation. This potentially overlooks the evolving “social” role of central and 
local government in supporting affordable housing construction, mediating social 
conflict, and ensuring proper resettlement of residents (Wang, 2004, Wu et al, 2007). 
It also appears to overlook the complex role of state-owned enterprises in fulfilling 
'public' purposes, traditionally to the neglect of market rationality or profit-motivation 
(Koppell, 2007). Thus, whether “growth” should be considered the only driving
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political agenda in housing renewal, and whether local enterprises are necessarily 
profit-seeking actors in the growth coalition requires careful qualification. Given that 
the growth-coalition perspective has so far been developed through examination of 
flagship urban redevelopment projects, it is also important to evaluate the accuracy 
of these claims by examining a broader range of housing renewal scenarios.
Shanghai provides a valuable context from which to examine housing renewal in 
China for a number of reasons. It is one of the largest cities in China and has a 
strategic position in national economic development. Many institutional features and 
urban problems characterising China are manifest in Shanghai, because its 
development was closely linked to the centrally planned economic system, and it 
has since then become a fore-runner in market-oriented urban policy (Wu and Ma, 
2005; Wu et al, 2007). The city was characterised by a significant older housing 
stock dating to the early 20th century, and is well-known to have some of the worst 
housing conditions among Chinese cities (Wu, 1999). According to the 1985 
national housing survey, the average per capita housing space in 1985 was only 6.3 
m2 per person - or around 25 m2 for a family of four. Almost 900,000 families -  about 
50% of the total households in the city -  experienced problems directly related to 
the problem of shortage of space.
Since the early 1990s, large-scale redevelopment and relocation of communities 
has been taking place at a rapid pace in the wake of land and housing marketisation, 
and several in-depth studies have confirmed the important role of the public-private 
growth coalition in driving redevelopment (Zhang, 2002; He and Wu, 2005). 
Economic growth is a major political concern and provides a basis for collaboration 
amongst public and private elites. Empirical research has also highlighted that 
strong tensions associated with relocation exist in Shanghai (Wu, 2004; He and Wu, 
2007; Wu et al, 2007). Although Shanghai is a unique city in terms of its specific 
economic position and local history of development, it exhibits many of the salient 
features of market-oriented urban development in post-reform China.
Within Shanghai, a particular housing form provides a focus for the study. ‘Lilong’ 
housing was the most common housing form in downtown Shanghai for most of the 
20th century, and has been one of the most conspicuous targets of housing renewal. 
It is a form of low-rise, terraced housing type that evolved in the context of 
colonialism between the 1860s and 1949. Its spatial concept and construction was a 
unique fusion of traditional Southeast Chinese dwellings, and the western terraced
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Figure 1.4: Low-rise 'lilong' housing in downtown Shanghai
house. The national housing survey in 1985 indicated that about 4.2 million 
residents -  over half the urban population - lived in lilong housing (ECSREH, 1998). 
The lilong is also symptomatic of some common housing problems in China -  
including deficient sanitation facilities, ageing, physical decay, and more recently the 
concentration of more disadvantaged groups in society (Wu and He, 2007; Fan, 
2003). Most had been transferred into state ownership and have since been 
allocated to individual households by local housing bureaus as public housing. 
Although other housing types in Shanghai will also be examined in this thesis, the 
lilong is the most significant part of the city’s on-going housing renewal efforts. From 
1990 to 2005, approximately 18 million m2, or around 120,000 units have been 
demolished as part of urban redevelopment, and the Shanghai Municipal 
Government plans to demolish a further 4 million m2by 2010. At the same time, its 
aesthetic character and local architectural significance meant that it has drawn 
important debates about local heritage and prompted selective efforts at 
conservation and rehabilitation. The lilong thus provides a useful lens from which to 
examine different kinds of interventions in the built environment occurring in urban 
China.
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1.3 Research aims and questions
Housing renewal represents one leading edge of urban change in China, and is a 
subject attracting considerable public as well as academic attention. This thesis 
aims to uncover the policy and practice of housing renewal in Shanghai since 1990 - 
a period corresponding to the enactment of comprehensive market-oriented housing 
reforms. It aims to determine if the prevailing Chinese growth-coalition perspective 
provides an adequate basis for understanding the underlying socio-political 
dynamics, and to consider how the analytical approach might be enhanced. These 
translate into two sets of research questions:
Question A: How has Shanghai responded to the task of housing renewai -  
including redevelopment, historic conservation and rehabilitation -  since 1990?
Question B: Does the Chinese growth coalition perspective adequately 
capture the social and political dynamics of housing renewal in post-1990 
Shanghai? If  not, how should it be modified?
To answer these overarching questions, the research examines the following issues: 
For question A:
• What urban housing problems did the local government seek to address?
• What economic and social context conditioned housing renewal in Shanghai?
• What were the local government’s agendas in housing renewal?
• What key strategies did the local government adopt to achieve intended 
goals?
• How has housing renewal been organised and delivered i.e. what public and 
non-public institutions were actively involved and how did they work together 
in various processes?
• What kind of impacts did the interventions have for the city?
For question B:
• Was housing renewal driven by a growth coalition of public and private 
sector elites?
• Aside from facilitating economic growth and capital accumulation, did local 
government also act with a concern for social equity and the welfare of the 
poor?
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• Were property developers involved in housing renewal homogenous in terms 
of their role and interests, or were there distinctions among them that 
significantly varied renewal outcomes?
• To what extent can grass-root actors challenge the growth coalition and have 
an impact upon urban policies?
A number of terms require clarification here:
• In this thesis, the terms "local government" is used interchangeably with the 
term "local state".
• "Housing renewal" is used as an umbrella term for any interventions in the 
housing stock to improve its quality, which can encompass physical 
measures such as redevelopment, rehabilitation, renovation. In China, 
housing renewal is often, although not always, accompanied by planned 
relocation of original residents.
• "Redevelopment" involves the demolition of existing buildings and the 
subsequent construction of new buildings, usually at higher standards and 
densities than the original.
• "Rehabilitation" and "renovation" are terms denoting the upgrading of 
existing buildings without resorting to demolition, and can involve a range of 
physical measures ranging from adding missing facilities, to adjusting 
internal layouts, to extensions in keeping with the original structure.
1.4 Hypotheses:
This section lists several working hypotheses for the research:
Question A: How has Shanghai responded to the task of housing renewal -  
including redevelopment, historic conservation and rehabilitation - since 1990?
Hypothesis A: Housing renewal has involved a wider set of interventions than 
commonly acknowledged. I expect to find that it has been facilitated largely by the 
promotion of private-funded redevelopment involving substantial public subsidies, 
local state led land assembly, and the forced relocation of lower-income residents. 
At the same time, housing rehabilitation has also been accomplished through 
public-sponsored programmes targeting the better quality older stock involving 
subsequent privatisation to sitting tenants. The task of historic conservation has not
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been neglected. It has been addressed through the progressive development of a 
historic conservation planning framework and by integrating heritage conservation 
selectively into market-oriented real estate development.
Question B: Does the Chinese growth coalition perspective adequately capture the 
social and political dynamics of housing renewal in post-1990 Shanghai? If not, how 
should it be modified?
I hypothesise that although the Chinese growth coalition captures some essential 
aspects of housing renewal, it is inadequate in a number of ways:
Hypothesis B1: The local state plays a more complex role in housing renewal than 
depicted by the Chinese growth-coalition perspective. Rather than merely facilitating 
the conditions for local growth and wealth accumulation to the neglect of social 
responsibility, the local state has a concern for balancing social interests and 
maintaining social order. This demands it to develop measures to address the 
needs of disadvantaged groups, albeit within the constraints set by market-oriented 
development and the general pro-growth political orientation.
Hypothesis B2: The local state to private-sector relationship in Shanghai is more 
heterogeneous than depicted in the Chinese growth-coalition perspective. Rather a 
monolithic coalition centred on profit-maximisation and urban growth there are 
tangible differences between ‘private’ and ‘state-owned’ property enterprises and 
their relationships with the local government. While private enterprises are 
autonomous market actors in pursuit of profit, some state-owned enterprises 
operate under a combination of profit-seeking agendas and bureaucratic influence. 
This can differentiate their roles and impacts in housing renewal.
Hypothesis B3: Despite the power of the growth-coalition, grass-roots resistance 
can cumulatively prompt minor adjustments to housing renewal policies and project 
outcomes. This means that a more flexible and dynamic conceptualisation of the 
politics of housing renewal is more appropriate -  one that acknowledges that 
contrasting visions for the city and social conflicts can prompt changes to the urban 
growth-coalition’s strategies.
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1.5 The evolution of urban housing policy in China
A brief review of how housing policy in China has evolved is useful here to help 
illuminate how the problem of urban housing emerged, how it was dealt with before 
the present period, and to give a sense of the more recent context framing housing 
renewal in Shanghai. In understanding the present-day conditions in China, 
scholars have emphasised the need to look simultaneously at the socialist system 
that prevailed prior to economic liberalisation and its transformations under more 
recent processes of market reform. This has been conceptualised as the post­
socialist transition perspective (see Andrutz et al, 1996; Sykora, 1999; Salier-Fliege, 
1999), now an important basis of urban and housing studies regarding China (e.g. 
Wang, 2004; Wu and Ma, 2005). The concept is derived from the experiences of 
formerly socialist states in eastern and central Europe. The perspective sees urban 
restructuring being influenced by state-initiated market-reforms, which lead towards 
a complex series of institutional, social, economic and cultural change.
As discussed by Wang (2004), the most simple and commonly used view of 
transition is the shift ‘from socialism towards capitalism’, or from ‘plan to market’. 
However, it is well known that such a transition involves more than economic 
changes, and it does not necessarily lead to any ideal notion of a market system or 
capitalist economy. The transition perspective thus also emphasises ‘path- 
dependence’ - the idea that where one comes from matters and therefore various 
legacies of the socialist past tend to continue to shape and influence future 
conditions (Kovacs, 1999; Salier-Fliege, 1999).
1.5.1 Housing under socialist policies (1949-1988)
Certain aspects of housing conditions in Socialist China are well known. In socialist 
regimes, almost all aspects of social, political and economic life was centrally 
planned by the state. Cities were regarded as focal points for industrialisation and 
the development of the egalitarian, classless society. Under the centrally planned 
economy urban land and housing were largely transferred into state ownership. All 
land was owned by the state and the Communist Party of China managed the 
allocation of resources in the name of the state. It was administratively allocated 
free of charge to work units when their projects were approved by the state. Housing 
became a welfare-good rather than a commodity. Private house-building for 
speculation was banned, and private rental was gradually eliminated. The purpose
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of housing was to provide workers with a place of residence, and to facilitate 
production. Housing was to be allocated by the state and state owned 
institutions/enterprises, based on various eligibility criteria rather than socio­
economic status. Rent and housing maintenance of the converted stock came under 
regulation of government policy (Wang, 1992,1995).
The public housing sector could be divided into ‘municipal-owned housing’ and 
‘work-unit housing’. Municipal housing was owned and directly managed by city 
housing bureaus. Work unit housing refers to housing constructed and managed by 
“work units” -  generally state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and institutions. Housing 
was allocated based on various administrative criteria. The process was tied to 
employment, with work units playing a key role as providers for their own workers. 
Nevertheless municipal housing bureaus owned substantial housing stock and 
provided for those work units which did not have resources to provide housing, or 
those parts of the population which did not belong to state work units (Wang 1995; 
Wu, 1996; Zhao and Bourassa, 2003).
Major housing problems encountered in this context included under-investment in 
housing construction and maintenance, and the associated problems of housing 
shortages and physical housing degradation. Low rent was one of the key features 
of public housing provision under socialism. The centrally commanded economy 
operated under the principle of low cash wages from which the state has already 
removed the purchasing power for housing, transportation, health services and 
education. Instead, these services were provided either free or heavily subsidised 
as welfare goods. However, due to the low rent policy, rising costs, and a growing 
housing stock, housing management became unsustainable and physical 
deterioration, especially of the older stock, became widespread (Wang 1995, Wang 
and Murie, 1996; Lee, 1988).
Under the socialist system the construction of new urban housing was planned in 
relation to social need and was mainly supplied by the state, or by state owned 
enterprises and institution. Work units, who produced housing, did so through direct 
financial allocation from the state, instigated through central and local economic 
planning. However housing was viewed as an unproductive welfare good, therefore 
under the economic principle of 'production first', and ‘consumption’ a distant second, 
the Chinese state consistently under-invested in housing. This led to chronic
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housing shortages, and the problems of over-crowding plagued many cities (Wang, 
1995; Lee, 1988). During the Cultural Revolution (1966~1976) building construction 
dropped to an all time low, housing maintenance experienced great disorganisation, 
and much maintenance work was deferred (Wang, 1995). By this time, older 
residential areas generally shared the characteristics high population density, and 
poor housing quality. A vast number of previously single family houses came to be 
subdivided for multiple-family occupancy, or had to accommodate tremendous 
family expansion over a period of decades (Wu and He, 2005; Leaf, 1995).
Cities also devoted only limited resources to urban renewal. In practice urban 
development was not the focus of national development until 1978 when China 
adopted economic reforms. Most new construction took place in suburban rings on 
the outskirts of the city in the form of work unit compounds. During this time the 
investment capital had to mainly come from the financial budget of the government. 
Because of the general deficiency in capital for urban construction, urban renewal 
on the whole constrained to small-scaled initiatives. It was concerned mainly with 
replacing the worst quality housing stock, often structurally precarious buildings. 
The purpose of housing renewal was principally to replace poorer quality housing 
with improved housing, and wherever possible work units and the government were 
responsible for ensuring the on-site resettlement of residents whereby residents 
were settled back into rebuilt housing on original sites. Essentially, urban renewal 
had a welfare role and local governments and state work units were the key 
providers (He, 2004; Wu and He, 2005).
These physical problems of cities were however not associated with pronounced 
social problems. Socially egalitarian policies had reduced overall levels of social 
disparity and spatial segregation (White and Parish, 1984; Liu and Wu, 2006). 
Because there was limited residential mobility under the centrally planned system, 
community compositions often remained stable and neighbours were able to 
develop substantial social networks over time. Whyte and Parish (1984) found that 
Chinese cities - with minimal residential mobility, minimal differentiation in income or 
consumption, little opportunity for reward for individual striving and the frequent 
joining of work and residence - personal relations include much more mutual 
knowledge, involvement, and concern than reported for cities in most other societies 
(ibid: 354).
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1.5.2 Economic Transformations in China
The third Plenum of the 11th central committee of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) which took place in December 1978 marked a key milestone in the history of 
the People’s Republic of China. This occasion officially proclaimed the market- 
orientated reform and open-door policy which has since dramatically transformed 
the Chinese economy and society. In the subsequent “reform era”, the hard-line 
socialist ideology about class struggle and national industrialisation was not longer 
presented as a workable guiding principal for national growth. The ‘new order’ that 
was instigated under Deng Xiaoping placed a greater emphasis upon the goals of 
enhanced economic efficiency, rapid economic growth, and an increasing role for 
markets in the circulation of goods, services, capital and wage labour (Cannon, 
1995, cited in Olds, 1997:110).
Since then the central government has introduced various reform policies to 
gradually liberalise the highly centralised planned economic system. Yet this was a 
‘pragmatic’ and more ‘gradualist’ manner compared to the Eastern European 
experience. The goal was to move towards a “Chinese-style socialist market 
economic system” in which there will remain significant public ownership. 
Importantly, liberalisation of the economy was not accompanied by the shift towards 
political democracy. Thus China remains officially a socialist-state. Arguably, the 
state apparatus has been successful in its ability to maintain its grip over the united 
country, and to suppress attempts to destabilise its reform policies (Wang, 2004; Wu 
et al, 2007).
Notwithstanding this distinction, market reforms have had profound consequences 
for the organisation of the economy and society in cities. This included the 
introduction of private sector ownership and production, and of market mechanisms. 
In both cities and countryside, non-state economics such as village and town 
enterprises, joint ventures, private businesses were allowed to proliferate, and grew 
rapidly (World Bank, 1997). Various markets such as those for capital, labour, farm 
products, manufactured goods and raw materials have been forming since 
economic reforms started. There has been a profound expansion of the private 
sector alongside declining share of the public sector. With the Open Door policy, 
China’s economy was opened to the outside world. There has been gradual 
integration into the international economy, with globalisation driving the spread of
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western cultural forms and lifestyles (Wu, 2003). Industrial restructuring and 
dynamic take-off of the previously under-developed service sector further 
underpinned sustained rapid economic growth (Han, 2000; Wu and Li, 2006b).
1.5.3 Housing in the post-reform era (1988~ present)
Within this context, land and housing reforms became important catalysts for the 
new wave of urban renewal in Chinese cities after 1990 (He and Wu, 2005). 
Housing reform was a central component of economic reforms, and became a 
national issue after Deng Xiaoping's April 1980 landmark speech regarding the 
future of urban housing policy to central government leaders. The housing reform in 
China was gradual and evolutionary, beginning with various experiments in a few 
cities (Wang and Miroe, 1996). A key milestone for nation-wide implementation was 
the issuing of the “Plan for a Gradual Housing System Reform in Cities and Towns” 
in February 1988 (State Council, 1988).
Since then, successive central and local government policies were published to 
guide the housing reform process. Privatisation of public housing was one of the 
most important aspects, and involved the massive sale of better quality public 
housing sitting tenants at cost-price or subsidised prices. Beyond these the state 
promoted a commercialised housing provision system by non-state actors. Work 
units, and later, commercial real estate development companies were allowed to 
develop “commodity housing” (shangping fang) that could be put into the market for 
sale and profit (Wang and Murie, 1996; Ying and Zhang, 2007; Wu, 1996).
Land reforms were also initiated to create the foundations of a more efficient land 
market. While the state remained the owner of land, land reforms stipulated that the 
'use rights' of land could from then be sold, assigned and transferred to developers 
through the mechanism of “land leasing”. Local governments were made managers 
urban land and the land-leasing process in cities. These changes laid the foundation 
for private enterprises to acquire land from local government by paying certain land 
leasing charges (Wu et al, 2007). Following these, housing -  previously a welfare 
service in a planned economy - gradually became a consumable commodity 
circulating in a housing market, leading to increasing housing choice and residential 
mobility (Wang and Murie, 1996; Huang, 2003). The revalorisation of housing and 
the setting up of the land-market meant that property development became possible
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and prevailed across the country. Since 1998, a more or less market-based housing 
system had been established in China (Li, 2007).
Another critical development in policy during this time was the shift from a policy of 
community retention towards an acceptance of off-site relocation. In June 1991, the 
State Council of China issued an important regulation on urban housing demolition 
and relocation. While relocation policies would continue to evolve over the next two 
decades, the key implication is that it legitimised the off-site relocation of sitting 
occupants for the enactment of urban renewal, and released the enormous 
speculative potential of redevelopment, freeing up land for more lucrative uses. 
Thus, the relocation of existing residents became a central feature of urban 
(re)development in Chinese cities.
This brief overview does omit significant details and more recent developments, but 
it serves to contextualise some fundamental trends crucial for the present study. In 
sum, urban renewal in post-1990s China occurred alongside economic, land and 
housing reforms which instilled market mechanisms in to the development process. 
It also underlined a profound shift in the relative roles of the state and market in 
urban building provision. Property developers increasingly became prominent actors 
investing in and carrying out real estate production, with the government becoming 
a market-facilitator (Wu et al, 2007). Simultaneously, there has been a shift from 
community retention towards off-site relocation of residents. With these serving by 
way of background, the next section outlines the key themes of the study.
1.6 Themes of the study
1.6.1 Socio-economic transformations
In this thesis, housing renewal is examined within the context of a profound socio­
economic restructuring. According to David Ley (1980: 240) "an understanding of 
the emerging urban landscape requires a prior grasp of wide-ranging processes of 
change in society itself'. It is widely agreed that urban regeneration, the nature of 
housing markets and the formation of specific local governing arrangements need to 
be contextualised within deeper changes in the economy and society (DiGaetano 
and Strom, 2003; Smith and Williams, 1986; Grigsby et al 1987). Notably, the 
concept of “post-industrial city” describes how certain industrialised cities have been
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transformed in the shift from manufacturing-based towards service-producing 
society. These changes are said to underpin increasing demands for commercial 
land use, the re-orientation of urban space for consumption, and the refashioning of 
the city centre for a segment of the new middle class. Restructuring tends to 
fragment or divide society in a variety of ways. It has led to increasing social and 
economic disparities, symbolised by the simultaneous concentration of an 
executive-professional-managerial class and increasingly deprived and 
marginalised class in the same places (Ley, 1996, Sassen, 1991; Soja, 2000).
In many Chinese cities as a direct result of market reform and industrial 
restructuring, a widening of the socio-economic re-stratification of urban society can 
be observed (Li and Wu, 2006). Another major change in the social profile of 
Chinese cities has been the intensification of rural-urban migration. Linder Mao, the 
system of residential registration and strict central planning meant that the Chinese 
social structure has seen a division between rural and urban population for many 
years. The reforms loosened previous institutional constrains regarding population 
movement and gave the rural population greater freedom and incentive to migrate 
into the city. Urban societies became more unequal, with rising affluence yet 
emerging problems of poverty (Wang, 2000, 2004). The distribution of interests and 
outcomes of housing renewal need to be examined in light of these deepening 
cleavages.
1.6.2 Local state as mediator and entrepreneur
Nevertheless, socio-economic processes do not in themselves drive housing 
renewal. This thesis pays attention to the complex role of the local government in 
creating policies and partnering with different actors to deliver housing renewal. 
Fulong Wu (2007:15) recently argued that post-reform China has been moving 
towards a very ‘advanced’ stage of capitalist development. Alongside a series of 
institutional reforms, local governments have gained greater fiscal autonomy and 
the capacity to retain a greater share of locally-generated revenues. It has become 
important managers of urban land, and has been entrusted with more discretionary 
powers of urban planning. Thus, the local government came to assume a key role in 
creating conditions for local economic development (Wu et al, 2007).
The concept of “entrepreneurial” urban governance (Harvey, 1989) which originates
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from advanced capitalist economies has been adopted to conceptualise the local 
state as a driving actor within China’s urban growth coalition (Wu, 2007; He and Wu, 
2005; Wu et al, 2007). A familiar idea here is that local governments have become 
more autonomous and directly engaged in economic development, whilst shifting 
away from its traditional role of service and welfare provision (Harvey, 1989). 
Entrepreneurial local governments seek to enhance a city’s structural 
competitiveness and actively organise and promote the city as a site for capturing 
mobile capital, often through an array of partnerships with the private sector (Hall 
and Hubbard, 1998; Jessop, 1996). Whether or not this characterisation of the local 
state encapsulates Shanghai’s experience over the last two decades will be 
scrutinised, through a review of Shanghai’s evolving housing policies and case 
studies of a range of housing renewal projects.
1.6.3 The growth coalition in cities
The dynamics of co-operation between the local government and private sector is 
said to influence the orientation, scope and content of urban development (Stone 
1993: 15-16). Logan and Molotch (1987: 13) emphasised in particular the role of 
land-based interests and argue that property speculators, development 
professionals, financiers and the local government are the key drivers of urban 
(re)development. United by the collective quest to maximise exchange values 
through intensifying land-use, this informal coalition can shape local agendas, 
mobilise resources and implement their visions, even if this excludes or comes into 
conflict with some members of local community.
This study outlines the existence and operations of the real-estate based growth 
coalition in Shanghai. It highlights pervasive formal as well as informal links and 
synergies between the public and private actors in housing renewal, which has 
sustained effective partnerships in project implementation. To advance this reading 
however, it emphasises that the key real estate actors in the city are not a 
homogenous group and can exhibit contrasting behaviours. The composition of 
actors within the overall coalition and their inter-relations reflect ambiguities in the 
process of post-socialist privatisation, which accounts for the variety of housing 
renewal processes and outcomes that can be found in Shanghai over the last two 
decades.
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1.6.4 The conditions of old neighbourhoods
Given the background of social divisions and diverging requirements for housing, 
this study is also about the paradox between old, run-down housing as a liability for 
cities, and as an indispensable resource for the poor. It provides a view of the living 
conditions of dilapidated housing both from official housing data and from the 
perspective of residents. The politics of housing renewal can be analysed in terms 
of a duality between ‘exchange value’ and the ‘use’ value of urban land and 
properties, claimed by competing interests (Logan and Molotch, 1987). While the 
interests of the growth coalition are in maximising and extracting exchange value 
from places, for urban residents it is the physical, social and sentimental “use value” 
of places that residents seek to defend. These values derive firstly from 
neighbourhoods as a focal point meeting one’s everyday survival needs. 
Neighbourhoods are also a potential source of a network of people who provide life- 
sustaining support, services or products. Emotional sentiment and practical, 
material purposes or needs tend to be closely intertwined in people’s experience of 
buildings and locations (Logan and Molotch: Chapter 4).
In the context of market reform, deteriorated old housing in Shanghai increasingly 
concentrated disadvantaged groups such as the poor, the unemployed, the elderly 
and rural migrants. These areas have become newly emergent ‘neighbourhoods of 
poverty1 in the urban landscape (Liu and Wu, 2006; Wang, 2004). Although various 
forms of deprivation constitute tangible ‘problems’ prompting government action, the 
study also pays attention to residents’ complex ties to their homes and 
neighbourhoods, how public and private interventions affect these ties, and the 
effect of housing renewal on original residents’ opportunities and everyday use 
demands.
One of the most important aspects of local state intervention in recent years has 
been its power of eminent domain to enforce relocation of existing uses and users. 
The relative exclusion of local communities from these decisions is common 
knowledge in China. Yet, the reading of neighbourhood politics is complicated. 
Residents themselves aspire towards social and economic wellbeing and support 
renewal processes that compromise existing use value relations when they are well- 
placed to benefit from the intensification of use. Local governments have the 
resources to mediate these interests to co-opt the peaceful co-operation of
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residents in the development process. How this works in the city rebuilding process 
is a crucial part of China’s recent growth politics.
1.6.5 Counter-dynamics to the growth-coalition
Sources of opposition to growth-coalitions are an important theme in urban studies, 
though until recently still poorly understood in China. In liberal democracies, the 
local state is subject to pressures from a variety of sources within local society, 
including capital and labour, political grass-roots groups and the voting public, all of 
who place competing demands on the local state (Logan et al, 1997; Fainstein, 
1987; Mollenkopf, 1983). Therefore local resistance to the negative impacts of the 
growth machine may emerge to demand concessions from the local government. In 
the west, numerous governments have been pressured to discontinue or modify 
their respective urban renewal programmes amid widespread urban protest and 
neighbourhood discontent regarding the destabilising effects on communities and 
toll on historical characters of places (Teaford, 2000; Gibson and Langstaff, 1982).
Given that China lacks a political framework for popular pressure to officially operate, 
this thesis highlights the prevailing view that communities are an excluded voice in 
urban politics and that growth-coalitions have so far encountered little resistance. 
On the other hand, counter dynamics to the prevailing forces of top-down planning 
have emerged. Grassroots resistance against demolition and an emerging market 
for the private acquisition and upgrading of historic housing both complicate the 
commonly held, but simplistic reading of urban change being ‘controlled’ by 
economic and political elites. These demand a more dynamic conception of urban 
politics than commonly adopted.
1.7 Structure of the thesis
Following this introductory chapter, which sets out the research problem and themes 
of the thesis, Chapter 2 provides a literature review and analytical framework. The 
Chinese growth coalition perspective is used as an analytical starting point for the 
study. The chapter explains its intellectual roots in western political theories, situates 
it against other theoretical approaches, and critically evaluates its key claims.
Chapter 3 explains the methodology of the study. This research was based on a
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mixed-methods approach, embedded within a broader analysis of the socio­
economic, political and housing context in Shanghai. Interviews with local officials, 
property developers, planning professionals and local residents were primary 
sources of data. This was supported by three in-depth case studies of contrasting 
housing renewal projects, and a variety of secondary sources and personal 
observations.
Chapter 4 examines Shanghai’s shifting urban context and provides an overview of 
the policy and practice of housing renewal in this city. It contextualises Shanghai’s 
housing problems in a historical perspective and provides an overview of the 
government’s responses towards housing renewal amidst complex institutional, 
economic and social changes in the post-reform era. It also presents the key 
measureable impacts of housing renewal over the last two decades.
Chapters 5 to 7 examine the processes of housing renewal in three inner-city 
neighbourhoods in Shanghai: Taipingqiao area, Fukangli and Taikang Road. They 
examine the pre-renewal conditions, the policy measures at work, the role and inter­
relations of different actors in the renewal process, and the impact of their 
interventions. The areas are typical of old neighbourhoods targeted for renewal in 
China. They occupy convenient locations in downtown Shanghai, comprised 
predominantly municipal public housing, and were all characterised by the most 
common historic housing type in Shanghai: the shikumen lilong. Physical decay, 
over-crowding and deficient amenities were common features, yet assets such as 
social networks, accessibility and affordability constituted their lingering use value. 
The case studies were chosen specifically to reflect upon a range of housing 
renewal scenarios in post-reform Shanghai. They were underlined by somewhat 
different agendas, they ranged from small-scale to large-scale interventions, 
involved different developers, exhibited different physical outcomes (from 
rehabilitation to redevelopment), and were associated with different degrees of 
resident relocation (displacement).
Chapter 5 analyses one of the largest housing redevelopment projects in 
Shanghai’s history - the redevelopment of Taipingqiao area. Here, a run-down 
residential neighbourhood was transformed into a new mixed-use district comprising 
commercial office buildings, luxury housing and elite consumption and recreational 
facilities. Its process demonstrates some of the key features of how China’s urban
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redevelopment operates since the early 1990s. The findings support the prevailing 
claim that urban redevelopment was dominated by a coalition of pro-business local 
government and powerful real estate actors for the purpose of promoting economic 
growth and capital accumulation. Involving displacement as a central strategy, the 
growth coalition has politically and spatially excluded large segments of local 
communities.
Chapter 6 examines New Fukangli - a residential redevelopment project that 
achieved a certain balance between community retention and market-oriented 
renewal. It sheds light on how in some instances the growth coalition acts to include 
the interests of local residents, and of the important role of the local government as 
a mediator between private wealth accumulation and residents’ interests. The study 
suggests the need to adopt a more nuanced reading of the local government as an 
actor, and to recognise the role of different real estate developers in urban renewal.
Although demolition has been the predominant mode of urban renewal since the 
1990s, selective revitalisation of historic buildings and neighbourhoods became a 
more apparent complementary concern of the local government by the early 2000s. 
Chapter 7 examines the rehabilitation of Taikang Road Tianzifang neighbourhood -  
one of the most renowned cases of ‘bottom-up’ housing conservation in China. The 
findings highlight the emerging role of some grass-roots actors in driving 
neighbourhood upgrading and gentrification, whose combined efforts can influence 
planning decisions and trigger a neighbourhood conservation movement. The study 
sheds light on the possibility of ‘counter-dynamics’ to top-down planning and 
redevelopment, and considers its social consequences.
Chapter 8 offers a comprehensive overview and analysis of the empirical material 
discussed in chapters 4 to 7. Cross-cutting the contrasting case studies helps 
provide a more holistic understanding of the policy decisions, agency dynamics, and 
outcomes of housing renewal in post-reform Shanghai. A number of key themes are 
drawn out: the urban context and the conditions of old neighbourhoods, the role of 
local government, the collaborative relations between public sector and private 
sector elites, the political exclusion of residents versus their ability to derive 
selective distribution of benefits, and the possibility and implications of resistance to 
the growth-coalition.
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Chapter 9 concludes the thesis. It argues the policy and practice of housing renewal 
in post-1990 Shanghai has been more multi-faceted than acknowledged. Despite 
capturing some essential institutional features, the Chinese growth coalition 
perspective does not adequately capture the diversity of socio-political 
arrangements underlying different aspects of housing renewal. A less monolithic 
perspective of the growth coalition and the local state as an actor is suggested as a 
way forward. Finally, this chapter identifies issues for future research and discusses 
several policy options regarding the on-going task of housing renewal in China.
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2 Analysing Housing Renewal in China: A Literature
Review
2.1 Introduction
As stated by Unger and Chan (1995: 29), observers of China are faced with the 
challenge of understanding a system in profound transition, and it is difficult to 
analytically frame what is occurring at the present. Yet, over the last decade or so, 
substantial progress has been made in making sense of urban China. Consequently, 
our understanding has been substantially improved. This chapter provides a review 
of literature to contextualise and guide the present research. Its primary aim is to 
situate and outline the Chinese growth coalition perspective, its intellectual claims, 
and to provide a critical evaluation of its usefulness for understanding housing 
renewal in post-1990 Shanghai.
The chapter begins by outlining what is involved in urban housing renewal, and 
some well-established insights from the policy and practices of industrialised nations. 
Major socio-economic drivers that are seen to underpin contemporary urban 
renewal/ revitalisation are then reviewed in section three. Section four reviews a 
range of theoretical perspectives regarding how institutions and politics mediate 
urban development. The Chinese growth coalition perspective, which derives from 
some of these insights, is examined in detail in section five. Limitations of this 
perspective and its core assumptions are drawn out. The final section provides a 
summary which serves as a framework for this research.
2.2 What is housing renewal?
2.2.1 The purpose of urban and housing renewal
Urban renewal is a multi-faceted phenomenon, and is not uniform in approach or 
policy (Nelissen, 1982; Gibson and Langstaff, 1982). In many parts of the world 
systematic efforts have been made to upgrade parts of the urban fabric, ranging 
from individual buildings, to whole neighbourhoods, to entire districts. The process 
takes place in a particular constellation of conditions determined by the institutional, 
economic, social, cultural and geographical context (Couch et al., 2003).
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Nevertheless, there are some recurring features in the ways in which similar 
problems are dealt with in different countries. Urban renewal is generally an activity 
directed at specific urban areas which do not function well in some respect. They 
may be characterised by physical degradation, devaluation, marginalisation, 
exclusion or population abandonment. For much of the immediate post-war period, 
housing renewal efforts were concentrated in older neighbourhoods in city centres.
Uban renewal is an activity that is often organised by public authorities within a 
policy and administrative framework. In this framework government agencies are 
charged with the task of directing and taking decisions regarding this process in 
pursuit of general or group interests. However, the processes and objectives can 
rarely be realised without the contribution of other actors, such as from the privates 
sector, communities or civil society. The co-ordination and interdependence 
between the actors is a central aspect of processes of urban renewal (Fainstein et 
al, 1986; Mollenkopf, 1983; Nellissen, 1982).
The goals of urban renewal can be diverse. There is usually a physical focus 
concerning improvement of the housing stock and the urban environment, and 
efforts at upgrading the urban infrastructure. Historic conservation is now also an 
accepted part of urban planning and urban regeneration in most developed 
countries - a reflection of the widespread interest in aspects of the past, and how it 
is viewed, used and changed (Larkham, 1996). It is a broader concept than 
“preservation”, concerned with maintaining a balance between development and 
protection, between “continuity” and “change”. There is as much concern for 
restrictive protection as there is for appropriate adaptation, re-use and upgrading 
(Litchfield 1988; Tiesdell et al, 1996).
Deepened understanding regarding the multi-dimensional causes of urban decay 
has led to greater attention to the underlying problems of poverty and social 
deprivation. Alongside physical interventions, there may be a series of measures 
designed to enhance the socio-economic characteristics of the population or area, 
to enhance the social cohesion of the neighbourhood, and efforts to empower local 
communities and businesses (Gibson and Langstaff, 1982; Lupton, 2003). In 
addition, renewal programmes are sometimes influenced by other objectives which 
are less clearly officially explicated, such as attracting the return of the well-to-do to 
the core areas; improvement of the tax base in order to increase local revenues;
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and the stimulation of large construction corporations to promote real estate 
investment (Nellissen, 1982; Fainstein etal, 1986).
2.2.2 Slum clearance/redevelopment
The current stage of urban renewal in China echoes the approach that was 
common-place from the 1940s up to the 1970s, where clearance and reconstruction 
were the mainstays of urban renewal. Historic conservation was until then still 
limited to a concern for historical monuments, and buildings of special importance, 
such as castles, palaces, churches, museums and other significant public buildings 
(Larkham, 1996; Steinberg, 1996). Thus it is instructive to review well-established 
insights from this period of interventions.
In the U.S and many other western European countries urban renewal at the time 
usually entailed a systematic demolition of old, poorly maintained districts regarded 
as slums. Physical degradation, poor amenities and over-crowded living conditions 
were seen as major problems in terms of public health, and a reflection of market 
failures in fulfilling housing need. Governments justified and secured land and 
housing for redevelopment on the basis of them falling below certain defined 
standards of quality. They provided a source of subsidised, cleared land for private 
development to take place, and in addition a range of other substantial supports in 
the form of tax concessions, relaxation of regulations, and public investments in 
infrastructure (Teaford, 2000; Fainstein et al, 1986). The stripped sites were rebuilt 
in accordance with functionalist views of modern urban planning, often involving 
relocation of existing residents into suburban public housing estates. Existing 
affordable units were often never replaced, and housing for higher-income groups, 
ofFice buildings, shopping centres, and other public facilities often became key 
outputs (Gibson and Langstaff, 1982; Keating and Krumholtz, 1999).
Long-standing debates about this form of redevelopment concerns the equity of its 
outcomes and a range of potential negative effects associated with forced relocation 
of residents (e.g. Hartman, 1964; Gans, 1962; Wilmott and Young, 1957). There has 
been some evidence that positive relocation outcomes can be achieved if adequate 
level of compensation and re-housings support are provided. Residents may be 
pleased to leave behind environments characterised by physical decay, 
dysfunctional relationships or lack of safety. They may gain better housing
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opportunities, move to higher quality neighbourhoods with less social or economic 
problems, and find better job prospects (Popkin and Cunningham, 2002; Smith et al, 
2002; Boston, 2005).
Nevertheless these outcomes often failed to materialise, and relocation had 
substantial negative impacts especially for the poor and minorities. Urban renewal 
demolished large number of affordable units that were never replaced and 
numerous households ended up in other poor quality housing (Hartman, 1964, 
1971). It decanted many more residents to peripheral areas that were more 
disconnected and under-developed than the original neighbourhoods. This has 
resulted in decreased access to services and employment (Keating and Krumholtz, 
1999; Baker, 2008).
The loss of a home had other long-lasting psychological impacts (Fried, 1963), 
because the home is in particular a place of great significance with which people 
can develop strong emotional relations (Proshansky et al, 1983; Tuan, 1975). 
Relocation also led to the destruction of existing social relations. A key insight was 
that existing networks of familiar people, friends and neighbours play an important 
role in the residents mutual support for one another - be it child-minding, transport, 
or through fostering a 'friendly' environment in which to live. Households relied on 
these sources of ‘social capital' to deal with the stresses of life in deprived housing 
and neighbourhoods (Gans, 1962; Wilmott and Young, 1957; Clampet-Lundquist, 
2004). Indeed, the isolation of relocated communities sometimes meant that they 
again became the locus of physical decay, social and economic problems (Keating 
and Krumholtz, 1999; Power, 1999).
2.2.3 Rehabilitation and gentrification
By the 1970s most industrialised nations shifted to a policy of rehabilitation, in view 
of the high financial and social costs of demolition and rebuilding. Growing distaste 
with redevelopment also led to heightened concern to enlarge the conservation of 
older neighbourhoods. Various programmes have since been initiated to improve 
housing and stabilise neighbourhoods. Measures to encourage and accelerate 
private sector investment for rehabilitating the existing housing stock included the 
provision of improvement grants for private house owners and improvement 
subsidies for public housing authorities (Balchin et al, 2002). Alongside these, many
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countries also developed more ‘holistic’ policy programmes aiming to address the 
perceived social roots and symptoms of housing decline including poverty and 
social deprivation (Carley, 1990; Lupton, 2003). These became by nature 
characterised by a more selective, area-based improvement projects, often 
involving investment in community and economic regeneration (Power, 1993; 
Keating and Krumholtz, 1999).
Many authors acknowledge that historic conservation as well as heritage has played 
an increasingly important role in the regeneration of cities (Pendlebury, 2001; 
Pearce, 1994). Heritage is recognised as one determinant of the individual 
character of places, and therefore a real source of differentiation. The marketing of 
the local built cultural heritage as a part of local distinctiveness and aesthetic 
qualities has thus become an important strategy for local development (Pearce
1994). The conserved, enhanced or recreated events, personalities, associations 
and surviving structures are also resources supporting the existence of a large 
heritage industry (Hewison, 1987).
In the developed countries, the practice of conservation has since the 1960s 
extended into area-based strategies dealing with groups of buildings, townscapes 
and the spaces between buildings rather than only on individual monuments and 
buildings. Usually the management of a historic conservation area will require the 
formulation and implementation of some form of plan mechanism and legislative 
framework as a basis for development control and to guide future development. 
Constraints are establishment in the ways in which the fabric should be treated 
during its remaining life cycle, to maintain a context that supports the composite 
value of historic buildings and areas. In addition to these, plan implementation may 
be augmented by other positive and active measures for physical enhancement and 
restoration (Larkham, 1996; Tiesdall et al, 1996).
However, policies supporting historic conservation and rehabilitation have been 
linked to gentrification -  traditionally defined as ‘"the rehabilitation of working-class 
and derelict housing and the consequent transformation of an area into a middle- 
class neighbourhood” (Smith and Williams 1986: 1). This complex process typically 
involves physical improvement of the housing stock, housing tenure changes from 
renting to owning, price rises and the displacement or replacement of the working- 
class population by the new middle class (Hamnett, 1991). Once an unexpected
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and quaint process occurring in a few cities, it has now become a prominent facet of 
urban regeneration internationally (Atkinson and Bridge, 2005).
Many governments to some extent support gentrification as a desirable revitalisation 
process. Commentators such as Neil Smith (2002: 2) has pointed out that there has 
since been a “generalisation of gentrification” in the urban landscape and in policy 
discourse, accepting it as the solution to regenerating declining inner city 
neighbourhoods. However, its social consequences have been controversial given 
the plight of low-income groups displaced from the gentrifying areas or marginalised 
amidst apparent revitalisation.
Displacement occurs when “any household is forced to move from its residence by 
conditions which affect the dwelling or its immediate surroundings, and which: 1. are 
beyond the household’s reasonable ability to control or prevent; 2. occur despite the 
household’s having met all previously imposed conditions of occupancy; and 3. 
make continued occupancy by that household impossible, hazardous, or 
unaffordable (Grier and Grier, 1978: 8, cited in Atkinson, 2001). It tends to take 
place when affluent groups create inflated prices that push out original, poorer 
residents over time (Marcuse, 1986), or when landlords seek to secure vacant 
possession (Atkinson, 2001). Affordable housing is lost and neighbourhoods 
become off-limits to the poorer segments of society. Private renters are usually the 
most vulnerable in the process due to their lack of tenure stability (Newman and 
Wyly, 2006). In extreme cases, market-led gentrification in the U.S has been found 
to produce overt resentment, racial and class conflict (Legates and Hartman, 1986: 
196).
Since the 1980s, definitions of gentrification have been broadened beyond the initial, 
more specific, to include redevelopment. Leading gentrification researchers have 
argued that all forms of housing renewal involving displacement, ‘class 
transformation’ towards higher socio-economic status, and concurrent processes 
such as restructuring of urban land use towards commerce and consumption 
denotes gentrification. These phenomena broadly reflect a profound economic, 
social and spatial restructuring process affecting cities (Ley, 1996; Smith and 
Williams, 1986; Hackworth, 2001).
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2.3 Socio-economic drivers:
While the last section provided a brief overview of what is entailed in housing 
renewal, the following sections outlines key perspectives regarding its driving forces. 
According to David Ley (1980: 240) "an understanding of the emerging urban 
landscape requires a prior grasp of wide-ranging processes of change in society 
itself'. There is now widespread agreement that any analysis of urban or housing 
renewal should be placed in the relevant socio-economic context. It is understood 
that macro-factors such as population and the structure of the economy and society 
have an impact on the demand for real estate, household preferences, and also the 
social-disparities that underlie patterns of segregation (Glennester et al 1999; 
Lupton 2003; Grigsby et al 1987). Market position and economic health also to 
some extent constrain the policy options available to national and urban 
governments (Kantor et al., 1997).
Considerable literature focusing on the uneven patterns of urban revitalisation cities 
since the 1970s has pointed out that they took place in the context of profound 
economic restructuring in the global system. Notably, the concept of “post-industrial 
city” describes how certain industrialised cities have been transformed in the shift 
from manufacturing-based towards service-producing society. Within the late 
capitalist development there has been a long-term shift from manufacturing towards 
services, involving the decline of manufacturing industry and the rise of office work. 
Restructuring has lead to large scale unemployment due to the decline or exodus of 
traditional manufacturing jobs from established industrial centres (Lupton, 2003; 
Wilson, 1996). Meanwhile, in cities that have been successful in the economic 
transition, economic development could be harnessed as capital investment shifted 
to new sectors of the economy such as consumer services, real estate, information 
technologies, business and finance (Ley, 1996; Sassen, 1991).
This post-industrial transition is said to underpin increasing demands for commercial 
land use, the re-orientation of urban space for consumption, and the refashioning of 
the city centre for a segment of the new middle class. Changes in the structure of 
the economy drove changes in the spatial structure and the built environment. For 
example, the shift from manufacturing towards services expanded demand for 
centralised downtown commercial and office spaces and constituted important 
forces influencing the fortunes of cities (Macuse, 1986; Smith and Williams, 1986; 
Sassen, 1991; Ley, 1996). Post-industrial transition also brought about marked
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changes in the occupational class structure and household income structure cities. 
It has led to increasing social and economic disparities, underpinned by growth of 
managerial, professional and technical personnel, as well as simultaneous 
concentrations of low- or unskilled service workers (Ley 1996, Sassen, 1991; Soja, 
2000). These processes have had important implications for property markets. As 
the proportion of high-paid workers expand, and city-centre property markets 
become more internationalised, those with weaker purchasing power eventually 
give way to commercial developments and higher income housing. These 
trajectories are said to in turn underpin the refashioning of the city centre as a site 
for business, consumption and middle-class living - the gentrification of numerous 
industrialised cities (Ley, 1996; Marcuse; 1986; Smith and Williams, 1986).
2.4 Theories of urban politics
While the socio-economic context provides general drivers and/or constraints for 
urban development, institutions and political factors are also crucial mediating 
factors. Central and local government agencies, property development and 
community sectors for example all constitute actors who make decisions, interact, 
and carry forth specific interventions in the built environment. Thus, socio-economic 
and institutional factors are usually considered in tandem when analysing urban 
renewal (e.g Feagin, 1984; Fainstein etal, 1986; Savitch, 1988).
There are various theoretical perspectives with which to make sense of political and 
institutional dynamics shaping cities. Different perspectives make different 
assumptions and forward different claims. For the purposes of this study, this 
section reviews several influential perspectives -  namely the liberal, pluralist, state- 
centred and Marxist perspectives. It also reviews several more recent theories of 
urban governance including the entrepreneurial city, urban regime, and the urban 
growth machine theories. Table 2.1 overleaf summarises these perspectives and 
makes clear their distinctions. This more general overview will provide a basis for a 
critical examination of the Chinese growth coalition perspective, which will be the 
subject in the subsequent sections.
48
Table 2.1: Key theoretical perspectives of urban development
Key claims of the perspective
Liberal perspective
(e.g. Peterson, 1981)
Underlines a faith in free-markets. Society is viewed as made up of individuals, 
and seen to have a common interest in growth. As competitors in the market 
economy, local states are compelled to make policies that enhance the 
economic position of the city as a whole. Both markets and government 
intervention are assumed to be 'neutral' institutions. The economic growth 
pursued by governments benefits all residents.
Statist perspective
(e.g. Gurr and King, 
1987)
In direct contrast to the free-market perspective, urban changes are assumed to 
be state-led, in accordance with its ideologies. The state plays a progressive role 
in society and yields strong power to plan and direct urban development. By 
social consensus or coercion, the private sector will follow and fit into the 
master-planning frameworks that are prepared by the state in implementation.
Pluralist perspective
(e.g. Dahl, 1961)
This perspective rejects the view that any one group in society monopolises 
power and dominates urban politics. Under the liberal democratic system, the 
state is seen to be responsive to varied popular interests. Relatively numerous 
and legitimate interests could organise, gain entry to the political system, have 
their concerns heard, and can impact upon policy outcomes.
Structuralist 
perspective (e.g. 
Fainstein et al, 1986; 
Castells, 1977)
Rejects the assumption of a neutrally operating market as well as a neutral 
political system. Urban development is seen to be socially and spatially unequal 
under capitalism, engendering class conflict. The aim of state intervention is to 
ensure the reproduction of the economy and society by managing these 
tensions. It tends to favour the capitalist class due to the necessity of 
maintaining capital accumulation. At the same time the state possesses some 
autonomy to develop institutions and programmes to ameliorate class conflict 
and to address the demands of the subordinate working class.
Instrumentalist 
perspective (e.g. 
Gordon, 1976)
Also emphasises the uneven and socially conflictive nature of capitalist system 
that constrain local politics. State policies are integral to the functionality of 
capital accumulation. The state has limited autonomy from the capitalist class, 
who yield crucial productive resources. Through its policies the state always acts 
to maintain and extend the interests of the dominant class.
Urban regime (Stone, 
1989, 1993)
Local politicians are capable of making a range of policy choices, but structural 
constraints of capitalism and democracy mean that they need to form alliances 
with powerful non-state actors to achieve their goals. Local policies are thus 
influenced by the composition of the local governing regime -  informal 
coalitions of public and non-private elites who work together to make urban key 
decisions and implement policies. Elite local businesses are most likely to 
become long-term partners of the local government and to play a prominent 
role in shaping a pro-business rather than socially progressive urban agenda.
Urban growth 
machine (Logan and 
Molotch, 1987; 
Molotch, 1976)
The search for financial gain from intensifying land uses (and creating 'exchange 
value) by elite businesses and institutions drives urban development. Urban 
'growth machines' - informal coalitions comprising predominantly of property 
owners, development professionals and financiers - form around a shared 
commitment to growth -  and can shape local government policies. However 
their actions may conflict with those residents wishing to protect the 'use value' 
of places, who may organise themselves to counter the growth-coalition in the 
form of neighbourhood and environmental groups.
Entrepreneurial City
(e.g. Harvey, 1989; 
Hall and Hubbard, 
1998)
In the context globalisation and heightened inter-urban competition, urban 
governments have become more autonomous and directly engaged in 
economic development, whilst shifting away from its traditional role of service 
and welfare provision. The city government acts like an 'entrepreneur', taking 
risks and forming partnerships with the private sector to enhance a city's 
structural competitiveness as a site for capturing mobile capital and skilled 
labour.
Source: author’s review
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2.4.1 Liberal perspective
Liberal or neoliberal ideas stress the value of market autonomy, embracing the 
policies of privatisation and the reduction of state regulation of markets. It 
conceptualises a clear distinction of boundaries between state and market, seeing 
them in ideal-type terms as characterised by distinct logics (Francis, 2001). In this 
view, society is made up of individuals, and individual choice and rationality operate 
as an effective basis for the allocation of resources and decisions regarding public 
affairs. Both markets and government intervention are assumed to be ‘neutral’ 
institutions (Leitner, 1990). Peterson (1981) argues that as competitors in the 
market economy, local states are compelled to make policies that enhance the 
economic position of the city as a whole. Since cities compete for investment and 
tax-paying residents, they generally show little concern for redistribution, because of 
a need to retain those who contribute most to the local revenue base. He argues 
that all individuals share an interest in growth and that growth benefits all residents.
2.4.2 Pluralist perspective
While the liberal perspective assumes that cities develop under a market-oriented 
growth rationale, it downplays the significance of political processes and decision 
making. Exemplified by the work of Dahl (1961), the pluralist perspective posits 
instead that in the democratic system, the state is responsive to varied popular 
interests. It rejects the view that any one group in society monopolises power and 
dominates urban politics. Rather, relatively numerous and legitimate interests can 
organise themselves, gain entry to the political system, have their concerns heard, 
and can impact upon policy outcomes.
2.4.3 Statist perspectives
In contrast to the free-market and pluralist perspectives, the statist perspective 
assumes that urban changes are state-led. One traditional view, the redistributive 
state, assumes that the state plays progressive role in society and that it yields 
strong powers to plan and direct urban development (Gurr and King, 1987; 
Fainstein and Campbell, 1996). According to Savitch (1988: 7), an autonomous 
state can "exercise great discretion in what is built, how it is built, and who are the 
likely beneficiaries". It is capable of rational and efficient planning rather than acting
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as an instrument for sustaining capitalist interests.
Another variant of state-centred theory is the developmental state (Johnson, 1982, 
1999). The concept derives from the Japanese state, which used financial 
instruments and made strategic alliances with big conglomerate business to foster 
growth and to catch up with industrialised nations. According to Johnson (1982: 
317-9), the developmental nation state performs the task of protecting or nurturing 
vulnerable domestic industries and puts aside short-term market profitability to 
pursue long-term optimisation of industrial structures. Rather than trying to 
command the economy, developmental states use ‘market conforming methods of 
state intervention’, flexible ‘administrative guidance’ and long-range planning to 
stimulate economic growth. This view of the state has been applicable in particular 
to various other East Asian countries including South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore 
(Johnson, 1999).
2.4.4 Marxist perspectives
Marxist political economy offers yet another contrasting perspective. This is a 
voluminous body of work and does involve considerable variety. Nevertheless the 
common point of departure is that they reject the assumptions of a neutrally 
operating market or a neutral political system. Instead, they highlight the socially 
uneven nature of economic and urban development. A key assertion is that the 
capitalist mode of production engenders class conflicts because it is an exploitative 
process allowing the accumulation of capital by a capitalist class at the expense of 
the working class.
In this view, state policies are integral to the functionality of capital accumulation. 
The state plays two indispensable roles -  one to provide the general conditions 
necessary for production (such as a legal system, a monetary system and a healthy 
labour force), and the second to maintain social order by the creation of institutions 
to maintain legitimacy and contain social conflict (Pickvance, 1995). The term 
“accumulation function” and “legitimation function” were introduced by O’Conner 
(1973) to refer to these distinct, but linked, sets of actions carried out by the state. 
Because in a capitalist system the private sector effectively controls production of 
most goods and services, the state is placed in a position of having to facilitate 
accumulation in order to advance the material development of the city and the urban
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economy. This systemic bias tends to favour the interests of the dominant groups. In 
this view, “The state is no longer seen to choose freely between policy alternatives 
on the basis of rational judgment; it chooses policies in the light of the major 
constraints on its action” (Gilbert and Ward, 1985: 3).
Beyond these basic claims about the state however, there Marxist scholars have 
been divided in their conceptions of urban politics. One influential variant, the 
“instrumentalist” perspective see the state as an instrument used in the general 
interests of the dominant (elite) class of capitalists. The state is considered a unified 
entity across different levels, and has limited autonomy from the dominant class. 
Through its policies the state always acts to ensure that the interests of the 
dominant class is maintained and extended. These tendencies are so strong that 
political factors such as party politics cannot change its basic shape (Pickvance,
1995). For example, Gordon (1976) attributed the state a minimal role in the sense 
that state policies tend to merely reproduce the structure of the ‘corporate city*.
By contrast, the “structuralist” perspective asserts that the state maintains a certain 
degree of autonomy from the dominant class in order to create social order and to 
reconcile national and local class interests. A key writer of this perspective is 
Castells (1977). In this view, the capitalist class is favoured but does not necessarily 
dominate the state apparatus. The state can theoretically establish public priorities, 
enlist resources to realise its own objectives, and to curtail private profit. It can act 
against the clearly defined interest of the dominant groups and address the 
demands of the working class, albeit under constant pressure from various interest 
groups. As such, state institutions become an important object of study due to their 
role in reconciling conflicting pressures in society (Pickvance, 1995).
Marxian interpretations have had considerable influence in the analyses of post-war 
urban renewal by drawing attention to and attempting to explain its uneven social 
consequences. For example, Susan Fainstein and her colleagues (1986: 252) 
argued that the objective of the state in urban renewal has been “to facilitate 
accumulation... to implement programmes which produce new investment in the 
built environment capable of generating private profit and of expanding the market 
value of real estate”. But they also accepted that pressure group activism, social 
movements, and social conflict can affect or indirectly alter the behaviour and 
policies of the state (ibid: 257).
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The deterministic nature of Marxist assertions has nevertheless been criticised. 
Despite its claim that states face similar pressures under capitalism which inevitably 
lead to similar outcomes, urban scholars pointed out that state responses to 
housing, planning and servicing vary markedly both geographically and temporally. 
For example, policy formulation, implementation and the rules that govern public 
administration will differ between “bureaucratic authoritarian” and “populist” 
governments (Gilbert and Ward, 1985). Marxist perspectives thus fail to account for 
variations in policies and practices across nations, cities, or over time (see 
Mollenkopf and Strom, 2007; DiGaetano and Strom, 2003). A more contextually 
sensitive approach developed since acknowledges that there are different kinds of 
capitalism and political arrangements which treat their populations and built 
environments differently. These are conditioned by political, social and cultural 
conditions, rather than only economic forces (Savitch, 1988: 7).
Furthermore, many urban scholars asserted that urban politics and urban 
governance also matter. National politics and structural forces of the economy form 
an overarching set of conditions and constraints, but cities themselves make certain 
policy choices - such as between community preservation or downtown office 
development, or the choice between job creation and environmental quality (Savitch, 
1988; Stone and Sanders, 1989). Urban political systems can be understood in 
terms of who the main actors are and how power is combined between them. Major 
actors in cities include politicians, technocrats, and different interest groups among 
the private and non-profit sectors. Savitch (1988: 266) argues that how these 
interests are put together in a city “explains a good deal about the politics of each 
city - and ultimately the choices that are available".
2.4.5 Urban regime theory
Over the last three decades, significant trend in state restructuring has occurred. In 
many places this has meant the transfer of administrative authority and that the 
locus of authority and responsibility for urban development sits at the local level of 
government (DiGaetano and Strom, 2003; Mayer, 1994). Theories of urban 
governance have thus come to shape much of the thinking about cities, asserting 
the insight that at urban actors can make decisions regarding specific policy options 
(Stone, 1989; Mollenkopf and Strom, 2007; Savitch, 1988). Urban governance
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broadly refers to the process through which local authorities, in concert with private 
interests, seek to enhance collective goals. It concerns the coordination and fusion 
of public and private resources, which have become a widely adopted strategy for 
local authorities throughout Western Europe (Pierre, 1999).
An influential theory of urban governance in liberal democracies is urban regime 
theory. The key writer here of note is Clarence Stone (1989, 1993). Shifting away 
from the structuralist perspective as a starting point, he argues that local politicians 
are capable of making a range of policy choices, but the constraints of capitalism 
and liberal democracy mean that they tend to form alliances with powerful non-state 
actors to achieve their goals. In this view - which may be characterised as neo- 
pluralist, or even elitist - power is unevenly distributed in the hands of a few 
privileged groups in cities.
Stone adopts a ‘social production’ conception of urban political power, whereby the 
governing process is about combining the ability to achieve governing goals (‘power 
to’). He claims that in a liberal democracy the local state alone is inadequate for 
effective administration, because power is divided between the government actors 
who control public authority, business elites who determine capital investment 
decisions, and the voting public. Elected officials must simultaneously consider the 
interests of public sector bureaucracy, electoral constituencies, and the holders of 
private capital in order to win elections and hold office. To be effective at governing 
therefore, governments must “blend their capacities with” those of various non­
governmental actors through negotiation and coalition (Stone, 1993: 6). He claims 
that this is done by forming "urban regimes" -  informal coalitions of public and non­
private urban elites who work together to make key governing decisions and 
implement policies. In sum, cities are governed by urban regimes, and local policies 
are influenced by the composition and ideologies of the regime (Stone, 1989: 4).
Who gets institutionalised into the urban governing process depends on the specific
political and economic context, the goals and ideologies of local officials and what
resources it needs to win elections (Stone, 2005). For example, progressive elected
officials may ally with community activists to build a social reform agenda. However,
regime theory still leans towards a structuralist view of the state. It asserts that
mayors and city governments tend to forge ongoing alliances with major private
asset holders (elite businesses), and to forward a pro-growth rather than socially
equitable agenda. This is because they control significant productive resources
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such as capital, and the media, and can ‘buy off’ opposition (Stone, 1989).
Regime theory emphasises how human agency is a force in cities, paying primary 
attention to the strategies, schemes and needs of regimes at the local level. This 
however means that it overlooks the ways in which urban politics and policies are 
linked to, and in turn influenced by the national or international context. Furthermore, 
this theory was developed in the U.S, where business interests are well represented 
in government and local government official are thus particularly receptive to the 
needs of business and for property development (see Harding, 1995; Stoker, 1995). 
Thus, it is important to bear in mind that its "strong business, weak state” 
assumptions should not be uncritically applied to other contexts (DiGaetano and 
Klemanski, 1999).
2.4.6 The Entrepreneurial City
While regime theory neglects extra-local forces, the ‘entrepreneurial city5 thesis 
picks up here by linking pro-growth urban governance to globalisation and the 
shifting regimes of accumulation from fordism towards post-fordism. A key 
contributor to this theory David Harvey (1989) argues that there has been a general 
shift in urban governance from managerialism to what he calls “entrepreneurialism” 
in late capitalism response to more intense global inter-urban competition. The key 
claims is that the traditional 'managerial role' of local governments - concerned with 
the provision of welfare, services and consumption - has shifted towards a more 
pro-business stance to foster and encourage local economic growth. The public 
sector has even become an active ‘entrepreneur’, taking over characteristics once 
distinctive to the private sector such as risk-taking, inventiveness, and profit- 
motivation.
Hall and Hubbard (1998) since characterise urban entrepreneurialism by two basic 
characteristics: a political prioritisation of local economic development rather than 
social redistribution, and an associated institutional shift from urban government to 
urban governance. In this interpretation, the aim of entrepreneurial cities is to 
enhance comparative advantages of the city relative to other cities. This generally 
means adopting policies which allow the city to gain higher standings within the 
international or regional urban hierarchy, and to or retain footloose investment 
capital, residents, skilled labour force, and visitors. Place promotion and urban re-
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imaging through large scale real estate development are often important themes of 
entrepreneurial cities. From an international perspective, the 1980s and 1990s has 
been widely seen as an era of urban entrepreneurialism (Hubbard & Hall 1996; 
1998; Short & Kim 1999; Jessop, 1998; Ward, 2003).
Key authors note that many entrepreneurial projects are risky and Speculative, and 
by nature may lead to social conflict or the neglect of social issues in urban 
development (Harvey, 1989). Nevertheless to Jessop and Sum (2000), ‘advanced’ 
entrepreneurialism involves specific place-based strategies to enhance competitive 
advantages. The local government takes the role of a place-promoter, based on a 
clear development strategy, a strategic discourse, and its actions are justified by 
long-term place-based interest.
A second crucial aspect of entrepreneurial governance is the embrace of 
'partnerships' or 'coalitions' with the private sector (Harvey, 1989; Hall and Hubbard, 
1998; Jessop, 1998). This institutional form may come to assume a leading role for 
rebuilding inner city areas where problems of declining industry, decaying 
infrastructure and poverty concentration are prevalent. Public sector subsidies are 
often used to encourage development, especially in areas of high risk (Healey et al., 
1992: 218, Hall and Hubbard, 1998). Thus, while urban regime theory focused on 
the dependency of the local state on private sector resources to govern cities, the 
entrepreneurial city theory highlights pressures on local governments to ‘compete 
for growth’ in a global context. These may be complementary views, with emphasis 
on drivers at different spatial scales. Cities throughout the world are now facing the 
pressure of globalisation. The response, however, varies, being dependent upon the 
national and local configurations of politics or regimes (Harvey, 1989).
2.4.7 The Urban Growth Machine
Resembling the entrepreneurial city and urban regime theories, but with particular 
emphasis on the city as a site of struggle around real estate, is the influential ‘urban 
growth machine’ theory. The key concepts were first set out in Harvey Molotch’s 
(1976) seminal paper, and later refined with John Logan (Logan and Molotch, 1987). 
The authors drew insights from the Marxist perspective but they also incorporated 
insights from human ecology and community studies.
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Growth-machine theory posits an elitist view of urban politics. It argues that the 
search for financial gain from intensifying land use constitutes the driving force of 
urban change and urban politics. In other words, the ‘rentier class’ -  those directly 
involved in the exchange of places as commodities -  are regarded as key players. A 
key concept is that the urban ‘growth machine’ -  an informal coalition comprising 
local politicians, property developers, property owners, development professionals 
and financiers - emerge around a shared commitment to economic growth and 
dominates local development. The essential goal of his coalition, the growth 
machine, is to maximise the overall value of land and keeping human activities at 
the sites of their property interests. They not only attempt to foresee future 
locational trends, but they actively attempt to shape the patterns through which 
others will seek value from place. Their principal effect is thus typically to bend the 
policy priority towards developmental, rather than redistributive goals (Logan and 
Molotch, 1987; Logan etal, 1997).
The composition of the growth machine roughly describes a business elite that 
collectively wields control over substantial material and intellectual resources. To 
secure the preconditions of growth the coalition can organise collectively to 
influence government and policy, because the public sector controls crucial 
regulatory and fiscal resources available to influence growth. Pathways of influence 
include alliances with planning administrators or city planning officials, dominance of 
media outlets in promoting their growth projects, and financial strength.
The authors argue that the interest of the growth machine is largely supported by 
local governments because governments are “primarily concerned with increasing 
growth” (ibid: 53). Local governments are seen to have strong material interests in 
expanding local real estate revenues and from business sponsorship. Thus, it 
routinely bolsters exchange value gains for powerful land-based interests. “In zoning, 
planning, environmental protection, and more broadly, national urban policies, the 
overall thrust of urban programs has been to bolster development and rents, and 
rarely to enhance use values” (ibid: 14).
Also central to this theory is the view of land and properties as possessing both “use 
value” and “exchange value”, and cities as sites of struggle over these different 
values. The politics of growth is analysed in terms of a duality between ‘exchange 
value’ and the ‘use value’ of urban land and properties, claimed by competing
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interests. ‘Exchange value’ broadly includes the value of outright purchases as well 
as payments that home buyers or tenants make to landlords, realtors, mortgage 
lenders, real estate lawyers and so forth (ibid: 23). ‘Use value’ in contrast are rooted 
in the neighbourhood as lived places rather than commodities. The stakes involved 
in people's relationship to place and its use value can be very high, relating to a 
range of material, spiritual, social and psychological connections to buildings and 
locations. For example, one's home is a particular place which provides access to 
school, friends, work place and shops, as well as individual identity and emotional 
satisfaction (ibid: 18-9).
Citizens and residents do not necessarily contest speculative behaviour of the 
growth-coalition. Some commercially oriented place-interventions create both 
exchange value and use value for residents -  such as the provision of new or better 
shops and facilities. Home-owners are for example also interested in the exchange 
value of their assets, and may thereby support rising values (ibid: 123). 
Nevertheless, a potential conflict exists between efforts to maximise the profit- 
potential of places and the everyday ‘use value’ of places (ibid: 2).
But citizens are not passive actors in this theory. They may be willing to resort to all 
sorts of mechanisms to fight for their right to keep their place-relations and 
connections secure and stable. They may organise, protest, and seek political 
regulation to this end (ibid: 18-9). Thus, emerging ‘counter-coalitions’ may form 
around distributional and environmental concerns, and may eventually become a 
sufficiently potent force to slow down or prevent the activities of the growth machine. 
This can bring together residential interests in the form of neighbourhood 
associations, environmental groups and other civic organisations to protect or 
enhance use values, often in the face of threats from development proposals.
The growth coalition may adapt as it attempts to manage the concerns of more 
powerful sources of opposition, but it has the resources to circumvent opposition 
and to remain durable despite local opposition or even government regulation. 
Financial and political resources, residential stability, social homogeneity, and 
already existing organisational structures are critical in having an ability to oppose 
the growth coalition. Thus, affluent areas are more likely than others to have 
organisation that achieve unity and become effective. Poor neighbourhoods in 
contrast have the least capacity to create and sustain them effectively (ibid: 135-7).
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Extending insights from Marxist perspectives, yet more clearly acknowledging 
human agency, urban regime and urban growth coalition theories have both been 
widely adopted as frameworks to analyse the governance of urban regeneration/ 
redevelopment (e.g. DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1999; Davies, 2001; Jonas and 
Wilson, 1999; Gotham, 2000). The urban regime theory anticipates a range of 
possible urban governance arrangements, but stresses the prominence of stable 
alliances between elite businesses and local politicians. The growth machine 
emphasises a more narrow conception of an elitist, real-estate led urban 
development which tends to be socially exclusive.
What is useful in the growth-machine theory is that it shifts our attention to the 
influential role of rentier groups acting in conjunction with favourable government 
policies. It also shifts our attention to the tensions between communities -  
particularly poor neighbourhoods -  and those seeking to extract exchange value of 
properties. In other words, it provides a link between urban politics and daily urban 
experience and shows how their activities intertwine in the urban development 
process (Jonas and Wilson, 1999). However, its conception of elite power over local 
government and its view of real estate as a driving force of urban politics do not 
necessarily carry elsewhere, (Harding, 1995).
Both of these latter theories of urban governance have been criticised as too 
'localise in that they fail to provide explicit references to how extra-local factors will 
affect the nature of regime formation. They have also been described as 
‘ethnocentric’. Both were generalised from the U.S, whose governmental system is 
specific in terms of the high level autonomy of land use decision controlled by urban 
authorities, a high reliance on taxes from local businesses and residents, and where 
business interests are well represented in government. Local government official 
are thus particularly receptive to the needs of business and for property 
development (see Harding, 1995; Stoker, 1995). Thus, it is important to bear in mind 
that their "strong business, weak state” assumptions should not be uncritically 
adopted.
2.4.8 The need for context-awareness
This section has briefly reviewed a range of contrasting theoretical perspectives for
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analysing urban development -  liberal, pluralist, statist, Marxist, entrepreneurial city, 
urban regime and the growth machine. Apart from the developmental state theory 
the others have been developed from insights from western, liberal democratic 
societies. What the review suggests is that reality is a complex condition and any 
one theoretical approach does not necessarily encapsulate the whole story. The 
Marxist perspective for example has been influential in highlighting the socially 
uneven and even conflictive nature of urban development, but downplays the role of 
politics. The urban growth machine thesis for example extends deterministic Marxist 
insights by stressing human agency, especially of elites, but arguably downplays the 
role of the state. Arguably, different perspectives have different degrees of 
applicability to different settings, and some situations might require the adoption of 
more sophisticated, hybrid perspectives.
Many urban scholars now do take such an approach, in order to achieve analyses 
that are contextually specific (Kantor et al., 1997; DiGaetano and Strom, 2003; 
DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1999). They acknowledge that before applying abstract 
theories to specific contexts, they need to be placed within a broader framework that 
recognises the national political-economic context, specific central-local relations 
and the extent of local government autonomy relative to the private sector 
(DiGaetano & Klemanski 1999: 24). Only by paying attention to these parameters 
can local governance be sensitively assessed.
2.5 China’s urban growth coalition
The above review of key theoretical perspectives provides a rich background of 
concepts for urban analysis. Yet, most of them are based on discussions in western, 
liberal democracies. This section in turn considers the relevance of different 
analytical perspectives to post-reform China. In recent years, scholars have made 
considerable progress in this field. Asides from reviewing some key ideas, this 
section shall focus on the growth coalition perspective which has become a 
prevailing approach in considering urban (re)development there.
2. 5.1 State power and marketisation
The statist perspective has always been particularly relevant for pre-reform urban 
development in China. Given its centrally planned economic system, the state was
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influential in almost all aspects of economic, social and political life during that time 
(Fu, 2002). Interesting, a review of the recent literature on urban development in 
China suggests that a state-centred, rather than free-market or pluralist 
perspectives, might still be valid in the post-reform context.
When analysing housing and urban development in China, scholars emphasise the 
process of political-economic transition under way since 1978. Since then, China 
has undergone a so-called ‘gradualist’, although actually radical, transition from a 
highly centralised planned economic system towards ‘a Chinese-style socialist 
market economic system’ (Wang, 2004). Some profound transformations have 
indeed occurred. There has been significant liberalisation of the economy, including 
the rapid growth of private sector ownership and production, of market mechanisms, 
and globalisation (Han, 2000; Wu, 2000). Housing and properties have been re­
valued as economic commodities. Since then private property development begun 
to emerge and market forces were said to at least partially replace the state in 
influencing housing and land development (Wu, 1996; Wang and Murie, 1996; Yeh 
& Wu 1997). Considerable work in recent years suggest that state policies were 
important drivers of market transition, industrial restructuring, rural-urban migration, 
and 'globalisation' , which are key processes associated with socio-economic and 
spatial restructuring in China (Li and Wu, 2006b; Wang, 2004; Wu and Ma, 2005).
Most scholars emphasise that China’s reform was ‘two-tracked’. Firstly, political 
reform towards a western-style democracy was not a part of the national reform 
agenda. There has been maintenance of centralised political control in the hands of 
the Communist Party, while liberalisation and market mechanisms were pushed 
forth in the economic sphere. In contrast to a free-market system, there remained 
significant public ownership and authority (Wang, 2004). In other words, China has 
been shifting towards a decentralised economy with a mixture of market 
mechanisms and planning controls (Zhu, 1999). Neither has the state been replaced 
by the expanding market, nor has there been a simple shift of power from the public 
towards the private sector actors (Wu et al, 2007; Zhang, 2002).
All these meant that although market forces were apparently operating and shaping 
China’s development, free-market assumptions of urban development would not be 
appropriate. For example, Han (2000: 2091) argues that “The state, including both 
central and municipal levels, has played a key role in determining the economic and
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spatial revitalisation of Shanghai.” In this state-centred view, market forces would 
not have come into play without government’s initiatives on reform and support for a 
liberalised environment. The ownership of large enterprises by the state also 
remains strong. The state can strongly influence “the timing, the pace and the 
economic and spatial configuration” of cities through its policies, though the market 
was becoming an indispensable part in central and local state decision-making (ibid: 
2091).
Nevertheless, state power should not be seen to be absolute as in earlier eras. 
There is also a need to shift away from the conception of an all-determining state, 
and to shift our attention to the more complex interplay that can occur between the 
state and market. For example, Le-Ying Zhang (2003: 1549) argues that it is 
inadequate to see urban economic development as driven by an ‘omnipotent state’ 
and a passive market. In her view the market has been much more than a ‘tool’ in 
the state’s decision-making. The public sector can influence the flow of resources by 
“articulating a broad vision, mobilising political support, attracting inward investment 
and providing the necessary infrastructure.” However “ultimately it is the market 
which decides the final shape of things” (ibid: 1569). The market has actually 
become “a growing force that the state had increasing difficulties trying to control” 
(ibid: 1549).
While this latter view begins to point importance of the market (and by implication 
market actors), other works focusing on urban development and redevelopment 
suggest that it is still deficient. This is because still neglects the considerable role 
that local governments have come to possess in the post-reform era, and to the 
changing nature of urban governance. Increasingly, urban development cannot be 
understood without looking at the local state and its relationship with various market 
actors at the local level. Indeed, Fulong Wu suggests that the entrepreneurial 
governance has become a crucial analytical tool (Wu et al, 2007; Wu, 2003).
2.5.2 Entrepreneurial governance
As mentioned, the context of central-local relations critical for understanding urban 
governance and how policies are carried out in cities (DiGaetano and Strom, 2003). 
One major aspect of national reforms in China has been a decentralisation of power 
towards urban level (municipal) governments. Traditionally, the Chinese state held
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decisive power in shaping urban patterns through centralised planning, while the 
local government had little autonomy in determining urban development. Local 
governments functioned as agents of the central government, rather than 
necessarily their perceptions of local interest (Fu, 2002). However, since the 1980s, 
by gradually devolving financial and land-use authority to localities, the central 
government has gradually transformed itself to assume the role of a regulator, while 
strengthening the role of local governments in developing their own jurisdictions. 
Since then, Walder (1995) found that the local government came to behave more 
like a firm, because strong incentives were now there to develop its own business 
activities so as to increase local revenue sources.
Local states have gained greater fiscal and administrative autonomy, more reliance 
on locally generated revenues for funding, as well as becoming responsible for 
urban planning and managing urban land. A relatively decentralised urban planning 
system developed, whereby urban development initiatives were now conceived, 
approved and carried out at the municipal or even urban district levels. These 
changes greatly enhanced local government capacity as well as pro-activeness in 
promoting local development. Meanwhile the central government has significantly 
reduced its direct involvement in local redevelopment projects (Wu et al, 2007; He 
and Wu, 2005; Zhu, 1999).
Thus, traditional statist theories, or the developmental state perspective do not 
capture the locally-rooted nature of decision making. Wu and his colleagues (2007: 
13) recently argue that the Chinese state has moved away from an egalitarian 
‘resource distributor’ (the redistributive state) towards a developmental state, and 
finally to a more entrepreneurial type of local urban governance. In the context of 
rising inter-city competition and market expansion, boosting local economic growth 
and raising local revenue have become the core concerns of the local governments. 
Specifically, this means that the local state behaves as a “market player” and can 
“use market instruments to achieve explicit or implicit political agendas”, for urban 
(re)development and economic growth, with limited concern for public accountability 
(Wu et al., 2007,196).
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2.5.3 The growth coalition
Yet, the local state could not act alone to achieve its objectives. Recognising all of 
the above institutional changes, Tingwei Zhang (2002) has applied the urban regime 
perspective to China highlight the emerging co-operative relationship between 
public and private sectors in urban development. He argues that although the public 
sector is still a very strongest stakeholder, and dominates all aspects of political 
decision making, the trends of a shrinking state and a growing marketplace has 
brought a changing economic relationship between the state and non-public actors. 
With increasing value of private enterprises, including the real estate sector, the 
municipal government is now increasingly compelled to see them as partners to 
achieve its urban development agendas. Simply put, the economic incentive for the 
local state to facilitate or enter into coalitions with the private sector has 
strengthened.
Corresponding to this view, there is now emerging consensus that the recent phase 
of rapid urban restructuring was driven not only by entrepreneurial local states, but 
by a ‘Chinese-style’ growth coalition in the context of rapid economic restructuring 
and market-transition (He and Wu, 2005; Zhu, 1999; Zhang, 2002). This has earlier 
been termed the “Chinese growth coalition perspective”. This argument draws 
elements from the urban growth machine, urban regime as well as entrepreneurial 
city theories, and has been modified somewhat to reflect the specific political and 
economic context of post-reform China. Although different authors come from 
slightly different angles, the core claim of the growth-coalition perspective is rather 
consistent.
Table 2.2 overleaf provides a summary of the “Chinese growth coalition” perspective, 
as expressed by some of the key authors. It asserts that China’s urban development 
“has been fuelled by emerging local elites taking advantage of de facto devolution to 
pursue growth during explosive urbanisation in a transitioning economy." (Zhang 
and Fang, 2004: 295). Pursuing common interests in local economic expansion and 
wealth accumulation, growth coalitions between local government, property 
developers, construction companies, and financial institutions have been formed to 
facilitate new construction as well as inner-city redevelopment (He and Wu, 2005; 
Zhu, 1999). As a result, the city has been turned into an engine for the growth 
coalition “to maximise exchange value at the expense of local communities’ use
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value" (Zhang and Fang, 2004: 294).
Table 2.2: The Chinese growth coalition perspective
Dimension Key claims in relation to housing renewal
Who drives 
urban renewal, 
for what?
Urban development has been fuelled by emerging local elites taking 
advantage of the de facto devolution to pursue growth during explosive 
urbanisation in a transitioning economy. Pursuing common interests in 
local economic expansion and wealth accumulation, growth coalitions 
between local government, construction companies, and financial 
institutions have been formed to facilitate inner-city redevelopment. As 
a result, the inner city has been turned into an engine for the growth 
coalition to maximise exchange value at the expense of local 
communities’ use value.
The
entrepreneurial 
local state
The municipal government is an essential player in urban development 
possessing political and land resources, and controlling financial 
leverages. It acts as the mediator and supervisor of the redevelopment 
process (He and Wu, 2005:1,16). The local government "opens up 
opportunities for property development and provides various types of 
support to accelerate the redevelopment process" (He, 2007).
“Two considerations motivate a municipal government in facilitating 
urban growth: exhibiting achievements to the central government and 
promoting economic development to serve interest groups and the 
constituency” (Zhang, 2002: 493, see also He and Wu, 2005, Zhu, 
1999).
Socio­
economic 
driving forces
Urban renewal has been underpinned by profound economic changes 
in the wake of market reforms. China has been shifting towards a 
decentralised economy with a mixture of market mechanisms and 
planning controls (Zhu, 1999). Its cities have experienced rapid 
urbanisation accompanied by economic growth. Large cities, such as 
Shanghai and Beijing, are in particular generators of economic growth 
and have attracted more investment from both international 
corporations and domestic investors (Zhang, 2002). With industrial 
restructuring, office buildings, demand for commercial and recreational 
facilities has dramatically increased. At the same time, the housing 
privatisation, the globalised property market, together with the 
emergence of urban affluence stimulated demands for upmarket 
residential complexes (He and Wu, 2005:6).
Counter- 
dynamics to 
the growth- 
coalition
Due to the lack of democratic mechanisms and the persistence of state 
power in China’s gradualist reforms, “Neighbourhoods are still 
excluded from the growth coalitions constituted by local government 
and the private sector. They do not have a share in the decision­
making and implementation processes, nor do they even know how 
and when the redevelopment projects operate” (He and Wu, 2005:16). 
“Driven by profit seeking ... thriving urban neighbourhoods are 
displaced by high-value property development, and suffer from uneven 
redevelopment” (ibid: 1)
Source: author’s iterature review
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Within the coalition, the municipal government is an essential player possessing 
political and land resources, and controlling financial leverages. It acts as the 
“facilitator” and “supervisor” of the redevelopment process (He and Wu, 2005: 16). 
The coalition is however exclusive. Due to the lack of democratic mechanisms and 
the persistence of state power in China’s gradualist reforms, “Neighbourhoods are 
still excluded from the growth coalitions constituted by local government and the 
private sector. They do not have a share in the decision-making and implementation 
processes, nor do they even know how and when the redevelopment projects 
operate” (He and Wu, 2005: 16). This has become the prevailing perspective for 
analysing urban and housing renewal in post-reform China. It is a perspective which 
is attuned to the country’s specific political-economic context, and to the socially 
unequal nature of urban change.
This perspective does situate its analysis within a broader socio-economic context. 
Market transition, industrial restructuring, rural-urban migration, and globalisation 
are key processes associated with socio-economic and spatial restructuring in 
urban China (Li and Wu, 2006b; Wang, 2004; Wu and Ma, 2005). Key writers (e.g. 
He and Wu, 2005; Zhang, 2002) do acknowledge that these provided a fertile 
environment for land and property development and therefore for the growth- 
coalition (see table 2.2).
The existence and operations of the growth coalition has been borne out by a 
number of detailed empirical studies. Zhang and Fang (2004) highlighted the close 
relations between the government and growing number of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and spin-off government enterprises who work together in monopolistic 
fashion to pursue urban restructuring and the intensification of land use. Shengjing 
He and Fulong Wu (2005) highlighted the partnership between extra-local property 
development actors and the local government. The co-operative relationship 
between local state and capital has been expedient for both sides, as they have 
shared interests in promoting growth and the intensification of land use. A general 
insight is that the local government "opens up opportunities for property 
development and provides various types of support to accelerate the redevelopment 
process" (He and Wu, 2007). Beyond these core actors the planning and design 
professions also play an auxiliary role in the development process (Ren, 2008; He 
and Wu, 2005).
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These studies emphasised that residents were politically excluded in urban 
(re)development. Forced displacement of existing residents has been the key 
operational mechanisms underlying urban redevelopment. Therefore “Driven by 
profit seeking... thriving urban neighbourhoods are displaced by high-value property 
development, and suffer from uneven redevelopment” (He and Wu, 2005:1). Due to 
the lack of electoral power to leverage government officials, community groups in 
China did not have the mechanisms to influence decisions or to gain entry into the 
coalition (Zhang 2002; He and Wu, 2005). At the same time, “local officials [did] not 
need to care about or be responsible to the residents, as [officials] are appointed by 
upper level governments rather than elected” (Zhang and Fang, 2004: 294). An 
extreme interpretation was that, "Economic growth for the benefit of the local 
elites... has become the real underlying motivation of political alliances between 
local governments and enterprises" (Zhang and Fang, 2004: 294).
Key contributors cited various economic and political reasons that fostered the 
emergence and dominance of the growth coalition. Zhu (1999) argued that the local 
government has an interest to nurture the performance of local enterprises -  many 
of them state-owned, in order to engineer urban growth. This was achieved often by 
offering local property enterprises ample subsidised land. Because the performance 
of local officials are evaluated in relation to their achievements in local economic 
development, being able to carry out large-scale, high-profile redevelopment 
schemes constituted an important way for local officials to demonstrate their political 
achievements and to further their own careers. Entering into partnership with private 
capital enabled local officials and the state apparatus to achieve these material 
objectives (Zhang, 2002; He and Wu, 2005).
Although the core claims of this perspective resemble the original urban growth 
machine or urban regime theory in some ways, it also recognises some novel, 
context-specific features. These include the background of market transition, the 
persistence of public authority, and the limits of community power. He and Wu (2005) 
highlighted that growth-coalitions in China do not resemble the pattern of strong 
private sector influence over local priorities or policies, as claimed in the original 
growth-machine theory. In a sense, the role of the private sector has remained more 
restricted to the implementation of specific development projects. Unlike in liberal 
democracies, the Chinese political system remains highly centralised. Its officials 
are not publically elected but are assigned through a complex process controlled by
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the Communist Party. The state apparatus thus retained control over political 
decision-making and still controlled significant productive resources such as 
finances, land and housing (Zhang, 2002). Fulong Wu (2007) even asserts that the 
Chinese local state support for the private sector can vary from time to time, 
depending on its own political interests.
2.6 Limitations of the literature
The above review demonstrates that the Chinese growth coalition perspective is 
sophisticated. It is empirically grounded, context-specific and multi-faceted, 
combining insights from a variety of schools of thought. By way of clarification, it 
acknowledges and highlights several-inter-related dimensions:
1. The context of market-oriented reforms and subsequent socio-economic 
restructuring.
2. A weakened but persistent legacy of authoritarian state power.
3. The emergence of more autonomous, entrepreneurial local governments in 
pursuit of local economic growth.
4. The formation of informal coalitions with the growing private sector in the 
realm of urban (re)development.
5. The exclusion of non-elite citizens and residents in the decision making 
process.
Yet, although it apparently sheds considerable light on the driving forces and social 
implications of urban and housing renewal, some aspects of it demands more 
scrutiny. In this section, I identify several key areas requiring further clarification -  
which also sketch out a direction for this research. These include the 
characterisation of the local state, the issue of grassroots power, and the 
composition of the growth coalition.
2.6.1 The local state
One possible limitation of the Chinese growth coalition perspective is in its narrow 
conceptualisation of the local state. The perspective highlights economic growth as 
the key motivation of local governance, even to the neglect of social responsibility. 
For example, in one of the more extreme interpretations, Zhang and Fang (2004:
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293) argued that “the distinction between the public and private is often ambiguous, 
if not totally unclear”. In the pursuit of urban renewal, it has “turned a blind eye to 
the resulting negative social and environmental impacts”. A more nuanced 
conception is provided by He and Wu (2005: 15) who demonstrated that in the 
pursuit of property-led redevelopment the local government has made some 
decisions intended to ensure more “sustainable” development. This includes 
measures to ameliorate social conflict and to ensure environmental quality, at the 
expense of private profit. Nevertheless, like other writers in the growth-coalition 
perspective, they do not imply that the local state acts for social or welfare concerns 
per se.
But do these claims adequately capture the role of the local state? The situation 
may be more complex. As pointed out by Hall and Hubbard (1998) it can be 
misleading to characterise entrepreneurial local governments as having abandoned 
the “traditional” role of redistribution and public service provision. Given that 
entrepreneurialism tends to be filtered through local institutional traditions, the 
Chinese local state may carry forth agendas and practices inherited from the former, 
more egalitarian system. Beyond this, Wang (2004) suggests that increasingly 
economic growth and social stability have become two simultaneous governing 
interests of the central government. It has evolved policies to support the poor and 
reformed the housing system to widen housing choice and quality of life. How these 
concerns are reflected at the local level, in housing renewal, is still poorly 
understood. A plausible view is that in response to these higher level political 
interests, local states have some concern for balancing social interests, within the 
constraints of market-oriented development. This might lead it to devise at least 
some policies and programmes that address the needs of disadvantaged groups.
In sum, there remains room for more careful assessment of how local states 
intervene in housing renewal, and with what purposes. Beyond facilitating economic 
growth, it would be critical to consider whether the local government also acts to 
address the welfare interest of local citizens, including the poor. If this is the case, it 
would challenge the simple characterisation of pro-growth governance currently 
taken for granted. It would also demand greater analytical attention to how ‘socially- 
oriented’ projects in urban China are conceived and implemented.
69
2.6.2 Grassroots counter-dynamics
Related to the above point, there also remains a lack of clarity regarding grass-roots 
power and its impact on policies. Internationally, much attention has been paid to 
the forms of ‘counter-coalition’ that have formed around distributional and/or 
environmental concerns who have attempted to slow down, change or even prevent 
the activities of the growth machine. To some degree, they have been successful 
(Fainstein, 1987; Mollenkopf, 1983; Logan and Molotch, 1987). In China, many 
authors have paid attention to the tensions between residents and the growth 
coalition, but one prevailing view is that residents have had too limited power and 
resources to oppose top-down decisions and plans (He and Wu, 2005; Zhang, 
2002).
However, this view has also been challenged in light of more recent changes in 
policy. A few authors (Wu et al, 2007; Wang, 2004) demonstrated that governments 
have sought to set in place better and more transparent compensation measures in 
relocation, in response to signs of citizen discontent, resistance and unrest. 
Residents have utilised tactics such as squatting and protests to protect and assert 
their interests in the relocation process. Picking up on the same point, Ren (2008) 
recently debated the ‘weak community perspective’ adopted by other authors. He 
argued that the growth coalition has in fact been “under constant challenges from 
community residents” (ibid: 41). In his view, grass-roots resistance does matter and 
that they have “significantly changed the pace of urban development [projects], and 
forced the state to change to change its response to resettlement issues” (ibid: 40).
This debate points to the heart of the analysis of community power versus the state 
and the growth-coalition, but it is not yet settled. Both sides of the argument require 
further qualification. More careful research is needed to determine whether 
residents can through their efforts ‘challenge’ the growth coalition, what recent 
changes in relocation policy actually meant, and to what extent grass-roots 
resistance can have a real impact upon urban policy.
2.6.3 Differentiating local actors and processes
Another possible limitation of the Chinese growth coalition perspective is in its 
assumption of an undifferentiated growth coalition. In the prevailing accounts, real
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estate actors have been characterised as a homogenous group with shared 
commitment to wealth accumulation, land use intensification, and whose actions 
inevitably result in the production of amenities for higher-income groups and 
displacement of the poor. Again, these analytical abstractions may be useful only to 
a degree. Scholars need to anticipate how more sophisticated patterns emerge.
There may be different kinds of property enterprises and intermediaries underlying 
interventions in the built environment which lead to distinct renewal outcomes. Yet, 
little is known about this issue, because little attention has been paid to comparative 
analyses of housing renewal projects, and to categorising the real estate actors 
involved. To address this issue, there needs to be more careful scrutiny of who the 
developers were and how their roles have been similar or different, though a 
methodology that considers a wider range of different development scenarios.
The local state-capital relationship in China may also be more heterogeneous than 
so far acknowledged. One possible dimension of differentiation might be between 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private or joint-venture firms. SOEs have 
historically been a vital instrument for provision of social services and an instrument 
of state policy. For example, the companies often provide the entire range of social 
services to their employees including housing, education, health care, and pensions 
(Steinfeld, 1998). Alongside the economic reforms, the reform of state-owned 
enterprises was intended to liberate the companies from bureaucratic control that 
hindered their efficient management. Thus, SOEs generally now face higher 
expectation for financial autonomy and performance. In the real estate sector, a 
plethora of state-owned property development enterprises have apparently thrived 
across Chinese cities, playing a significant role in profit-oriented operations rather 
than social functions. Often they were supported by the favourable, almost 
protectionists policies of the government, making windfall profits (Zhang and Fang, 
2004; Zhu, 1999).
However wealth accumulation may not constitute the sole driving motivation 
underlying ‘public-private’ implementation of projects in China. Scholars such as 
Koppell (2007: 261) argued that "it is questionable whether or not policymakers are 
truly willing to surrender SOEs as state instruments." He asserts that many SOEs 
play a dual role under bureaucratic influence, some of which are clearly against the 
financial interests of the enterprises: "On the one hand, the SOE is charged with
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performing like a profit-seeking company, maximizing revenue and reducing costs. 
On the other hand, the company has policy responsibilities" (ibid: 264).
As Duckett (1996, 2001) identified, many property development enterprises were 
formed out of and retain close administrative links to local government bureaux or 
offices. Channels of public-sector influence, and the competing roles expected of 
these quasi-governmental enterprises means that some of these companies may 
have operated to achieve certain public agendas rather than merely in the interest 
of ‘growth’ and profiteering. In this sense, the growth-coalition perspective may be 
deficient, because wealth accumulation may not constitute the sole driving 
motivation underlying ‘public-private’ implementation of projects. This possibility 
needs to be properly investigated in the realm of housing renewal. In other words, 
more analytical attention needs to be paid to the role of state-owned, especially 
quasi-governmental enterprises, and whether their activities actually entailed a 
range of socially-oriented endeavours. This might demand a modification of the 
currently monolithic characterisation of China’s growth coalitions.
In emphasising powerful elites as driving actors, the growth-coalition literature has 
also neglected the role of individuals in housing rehabilitation. Internationally, 
individual action by ‘organic entrepreneurs’ to upgrade run-down neighbourhoods 
has been a significant part of housing regeneration and gentrification. It is widely 
agreed that rehabilitation and redevelopment need to be seen as part of a broader 
view of urban restructuring (Ley, 1996; Smith and Williams, 1986).
This suggests that perhaps the grass-roots should also be considered relevant 
actors in urban change. In China the formation of the property market, the rise of 
private ownership, and rising affluence has theoretically led to increasing capacity 
for individuals to affect their own housing and neighbourhood predicaments. Thus, 
housing renewal may also take place in more decentralised forms, perhaps by 
certain more privileged segments of the middle class. Whether these processes 
have an impact on cities, how they relate to urban planning decisions, and their 
potential impacts on neighbourhoods still requires more careful research.
In sum, it may be possible to move beyond a monolithic conception of an 
undifferentiated growth-coalition, and is important to reconsider the role of grass­
roots actors in housing renewal. Greater specificity regarding the different actors
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participating in the urban growth agenda and more attention to the ways in which 
they relate to the agendas of the local government might offer a way forward.
2.7 Conclusion
This literature review suggests that rather than using a single perspective, a hybrid, 
contextually sensitive approach is required to understand urban housing renewal in 
post-1990s China. It has explained the intellectual origins and key claims of the 
“Chinese growth coalition” perspective, which has become prevalent in recent 
analyses of urban China. This perspective is empirically grounded, context-specific 
and multi-faceted, combining insights from a variety of schools of thought. It 
provides a crucial reference for this study.
The political-economic context is a crucial overarching determinant of a city’s 
approach to housing renewal. Chinese cities are undergoing a process of post­
socialist transition. Economic liberalisation and marketisation has taken place, 
signalling the shift away from a command economy. However, the Chinese state 
continues to wield considerable productive resources and there has not been a shift 
towards political democracy. It is also important to recognise the highly devolved 
inter-governmental organisation in the wake of institutional reforms. Power 
devolution towards lower levels of urban government, the emergence of growth- 
seeking urban governance, and the formation partnerships with private capital are 
crucial dimensions urban development in the post-reform era. Entrepreneurial urban 
governance can be a useful concept to understand the local government as a 
proactive actor in driving urban (re)development.
Beyond this, the literature suggests that urban development is has come to be 
organised through a coalition of powerful public and private interests, notably real- 
estate interests. Maintaining the conditions for economic growth and capital 
accumulation has become a key role of the local state. This has engendered a bias 
for private capital and the maximisation of exchange values in the process of urban 
development, at the expense of use values of residents. Unlike in liberal 
democracies, communities in Chinese cities have limited capacity to influence state 
policy because of the absence of democratic representative mechanisms and 
under-development of civil society.
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Although this perspective provides a useful basis, some important areas requiring 
further scrutiny were pointed out. These include its characterisation of the local state, 
the issue of grassroots power, and the composition of the growth coalition. More 
research is needed to understand the role of the local state in housing renewal, 
such as whether a social welfare orientation co-exists and intertwines with the more 
entrepreneurial aspects of its interventions. A structuralist view of the local state 
might be more appropriate, which presumes that it is biased towards facilitating 
capital accumulation and economic growth, whilst also attempting to maintain social 
order and legitimacy.
The growth coalition also needs to be examined as a differentiated, rather than 
monolithic entity. There may be differences among property actors that underpin 
distinct outcomes in housing renewal. More complex interests than ‘growth’ may 
underpin the activities of different property enterprises and their involvement in 
housing renewal. As urban interests become more diverse, counter-dynamics to 
dominant coalition strategies may emerge to challenge the one-sided drive towards 
physical modernisation and forced relocation. Within the politics of citizen resistance 
which has now emerged, the extent to which grassroots actors can attain 
concessions from the state or impact upon urban renewal policy is yet to be fully 
considered. Clarifying all these can help develop a more nuanced understanding of 
housing renewal.
More broadly, the present research shall link the operations and outcomes of urban 
housing renewal to processes of economic and social restructuring. Critical here are 
the processes of urbanisation, market transition and of post-industrial transition. All 
these are crucial as conditions which sustain China’s real-estate based coalition, the 
outputs of the growth coalition, and the inequalities that become manifest through 
housing renewal. Before progressing onto the empirical sections of this study, the 
next chapter explains the methodology adopted.
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3 Methodology
3.1 Introduction
This chapter explains in detail the methodology of the research, which was a mixed- 
method approach including interviews, case studies and a range of secondary data. 
It drew on 21 interviews with local officials, property developers, urban planners and 
academics, two pilot case studies, three in-depth case studies documenting a range 
of housing renewal processes, and included 35 interviews with residents of 
dilapidated housing. Section two discusses the researcher’s personal background 
and reflects upon how this had both limited and helped my fieldwork in Shanghai. 
Section three outlines the methods used to understand the national and urban 
context for housing renewal. Section four outlines the merits of the case study 
approach adopted to analyse housing renewal, and the criteria and processes of 
case selection. Section five explains how case studies were carried out and later 
analysed. The final section provides a summary. A great deal of care was applied 
throughout the research process regarding ethical issues such as personal consent, 
confidentiality, accurate recording of evidence, and accurate and responsible use of 
research findings. These are well accepted academic practices, and a note is 
included in Appendix 3.
3.2 The researcher’s personal status
In retrospect, the author’s personal status had considerable bearing on my data- 
collection process and these need to be outlined at the outset. As mentioned in 
Chapter one, the author is not a native of mainland China, but grew up in Taiwan 
and was later educated in New Zealand. My family nevertheless had roots in 
Shanghai. It was both my father’s birthplace and where my grandmother had grown 
up before moving to Taiwan in the late 1940s. Being a non-native and lacking some 
institutional ties to local authorities was one important barrier I had to confront 
during the course of the research. How this was eventually addressed, and to what 
degree, will be discussed in later sections.
Nevertheless, it was also the case that my upbringing in Taiwan gave me invaluable
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advantages compared to most foreigners wishing to conduct research in mainland 
China. Chinese (mandarin) was my native language, I understood much about 
Chinese history and culture, and it was relatively ease to blend into the local scene. 
Proficiency in the language meant that I could make use of Chinese literature, to 
organise various aspects of my fieldwork in Chinese, and to carry out face-to-face 
interviews and conversations. It naturally extended more broadly into my ability to 
move around, to observe and experience the city as a resident during my various 
fieldwork. Being able to pass as an ordinary Chinese resident in different 
neighbourhoods and to speak to people I came across during the course of my 
fieldwork was immensely valuable.
The political tensions between Taiwanese and mainland Chinese authorities are well 
known, and Taiwan “remains a sensitive issue to many people on both sides. This 
was one aspect of my identity that might have seriously affected my opportunity to 
obtain data. Fortunately, my status as a Taiwanese researcher in Shanghai did not 
prove to be a significant problem. The reality was that aside from the political 
dimension, other dimensions such as business, tourism and academic exchanges 
between mainland China, Shanghai and Taiwan had become extremely 
commonplace and accepted by the 1990s. After more than two decades of 
economic reform and open door policy, China was generally an accommodating 
place to most of its visitors.
In many ways, the Taiwanese economy has become inextricably linked to the 
mainland Chinese economy, meaning intensified social interactions and networking 
between the two places. By the time of my first visits to Shanghai there were 
reputedly around 300,000 Taiwanese entrepreneurs and employees based in the 
city or operating across two sides. Taiwan, alongside Hong Kong, was one of the 
biggest sources of 'foreign investment' to Shanghai's industries and real estate 
development (Friedmann, 2005), and Taiwanese businesses had long been 
welcomed to set up operations in the city and to bring in its management or 
technological know-how. Local universities had established frequent academic 
exchanges with academics and institutions from Taiwan -  eager to learn from one- 
another. Many public officials from China, including mid-level bureaucrats had made 
formal visits to Taiwan and understand its plans and policies better than outsiders 
might expect. My being in Shanghai was therefore not generally seen as 
significantly out of the ordinary.
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All these helped my ability to operate as a researcher and my stay in Shanghai 
immensely. Although access to decision makers was always difficult and required 
significant organisational efforts, in the public realm I was able to organise my 
activities relatively easily. The officials, professionals, academics and even many 
residents I eventually spoke generally behaved in an accommodating, even 
interested manner. Without these personal and contextual factors in place, my 
research could not have proceeded very far, or if at all. With all these as a 
background, the specifics of the research methodology can be explained next.
3.3 Understanding the national and urban context
This thesis focused on two key questions:
• Question A: How has Shanghai responded to the task of housing renewal -  
including redevelopment, historic conservation and rehabilitation - since 
1990?
• Question B: Does the “Chinese growth coalition”perspective adequately 
capture the social and political dynamics of housing renewal in post-1990 
Shanghai? If not, how can it be modified?
Three inter-related components of investigation were carried out to provide answers 
to these questions:
• A literature review to summarise and critically evaluate the Chinese growth 
coalition perspective.
• Research regarding the broader national and urban contexts and how they 
link to Shanghai’s housing renewal programmes and processes.
• Specific case studies examining the relations and processes of different 
modes of housing renewal in areas of the city.
The first component was detailed in Chapter 2 and formed a basis for comparisons 
against findings from the second and third, empirical parts, of the research. Specific 
sources of data are outlined below:
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3.3.1 Social and Economic context
To situate housing renewal within broader socio-economic circumstances the author 
took considerable time to carry out background research. A broad review of 
literature helped identify the key social and economic trends in urban China since its 
economic reforms in 1978. Shanghai’s urban development was also examined from 
a historical perspective. In addition, a number of statistical sources were used to 
examine the social and economic changes in Shanghai, especially over the last 
three decades.
One major source was the “Statistical Yearbook of Shanghai”, published annually by 
the Shanghai Statistical Bureau (SSB). Issues from 1992 could be found in the 
Shanghai City Library, and the years from 2001~2009 were accessed online through 
the official SSB website. Another was China’s 5th National Population Census of 
2000, and the “China 1% Population Survey” of 2005 - both organised by the State 
Council of China and the State Statistical Bureau. These were accessed through the 
“China Data Online Database” provided by The University of Michigan’s China Data 
Centre.1
The following issues were examined using the longitudinal data collected:
• Urban population trends, including rural-urban migration.
• Economic growth and industrial restructuring -  including the composition of 
the economy, paying particular attention to the growth of the service sectors 
and the upgrading of the manufacturing industries.
• Changing employment composition -  including the distribution of 
employment in different economic sectors, changes in the occupational class 
structure, and unemployment.
• Earnings and income distribution in the city.
• Performance of the real estate industry: including the trends in investment, 
construction, demolition, and housing sales.
To augment these insights the author also personally contacted and interviewed a 
senior official within the Development Research Centre of the Shanghai Municipal 
Government, to better understand the city’s economic development strategy.
1 Access was linked online through the London School of Economics library website.
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3.3.2 The housing context
A variety of secondary sources were used to build up a preliminary picture of the 
housing context in China and Shanghai, including academic publications, 
government websites and official statistics. First hand insights also came from living 
in Shanghai for much of my fieldwork visits between 2006 and 2008. While general 
descriptions of the housing system and housing problems in the pre-reform era 
were abundant in the literature, there was only a limited amount of quantitative data 
describing living conditions before 1990. Nevertheless, one useful source found was 
“Shanghai Real Estate History” (ECSREH, 1999) - an official publication 
documenting the history of housing development in Shanghai from the 19th century 
up to 1995. It provided the results of the National Housing Survey of 1982 and 
1985 -  which shed light on overall housing conditions prior to the onset of 
comprehensive housing reforms in the late 1980s.
The 1982 survey provided information such as per capita housing space in the city 
and by different housing types in the city. The 1985 survey included data on the 
housing stock such as age, tenure distribution, construction type, per capita housing 
space, possession of amenities, and state of repair/degradation. These sources 
provided an overview of the local housing problems the government and urban 
citizens faced by 1990. More up to date longitudinal data on the housing stock, 
housing tenure distribution, per capita living spaces, rates of real estate investment 
and construction were obtained from the Statistical yearbook of Shanghai. Additional 
detailed insights about the local housing conditions were gained from interviews and 
case studies of specific areas. These will be explained in the ensuing sections.
3.3.3 The state and housing renewal
A broad approach was adopted to understand government strategies for housing 
renewal, how they were organised and implemented. The process began by 
consulting the existing literature and various government websites. From these the 
author established the nature of formal political institutions in China, the roles and 
powers of the local government, and the key administrative institutions for enacting 
urban and housing (re)development were then identified. The political agendas of 
central and local governments in urban development and in the evolution of housing 
policy were also examined.
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Next, the author collected information regarding key urban planning and housing 
renewal initiatives enacted in Shanghai of relevance for the study period. Attention 
was paid to the evolving goals of housing renewal, what the government attempted 
or carried out in the realm of redevelopment, rehabilitation or historic conservation, 
why it intervened in such ways, and the roles of different agencies involved. Useful 
overviews were provided in the official publication “Shanghai Construction” (EBSC, 
1991, 1996, 2001) -  a history of major urban construction programmes in the city, 
and a more up to date review by Minqian Xu (2004, chapter 4) -  an officer in the 
Luwan District Construction and Management Committee. Information also came 
from a variety of other sources including academic literature, local newspapers, and 
policy documents (accessed on-line from the websites of relevant government 
bureaus).
The author also carried out an online search to identify the top-ranked 25 property 
developers operating in Shanghai and reviewed their company information. This 
provided some information regarding their corporate characteristics, the kinds of 
projects they engaged in, and the backgrounds of their company leaders. These 
constituted preliminary insights into the real estate industry and their roles in city- 
building.
To better understand the interface between the plans, policies and the practice of 
housing renewal, more information was needed regarding the detailed processes, 
organisation and inter-relations of actors involved in housing renewal, including the 
government, property enterprises, and communities. This was gained by 
interviewing various local experts, property developers and government officials in 
related agencies. In total, 21 interviews with government officials (6), urban planners 
(5), local academics (4), and large and small real estate companies (6) were carried 
out as part of this research. A full list of interviews and the general interview 
schedules can be found in Appendices 1 and 2.
Informants include officials in a district urban planning bureau, district housing 
bureaux, members of the government-designated Expert Committee for the 
Preservation of Historical Areas and Heritage Architecture, senior academics/ urban 
planners based at the Tongji University College of Architecture and Urban Planning 
(TJCAUP) and its Institute of Urban Planning and Design, managers of several
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state-owned property development/management enterprises, and a number of small 
private property developers.
Access to some of these people was extremely challenging, and the limited number 
of informants in each category reflected the constraints experienced. Due to the 
centralised political system, many aspects of decision making and policy 
implementation in China are closed off to the public. It was suggested to me that 
access to public officials required the mobilisation of formal institutional channels or 
informal personal contacts, yet the author had no apparent useful links at the outset. 
In practice early contacts were made with academics and urban planners at the 
Tongji University College of Architecture and Urban Planning - one of the leading
centres for urban planning studies in China with extensive ties with the local
authorities. Speaking to these contacts provided much useful information regarding 
the housing and urban planning context, and some of the informants were extremely 
helpful in pointing out other relevant contacts. This was a time-consuming process, 
and even with proper recommendations it was not always possible to secure 
opportunities for interviews.
Key issues dealt with in the interviews included2:
• Nature of housing problems in Shanghai;
• Conditions and population dynamics in dilapidated housing;
• The urban planning system;
• Official strategies and procedures for housing redevelopment;
• Official strategies and procedures for housing rehabilitation;
• Official strategies and tools for historic conservation;
• Property developers in operation in the real estate industry;
• Known impacts and problems of housing renewal;
• How relocation/ compensations worked in practice and their impacts;
• How social tensions in housing renewal were being dealt with;
• Discussion of notable case studies.
Fortunately, the interviewed conducted were generally open and accommodating 
discussions in which the informants demonstrated intimate knowledge of the subject 
matters. All the interviews were carried out personally by the researcher, in
2 See Appendix 1 for interview schedules.
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Mandarin. They were semi-structured and lasted from one hour up to four hours. 
Questions varied depending on the role and expertise of the informants. Most were 
recorded and written up soon after the interview. Conditions of confidentiality and 
anonymity were respected throughout. Some additional methodological 
considerations that arose are discussed in section 3.5.3.
3.3.4 The impacts of housing renewal
To understand the impacts of housing renewal on the built environment and social 
infrastructure over time, both quantitative and qualitative data were important. Many 
qualitative insights were gained from the above interviews. In addition to these the 
researcher drew on descriptive statistics from the Statistical Yearbook of Shanghai 
to examine the changing built form and functions of the inner city districts between 
1985 and 2005 -  in which most housing renewal took place.
Available data on housing demolitions demonstrated the progress of physical 
redevelopment over time. I then examined the changing composition of the built 
environment: specifically the quantity of different housing types, the quantity of office 
space, retail space, and other public facilities such as healthcare and educational 
spaces in the inner city. The growth in numbers of high-rise buildings in the city was 
used to provide a sense of the shift from low-rise urban form to a higher-density 
form. These shed light not only on the changes in the overall housing composition, 
but also on the changing land-use (economic) functions. Meanwhile, data on the 
rate of resident relocation and changing population densities in the urban districts 
provided two important indicators on the social impacts of urban renewal.
Overall, this stage of the research, drawing on a range of secondary sources and 
first-hand interviews, allowed the author to familiarise himself with the city, the range 
of approaches underlying housing renewal, the institutional framework, and the 
agencies that appeared to be involved in the planning and interventions in the built 
environment. The data also provided insights into the broader social, economic and 
physical changes in the city.
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3.4 The case study approach
3.4.1 Rationale
Although the above research components provided substantial insights, many 
crucial aspects of the research could not be discerned via these sources alone. 
Living conditions of dilapidated neighbourhoods targeted for intervention and the 
implications of housing renewal can only be fully appreciated from the perspective 
of residents and various other actors ‘on the ground’. The nature of inter-agency 
dynamics underlying the ‘growth-coalition’ also needed to be examined through 
concrete evidence rooted in specific housing renewal projects. Thus, a case study 
approach was decided upon.
The strengths of the case study in exploring complex urban phenomena are well 
known (Yin, 2003). Its usefulness lies in its ability to utilise a full variety of 
evidence -  including documents, census data, artefacts, interviews and 
observations - to give a researcher a holistic and meaningful view of real-life events 
in their context, and the possibility exploring inter-connected causal mechanisms. 
Thus, it has been widely adopted in studies of urban politics and 
regeneration/redevelopment processes. Some studies focused on the level of the 
city as an overall entity (e.g. Fainstein et al, 1986; Stone, 1989). Others focused on 
interventions and processes in specific areas within cities (e.g. Fainstein, 1994; 
Gilbert and Ward, 1985; Savitch, 1988). Recently, case studies of specific 
redevelopment projects in Chinese cities have been utilised as a way to shed light 
on the process and agency dynamics of urban redevelopment in its transitional 
context (Wu and He, 2005; He, 2007; Yang and Chang, 2007).
One of the clear limitations of case studies is that they cannot be used as a basis for 
drawing scientific statistical generalisations. However Yin (2003: 38) explained that 
insights from case studies can help build ‘analytical generalisations’ - explanatory 
insights that can then be compared to other empirical studies. It has also been 
argued that by providing thick, context-sensitive descriptions of case studies, case 
studies communicate transferable insights because readers may be able to discern 
the applicability of their findings to contexts which may be similar but not identical 
(Lincoln and Guba 1985; Bloomberg and Volpe 2008: 87).
Given that housing renewal can be complex interventions that evolve in time and
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across different parts of the city, it was decided that a holistic understanding of it 
required an analysis of multiple case studies. A single case study may permit a 
more focused, deeper enquiry, but it may at the same time it may miss a sense of 
the whole or what the city is really like. By studying a few cases, a more nuanced 
view may be possible (Savitch, 1988). The evidence from multiple case studies is 
often considered more compelling, because it allows the researcher to discern more 
general tendencies as well as forcing him/her to account for variations, which can 
be helpful in moving the analysis away from monolithic assumptions. In such a way 
the use of multiple case studies is also suitable for refining a theoretical framework.
According to Yin (1994: 14; 2003) a robust analytical framework anticipates the 
conditions under which specific cases in the selection may produce either similar or 
dissimilar results, and this framework can be developed by making comparisons 
with the actual findings. Many notable studies of housing or urban regeneration use 
multiple case studies to understand commonalities as well as variations in 
conditions and dynamics in different places (e.g. Gilbert and Ward, 1985; Power, 
1999; Fainstein et al, 1986).
The conceptual framework for this study (see chapter 2) anticipates housing 
renewal being driven by a powerful local state-led growth coalition for the purposes 
of enhancing exchange value of land, modernising the built environment and driving 
economic growth. It anticipates that the growth coalition may be largely 
unchallenged in its strategy, but variations in specific outcomes may occur 
depending on the specific interests of the local government for different areas, the 
constellation of actors involved, under changing economic circumstances, or in 
theory if well organised local resistance to existing renewal plans takes shape, 
forcing changes or concessions in the growth coalition's strategy.
3.4.2 Selection of case studies
Field visit to Shanghai from August 2006 to October 2007 allowed the researcher to 
become more familiar with the city, to speak to various local experts mentioned, and 
to consider possible case study areas. Several criteria were deemed important in 
the selection of case studies at the outset:
• The kind of housing and neighbourhoods involved should represent or be 
typical of the government's targets for renewal action;
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• The cases should be of physical and/or political significance in the city;
• The cases should permit the researcher to examine different approaches to 
housing renewal in post-1990 Shanghai;
• they should allow the researcher to examine a range of institutional 
arrangements underlying housing renewal- but in particular the partnership 
of property developers with local authorities;
• The case should be far enough progressed to allow in-depth evaluation of 
the process and the outcomes;
• However, it was not possible to consider income levels of specific 
neighbourhoods as a criterion for selection, because of the lack of spatially 
disaggregated income data in China.
There was no systematic record of housing renewal projects available to the public 
to facilitate sampling. Thus, in conversation with local experts and through a review 
of secondary sources the researcher personally built up a profile of 14 potential 
housing renewal schemes as a basis for selection. (A full list and summary is 
attached in Appendix 4). This sample of projects encompassed a comprehensive 
range of interventions ranging from large scale redevelopment schemes (7 in total) 
to small scaled rehabilitation/ historic conservation projects (7 in total), all initiated in 
the 1990s or 2000s and at varying stages of completion. They involved different 
housing types -  including one case of slum housing, nine cases involving 
Shanghai’s most common dilapidated ‘lilong’ housing, two cases involving better 
quality detached colonial villas, and one mixed area. Seven were areas or buildings 
with designated conservation status, and seven were without any conservation 
status. They reflected a range of institutional arrangements. Three were housing 
bureau-led initiatives. Nine were procured through some combined effort of local 
authorities and property developers, and two were private-led schemes. From these 
the researcher was able to refine the case selection criteria further. The detailed 
considerations are as follows:
Firstly, the decision was made to target one particular type of historic housing that 
has been a consistent focus of Shanghai’s housing renewal efforts from the 1980s 
till the present day -  the indigenous shikumen lilong house. This would provide a 
basis of comparing different kinds of renewal interventions. Although this form of 
formal housing was not the only target for renewal, the shikumen lilong was the 
most prevalent form of old hosing in Shanghai, it remained the priority of urban
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renewal from the 1980s into the 2000s, it reflects China’s legacy of high public 
sector ownership, and has since the 1990s also been the target of selective 
rehabilitation historic conservation. Because most of these dwellings were built 
between 191 OH 930, this also provided a clear guide to the age of neighbourhoods 
to be selected.
Secondly, the cases should have physical and/or political significance. Following the 
approach of Savitch (1988) in his study of post-industrial urban development in 
London, New York and Paris, cases should represent “critical incidents” -  events 
that involve a significant political effort to get something built, demolished, remade 
or rebuilt (ibid: 24). Critical incidents are not trivial or routine. They may affect 
significant changes in the built environment, shape an area of strategic importance, 
or be a key public policy initiative. It may involve the potential for conflict by its very 
impact on people and places, even if they do not necessarily engender overt conflict 
in the end. Studying these critical cases of urban development sheds light on the 
ways in which the system of government and other interest groups perform, and the 
impacts of their cumulative decisions and actions.
A third consideration in selecting case studies was that they should represent a 
range of development scenarios, for example different policy initiatives or different 
types of physical and/or social interventions. The selection of case studies thus 
embodied deliberate inclusion of discernibly different interventions and outcomes of 
housing renewal, in order both to draw out broader tendencies and extend 
understanding of how local differences occur.
Fourthly, because this study seeks to build upon existing insights regarding the 
“coalition” relationship amongst property actors and the local government, it was 
decided that at least two cases should entail this institutional form in project 
inception and implementation. The decision was also made to include cases 
involving “elite enterprises” -  large property developers that have had significant 
impact on the city and a long working relationship with the local authorities in the 
realm of urban redevelopment.
Fifthly, because housing renewal can be a long-term process, one other criterion 
was that the process should have progressed to an extent such that some 
preliminary assessment of its impacts could be made. Ultimately, the availability of
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secondary sources was also an important consideration. The researcher needed to 
feel at the outset that there would be sufficient range of information regarding the 
area, the project and its impacts to facilitate detailed analysis.
Finally, three case studies were chosen for this research:
• Redevelopment of the Taipingqiao area (abbreviated as TPQ): a case of 
large-scale restructuring involving significant resident displacement.
• Redevelopment of the Fukangli Neighbourhood (abbreviated as NFKL): a 
case of housing redevelopment involving community retention.
• Conservation and rehabilitation of the Taikang Road Tianzifang 
neighbourhood (abbreviated as TT): a case of piecemeal, market-led 
rehabilitation.
The locations of these case studies are shown on figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1 Locations of case studies in Shanghai
PILOT STUDIES 
CASE A: YUQINGLI 
CASE B: PENGLAI ROAD
Metro Line 2
Metro Lme8
SHANGHAI URBAN AREA
B |  Metro Una 1 B
Metro Line 2 
Metro Line 3 
I B  Metro Line 4 
W  Magiev
mh m m b i inner Elevated Ring Rd —
The Outer Ring Rd (A20) —
Q  CASE 1: TAIPINGQIAO 
0  CASE 2: TAIKANG ROAD 
0  CASE 3: NEW FUKANGLI u w o u n .
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Table 3.1: Summary of case studies
Taipingqiao area New Fukangli Taikang Road
redevelopment redevelopment Tianzifang
(TPQ) (NFKL) Rehabilitation
(TT)
Location Inner city, Luwan district. 
Well connected and well 
serviced area with high 
property values
Inner city, JingAn district. 
Well connected and well 
serviced area with high 
property values
Inner city, Luwan 
district. Well connected 
and well serviced area 
with high property 
values
Original 
building type 
and age
Dilapidated 1920s 
shikumen lilong and new- 
style lilong housing
Dilapidated 1920-1930s 
shikumen and new style 
lilong housing
Dilapidated shikumen 
lilong housing and 
various industrial 
buildings from 1920- 
30s
Original
tenure(s)
Municipal rental housing 
and informal private 
renting
Municipal rental housing 
and informal private 
renting
Municipal housing 
rental and informal 
private renting
Time-frame of 1996- ongoing 1997-2001 1998~on-going
renewal
Physical
interventions
Comprehensive 
redevelopment, with 
selective historic 
conservation
Redevelopment of 
existing housing after 
demolition
Conservation & 
Improve existing 
housing and industrial 
buildings
Scale of project 52 hectares, affecting 
approximately 70,000 
households
3.9 hectares, affecting 
approximately 1600 
households
Approximately 7 
hectares, 300 dwellings 
upgraded from 2004- 
2009
Physical/
functional
outcomes
Transformation from 
municipal housing 
towards commercial 
offices, retail and 
entertainment facilities, 
luxury private housing
Transformation from 
municipal housing 
towards to a modem 
residential complex for 
private ownership
Transformation from 
municipal housing 
towards commercial, 
retail and cultural 
destination
Key social 
impacts
Forced displacement of 
original households and 
occupants, and 
replacement by high 
income groups and 
international businesses
Partial community 
retention, partial 
relocation and 
replacement by new 
house-buyers
Partial community 
retention, partial 
voluntary relocation by 
residents to profit from 
rising property values
Relevant policy 
initiative
New Round of Urban 
Renewal, from 2001
Old Housing Amenity 
Fulfilment Renewal, from 
1995-2001
Not a policy driven 
initiative
Key
institutions
Local authorities and 
large Hong Kong property 
developer
District housing bureau 
and large local state- 
owned property 
developer
Market-led investment 
by small businesses 
and cultural-creative 
firms with indirect local 
official support
Source: author’s fieldwork
Table 3.1 summarises the key parameters of the cases. All of them were located in
the inner city -  which concentrated the older dilapidated housing stock and has
been the target of urban renewal since 1990. All of the neighbourhoods were
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characterised at the outset by shikumen lilong housing dating between 1910 and 
1930s, which exhibited common problems of physical decay, crowding and poor 
amenities. All of them reflected China’s legacy of public-housing provision and were 
predominantly municipal public housing. They represented a range of interventions. 
The two redevelopment schemes were enacted via a partnership between the local 
authorities and large real estate enterprises -  one case involving a local state- 
owned enterprise, and another a private Hong Kong developer. The rehabilitation 
scheme was more decentralised and was a ‘bottom-up initiative’ involving local 
residents and individual businesses.
Case study one: the Taipingqiao (TPQ) redevelopment scheme is one of the largest 
redevelopment schemes in the whole of Shanghai. Initiated in 1996 (and still on­
going) it entails the transformation of a strategic area of the city next to Shanghai’s 
premiere commercial centres - Huaihai Road. It covers an area of 52-hectares, and 
has a planned total construction floor area of over 1.3 million m2 including retail/ 
entertainment facilities, commercial office buildings and luxury apartments. It can be 
considered a ‘critical issue’ because of its scale, its locational significance, the 
scope of its impact on the existing environment, and because it represents a part of 
the major municipal urban renewal policy since 2001 (The New Round of Urban 
Renewal). Although it has already been the subject of several extensive studies (He 
and Wu, 2005; Yang and Chang, 2007; Yang, 2008), these had focused on one 
early part of the overall redevelopment project (Xintiandi). They did not offer first­
hand data on pre-renewal neighbourhood conditions and had only limited data 
regarding later phases of the on-going redevelopment process. This study provides 
a more comprehensive investigation by examining the conditions of ‘pre-renewal’ 
housing in the neighbourhood as well as considering various subsequent phases of 
redevelopment using more up to date data.
The two other case studies are significantly smaller in scale. Case study two: 
redevelopment of Fukangli (NFKL) took place between 1997 and 2001 as part of a 
different policy of ‘Old Housing Amenity Fulfilment Renewal’. It affected a community 
of approximately 1,600 households on a site of 39,000 m2. The scheme symbolised 
a step in the evolution a community retention oriented housing renewal approach 
since the 1990s. Apart from a recent effort by Tian and Wu (2007) this approach has 
previously been less researched, because most scholars have focused on the more 
speculatively driven approach typified by case TPQ. The author was interested to
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examine through this case how the local authorities organised the planning and 
delivery this model of renewal, and whether it sheds additional light on the nature of 
decision making regarding housing renewal in Shanghai.
Housing rehabilitation has not been the subject of in-depth research in China, 
because it remains a relatively rare phenomenon. However, as argued in the 
literature review, given that it exists it should be incorporated as part of a broader 
approach to examining housing renewal. The third case study is the conservation 
and rehabilitation of Taikang Road ‘Tianzifang’ (T.T) neighbourhood. This involved 
the piecemeal ‘gentrification’ of a run-down neighbourhood and its transformation of 
function from public housing towards a mixed-use district including artistic, 
commercial and retail functions. It also involved a rare political struggle to save the 
neighbourhood from existing demolition plans. At the time of the field research, 
approximately 300 dwellings had experienced upgrading and functional conversion 
and the location has become popularised as a cultural-consumption landmark of 
international renown. The emergence of a market-based rehabilitation dynamic 
against the background of large-scale redevelopment, and the political decision to 
promote historic conservation rather than demolition represented a critical incidence. 
The author was interested in including this case to understand the factors that were 
involved in the rehabilitation of run-down historic housing in Shanghai as opposed to 
redevelopment and to shed light on the implications of rehabilitation on the existing 
community.
3.5 Carrying out the case studies
3.5.1 Pilot studies
Field data for this research was accumulated over four successive visits to 
Shanghai between August 2006 and October 2008. For each case study the 
approach was first to gather general information from secondary sources, secondly 
to interview key actors in government and in other institutions responsible for 
conceiving and implementing housing renewal, and finally to interview local 
residents or businesses who have had direct experience of the process. Housing 
renewal was examined in terms the public policies at work, the roles, interests and 
inter-relations of the key stake-holders, the decision making and implementation 
procedures at different stages, and the impact of interventions on neighbourhood
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conditions and residents. These were meant to allow the researcher to reconstruct 
how the interventions were conceived and implemented and how different agents 
affected changes.
Two pilot studies were carried out in early 2007, to understand the living conditions 
of dilapidated neighbourhoods and to develop the researcher's interview techniques. 
Their locations are also marked on figure 3.1. One study was Yuqingli - a 
neighbourhood of old-style lilong housing dating back to 1910 which has been 
demarcated for demolition. Eight interviews were carried out with local residents to 
understand various dimensions of the neighbourhood: housing conditions from a 
long-term perspective, tenure and rental relationships, social dynamics and local 
social networks, perceptions of location quality, residential aspirations of residents, 
and their views regarding how urban renewal impacts the city and residents.
The second pilot study was a small-scale rehabilitation project (Penglai Road 252 
lane) implemented between 1991~1994 as an experimental project by the Nanshi 
District Housing Bureau. This socially oriented scheme involved a small community 
of 23 lilong dwellings and about 70 households whose homes were converted into 
99 autonomous flats. It represented a step in the evolution of Shanghai’s approach 
to old housing rehabilitation and it was valuable to understand how local officials 
viewed the approach and why it was not later widely replicated. In total 13 residents 
were interviewed, as well as two housing bureau officials responsible for the 
scheme. Pilot studies were written up in as full case reports and provided invaluable 
insights into the conditions and characteristics of run-down neighbourhoods, the 
kinds of residents who lived in them, some of their perspectives regarding the urban 
process, and about early approaches to housing rehabilitation. Many of these 
insights were eventually incorporated into various parts of the thesis.
3.5.2 Secondary sources and observations
Each formal case study began with the collection of secondary documents and visits 
to the areas, although these were also on-going processes alongside other methods 
of data collection. Secondary sources included published documents or reports by 
the responsible institutions, from media articles and journal articles. They provided 
information about redevelopment plans, chronologies, the key agencies involved, 
often some idea of company backgrounds, and the key impacts of renewal.
Nevertheless, the extent of detail was varied. In addition, the researcher made 
personal visits to each area. Spending time observing the neighbourhoods -  
including any redeveloped parts and any surrounding non-upgraded parts - provided 
many insights about the physical, environmental and social conditions of each place. 
My observations were recorded by notes and photographs during each visit. A 
sense of the local housing market was also established by visiting estate agencies 
in each area.
Published information was relatively abundant for the large-scale redevelopment 
project of TPQ. This notably came from both the Shanghai and Hong Kong media 
and several international academic journal papers which had provided institutional 
analysis of the early years of the redevelopment process (He and Wu, 2005; Yang 
and Chang, 2007). Several media interviews with the director and CEO of the 
developer regarding their strategy, company background and relations with local 
officials proved particularly useful. The developer provided the researcher with 
information regarding the overall redevelopment plan, and detailed information 
about the progress of redevelopment, the marketing and sale of constructed space 
and their profit implications were found through the developer’s company reports for 
the years 2006 to 2008.
More limited information existed regarding the rehabilitation of Taikang Road 
Tianzifang. Most existed in the form of local media articles from 2005~2009 
regarding the rehabilitation process, the key actors thought to have facilitated the 
process, and some of the key urban planning decisions regarding the area being 
undertaken by the city authorities.
Secondary sources regarding the New Fukangli case primarily came from the 
respective websites of the property developer and architectural design consultant. 
These provided basic outlines of the redevelopment plan, policies, the agents 
involved, resident resettlement and physical outcomes. They also provided 
substantial insights about the backgrounds of the property developer and the 
political and business credentials of its company director. Socio-economic data for 
the redeveloped community was found in two neighbourhood-level surveys targeting 
New Fukangli. These allowed me to describe the socio-economic impacts of the 
redevelopment process. The first was by Li and Wu (2004, 2006) conducted in 2002 
in conjunction with the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. A more recent one
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was by University of College London researcher Richard Wang (unpublished 
manuscript, 2009) over July-August 2007, under official approval by the local Street 
Office and disseminated by the local Resident's Committee. This more recent 
survey was used to understand the most recent socio-economic composition NFKL, 
almost ten years after redevelopment. Out of a total of around 1,200 households in 
the estate, 164 households were randomly sampled. 89 valid, completed 
questionnaires were returned, representing about 7% of the community. 
Respondents were the heads of households.
It was difficult to understand the socio-economic profiles and their changes the two 
other case studies (TPQ and TT). China’s census data does not provide information 
about specific neighbourhoods or small areas. Alternatively, conducting primary 
surveys would have required substantial administrative support from government 
bureaus, street-offices or other local institutions. The researcher did not have the 
channels to organise these. Instead, the changing social composition was deduced 
from interviews with local residents as well as from local real-estate prices. Indeed, 
the main focus of the study was to address qualitative questions regarding the 
urban politics of housing renewal.
3.5.3 interviewing decision makers
The second aspect of data collection was to interview government officials and 
private sector stakeholders responsible for project conception and implementation. 
Interviews formed an important source of primary data, to fill in gaps in the 
documentary sources, to corroborate the evidence, and to gain more insights into 
the relationships and processes involved in each case. Some major benefits of 
interviews include its potential to elicit rich descriptions, and the ability to capture a 
person’s perspective of events and experiences (Creswell 1994; Marshall and 
Rossman, 2006; Denzin and Lincoln, 2003). Interview schedules were specific for 
each case and are shown in Appendix 1. In general, they focused on the following 
issues:
• Pre-renewal conditions of the relevant neighbourhood.
• The policies, objectives and renewal strategies adopted.
• How the process was organised, including who was involved, when, the
roles and interactions between different agents (particularly the local
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government, developer, and local residents), and the influence of different 
agents on the outcomes.
• The (on-going) impacts for the targeted area: including physical, social,
economic and housing market implications.
• The relocation of any residents, the terms of relocation and any known
implications.
The semi-structured interview was adopted because it gave the researcher some 
control over key issues to be discussed while allowing sufficient sense of informality 
for respondents to speak freely. As already mentioned, the researcher was aware of 
significant constraints in accessing key decision makers. This was inevitably a time- 
consuming and uncertain process. However targeting specific cases and by 
gradually building up my own network of contacts, I was eventually successful in 
gaining access to some key stakeholders in each of the case studies.
Using secondary sources as a guide, local authorities and developers were formally 
contacted by telephone or through personal visits to their offices. The researcher 
highlighted his U.K student status and emphasised great interest in learning about 
the relevant case from the views of those directly involved. Often this led to refusals, 
and sometimes secondary materials would be provided in good faith. Where I was 
successful I was often referred to relevant departments or to intermediary persons 
who could refer me to specific persons to contact and to submit a request for 
interview. Referrals from intermediaries within respective organisations were often 
more helpful in getting through to the key persons.
For the New Fukangli (NFKL) case, a former official of the JingAn District housing 
bureau was a key informant. He directed the old housing renewal office co­
ordinating the project and was simultaneously a manager within the quasi- 
governmental property development company who implemented the scheme. In this 
sense he occupied a critical role from conception to completion. Corroborating 
insights about this scheme and its surrounding developments were gained from 
another official within the JingAn district urban planning bureau. He did not have 
direct involvement in this scheme but had in-depth knowledge of all developments in 
this district.
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For the case of rehabilitation at Taikang Road Tianzifang (T.T), two local officials 
who played critical roles were interviewed. One was a former director of the 
Dapuqiao Street Office - the sub-district government office who oversaw for 
business development and service provision in the area. Another was a manager of 
the Taikang Road Art Street management Committee (TRAMSC) -  which managed 
and promoted significant changes in the neighbourhood since 1998. Both 
informants were contacted through personal visits to the offices of the TRAMSC. 
During these interviews, they also provided the researcher with relevant reports and 
documents. This includes a report by the National Economics Research Institute of 
the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (2004), a government policy think-tank. 
Nevertheless, the researcher was unable to access district or municipal-level 
government officials who played more indirect roles in the urban planning process. 
This may have limited the depth of understanding regarding the negotiation 
processes occurring between the sub-district and higher-level authorities.
For the Taipingqiao (TPQ) area redevelopment interviewees included two key 
architects responsible some important components of the overall redevelopment 
project.3 Due to their early involvement in the redevelopment scheme and 
experience of working with the developer and local planning authorities, they were 
able to provide substantial insights about the personalities and processes involved. 
They helped verify and also clarify various findings of pre-existing studies. However 
the principal developer Sui-On Land declined the request for interview, and the 
author was also unable to interview other responsible government officials. This 
inevitably limited my first-hand information and meant that I had to rely considerably 
upon various secondary sources already described, including company and project 
reports provided by Shui-On Land.
All the interviews described were carried out by the researcher personally, in 
Mandarin, my native language. The only exception was in the case of one foreign 
architect who was interviewed in English. The interviews lasted from one to two 
hours, and most were recorded and written up in full soon after the interview. I was 
able to organise follow-up conversations with several of them to clarify further 
queries or to follow up on-going transformations. All the interviews were carried out 
under the condition of confidentiality. Some of the key agents in these highly 
publicised schemes are already public knowledge, but in the reporting of the
3 Xintiandi and Lakeville Residential developments (see Chapter five)
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evidence the researcher has avoided naming any individuals.
One limitation of the interview as a research method in general pertains to the issue 
of ‘participant reactivity’ (Maxwell, 1996, Bloomberg and Volpe 2008: 87). 
Responses are inevitably influenced by the nature of interviewer-interviewee 
relations and communicative dynamics. It was expected that respondents would to 
some degree provide accounts that represented their own interests. This is a well 
known limitation of much urban research (see Logan et al, 1997). I was 
nevertheless careful about the ways I might be influencing the respondents, and 
tried to elicit the most open and candid responses from each interview. Fortunately, I 
was able to establish a degree of rapport with the respondents and they tended to 
speak relatively openly and in a responsible fashion. Most saw these case studies 
as exemplary practices in Shanghai, with positive achievements and contributions to 
the problem of housing renewal, so they were pleased to share their own 
experiences.
Each of the dimensions of the case studies was discussed. However it was felt that 
generally the respondents had only limited understanding of the detailed living 
conditions of the old neighbourhoods, resorting to common generalisations. 
Furthermore their discussions of the terms of relocation -  such as the locations of 
relocation estates or the nature of the process were often limited to what they were 
willing to disclose, possibly downplaying the degree of conflicts. This meant that 
interviews with affected residents were crucial to gain a holistic perspective of the 
process.
3.5.4 Interviewing iocai residents
Interviews with local residents turned out to be extremely valuable in terms of 
understanding pre- and post-renewal living conditions, community dynamics, and 
resident’s perspectives of the processes. The plan was to interview around 10 
residents in each case study area. The interview schedule used can be found in 
Appendix 1. One aim was to understand community perspectives regarding the pre­
renewal neighbourhood conditions, and post-renewal conditions if they returned to 
the upgraded neighbourhood after the interventions. The other aim was to 
understand their views and experiences of housing renewal, including following 
issues:
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• How housing renewal began in their area and what it entailed.
• Who was apparently driving the process and what was the role of residents 
in the community.
• The impacts of interventions on the neighbourhood in terms of physical, 
social, location and affordability implications.
• Any relocation of residents, how it worked and how these affected different 
residents.
• Perceived satisfaction or otherwise associated with the terms and processes 
of change, and the reasons for these opinions
• The discussions explored not only the informant’s own experiences but also 
similar or contrasting experiences/ perspectives of others they could think of.
There were some apparent limitations for sampling at the outset. It was generally 
not possible to access residents already relocated due to redevelopment, because 
years after the process their whereabouts and contact details cannot be traced. 
Thus, in the case of TPQ the interviews included only those residents who still lived 
in dilapidated housing nearby. In the case NFKL, where some community retention 
was facilitated, I interviewed these ‘returnees’ as well as the new settlers who 
superseded displacees. In the case of TT, I was more fortunately able to interview 
both residents who still lived in the neighbourhood and those who had recently 
relocated away voluntarily.
Table 3.2: Number of interviews in the case studies
Subtotal TPQ* NFKL TT
Interviewed respondents 35 9 10 16
Informal conversations 36 6 9 21
Total 71 15 19 37
Note: * From one surviving lilong housing community selected within the TPQ case 
study area
In total, 35 interviews and 36 informal conversations were conducted out across the 
three case studies. Table 3.2 shows the numbers in each area. Interviews were only 
loosely structured, intended for the residents to speak freely and openly. The 
majority lasted no more than 30 minutes, although several lasted up to two hours. 
Informal conversations with local residents and businesses helped verify the issues 
generated in the interviews, or point out new issues to be discussed in more detail 
in subsequent interviews.
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The objective in sampling was not to achieve a statistically representative sample, 
but an information rich-sample that would provide the viewpoints of residents with a 
range of characteristics such as age, gender, household forms, income status, and 
living conditions. The intention was to include specifically some disadvantaged 
households such as the low-income, the unemployed, retired and elderly residents 
who are widely known to be more vulnerable also in the processes of housing 
renewal (Wu, 2004; He and Wu, 2007). However this turned out to be extremely 
difficult to do because there was a lack of household registers to facilitate household 
selection. The results reflected the shortcomings of a much more informal approach.
In conducting resident interviews in China many researchers take a rather formal 
approach, engaging the assistance of local resident committees. These committees 
form an important part of the system of neighbourhood management in China. They 
comprise government-appointed staff as well as elected members of communities 
who help manage neighbourhood services. They do not have significant decision 
making roles in the housing renewal process, but because they tend to have good 
knowledge of the community they can help elicit resident to participate and help 
identify households for interview.
However the author felt that as administrative arms of the local government they did 
not necessarily share the same interests or views as all local residents. Their 
involvement may bias the selection of respondents, and may have made it more 
difficult to ensure the anonymity of informants. All these might impact residents’ 
willingness to express their views openly. To prevent these potential biases, I opted 
not to elicit the help of resident committees. Residents were instead elicited in an 
informal manner in various public spaces of each community, such as in the network 
of lanes that characterised the traditional lilong housing. It was relatively easy to 
access a large number of potential informants in each of the communities because 
public spaces were well used. Thus, almost all of the interviews were carried out ‘on 
the spot’ outside or occasionally insides respondents’ homes.
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 (overleaf) summarise the respondents’ housing status and 
general attitudes towards housing demolition. About half the respondents were still 
living in lilong housing at the time of the interview, and half were formerly residents 
of lilong housing who had since moved to new residences. Many informants were
98
long-term residents in the same address with at least two decades of living in the 
same place. This was advantageous because they had in-depth knowledge of the 
areas, their communities and the dynamics of change over a long period of time -  
often not recorded by any secondary sources. About half were public tenants in 
lilong housing, and the rest were either home-owners through privatisation or 
renting privately. It is interesting to note that about 60% among those interviewed 
were critical or opposed to current redevelopment practices, and about 20 % 
explicitly supported it. Thus, a range of viewpoints was incorporated.
Table 3.3: Respondents’ housing status and attitudes to housing renewal
Total % of total TPQ NFKL TT
Total interviewees 35 100 9 10 16
Currently lives in lilong housing 17 49 9 0 8
Formerly lived in lilong housing 18 51 0 10 8
Tenure
Renting current home publically 15 43 7 0 8
Owns current home 9 26 0 9 0
Renting current home privately 11 31 2 1 8
Attitudes to housing and renewal
Supported demolition/ redevelopment 8 22 3 10 2
Satisfied with current home 15 43 6 10 5
Opposed to or critical of 
redevelopment
20 57 6 0 9
Did not express clearly 5 14 0 0 5
Source: author’s fieldwork
Table 3.4: Lengths of residence of respondents
Subtotal TPQ NFKL TT
Valid responses 19 7 3 9
0 -5  years 2 1 1 0
5~ 10 Years 3 1 1 1
11-20 Years 2 0 0 2
2 1 -3 0  Years 5 2 0 3
31-50 Years 1 1 0 0
51 years or more 6 2 1 3
Don't know 16 2 7 7
Source: author’s fieldwork
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Table 3.5: Demographic and socio-economic raits of interviewees
Total % TPQ NFKL TT
Number of informants 35 100.0 9 16 10
Gender
Male 23 65.7 6 10 7
Female 12 34.3 3 6 3
Age group
<30 0 0.0 0 0 0
3 0 -3 9 3 8.6 1 0 2
4 0 -4 9 2 5.7 0 1 1
5 0 -5 9 13 37.1 4 5 4
6 0 -6 9 16 45.7 5 8 3
70-80 2 5.7 0 2 0
80+ 1 2.9 0 1 0
Annual Income* (yuan/person)
Did not respond 23 65.7 4 9 10
- Very low (<10,000) 3 8.6 1 2 0
-Low (10 ,0 0 1 -1 5 ,0 0 0 ) 1 2.9 1 0 0
-M id-low (1 5 ,0 0 1 -2 0 ,0 0 0 ) 5 14.3 2 3 0
-Middle (2 0 ,0 0 1 -3 0 ,0 0 0 ) 1 2.9 0 1 0
-Mid-high (3 0 ,0 0 1 -5 0 ,0 0 0 ) 2 5.7 1 1 0
-High (>50,001) 0 0.0 0 0 0
Employment status
Retired 19 54.3 6 10 3
Employed 11 31.4 2 4 5
Laid Off 2 5.7 1 1 0
Retired but doing regular 
work 2 5.7 0 1 1
Did not respond 1 2.9 0 0 1
Source: author’s fieldwork, * Most respondents did not provide income details
Table 3.5 summarises their household demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics. In terms of gender, there was a bias towards male respondents in 
each case study, with a total of 23 out of the 35 respondents being male, and 12 
being female. Interviewees ranged between the age of 30 and 95. However, overall 
the sample included mostly older households. Most of the interviewees were middle 
aged or older retirees, with 13 out of 35 aged between 50-59, and 16 aged between 
60-69. This was consistent with more general demographic and socio-economic 
trends identified in older deprived residential areas in China (Wu and He, 2005b; Li 
and Wu, 2006). Most respondents did not wish to give income details, thus it was
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difficult to determine the socio-economic make-up of the sample. Nevertheless, of 
those that did there was a range from very low annual household incomes of less 
than 10,000 yuan to above-middle earnings of more than 30,000-50,000 yuan.
There were several shortcomings with the informal selection process. On the whole, 
younger residents, the unemployed and rural migrants were less well represented. 
In terms of the household-registration status, all of the residents had local, urban 
‘hukou’ status. No rural migrants were interviewed, even though both this study and 
others (e.g. Li and Wu, 2006; Wu and He, 2005b) show that they can be a 
significant part of the population living in older, deteriorated housing. Rural migrants 
were generally more recent settlers in the city and these communities, and they did 
not appear to be very ready to speak about their personal predicaments. Only a few 
informal conversations and observations of their homes were carried out. To 
compensate for this shortcoming, the researcher tried to gain insights about them 
and their lifestyles in the community when interviewing their immediate neighbours. 
Census data was also consulted to better understand characteristics of the migrant 
population.
Regarding the issue of relocation, in retrospect this sample included residents who 
either are yet to experience relocation from old housing, or have experienced on­
site resettlement, or have moved away voluntarily in the market. Most residents did 
have considerable insights into the relocation process due to its pervasive influence 
on their neighbourhoods, their families or friends over the last two decades. 
Nevertheless a more balanced viewpoint might have been achieved if the 
researcher had been able to interview post-relocation households who could reflect 
better upon their entire relocation experience. In recognition of this gap, the 
researcher also took care to compare the interview findings to other evidence from 
the wider literature.
3.5.5 Analysing the case studies
As the data gathering progressed, each case was at first considered independently, 
within its own context. At first, a general ‘narrative’ of each case was written up in a 
chronological order by bringing together the sources of data. The qualitative 
components generated a large quantity of data which had to be categorised and 
gradually distilled down. Interview transcripts were sorted by case studies, by the
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research questions, and also by the specific interview questions. Summary tables 
were used to capture the range of responses to key issues. Useful quotations were 
collated together under relevant headings to get a sense of the overall picture and 
for later use. To help better organise the information, and in the final reporting, case 
studies were divided into stages of the renewal process. These were:
1. The pre-renewal area and community conditions.
2. The initiation stage, which concerned who made the decision to intervention 
in the built environment, their underlying objectives, and how the decision 
was shaped through the political process.
3. The formation of an organisational structure to carry out housing renewal 
and the development of a specific plan of action. This stage usually involves 
key interventions including appointment of developer, land transfer and the 
negotiation of subsidies and development proposals.
4. The implementation stage, which emphasises who carried out the decisions 
and how changes in the built environment and community fabric are enacted. 
This stage usually involves a range of potential interventions from resident 
resettlement, to the (re)construction, and subsequent sale of built products, 
but also negotiation or conflict over the plan or decision.
5. The outcomes of renewal, which considers the effect in terms of 
transformations in the built environment, the land-use, housing tenure, the 
social composition and the effects on local social relations. Many of these 
were on-going changes and it was the nature and direction of change that 
was the focus. While the material dimensions of change were often 
discernible through documentary evidence and personal observations, the 
meanings of these changes and the social implications of these changes 
were only discernible through the words and sentiments of local 
communities.
Further analysis then paid attention to understanding ‘who’ runs the process, and 
‘how’ decisions about the built environment and the neighbourhood fabric were 
brought about. This was structured by themes:
• The socio-economic context of renewal, and how these were reflected in the 
decisions made and the outcomes of housing renewal.
• The roles and powers of the local authorities, its plans, policies agendas,
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and what it does specifically to carry out housing renewal.
• The private sector institutions (for example property developers, and design 
consultants) involved, who they were, and their relationship with the local 
authorities in the planning/ design/ implementation process.
• The role and options of local residents relative to other parties in the renewal 
process, including resident resettlement process.
• Any opposition to top-down decisions and plans, what forms these took and 
their impacts.
In understanding ‘how’ processes were determined, attention was paid to the 
‘instruments’ used to realise housing renewal: for example urban planning, 
subsidies, grants, compensation and concessions provided to households. The 
author also paid attention to the style and techniques of decision making, for 
example through a top-down directive, or as a collaborative effort, or involving 
conflict/ bargaining within a larger set of organisations.
Then, a cross-case analysis was carried out. Although individual case studies could 
be understood in their own contexts, in the cross-case comparison it was also 
important to situate all the cases into a broader economic, social and political 
context -  as a way of opening out to a more holistic view of the whole. Accounting 
for similarities and differences across the case studies was particularly valuable in 
forcing the author to move away from adopting monolithic analytical assumptions. 
Yet, the underlying similarities drawn out also shed light on more general tendencies.
The comparison of the case studies was made easier by structuring the material 
both by phases and by themes. This made it possible to identify similarities and 
differences at each stage, the factors which seemed to sustain the similarities, and 
those which distinguished them. Key findings were then compared and contrasted 
to the existing literature and to the Chinese growth coalition perspective established 
in the literature review. These became the basis for answering the research 
questions.
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3.6 Summary:
This research adopted a mixed methods approach. The quality of the research was 
accounted for as much as possible by using multiple sources of data to elicit rich 
accounts of places, policies, processes and outcomes. Substantial care was given 
to selecting and analysing information-rich, critical incidence case-studies. One 
case of large-scale redevelopment and displacement, one case of redevelopment 
involving community retention, and finally a case of small-scaled housing 
rehabilitation were used to shed light on a range of housing renewal processes. This 
research was designed so as to permit the researcher to as much as possible 
establish a holistic understanding of the varied political agendas, institutions and 
outcomes associated with housing renewal in Shanghai since 1990.
However, as acknowledged by urban researchers (Stone, 1989; Ley, 1996), it was in 
practice impossible to unravel all relevant aspects of the topic. The methodology 
had limitations which reflected the difficulty of gaining access to both high-level 
decision makers and marginal groups in Shanghai, the difficulty of re-tracing 
relocation processes in the case studies, the small number of case studies that 
could feasibly be carried out, and to some extent the deficiency of detailed housing 
and socio-economic data in China. Yet the author believes that the overall strategy 
adopted was correct, that the key findings were supported by multiple reliable 
sources, and that the conclusions should stand up to scrutiny by others in the field.
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4 Shanghai in Transition: Contextualising Market- 
Oriented Housing Renewal
4.1 Introduction
After almost three decades of economic reforms and the consequent relaxation of 
social controls, Chinese cities have undergone extraordinary transformations. In this 
period, one of the most critical governing challenges for the state was how to deal 
with the run-down and over-crowded urban housing stock, to improve the living 
conditions of its citizens, whilst meeting new demands for industrial, commercial and 
cultural activities (Wu, 1999). This chapter contextualises housing problems in 
Shanghai in a historical perspective and provides an overview of the government’s 
responses amidst complex institutional and structural changes in the post-reform 
era. Section two traces the origin and the nature of Shanghai’s urban housing 
problems up to 1990. Section three, reviews major political, economic, social and 
housing system changes taking place in the post-reform era. Section four examines 
Shanghai’s evolving policies for housing redevelopment, rehabilitation and 
conservation since 1990. Section five provides an overview of the most apparent 
impacts of housing renewal up to 2005.
4.2 Urban housing problems in perspective:
4.2.1 Shanghai’s early ‘golden age’
Shanghai is situated near the centre of China's Eastern coastline, bordering on 
Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces. Today, it is one of the most populous cities in the 
world, with a population of 18.88 million at the end of 2008, of which 5.17 million are 
migrants. The metropolitan area occupies a total land area of 6,377 square 
kilometres (SSB, 2009). Since China's economic reforms in 1978, the city has 
enjoyed sustained economic growth, with particularly rapid development since 1990. 
The city has come to assume the position of an economic power house of the East 
Asian region. Its GDP has grown in leaps and bounds, from 2.7 billion yuan in 1978 
to 78.7 billion yuan in 1990 and reached 916.4 billion yuan in 2005. Its annual GDP 
growth rate has been at over 12% since 1992 (SSB, 2006). The annual per capita 
disposable income in 2008 was 26,675 yuan, making it one of the most prosperous
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cities in China (SSB, 2009).
Figure 4.1: Location of Shanghai in China
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Table 4.1: Population of Shanghai, 2000-2008
Unit: million people
2000 2008
Population % Population %
Total 16.09 100 18.88 100.0
Local Residents 13.10 81.4 13.71 72.6
Migrants 2.99 18.6 5.17 27.3
Source: SSB (2009)
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Built along the Huangpu River in the lower Yangtze delta, Shanghai’s development 
has been linked to its history as China’s largest seaport. It entered the stage of 
modern commercial and industrial development in the second half of the 19th 
century. The Opium Wars (1839-41), which erupted after the Chinese imposition of 
trade bans on foreign opium, marked an important turning point in the city’s fortunes. 
At the end of the Opium Wars, western powers succeeded in forcing the Qing 
government (the last feudal government in China) to sign the Nanjing Treaty in 1842, 
which granted foreigners with privileges to live and trade in China. Under the Treaty, 
Shanghai became one of the five treaty ports open to Western Trade and settlement 
and was divided into a Chinese municipality and two foreign-run districts: the 
International Settlement and the French Concession (Figure 4.2).
Subsequent growth in foreign trade and the establishment of China's first modern 
institutions of higher learning soon made Shanghai the financial and cultural centre 
of the Orient (Wu, 2004). Its population increased to two million in 1915 and 
reached three million in 1930 (Cheng, 1999). During this so-called ‘golden age’ its 
industrial production accounted for half of the total value of production of China. The 
city concentrated 90 percent of China’s banks and over half of China’s foreign trade 
(Felicity and Tang, 2002). It became the seventh largest city in the world in 1936 
(Yusuf and Wu, 2002) and was seen as “a meeting ground for people from all 
countries, a great and a unique city, one of the most remarkable in the world” (Pott, 
1928: 1).
Figure 4.2: Map Shanghai, 1935
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Shanghai’s urban housing legacy can be traced largely to this phase of rapid 
development. Due to its contact with the western world, it inherited a rich western- 
inspired architectural heritage. Alongside successive waves of population growth 
and economic prosperity, a modern real estate industry developed in which both 
Chinese and foreign developers built large quantities of new commercial facilities 
and housing. By the 1920s, the city boasted the most highly developed urban 
amenities in Asia outside of Tokyo. The officials who managed the city’s 
International Settlement and French Concession built electricity networks, sewerage 
lines, and tramways that were the equal of most European cities (Wu, 1999). A 
variety of western influenced housing forms characterised the built environment of 
Shanghai by the time of the socialist revolution (1949), and these continued today to 
be highly visible in the central areas today.
Beneath the glitter of economic success, this was a time where extraordinary wealth 
existed side by side with extreme poverty (Wu, 2004; Lu, 1999). At the lowest end of 
the housing hierarchy, peasants from rural areas, refugees and poor industrial 
workers were concentrated in slums and informal constructions where conditions 
were the poorest (Lu, 1999). At the opposite end of the spectrum, western style 
villas and apartments built mainly in the French and International Concessions were 
the homes to Shanghai’s wealthiest households. Detached villas with gardens, built 
to a variety of international styles comprised 9.5% of the total housing space by 
1949. Modern or art-deco styled apartments which often provided a very high 
standard of modern facilities accounted for 4.3% of the total housing space by 1949 
(ECSREH, 1999).
Nevertheless the most prevalent housing type in Shanghai during this time, and for 
much of the 20th century, was a form of low-rise terraced housing called “lilong” 
housing. The Chinese term "Li" traditionally means a neighbourhood, or an 
organisation of multiple households. "Long" means lane or alley (Lu, 1999; Guan, 
1996).The design of lilong housing represents a unique fusion of the Chinese and 
the foreign. While the layout and structure of houses derived from traditional 
courtyard dwelling of south-eastern China, the larger spatial organisation mimicked 
European terraced housing to maximise the efficiency land use. Individual housing 
units were tightly attached to form rows. The rows were usually evenly set out inside 
the land plot to form a residential complex. Spaces between rows of housing formed
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a network of circulation lanes. Up to hundreds of dwellings may exist in a single 
Figure 4.3: Prominent older housing types in Shanghai today
1. Detached garden villa
2. New-style lilong house
3. Staff housing
4 S hikum en lilong 
5. Shikum en lilong (restored)
Source: author’s fieldwork
Note: “staff housing” is the dominant form of workers’ housing built from 1949 to 
1980s.
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development. Street-side units commonly accommodated laundries, teahouses, 
groceries stores, and bathhouses -  providing everyday necessities (Hammond, 
2006). Up to 1949 around 200,000 dwellings were built, accommodating a very 
diverse ‘middle mass’ of the urban population, ranging from the relatively well-off 
middle class families as well as migrant workers of lower socio-economic status (Lu, 
1999; Xu, 2004).
The lilong was an evolving housing typology that derived several variants. The 
oldest of the surviving lilong housing, known as the ‘old style shikumen lilong’ were 
developed in the city from around 1880 until 1915 (figure 4.2). Designed for the 
traditional family, this early housing form was relatively spacious. The basic housing 
prototype was a two-storied main building that enclosed a central courtyard (Guan, 
1996).
Figure 4.4: Typical plan of an early shikumen lilong house
1. Courtyard
2. Central Hall
3. Bedroom
4. Light-well
5. Kitchen
6. Storage
7. Storage or Servant room
Source: Sheng (1987: 25)
To meet rising demand from a growing number of smaller, lower-income families a 
more compact and space-efficient form - known simply as “shikumen lilong” - 
became prevalent from around 1910 (Guan, 1996). Typical dimensions of a unit 
were about 14m in length by about 4m in width, of two-or three stories. Thus, 
dwellings typically provided between 100-150 m2 of living space. Standards of 
amenity for lilong housing up to this point were still basic. Indoor WC, bath, 
electricity, heating and gas connections were not integrated into the house. 
Residents relied upon bath houses in the city, and used chamber pots which were 
emptied and collected by waste collectors each morning (Lu, 1999). By 1949, inner
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city Shanghai comprised more than 12.4 million m2 of shikumen lilong housing 
(about 100,000 units). These remained the key housing form for the majority of the 
urban population up to the 1980s, but by the 1990s became the main targets for 
demolition.
Figure 4.5: Typical plans of shikumen lilong houses
First-floor Plan Second-floor Plan
a) One-Jian Unit
Source: Sheng (1987: 35)
1. Courtyard
2. Central Hall
3. Bedroom
4. Light-well
3. Kitchen
6. Stonge
7. Bathroom
8. Auxiliary Room
L i-L i.
Second-floor Plan
b) One-Jian and one shiang unit
A more modern variant, ‘New-style’ lilong housing evolved in the 1920s and 30s 
alongside the growth a middle class in the foreign concessions. Reflecting their 
demand for more modern lifestyles and higher standards of living, its interior layouts 
became more westernised and modern amenities such as toilet, bath, heating, 
fireplaces and even garaging were incorporated (Guan, 1996). New style lilong 
housing became the second most-prevalent form of housing after old-style lilong in 
Shanghai with a total floor area of about 4.7 million m2 (around 23,000 units). To this 
day, new style lilong housing as a sub-type is a valued housing type and most are 
protected from demolition (refer to Section 4.4.5).
Although the early 20th century was a time of relative prosperity, problems such as 
exploitive landlords, high rents, and over-crowding plagued the city by the 1930s, 
against the background of successive population growth and civil unrest. 
Successive Japanese invasions of coastal China in 1932, and later in 1937 led to 
explosive population growth in the foreign concessions. Refugees encompassed 
both the affluent and the poor, and were eventually settled through different means. 
The poor hastily erected informal housing on vacant plots of land, leading to a 
sudden growth of slums in the city. Housing conditions also deteriorated with
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increasing subdivision and densification of the existing stock (ECSREH, 1999). 
According to a housing survey in 1937, it was not uncommon for a lilong house, 
originally intended for a single family, to be occupied by four or five families. There 
were 5,691 houses being inhabited by four families, 2,338 houses by six families, 
and 145 houses by nine families. At most a single lilong accommodated 15 different 
tenants (Concessions Municipal Council 1937, cited in Lu 1999). By 1949, Shanghai 
had a total residential floor-space of 23.59 million m2and a population of 4.14 million. 
Table 4.2 shows that 52.7% was shikumen lilong housing, 19.8% new style lilong 
housing, 9.5% detached villas, 14.3% were apartments, and 13.7% categorised as 
slums. The per capita living area in Shanghai was very low, at only 3.9 m2, 
demonstrating crowding in large segments of the housing stock (ECSREA: 1999).
Table 4.2: Housing composition in Shanghai, 1949
Floor area 
(1,000 m2)
% of total
Total housing space 23,590 100
Garden villas 2,237 9.5
Shikumen lilong housing 12,430 52.7
New style lilong housing 4,690 19.8
Pre-1949 apartments 1,005 4.3
Slums 3,228 13.7
Source: Xu (2004:128)
4.2.2 Shanghai under Socialism
Although Shanghai’s housing problems can be traced back to the population 
pressures in the early 20th century, problems were complicated in subsequent 
decades. After 1949, China came under the control of the Communist Party, which 
brought a radically different context for urban development and housing. The 
introduction of state socialism emphasised the principles of egalitarianism and 
social control. The new government developed a centrally-planned economy 
whereby industrial production, agricultural production, and the stocking and selling 
of goods in commercial departments were all controlled by central planning (Fu, 
2002; Wang, 1992, 1995).
Under socialist ideology and the leadership of Mao Zedong, Chinese cities were the
basis of the state’s strategic pursuit for rapid industrialisation and ideological
endeavour to transform urban functions from consumption to production. This was a
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period of substantial economic transformations as well as population growth. The 
city’s population grew from just over 5 million in 1940 to over 10 million by 1960 
(Table 4.3). Shanghai was developed for production over the next four decades, and 
became a major industrial centre of China (Wu, 2003). Its GDP grew significantly, 
from 2.3 billion yuan in 1949, to 15.8 billion in 1970 and 31.2 billion yuan in 1980.
In terms of economic development, manufacturing became the backbone of the 
urban economy dominating the generation of output, employment, and spatial 
planning (Fu, 2002). However, the city’s previous international position and financial 
function disappeared. The importance of the tertiary sector declined rapidly, from 
45.7% in 1949 to as low as 15.4% by 1970, before gradually picking up in later 
years. With industrialisation, the primary sector also gradually declined in 
importance, from 7.1% in 1949 to 4.2% in 1980. By this time, the economy was 
clearly dominated by the secondary industry, with its share of GDP at 75.7 percent.
Table 4.3: Population and GDP in Shanghai, 1949-1985
G D P
Year Population
(1 ,000)
Total 
(billion yuan)
Primary
%
Secondary
%
Tertiary
%
1949 5,029 2.03 7.1 47.1 45.7
1950 4,927 2.24 7.4 44.9 47.7
1955 6,231 5.36 5.1 54.8 40.2
1960 10,563 15.84 2.7 77.9 19.4
1965 10,938 11.36 5.7 73.0 21.3
1970 10,726 15.67 4.7 77.1 15.4
1975 10,767 20.41 4.0 77.2 18.8
1980 11,465 31.19 3.2 75.7 21.1
1985 12,167 46.68 4.2 69.8 26.1
Source: SSE
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Under socialism, dramatic changes also took place in the ownership, distribution 
and management of the existing housing stock. A centralised housing system 
eliminated market mechanisms of production and distribution (Wang, 1995). In 1949, 
about 98 percent of housing was privately owned, by individuals or private 
enterprises. Since then, the majority were progressively incorporated into 
government ownership. Public sector ownership increased to 40 percent in 1955, 
and reached 76.7 percent by 1978. Private ownership had declined to 23.3% by this 
point. In general, only units smaller than 150 m2 and under self-usage by the 
occupant’s families were exempt from nationalisation. Private renting, which had
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been the predominant tenure in the city before, had all but disappeared (Table 4.4). 
Housing became viewed primarily a social welfare good rather than a capital asset 
and was mainly supplied by the state, or state owned enterprises and institutions 
according to social need. Administrative allocation was based on various eligibility 
criteria rather than socio-economic status (Wang, 1992, 1995). Private house­
building for speculation was banned, and private rental was gradually eliminated. 
The majority of housing built after 1949 were flats using standardised construction 
techniques, and no more lilong housing was constructed (ECSREH, 1999).
Public sector housing was differentiated into ‘municipal-owned housing’ and ‘work- 
unit housing’. Municipal housing is housing owned and directly managed by city 
housing bureaus, and became the largest sector in Shanghai (72.5% in 1978). The 
majority of housing accordingly came under control of the municipal government. 
Work-unit housing in contrast refers to housing newly constructed and managed by 
state owned enterprises and institutions. This was relatively insignificant as an 
ownership form in Shanghai (4.2% in 1978) until the 1980s, when work units began 
to play a more significant role in housing construction. Low rent became one of the 
key features of housing provision under socialism. In 1988, average rent accounted 
for only 1.94% of the average family wages (Wang and Murie, 1996; ECSREA, 
1999).
Table 4.4: Housing ownership patterns in Shanghai, 1949-1978
Total
residential 
floor area 
(1,000 m2)
Municipal 
Government 
(1,000 m2)
% Work Unit 
(1,000m2)
% Private 
(1,000 m2)
%
1949 23,594 531 2.3 0 0.0 23,063 97.7
1958 32,533 19,051 58.6 2,931 9.0 10,551 32.4
1966 37,622 25,395 67.5 1,881 5.0 10,346 27.5
1978 41,170 29,865 72.5 1,729 4.2 9,576 23.3
Source: Editorial committee of the ‘Common history of Shanghai’, 2005
During this era, urban residents lived in relatively homogeneous living conditions, 
and there was no clear segregation according to socio-economic status in urban 
areas (Chan, 1996; Liu and Wu, 2006). Nevertheless there was a profound 
distinction between rural and urban areas. After 1950 the Chinese government set 
up the ‘hukou’ or household registration system, which is a kind of internal passport
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system that strictly controlled rural-urban population movement along with the food 
supply system employed in the urban areas. The household registration system 
effectively divided China into two distinct societies, the urban and the rural. Without 
urban hukou status, rural residents could not enter the city, and were excluded from 
access to urban public housing, local schools, state sector jobs, or welfare 
programmes or facilities city-wide. This division of urban and rural areas and their 
residents remains one of the most important features of Chinese society (Wang, 
2000, 2004).
A host of urban problems accumulated during this period. Under Mao Zedong much 
of the national development was focused on the countryside or on industrial 
development. When major cities did develop most construction took place in 
suburban rings on the outskirts of the city in the form of workers compounds (He 
and Wu, 2005; Wu and He, 2005). With industry soaking up most investment capital, 
little was also left for the maintenance and improvement of the urban environment -  
including in housing, transport, utilities, and other urban amenities (Wu, 1999). 
Beyond this, lack of a proper planning framework led to a situation of un­
coordinated land use. Factories and houses were located rather randomly and often 
encircled each other. After a long period of under-investment and unplanned growth, 
the city came to be were characterised by a deteriorated housing stock, high 
residential density, out-dated infrastructure, incompatible land uses and pollution of 
various kinds. These pressures were particularly acute in the older inner city (Chan 
1996; Wu, 1999).
The housing shortage persisted nationally under the socialist system, because 
housing was viewed as an unproductive welfare good and relegated to a low 
position within national development policy. Furthermore the centrally planned 
system of production could not establish a sustainable cycle of investment. The rate 
of housing construction was limited and barely kept up with population growth 
(Wang and Murie, 1996). Table 4.5 overleaf shows that up to 1980 per capita 
housing space in Shanghai remained less than 5 m2. By the late 1970s it became 
apparent that the welfare housing system posed many barriers for the efficient 
allocation of housing resources and the efficiency of housing administration (Yin and 
Zhang, 2007; Zhao and Bourassa, 2003). By 1985, the average housing space per 
person in Shanghai was only 5.4 m2or in other words a room of around 20 m2 for a 
family of four. More than 200,000 households lived in extremely crowded conditions
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of less than 4 m2 of space per person In addition over 565,000 households lived in 
officially ‘inconvenient conditions’ -  which included situations where multiple families 
or generations were living in the same room (see Table 4.6).
Table 4.5: Housing production in Shanghai, 1952~1985
Period
No. of years
Total constructed 
floor area 
(1,000 m2)
Per capita 
space at end of 
period 
m2/ person
1952-1960 9 619 3.8
1961-1965 5 212 3.9
1966-1970 5 207 4.4
1971-1975 5 346 4.2
1976-1980 5 918 4.4
Source: Compiled from SSB (2001, 2002)
Housing allocation thus became a major burden of the government. Subdivision and 
densification of the existing housing stock was a significant method of coping with 
housing demand, the standards of space allocation were consistently very low. 
Houses were generally sub-divided by room, or by floor amongst families. A lilong 
house of about 100 m2, commonly accommodated five or six families, and it was not 
uncommon for more than ten families to be sharing a larger dwelling unit. Under a 
situation of prevailing shortage the administrative housing allocation also came to 
be associated with problems of inequality and corruption, which came at odds with 
the socialist principles of egalitarianism (Zhao and Bourassa, 2003; Wang and Murie, 
1996).
Physical deterioration of housing due to under-maintenance was also a general 
problem (Lee, 1988). With a large public housing stock and limited rental income, 
maintenance was an increasingly heavy burden for the government. In Shanghai, 
the annual rate of repaired housing relative to the total housing stock consistently 
declined, from 5.7% in the early 1950s to around 1 % by the 1970s, to less than 
0.6% of the total stock by 1995 (ECSREH, 1999). The national housing survey of 
1985 showed that within Shanghai’s municipal housing stock, 10.3% was classified 
as being dilapidated or structurally dangerous, and another 21.5% deemed 
‘moderately dilapidated’. Most of this would have been older housing inherited from 
the pre-socialist era. Standards of amenity remained very low. Only 47% of
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households had gas connections, 44% of households shared running water with 
multiple families, 56.5% of households did not have an indoor WC, and only 26.8% 
of households had access to an indoor bath (Table 4.7).
Table 4.6: Housing conditions in 1985
Households
(1,000)
%
Total 1,800.3 100
Lacking housing 13.6 0.8
Live in ‘Inconvenient’ conditions 565.5 31.4
Per capita 
housing space 
of households
< 2m 2 15.2 0.8
2 -4  m2 197.5 11.0
4~6m 2 374.8 20.8
6~8m 2 372.3 20.7
8~10m 2 274.6 15.3
10 or more 565.9 31.4
Source: National housing survey of 1985, in ECSREH (1999)
Table 4.7: Possession of housing amenities in 1985
Total Housing stock Municipal owned housing 
only
Households (1,000) 1,800 1,317
Has indoor WC (%) 23.8 24.3
Shares WC (%) 19.7 24.9
No WC (%) 56.5 50.8
Has indoor bath (%) 26.8 28.5
Has private kitchen (%) 40.0 33.9
Has shared kitchen (%) 30.1 38.6
Has gas connection (%) 47.2 55.7
Shares running water (%) 44.1 55.5
Source: National Housing Survey of 1985, in ECSREH (1999)
The shortage of space and the fragmentation of industrial land use, combined with 
inefficient transportation services, also imposed severe constraints on industrial 
performance (Wu, 1999). Municipal governments themselves nevertheless had 
limited administrative or financial resources to carry out renewal of older housing. 
Within the centrally-planned economy the local government had little decision 
making powers and acted as no more as an agent of the central government. 
Furthermore, about 87% of the local revenues of Shanghai had to be remitted to the 
central government (Hook, 1998, cited in Wu, 1999). Thus, only the most structurally
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dangerous and dilapidated areas could undergo renewal, usually in a small scaled 
and un-coordinated manner (ESCREH, 1999; Wu and He, 2005).
The implementation of market reform and the Open Door policy since 1978 
gradually liberalised China’s economy and began to kick-start an economic boom in 
a many Chinese cities. In economic terms, after nearly thirty years of socialist 
development, industries were inefficient, and labour productivity was generally static 
or declining (White, 1993). The leaders in the central government intended to 
deveiop the economy by accelerating both industrialisation and urbanisation (Li and 
Wu, 2006b). Coastal regions were allowed to go ahead of other regions to attract 
foreign investment, import facilities, machines and advanced technologies (Li and 
Wu, 2006b). Shanghai was nevertheless untouched by the first wave of economic 
development. As some cities such as Guangzhou were given special preferential 
policy status to facilitate rapid economic growth, Shanghai was allocated a 
“rearguard” position in the interest of maintaining stability (Fu, 2002). Although 
various programmes were launched in the 1980s that had a positive effect on 
increasing housing construction, including granting work units greater autonomy to 
utilise their surplus and to become major housing providers (Quan, 2006; Wu, 1996), 
cities did not develop sufficient capacity to implement comprehensive housing 
renewal until the 1990s (Xu, 2004).
4.3 “Post-Socialist” Transformations
4.3.1 Urban government amidst economic reforms
While the previous section outlined the evolution of housing problems in Shanghai 
up to the 1980s, this section examines the changing institutional, economic and 
social context framing the 1990s and beyond. These constituted in aggregate a 
radically different environment for housing renewal.
It was during Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour of China and visit to Shanghai in 
February 1990 that Chinese leadership expressed the need to speed up the 
development of Shanghai. At the 14th Party Congress held in October 1992, the city 
was given an official mission to develop as a “dragon head and three centres” to 
lead the Yangtze River Basin and China at large into the twenty-first century. The 
three ‘centres’ referred to an economic centre, a financial centre and a trading 
centre (Fu, 2002). Soon afterwards, Shanghai received a package of special.
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policies from the centre for the development of Pudong -  the area to the East of 
Shanghai’s city proper. Based on the model of China’s Special Economic Zones, 
Pudong has a total area of 522 km2, larger than the existing central city. It was 
designed to relieve the spatial pressure on the existing centre of Shanghai and was 
to become a new centre of industrial and commercial activities. The opening up of 
Pudong and the intention of developing Shanghai into a world-class urban centre 
signified to the world at large China’s commitment to continue its reform and open 
door policy. From this point onwards, Shanghai finally became the national focus of 
economic reform and development (Wu, 1999; Han, 2000).
Around the same time, a series of reforms enacted a significant decentralisation of 
power towards municipal governments. Under fiscal reforms, a new revenue sharing 
system was established across provinces in China. From then on, provinces were 
responsible for balancing their own budgets by adjusting their expenditures to better 
meet their revenues. Revenue shares were fixed so that provinces could plan ahead 
and profit from any increases in revenues. They were also given power to arrange 
the structure and amount of local spending, no longer being restricted by fiscal 
targets provided by the central ministries (Oi, 1992; Zhu, 1999; Zhang, 1994). The 
importance of urban planning and economic development has been increasingly 
recognised since the mid-1980s, and municipal governments were given the prime 
responsibility for urban planning (Wu et al, 2007).
Figure 4.6 overleaf shows the basic urban government structure in Shanghai. Along 
with Beijing and Tianjin, Shanghai is one of the three cities directly under central 
administration (zhixiashi). This means that administratively it is equal in rank to a 
province, and that its municipal bureaux are directly under the central ministries. 
The city’s top leaders are in practice appointed by the central government and its 
Communist Party organs, whereas in other cities they would be appointed by the 
provincial government. In its formal and more narrow definition, this government 
includes the 'government standing committee' (zhengfu changwuwei) which 
comprises the mayor, deputy mayors and secretary, and the ‘government plenary 
committee' (zhengfu quanti huiyi) which includes the same people plus the heads of 
municipal-level bureau and commissions. These two core groups of officials make 
most of the major decisions affecting the city, which they report to the People's 
Congress and up to the State Council. Yet, they are also circumscribed by the 
dictates of the Communist Party, national legislation and State Council’s policies.
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Figure 4.6: The urban government structure in Shanghai
Source: adapted from SSB (2009)
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120
The municipal government is in turn composed of a plethora of bureaus and 
commissions, whose chiefs are appointed by the mayor. These carry out their work 
within the scope of broader decisions made by the standing committee.
The Mayor heads the municipal government and has supreme authority in policy 
making and the to co-ordinate administrative work in the city. However, the 
Communist Party remains a key organisation in the city and permeates the 
governing bodies. The most important Party organisation in the city is the Municipal 
Party Committee (shi dangwei), which has departments which duplicates those 
within the municipal government and ensures that policy is implemented. 
Underneath the municipal government are district and county governments. The 
district/county governments are circumscribed by municipal policies and targets, but 
have been given a stronger role devoted to urban service administration, law 
enforcement, as well as local urban planning and construction. The two levels of 
governments are co-ordinated and reinforce each other, with the municipal 
government in the steering role (Wu et al, 2007; Wu, 2002).
Below these are additional, lower levels of public administration: the Street office 
(SO) and residents committees (RC). As sub-district level, the SO operate as the 
interface between society and government by managing everyday services for 
communities (Zhang, 2002b). Below the street-office, “resident committees” are 
administrative units at the local neighbourhood level and a key way of how the 
government manage life at the grass-roots. They undertake many tasks assigned by 
the government, such as basic welfare provision, the maintenance of public order 
and mobilising people (Wu, 2002). These comprise the key elements in the multi­
tiered formal governing structure in Shanghai.
4.3.2 Economic Development
Since China's economic reforms in 1978, Shanghai has enjoyed sustained
economic growth, but once the barriers to locally determined growth were removed
in the early 1990s, the pace of transformations increased radically (see table 4.7).
Shanghai’s GDP increased from 78.2 billion yuan in 1990 to 477 billion yuan in 2000
and 1.37 trillion yuan in 2008 (SSB, 2007). With the official designation of Shanghai
as the 'dragon's head' of Chinese cities, newly devolved powers and central
government subsidies for the development of Pudong district, the Shanghai
municipal government has become a powerful and proactive actor in the pursuit of
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economic growth, setting its sights on becoming a global city. In a more 
entrepreneurial fashion, it has provided providing wide-ranging preferential policies 
to attract private business and capital investment, setting in place mechanisms to 
promote competition and marketised operations (Wu et al., 2007).
Table 4.8: Shanghai's GDP and sectoral structure, 1985-2008
Contribution to total GDP
Year Total GDP Primary Industries Secondary industries Tertiary Industries
(Billion yuan) % % %
1985 46.7 4.2 69.8 26.0
1990 78.2 4.4 64.7 30.9
1995 249.9 2.4 56.8 40.8
2000 477.1 1.6 46.3 52.1
2005 916.4 1.0 48.6 50.4
2006 1,036.6 0.9 48.5 50.6
2008 1,369.8 0.1 40.1 59.8
Source: SSB (2007, 2009)
A profound process of economic restructuring took place. In 1990 the secondary 
sector as a whole contributed 64.7% to the total GDP, the tertiary sector 30.9%, and 
the primary sector only 4.4%. Since then, industries have been upgraded. The 
municipal authorities paid close attention to the development of high-tech products 
and six manufacturing subsectors: automobiles, telecommunications, power station 
equipment, steel, petrochemicals, and home appliances (Han, 2000). Industries with 
advanced technology, such as in ‘telecommunications equipment’ and ‘integrated 
circuits and computers’ expanded, while traditional industries such as textiles and 
ordinary machine manufacturing decreased since 1990 (Li and Wu, 2006b). 
Opening up of the economy has also opened the way towards foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and foreign trade. Between 1990 and 2000 a total of US$ 45.42 
billion, from 22,270 projects, was invested in Shanghai (SSB, 2002). Since then, the 
world’s largest manufacturing firms, as identified by Fortune, have invested in 
Shanghai: including GM, Siemens, Nescafe, Unilever, IBM, Hitachi, Sony, 
Panasonic, HP, Samsung, and Toshiba. Shanghai has accordingly been propelled 
towards a national, or even global, centre of manufacturing (Li and Wu, 2006b: 256).
From the eighth five-year plan (1991-1995) the local government further set up a 
principle that the tertiary sector was to receive the greatest emphasis for 
development, followed by active restructuring of the secondary sector, and the
stabilisation of the primary sector (Han, 2000). By 2008 the secondary sector 
remained significant, representing 40.1% of the GDP, and the primary sector 
continued to diminish proportionally, representing only 0.1%. The tertiary sector had 
in turn become the biggest contributor to the economy, with its share of the GDP 
rising from 30.9% in 1990 to 52.1% in 2000, and reaching 59.8% in 2008 (see Table 
4.8).
Table 4.9 shows that total employment in Shanghai increased by 1.1 million from 
1985 to 2006. However, employment in the primary industries declined by 715,000 
and employment in the secondary industries declined by 1.18 million. Growth was 
concentrated in the tertiary sector, which grew by almost 3 million and whose share 
of the total workforce increased from 26% to 57%.
Table 4.9: Employees by economic sectors Shanghai, 1985-2006
Unit: 1,000 persons
1,985 1,990 1,999 2,006 Net Change 
1978-2006
Primary industries 1,268 873 922 553 -715
Secondary industries 4,454 4,671 3,262 3,276 -1,178
Tertiary industries 2,034 2,334 3,154 5,026 +2,992
Total employment 7,755 7,877 7,338 8,855 +1,100
Source: SSB (2001, 20<07)
Within this, the five key service sectors, namely, retail and wholesale, hostelling and 
catering, financial and insurance, real estate, and information technology, 
demonstrated strong signs of flourishing. Between 1990 and 2008, the total revenue 
of the retail sector increased 13-fold, from 33.3 billion yuan to 454 billion yuan (SSB, 
2009). The local government also placed strong emphasis on the growth of 
advanced service sectors, particularly finance, insurance and real estate (the FIRE 
sectors). A reformed building construction and real estate sector boomed by the 
1990s, and its total value grew forty-times from 7.6 billion yuan to 307 billion yuan 
(SSB, 2009). The discourse of globalisation became increasingly embedded in local 
politics (Wu 2003b). The objective here was to make Shanghai the financial centre 
of China and the Far East by attracting more domestic and foreign financial 
institutions to set up their offices in Shanghai (Han, 2000). Between 1990 and 2008
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the value of saving deposits in the city's financial institutions increased forty-fold, 
from 85 billion yuan to 3.56 trillion yuan. Shanghai has since become an economic 
powerhouse in the East Asia.
4.3.3 Social transformations
Market reform and economic restructuring also meant profound changes in the 
urban employment and social structures, leading towards enlarged social disparities 
(Li and Wu, 2006; Wang, 2004). Shanghai has yet to become a ‘post-industrial’ 
service society, but long-standing manufacturing manual working class has shrunk 
and a large service-based middle class is emerging. Table 4.10 shows that the 
proportion of workers in manufacturing, transportation and equipment operation 
roles declined from 47.7% in 1982 to 38.2% in 2000. Meanwhile, the share of 
clerical staff rose from 3.1% to 11.8%, and commercial service staff increased from 
11.5% to 22.5%.There has not been very significant growth in professional or 
managerial segments of the local labour force - reflecting the fact that Shanghai is 
still in the early stages of post-industrial transition (Li and Wu, 2006b). The share of 
professional workers and the labour force experienced modest gains from 10.7% in 
1982 to 13.3% in 1990, but declined slightly to 12.8% in 2000. The share of 
managerial staff increased only slightly from 3.2% in 1982 to 3.4% by 2000 (SSB, 
2004b).
Table 4.10: Occupational class structure changes in Shanghai
Unit: percent
1982 1990 2000
Managers in institutions and enterprises 3.2 3.7 3.4
Professional and technical staff 10.7 13.3 12.8
Clerical staff 3.1 5.8 11.8
Commercial service staff 11.5 15.2 22.5
Agricultural workers 23.7 11.5 11.3
Manufacturing, transportation and machine 
operators
47.7 50.5 38.2
Others 0.1 0 0
Source: SSB (2004b)
By the end of 2008, the city employed 1.73 million staff in its expanding retail and 
wholesale sector, 417,000 in the hotel and catering sector, and 598,000 in business 
services - now an important element in the labour force of global cities. In the
124
producer services sectors, there were 232,000 staff in the financial and banking 
industries, and 697,000 in real estate (SSB, 2009).
Under a more marketised environment, various forces began to diversify urban 
society. One underlying factor was increasing divergence in pay. For example, 
market competition resulted in rising differentials of income across enterprises 
depending on their economic performance. Joint ventures and foreign-funded firms 
came to pay much higher salaries than in the state sector. As seen in Table 4.11, 
there has also been a widening of the income distribution along with the rise of 
several high-earning sectors of the economy, such as financial and information 
services (Wang, 2004; Li and Wu, 2006b).
Table 4.11: Incomes in various economic sectors, 2006
Unit: yuan/ year
Industry Overall State-
owned
enterprises
Collective
enterprises
Foreign-
Funded
enterprises
Others
City average 31,371 40,141 22,959 40,964 23,915
-Primary sector 19,459 22,610 26,644 16,719 16,724
-Secondary sector 29,079 37,128 17,972 36,330 22,646
-Tertiary sector 33,294 41,017 24,278 67,409 24,984
High-paying sectors
Information services 82,867 73,890 28,929 98,742 89,238
Finance 70,546 89,394 - 134,177 55,438
Power and water production 
and supply services
51,501 46,133 44,621 90,961 60,293
Mining 56,531 75,392 - - 15,538
Scientific research and 
technical services
47,822 43,299 36,534 158,175 68,888
Source: SSB (2007)
The 5th National Population Census recorded a total of 27,700 local managerial 
workers, including managers of SOEs and private enterprises. Although the number 
of managerial and professional staff within the local population has increased 
modestly, globalisation has also created a new social group - foreign employees of 
foreign companies and joint ventures. Between 2000 and 2008 the total number of 
foreign residents in Shanghai rose from 60,000 to 148,000, constituted by 
expatriates who usually occupied middle-to upper managerial positions, and their 
families. A majority of these originated from Southeast Asia including Japan, Korea, 
Singapore, as well as further afield from the USA and Europe (SSB, 2009). Being 
expatriates and enjoying high pay, they have become a growing part of the top of
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the urban social hierarchy (Wang and Lau, 2009; Li and Wu, 2006b).
At the opposite end, urban social inequality was exacerbated as redundancies, lay­
offs and downsizing further enlarged the group of urban poor (Wang, 2004). 
Economic restructuring also resulted in a dramatic loss of secondary sector jobs, 
and more widespread unemployment. With intensified competition and state-led 
SOE restructuring, numerous inefficient enterprises were closed, merged or 
privatised (Li and Wu, 2006b). National statistics showed that 8 million workers in 
China were laid off by 1996 (Wang, 2000). In Shanghai, the unemployment rate 
increased from 0.2% in 1985 to 4.9% in 2003. In absolute terms the registered 
unemployed increased from 12,000 to around 300,000 (SSB, 2004). However, this 
figure excludes even more laid-off workers relieved from their posts {xiagang). The 
local term ‘Xiagang’ denotes the situation where a public sector employee has lost a 
permanent job but still received a monthly benefit or a proportion of his wage from 
the employer. These laid-off workers were mainly low-skilled and middle-aged 
workers with poor education (Wang, 2004).
Urban social inequality was also exacerbated alongside intensified rural-urban 
migration. To put redundant labour force in rural areas into urban labour, the once 
strictly controlled hukou system has been relaxed by the state. From 1984 peasants 
were permitted to move into cities for work and business without changing their rural 
status. This has resulted in large numbers of rural migrants flooding into cities 
(Solinger, 1999). In Shanghai, the size of the migrant population was 1.06 million in 
1988, which increased to 5.81 million in 2005 (SSB, 2001, 2006). According to the 
2000 census, 73.4% of them were working, and actually composed 39.5% of the 
city’s labour force. Nevertheless they were restricted to jobs undesirable to local 
residents, in domestic service, sweatshops, restaurants and retail services. The 
average educational level in the 2000 census, was below ‘junior high school’, while 
only 3% of them were educated to college level or equivalent. Most worked in 
manufacturing (25.8%), construction (19.5%) and services (27.4%), including 
business services (13.9%), catering (6.6%) and community services (6.7%). 
Migrants were also excluded from most of the amenities of permanent residents, 
such as housing welfare, medical facilities, and pensions, and they constitute the 
low tiers of the urban social hierarchy (Wang, 2000, 2004).
Alongside socio-economic restructuring, income disparity has become more
apparent (Figure 4.7). Between 1985 and 2000 income of the top 10 percent (‘very
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high income group’) increased from 1,648 yuan to 23,849 yuan, by 14.5 times. 
Meanwhile the bottom 10 percent (‘lowest-income group’) grew from 665 yuan to 
6,169 yuan -  only 9.2 times. Thus, the ratio between the top and bottom 10 percent 
increased significantly, from 2.48 to 3.87 (SSB, 2001). Nevertheless, these official 
statistics only covered registered permanent residents. This means that neither 
higher income foreign elites nor poorly paid rural migrants were counted. Therefore 
the actual inequalities are believed to be far greater (Friedmann, 2005; Li and Wu, 
2006).
Figure 4.7: Income disparity in Shanghai, 1985-2000
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4.3.4 Housing and Land Reforms
Aside from economic and social changes, physical developments in the city were 
also a highly visible component. These need to be examined in the context of 
national reforms in the land and housing systems. From the 1980s China embarked 
on a process of market-oriented housing and land reforms. A large amount of 
literature has discussed the complex policies and processes involved (see e.g. Lee, 
2000; Wang and Murie, 1996, 1999; Wang, 2000; Wu, 1996, 1997; Zhang, 2001; 
Zhao, 2003). An overview of the key aspects is provided here.
After a series of experiments in selected cities, general implementation throughout 
the country was called for in 1988 (State Council, 1988). In February 1991, the
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Shanghai Municipal Government accordingly published the “Implementation plan for 
Shanghai City housing reform” (SMG, 1991), formally initiating housing reforms in 
the city. Over the following decade, several key central government policies were 
issued to guide the complex reform process and progressively transformed the 
previous public-sector dominated welfare housing system towards a market 
orientated one. Of note were "A Decision from the State Council on Deepening the 
Urban Housing Reform" (State Council, 1994), and "A Decision from the State 
Council on Deepening the Urban Housing Reform" (State Council, 1998).
According to Wang and Murie (1996), in terms of housing circulation the goal of 
housing reform was to make the transition from a welfare system which rejected the 
commodity value of housing towards a system where housing was a commodity 
circulating in a market. On the supply side, housing provision was gradually 
decentralised towards the work units as well as the private sector and individuals, 
paving the way for a commercialised housing provision system. Initially work units 
were allowed to develop commercial housing that can be put into the market for sale 
and profit. This was then usually sold to their employees at highly discounted prices. 
To create a more rational market system, the government then put forward 
regulations whereby real estate companies were set up and became the major 
producer of commercial housing (Wu, 1996; Quan, 2006).
Public housing was to play a smaller role than the past (Wang, 2000). In terms of 
housing management the goal was to make the transition from a state-dominated 
administrative system towards a more marketised and professionalised property 
management system. Public sector rents would gradually be raised, to ensure a 
sustainable cycle of housing investment and to encourage home-ownership. A large 
privatisation programme was implemented, selling off the better quality housing to 
sitting tenants at subsidised prices. Between 1993 and 2004 more than 1.63 million 
units in Shanghai had been privatised (Yin & Zhang 2007: 12). The process 
nevertheless excluded a large stock of dilapidated and under-equipped housing, as 
only self-sufficient units could be sold. These remained a significant source of 
housing accommodating the urban poor, and it is notable that rent reforms brought 
little changes to the overall affordability of public housing.
Corresponding land reforms also radically altered the logic of land use and of urban
development. In 1988 the National People’s Congress legalised the leasing of land
by the local governments to developers through the paid transfer of a ‘land-use
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right’. Thus, although the state would continue to own all urban land, by paying a 
land leasing premium the right to develop on state-owned land can be acquired via 
negotiation, public auction, or tender by developers for development (Wu et al, 2007; 
Zhu, 1999). Following this, a number of regulations were promulgated to formalise 
the land reforms, later permitting foreign capital to invest in urban land in China. As 
the land use right was released into the market, the creation of profits carrying out 
property development became possible across the country. After these institutional 
changes, commodity housing has been mainly provided and purchased through 
market mechanisms (Wu and Yeh, 1996). Nationally, investment in commercial 
housing construction represented 70% of total housing investment by 1996, 
whereas the government by this time contributed only 0.3% (Quan, 2006).
From 1994, the central government implemented various policies to create a more 
diverse housing system which made available different forms of housing for different 
social groups. ‘Affordable housing’ (jingji shiyongfang) intended for middle and lower 
income families was formally promoted. This would be provided by private 
developers, but under the principle of profit being no more than 3%. Their 
construction would be supported by various special central government loans and 
free land allocations (Wang, 2000; Quan, 2006). However, affordable housing 
remained a relatively small component of total construction output up to the early 
2000s. Between 1995 and 1999, Shanghai built a total of 3.45 million m2 of 
affordable housing - only about 6.7% of the total commodity housing built (SSB,
2000). Furthermore, due to eligibility restrictions and prices, the main beneficiaries 
were not the poor, but middle income households in the state-sector (Wang, 2000).
In 1999, the central government further developed a policy of ‘cheap rental housing’ 
(lianzu fang), intended for households whose incomes fulfilled minimum income 
standards set by local governments. Rent for ‘cheap rental housing’ was to be 
heavily subsidised (Wang, 2000). However, to date rental housing policy has been 
very limited in scope in most Chinese cities, and public housing inherited from the 
past remained a more significant mode of provision for those urban residents who 
could not access housing in the market (Zhang, 2007).
Aside from policies aimed at changing the supply side of housing, various state
policies also helped support individual’s capacity to purchase commoditised housing
in the market. The Housing Provident Fund (HPF) system is a housing savings
system instigated in 1991 which ensures that both employers and employees make
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a monthly contribution (of between 5~10% of their income) to the employees’ 
savings accounts for housing purposes. The system has been adopted in most 
public sector enterprises, collective-owners enterprises, private enterprises as well 
as some joint-venture or foreign funded firms throughout the country (Wang, 2000). 
Since 1991, the HPF has provided over 872,000 loans for households in Shanghai 
(Yin and Zhang, 2007).
Work units continued to purchase and distribute commodity housing at subsidised 
prices to their employees during the 1990s. However, this practice was formally 
terminated by the central government in 1998. A monetary housing subsidy system 
was developed to replace the material distribution of housing, and mortgage loans 
from commercial banks were gradually opened up to individuals for purchasing 
commodity housing. Since then, the housing needs of public-sector employees 
came to be met predominantly by the housing market, with work units mainly 
helping their employees through the HPF system (Quan, 2006; Wang, 2000). Since 
then housing mortgage loans and individual consumption of housing have both 
increased rapidly (Yin and Zhang, 2007; Quan, 2006).
Shanghai soon led other cities in China as a pioneer in experimenting with market- 
oriented urban development, and even attracting foreign investment into real estate 
development. In 1990, there were 103 property development enterprises in 
Shanghai, but the sector expanded rapidly after Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour to 
the city in 1992. By 1995, a total of 2,635 property development enterprises were 
registered in Shanghai (Yin and Zhang, 2007). Most of the earliest property 
developers in China were state-owned enterprises set up by the government for 
taking up the function of comprehensive urban development and realising urban 
master plans for the local governments. In many cities there were normally at least 
one or two very large corporate enterprises acting as the ‘backbone’ builders under 
the direction of local governments. Some were quasi-government enterprises set up 
by local government bureau or central government ministries. Their main missions 
were to make use of land and property development to provide much needed 
modern urban infrastructure, to expand housing production, improve housing 
conditions and improve the physical environment of the city (Tang, 2003).
However as speculative potential of real estate development was unleashed, private
developers and various overseas investors also flocked to set up operations. A
booming real estate market emerged. As seen in Figure 4.8, total real estate
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investment shot up from 0.82 billion yuan in 1990 to 46.62 billion yuan in 1995. The 
period 1996-1999 saw a brief real estate slump in China in response to the Asian 
Financial Crisis, causing a significant decline in investment activity. However, the 
market rebounded by 2000. Since then total investment continued to rise rapidly, 
reaching a peak of 124.7 billion yuan in 2005.
Figure 4.8: Investment in housing construction in Shanghai, 1978-2007
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The Chinese property development sector has gradually shifted “from an 
oligopolistic, state monopolized industry to become much more pluralistic and 
competitive sector” (Tang, 2003: 180). By the end of 2004, there were 5,117 
developers operating in Shanghai, with a total registered capital asset of 236 billion 
yuan. Among these, 162 were foreign-funded firms and 197 were from Hong Kong, 
Taiwan or Macao (Ying and Zhang, 2007: 73). Aside from local state-owned 
enterprises, property developers from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macao emerged as key 
external players injecting foreign investment into the city. Some were already brand- 
name developers who sought to diversify their property businesses to the mainland. 
Many were experienced, capital rich and had good political connections with top- 
level leaders of cities -  including mayors and his deputies. External investors were 
required to form joint ventures with local enterprises in undertaking development 
projects in the mainland, but were generally welcomed by local governments for 
bringing in capital and importing new management skills into the Chinese market. In 
general, these actors focused on the development of up-market properties for well 
off buyers. Besides these, numerous mainland Chinese property development
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companies emerged which were funded by non-state capital, and were self- 
financing enterprises. These private developers soon expanded their operations and 
choices to consumers, although they were generally much smaller in scale, staffing 
and operations to state-owned development companies (Tang, 2003).
Growth of this industry underpinned a massive building boom. Housing construction 
was a significant component of this activity. From 1990 to the end of 1999, more 
than 157 million m2of new housing was built city-wide (Figure 4.9). From 2000 to 
the end of 2008, another 212 billion m2 was added (SSB, 2009). Assuming an 
average dwelling unit size of 100 m2, approximately 2 million new units were built 
from 1990 to 2008.
Figure 4.9: Housing construction in Shanghai, 1978-2007
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With deepened marketisation, the sources of finance for new developments were 
diversified (Yu, 2006). According to the Shanghai Real Estate Industry Association, 
in recent years self-raised funds from local enterprises accounted for about 30% of 
total capital investment. Foreign investment constituted approximately 10%. 
Financial institutions such as commercial banks provided another important source, 
of around 30%, and finally pre-sale of properties constituted 30% of the finance (Yin 
and Zhang, 2007: 82).
These changes overall shifted the housing system from one based on public 
ownership and distribution towards one based on private ownership. Table 4.12
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shows Shanghai’s housing tenure structure over time. In 1985, public housing 
accommodated 80.9% of all households, with private ownership representing only 
19% and a virtually non-existent private rental sector (ECSREH, 1999). By 2005,
40.4 % of the households had purchased their homes via privatisation, 30.5 % had 
purchased commodity housing in the housing market, and only 35.5 % were still 
renting public housing, while (SSB, 2004). These official figures possibly under­
report the size of private rental sector (only 1.1 % in 2005) because there has been 
substantial informal lettings which may have been difficult to accurately document.
Table 4.12: Housing tenure changes, 1985-2005
1985* 2000** 2005++
Urban population (million households) 1.80 4.76 5.00
Public renting % 80.9 37.1 25.5
Purchased ex-public housing % 0.0 29.6 40.4
Purchased home in market % 0.0 11.6 30.5
Owned original private dwelling % 19.0 -- 7.0
Private renting % 0.0 4.3 1.1
Others % 0.2 17.4 0.2
Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: compiled from the * 1985 housing census, ** 2000 census, and ++ the Statistical 
Bureau of Shanghai (2006)
Up to 1998, work units still played a significant role in buying and distributing 
housing to their employees. Thus institutional affiliations, employment seniority and 
especially government official status all affected people’s opportunities to gain 
housing (Wang, 2000; Huang, 2003; Yu, 2006). However China has since become 
more similar to market economies, where housing is competed for through the 
market on the basis of price and ability to pay. For most buyers access to market 
housing became significantly constrained by earned income and hence by the 
position of individuals within the paid labour market.
Housing price was consistently high relative to the middle and low income groups. 
The average commodity housing price was 2,481 yuan/ m2 in 1995, rising almost 
three-fold to 6,698 yuan/ m2 in 2005 (SSB, 2006). During this time, the average 
price of a 70 m2 unit was about 10 times the annual disposable income of a three- 
person middle-income household, and 20 times for the low income household (SSB, 
2001, 2006). Large numbers of low-paid or unemployed workers were excluded 
from purchasing in the housing market. Also particularly disadvantaged were the
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migrants flooding into the city. The rural population has been excluded from most of 
the housing policies, and could not qualify for affordable housing, housing 
privatisation, or for public housing. Thus, they came to rely on accommodation 
provided by their employers -  such as in factory dormitories, or the flourishing 
private renting sector. Many were concentrated in cheap peasant housing in the 
urban peripheries, or renting rooms in dilapidated inner city housing such as the 
lilong (Wang, 2000; Wu, 2002), which perhaps accounts for the low aggregate 
status of private renters.
Table 4.13 shows these emerging inequalities. In the 2000 census, public and 
private renting tenures tended to concentrate people of lower occupational status. 
12.6% commodity housing owners were administrators and managers, compared to 
4.0% amongst public tenants, and 2.7% among private tenants. 24.7% of 
commodity housing owners were professional or technical staff, compared to only 
13.6% amongst public tenants, and 3.6% amongst private tenants. In contrast, the 
majority of renters in Shanghai were workers in sales, services or manufacturing 
(63.8% amongst public tenants, and 86.7% amongst private tenants).
Table 4.13: Occupation status of households’ heads by housing tenure, 2000
Unit: percentage
Occupation Categories All
tenures
Private
Housing
Privatised
public
housing
Public
renting
Private
renting
Total 100.0 100 100 100 100
Administrators and managers 5.7 12.6 7.0 4.0 2.7
Professional/technical staff 14.6 24.7 21.4 13.6 3.6
Clerical & related workers 17.9 22.8 25.4 17.9 4.4
Sales & service workers 23.6 16.3 16.4 28.3 38.6
Production & related Workers 34.8 23.2 29.6 35.5 48.1
Agriculture & related Workers 3.4 0.4 0.3 0.8 2.4
Source: Calculated from the 5th Population Census
4.4 Housing renewal since 1990
4.4.1 Objectives and administrative structure
The last section has showed that Shanghai has been experiencing rapid economic 
growth since 1990, alongside a substantial decentralisation of administrative and 
fiscal powers from the centre. Urban economic development became the major 
mission of the city, and the target was to remake Shanghai as a world city. At the 
same time, market reform gradually eroded and replaced the old welfare oriented 
housing system within a real estate market, generating new inequalities. Housing 
renewal was an important agenda during this period, and this section will review the 
evolving policies since 1990.
According to the “Urban Housing Reform Resolution” of 1991, issued by the central 
government, each urban government was required to rationalise and support 
continuous housing investment and construction. The nationally defined aims for the 
period 1991-1995 were to resolve urban crowding problems, to eliminate dangerous 
dwellings, and to reform the low-rent and free-distribution system (Wang and Murie, 
1996). Shanghai’s overall agenda for housing renewal was set out in a major 
housing conference held by the Municipal Government in March, 1991. The strategy 
was initially two-pronged, focusing on the worst quality slums in the city, as well as 
the immense stock of dilapidated old lilong housing. With respects to the former, the 
principle was to redevelop these areas and to decentralise the population by 
relocating existing residents to various districts, which were planned to become 
satellite towns. In 1992, the Municipal Government announced the urban housing 
targets for the city until the year 2000, the main objectives of which were (Xu, 2004):
• To demolish 3.65 million m2 of slums and structurally precarious dwellings 
identified by the city-wide housing survey.
• To help resettle households with per capita living space of less than 4 m2 per 
person.
• To increase the city-wide per capita living space, from 6m2 to a target of 10 
m2.
• To ensure that by 2000, 70% of the housing stock would be self-sufficient 
units equipped with autonomous WC and kitchens.
• With respects to old-style lilong housing, the principle was at the outset to
improve residents living conditions progressively through upgrading.
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A number of government commissions and bureaux were responsible for co­
ordinating and implementing urban housing renewal. The Shanghai Municipal 
Commission of Construction and Administration oversees their activities and the 
designation of urban renewal projects. The Shanghai Municipal Housing and Land 
Administration Bureau (‘Housing Bureau’ in short) is responsible for the identification 
and monitoring of dangerous and dilapidated buildings, and to decide upon the level 
of compensation and overseeing the compensation and relocation of residents in 
specific redevelopment projects. The Shanghai Municipal Urban Planning Bureau 
(‘Planning Bureau’ in short) has an important role to play in setting up planning 
standards and in planning approvals. There are no administrative requirements 
regarding obtaining agreement from affected residents before carrying out a renewal 
project (Law et al, 2009).
To speed up the pace of urban renewal, the municipal government launched a 
series of devolution policies in April 1992, giving district authorities greater financial 
incentives to take part. In the case of land leasing, district authorities could approve 
development projects valued up to U.S$ 5 million, and could retain 85% of the land- 
leasing revenues for the purposes of redeveloping dilapidated areas. Thus, district 
governments came to play a pro-active part (Fu, 2002). They would help identify 
sites to meet the targets and plans laid down by the municipal authorities. When a 
project is confirmed at the municipality level, the concerned district government will 
then set up a management team comprising of members from various related 
departments and bureaux in the district. This management team will be responsible 
for monitoring and coordinating the project (Law et al, 2009). Table 4.14 overleaf 
summarises major housing renewal policies implemented in Shanghai since 1990. 
These can be categorised in several phases.
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Table 4.14: Major housing renewal initiatives in Shanghai, 1990-2010
Time period Name of renewal plan Target Key features Physical results
1992-1995 365 slum housing redevelopment 
phase I
Informal shanty and dangerously 
dilapidated dwellings
Earliest experiments with land markets and 
privately funded property-led redevelopment
1.1 million of old 
housing demolished
Old housing rehabilitation (pilot 
projects phase)
Structurally sound/ architecturally 
distinct lilong housing
On-site resettlement of residents, joint 
financing from local housing bureaux, work 
units and residents
A number of completed 
pilot projects
1996-  2001 365 slum housing redevelopment 
phase II
To redevelop 3.65 million m  ^of 
informal shanty and dangerously 
dilapidated dwellings
Substantial concessions to developers offered 
to speed up process
3.65 million successfully 
redeveloped by 2001
Old Housing Amenity Fulfilment 
Renewal
Rehabilitation or selective 
reconstruction of lilong housing. No 
clear quantitative targets city-wide
On-site resettlement of existing residents via 
discount sale
2 million rehabilitated or 
redeveloped by 2001
2001-2005 New Round of Urban Renewal: 
lilong demolition phase I
Redevelopment of 10 million m  ^of 
dilapidated lilong housing
Monetary compensation to displaced residents, 
Substantial concessions to developers
7 million of lilong 
housing demolished
New Round of Urban Renewal: 
Rehabilitation of older staff housing
Improvement of old post-1949 
workers flats
Housing improvement, On-site resettlement 
option for residents
7,600 buildings upgraded
2006-2010 New Round of Urban Renewal: 
lilong demolition phase II
4 million m  ^of poor quality lilong 
housing to be demolished
Monetary compensation, 
Concessions to developers,
Site clearance and land reserve by 
government
1.2 million m  ^demolished 
by 2008
Source: author’s analysis
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4.4.2 Rehabilitation and on-site resettlement
From the early 1980s to the early 1990s, a small scale rehabilitation approach for 
lilong housing was evolved through a series of small scale pilot projects. Schemes 
were welfare orientated, with limited profit potential, and emphasised the retention 
rather than displacement of the existing residents. This aimed to enhance the living 
standards of lilong housing by adding basic amenities such as private bath, WC, 
kitchen and gas fittings, and optimising the internal space layout. The original 
structure and building facades were retained, and the focus was to re-build the 
interior space so that each household had an autonomous unit. Unit sizes remained 
tight, but where possible, extensions and an addition of an extra story helped 
alleviate congestion, or as surplus space to be sold to make up for the capital 
investments. The local housing bureaux or their affiliated quasi-governmental 
companies were responsible for most of the financing and implementation, although 
work units were required to contribute to the construction costs, and residents also 
paid a very minor contribution.
At a limited scale, this “community-retention” model was still rolled out alongside the 
rise of market-oriented demolition. It was set out in the Shanghai Municipal 
Construction Commission policy "Temporary regulations for the amenity fulfilment 
renewal of old housing” in September 1995. Between 1995 and 2001, a total of 
approximately 2 million m2 of old housing (around 12,000 dwellings units) was 
renovated under the terms of this policy, involving 57,700 households (SMHLAB, 
2002). By the mid-1990s, privatisation to sitting tenants became a key mechanism 
through which some funding for these schemes could be derived. Resettlement into 
the upgraded units was based on the condition that the household purchased the 
rehabilitated unit at a discounted price. Eventually, reconstruction as multi-storey 
flats rather than rehabilitation also became the norm. Local officials were not 
satisfied with the results of rehabilitation because it fulfilled only minimal housing 
standards, and did not do much to lower the high residential densities.
Yet these constituted only a minor component of the overall urban renewal efforts. 
The practice of on-site resettlement significantly constrained the profit potential of 
housing renewal, and therefore attracted only limited capital investment (Dowell, 
1994). It was not therefore seen as a sufficient solution to match the ambitions of 
the local authorities. Instead, market-orientated mechanisms of real estate 
development combined with off-site relocation were increasingly introduced,
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resulting in a model of large-scale, privately funded redevelopment. Indeed, the 
most obvious change in the practice of housing renewal in the 1990s was the shift 
towards private-funded redevelopment based on relocation of existing occupants.
4.4.3 Offsite relocation and redevelopment
Recognising that on-site resettlement severely constrained the commercial 
profitability of redevelopment projects in a market context, the State Council of 
China issued an important regulation on urban housing demolition and relocation in 
June 1991, formally promoting a shift towards 'in-kind' compensation as a primary 
mechanism. From this point onwards sitting residents could be resettled off-site into 
replacement housing at a different, usually cheaper, location (a practice known as 
'in-kind' compensation). Because all land was owned by the state, and the local 
governments had the legal authority to decide on land transfers for urban 
development, the government could actively force residents to move out in the 
name of public interest.
This shift in policy legitimised the large scale off-site relocation of sitting occupants 
for the enactment of urban renewal, and was fundamental to realising the 
speculative potential of redevelopment by freeing up land for more lucrative uses. 
Subsequent to this new regulation, developers built large quantities of low-cost 
housing in the urban peripheries, or bought second hand housing from the property 
market for the purposes of settling relocated families. Through the land-leasing 
process, developers could potentially turn over substantial profits by redeveloping 
old neighbourhoods into new real estate that can be sold or rented in the market, 
thereby realising the latent value of land. This provided an impetus for their injection 
of capital into the built environment, and opened up an enormous source of 
financing for the government to rebuild dilapidated areas (He and Wu, 2005).
Large scale redevelopment through private initiative quickly became the main driver 
of housing renewal and preoccupied most of the resources and political attention of 
the local government. Between 1991 and 1995, a total of 1.16 million m2 of old 
housing was demolished, relocating some 297,000 households (Xu, 2004). 
Compensation was calculated in relation to household size (number of persons in 
the household multiplied by the floor area compensation standard). Households 
could generally chose from housing offered at a variety of locations, with the 
compensation standards more generous if residents agreed to move to areas
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further away from the centre. These were generally more spacious and better 
quality physically than the ones residents are moved out of. However, the tensions 
relocation created became one of the most contentious issues in society. The 
specifics of the relocation process, the nature of resultant tensions, and further 
evolution of relocation policies will be detailed in subsequent chapters.
Apart from the state-led enforcement of relocation, redevelopment was sustained by 
other favourable policies for developers. During the 1990s, the local government 
intervened most forcefully in eliminating what remained of the 3.65 million m2 of 
slums. During the early phase of market-led redevelopment, projects were heavily 
biased towards the financially lucrative sites. In the pursuit of greater profitability 
and minimum development risk, property developers focused on the prime locations 
and those with lower population density. Only a minority actually corresponded to 
designated slum clearance areas. Other sites with less profit-potential and in 
particular high population density -  which meant higher relocation costs - were often 
neglected (Xu, 2004).
In order to channel property development towards less profitable slum areas and to 
achieve its housing renewal targets, the Shanghai Municipal Government instigated 
set of preferential policies in 1996: “Notification of various suggestions regarding the 
speeding up of inner city dangerous, basic and slum dwellings in this city” (SMG 
1996). The policies simplified procedures for approving applications for designated 
‘365’ slum areas. They reduced a range of administrative fees associated with 
redevelopment process and reduced and/or allowed delayed payment of land- 
leasing fees related to the acquisition of sites. Subject to the approval of the land 
and housing bureau land-leasing fees for these so-called 365 areas could be 
reduced by up to 40% for grade-3 locations, by 50% for grade-4 locations, and by 
60% for grade-5 locations (Xu, 2004). This practice of subsidised land transactions 
from the government to enterprises gave tremendous advantages to the private 
sector, and created the basis for windfall profits (Zhu, 1999).
The policy also permitted local authorities to offer special building density 
concessions for designated areas. Developers were also relatively free to determine 
the kinds of real estate they developed, and most new developments targeted the 
middle and high-income groups in order to achieve higher profits (Xu, 2004).
These policies were extended in 1998. The period 1997-8 saw the first, albeit short-
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lived, real estate slump in China. Facing these obstacles, the Municipal Government 
issued a further policy document in August 1998 -  “Notification concerning the 
speeding up of the renewal of slums dwellings in the inner districts of this city”. This 
offered an even more comprehensive set of preferential policies designed to ensure 
the speedy completion of the 365 redevelopment programme. Apart from the 
exemption of various administrative fees, all remaining designated sites were 
exempt from land-leasing fees. Beyond this, the municipal and district governments 
jointly offered fiscal subsidies for approved schemes for certain priority clearance 
sites. This ranged between 300 to 900 yuan for every square metre of dwellings 
demolished, depending on the location. These highly preferential, and costly, 
measures ensured that the ambitious clearance goal was formally achieved by 
November 2000 (Xu, 2004).
4.4.4 Redevelopment in the “New Round of Urban Renewal”
With the completion of the ‘365 slum clearance’ programme, the municipal 
government initiated an even more ambitious housing renewal programme for the 
period 2001-2010. The ‘New Round of Urban Renewal’ (NRUR) was announced in 
February 2001 according to the document ”Temporary methods regarding 
encouraging resident resettlement and the initiation of the new round of urban 
r e n e w a lDemolition remained the key focus of the NRUR, targeting by this stage 
the clearance of dilapidated lilong housing. It was announced that there were still 
20.15 million m2 of low-quality old dwellings requiring demolition. This included poor 
quality grade 1 lilong housing (32.3%), very poor quality grade 2 lilong housing 
(54.2%), and various informally built or basic dwellings (13.6%) distributed across 
941 plots of land.
Similar to the earlier redevelopment programme, favourable subsidies focused on 
removing supply-side constraints for private capital. Land-leasing fees of designated 
clearance sites could be negotiated or even waived, and various administrative fees 
were reduced or waived. All of these demonstrated a commitment of the 
government to encourage the participation of property development enterprises in 
the reconstruction of older inner city areas. The initiation of the NRUR programme 
also coincided with the recovery of the real estate market from the Asian Financial 
Crisis. A context of rebounding property prices helped generate a new sense of 
optimism and generated impetus for developers to resume their participation in 
urban renewal. Thus, between 2001 and October 2003, a total of 307 plots of land
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were speedily approved and leased out to property developers under the NRUR 
policy. This covered a total land area of more than 13.48 km2 and the planned 
relocation of some 300,000 households (Xu, 2004).
During this period, the central government shifted the method of relocation towards 
monetary compensation. With the rapid pace of urban redevelopment, available 
housing stock for resident resettlement became increasingly scarce, and therefore 
more expensive to provide. At the same time, officials discovered that residents 
would frequently try to increase the number of relatives living in the household prior 
to relocation so as to become eligible for larger replacement units. In order to 
resolve these problems, a new regulation called for the shift towards providing 
relocated households with cash compensation rather than housing in-kind, so that 
they can resettle in housing market themselves (Law et al, 2009; Wu et al, 2007). In 
October 2001, the Shanghai Municipal Government followed these new principles 
through the "Detailed rules for the management of Shanghai urban housing 
demolition and relocation"(SMG, 2001). From this point, cash compensation was to 
be determined in relation to the location, function and size of the demolished 
buildings, with no consideration of household size (as it had been done in the 
1990s). In other words, cash compensation was evaluated as a monetary value for 
the demolished premises, rather than related to the specific household forms.
These policies only nominally encouraged residents to resettle back into 
redeveloped housing. According to the policy, existing households were entitled to 
purchase the redeveloped housing at a discount price.4 In reality however, there 
was no explicit target rate of community retention, nor were there requirements for 
ensuring the affordability of new developments for existing households. Because 
existing households generally only had limited purchasing power, and new 
developments tended to target the affluent groups, most residents had little actual 
choice but to move away. Generally no more than 10% of the original households 
returned back to their original neighbourhoods after redevelopment (Xu, 2004). 
Detailed analysis of relocation in this period will be included in Chapter 5.
4 For example, if the household originally lived in a room of 30m2 that was demolished, and the 
newly developed units were 80m2, then 30m2 would be offered to them at a discount price, but the 
remaining 50m2 would be sold at market price.
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4.4.5 Re-engaging with rehabilitation and conservation
The above discussions showed that the combination of economic circumstances 
and preferential policies for real estate developers helped sustain large-scale 
housing redevelopment into the 2000s. In a context biased towards economic 
growth and rapid physical modernisation, historic conservation was a distant 
concern for local policy-makers.
The 1990s represented only the embryonic stage of historic conservation in China. 
Shanghai was formally designated as one of the “Renowned Historic and Cultural 
Cities” by the State Council of China in 1986 - an accolade which comes with the 
responsibility to develop a local historic conservation plan. However, no national 
policy in China to instructed local government on the actual practice of conservation 
planning (Zhang, 2003). In 1991, Shanghai itself developed the foundations of a 
local conservation system, expressed in the “Shanghai Historic and Cultural City 
Conservation Plan”. This involved a building listing system which identified 
“Outstanding Historic Buildings” (OHB) for individual protection, and an area-based 
system comprising larger designated ‘Historic Cultural Character Areas’. 11 
conservation areas were designated across the inner city of Shanghai, covering a 
total area of over 2,000 hectares (Zhang, 2003). They were characterised by 
different types of architectural heritage (Table 4.16). The management of 
developments in these areas was placed under the responsibility of the Municipal 
Urban Planning Bureau.
However, these did not lead to effective protection of historic areas. The building 
listing system proved relatively effective. However with only a few hundred 
designations across the city, it had a very limited scope. Another main problem was 
that the “Shanghai Historic and Cultural City Conservation Plan” operated at the city 
master plan level. It defined the boundaries of conservation areas and specified 
some basic density and height controls. However it did not set out sufficient detail of 
conditions and regulations for specific conservation areas, there was no legislative 
basis for enforcing controls, and in practice urban planners found them too vague 
for discussions over specific development proposals (Zhang, 2003). Thus, under 
strong pressures for redevelopment from district officials and developers, real estate 
development projects often sidelined conservation planning concerns. In particular, 
municipal infrastructure projects such as road expansions and landscaping schemes 
always took precedent over any conservation concerns.
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During the 1990s, the local government was only focused on revitalising a few 
iconic historic sites with more widely acknowledged historic or tourism value. For 
example, from 1994 Huangpu district government progressively facilitated the 
revitalisation of the iconic waterfront stretch known as the bund -  characterised by 
hundreds of neo-classical, romanticist, and eclectic styled buildings built between 
the 1910s and 1930s. Many of these buildings have now been lavishly restored to 
create a centre for luxury consumption.
Nevertheless, rehabilitation of older dwellings did progressively become a more 
important component of urban renewal in the 2000s. The “New Round of Urban 
Renewal” (2001-2010) for the first time advocated a more sophisticated three­
pronged approach under the principle of “demolition, conservation and 
improvement” (chai, liu, gai), targeting different parts of the existing stock. In 
addition to redevelopment, a significant rehabilitation programme targeting 
substandard workers’ housing (staff housing) built in the 1950s and 1960s was 
rolled out. These aimed to resolve problems such as shared use of bathrooms and 
kitchens as well as leakage and insulations problems.
As an extension of the earlier “amenity fulfilment renewal programme”, 
comprehensive rehabilitation measures were enacted to upgrade them as self- 
sufficient flats through a combination of extension, installation of utilities, and 
modification of internal layouts. Often, it included the addition of one or two stories 
via a 'flat-roof to pitched roof conversion approach. Notably, improved dwellings 
were for the most part sold to sitting tenants and thus supported community 
retention rather than displacement. These initiatives were first tried out in 1999, and 
made significant progress into the 2000s. Up to 2006, some 8,730 buildings were 
upgraded, with a total floor area of more than 17 million m2. (Law et al, 2009). 
Rehabilitation gradually became comparable in scale to redevelopment. Table 4.15 
overleaf shows that in 2005 and 2006 alone, 116 rehabilitation projects of this kind 
were rolled out across Shanghai, benefiting some 160,000 households. (Further 
examination of amenity-fulfilment renewal is documented in Chapter 6).
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Table 4.15: Housing rehabilitation projects in 2005-6
2005 2006
Districts Number of 
Projects
Total floor 
area
(1,000 m2)
House­
holds
Number of 
Projects
Total floor 
area
(1,000 m2)
House­
holds
City total 60 3,798 65,152 56 5,865 94,886
Huangpu 2 48 377 3 627 3,587
Luwan 3 188 3,775 1 144 2,699
JingAn 3 119 1,921 1 10 224
Xuhui 7 466 8,637 6 627 10,341
Changning 6 376 6,472 4 381 6,135
Hongkou 1 54 1,032 4 278 5,031
Yangpu 2 81 1,661 3 235 4,960
Zhabei 4 222 4,424 3 469 8,037
Baoshan 1 84 1,673 3 349 5,772
Minhang 8 638 9,751 6 863 11,868
Putuo 2 95 1,904 3 136 2,876
Pudong 0 0 0 3 245 4,205
Songjiang 1 89 976 1 145 1,944
Jinshang 3 205 2,917 2 267 4,171
Jiading 3 240 4,087 3 304 4,490
Fengxian 4 234 3,036 4 419 6,410
Qingpu 6 336 5,977 3 385 5,251
Nanhui 3 178 2,936 1 249 3,305
Chongming 1 145 2,955 2 178 3,580
Source: Shanghai Municipal Land and Housing Administration Bureau (2 005, 2006)5
Since 2002 there were also signs of increasing leadership recognition and support 
for historic conservation. Throughout the 1990s, historic conservation lacked a 
legislative basis, which made it difficult to enforce protection of buildings. To address 
this problem, the municipal government issued a pioneering set of local legislations: 
“ S h a n g h a i  c i t y  c o n s e r v a t i o n  r e g u l a t i o n s  f o r  h i s t o r i c  c o n s e r v a t i o n  a r e a s  a n d  
o u t s t a n d i n g  h i s t o r i c  b u i l d i n g s ” , which came into effect from January 2003. At the 
Urban Conservation Conference in August 2003, the Mayor of Shanghai made a 
speech urging that the city must adopt the most stringent measures to manage 
urban heritage and conservation areas, according to the principles of 
comprehensive planning, integrated protection, proactive utilisation, and law-abiding 
management.
5http://www.shfg.gov.cn:82/gate/big5/www.shfg.gov.cn/fgdoc/gzcjp/200910/t20091023_329636.htm 
I, Retrieved 23 October 2009
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In September 2003, the municipal government announced a revised and expanded 
set of conservation area designations (see Table 4.16). This includes 12 areas with 
a total coverage of almost 27 km2 -  about one tenth of Shanghai’s nine inner city 
districts. Within these were about 12 million m2 of residential buildings with 
protected status -  which represented about 8% of all inner city housing (SSB, 2006). 
The protected stock comprised 1.5 million m2 of garden villas (about 6,000 units),
3.4 million m2 of new-style lilong housing (about 15,000 units), 1.2 million m2 of 
historic apartments (about 10,000 units), and also 6.2 million m2 of old-style lilong 
housing (about 40,000 units). By this time, the number of listed Outstanding Historic 
Buildings was increased to 630, encompassing over 2,000 buildings.
Table 4.16: Historic conservation areas in Shanghai, 1991-2004
Conservation 
Areas, 1991
Area
(Hm2)
Conservation 
Areas, 2004
Area
(Hm2)
Main heritage types 
protected
Total (N=11) 2,094 Total (N=12) 2,696
Bund 99 Bund 101 Commercial buildings
People’s square 87 People’s square 107 Public square and commercial 
buildingsNanjing East 
Road
91
Historic City Core 199 Historic City Core 199 Traditional buildings, ancient 
relics and lilong housing
Hengshan Road 430 Hengshan-Fuxing 
Road (Merged)
775 Lilong housing and garden 
villasSinan Road 81
Maoming Road 53
Hongqiao 521 Hongqiao 481 Garden villas
Shanyin Road 113 Shanyin Road 129 Lilong housing and garden 
villas
Jiangwan 368 Jiangwan 458 Public buildings and 1930s 
urban plan
Longhua 52 Longhua 45 Historic temple and 
revolutionary memorial
Tilan Bridge 29 Lilong housing
Nanjing West Road 115 Commercial buildings and lilong 
neighbourhoods
Yuyuan Road 223 Garden villas
Xinhua Road 34 Garden villas
Source: Zhang (2004)
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In September 2004, the “Notice from the Shanghai Municipal Government regarding 
the further strengthening of the protection of historic cultural conservation areas and 
outstanding historic buildings” (SMG, 2004) highlighted the rationale for stepping up 
historic conservation in the development of Shanghai as a great modern metropolis:
The existing historical architectures o f Shanghai are... important 
embodiments of the precious cultural heritage o f our nation, fully expressing 
the vibrant characteristics o f Shanghai as a Renowned National Historic and 
Cultural City. To protect and utilise Shanghai’s urban conservation areas and 
outstanding historic architectures is an indispensable component of 
Shanghai’s development into a modem international metropolis.
The municipal government also made moves to enhance the capacity for integral 
area management through the preparation of much more detailed, statutory Historic 
Conservation Area Plans. According to the Shanghai Municipal Government’s (2005, 
November) "Notice concerning affirming in principle the planning of ten historic 
conservation areas such as the Bund'6, the overall mission of these conservation 
plans was to "ensure integrated protection of the cultural heritage and historic 
cultural character of the conservation area, to guide the harmonious development of 
conservation and renewal, to provide regulatory planning controls that are suited to 
the particular conservation area.”
These detailed plans, completed towards the end of 2005, clarified the ‘aesthetic 
character’ in each area, the principles of protection, and defined clear, enforceable 
regulatory controls concerning building heights, set-backs, separations, volume 
(density), colour, traffic, landscaping, and requirements for car parking, public 
services and facilities. The new system incorporates a five-tier categorisation of 
buildings in each conservation area, each corresponding to a different level of 
protection. This was expected to provide a more robust and practical framework for 
reconciling conservation and development (see Table 4.17 overleaf). An experts 
committee for historic conservation was set up to oversee and approve of any 
developments relating to listed buildings in relation to the regulations.
6 httD://www.shati.aov.cn/ahsp/ahsD/shi/200605/t20060522 181656.htm. Retrieved 12 December 2009
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Table 4.17: Multi-tiered building conservation requirements
Building category Description Key regulations
Protected Building 
(bauhu jianzhu)
Includes all nationally listed cultural 
heritage buildings and municipal- 
listed Outstanding Historic 
Buildings. These have particular 
historical, cultural or architectural 
value.
These cannot be demolished and 
should be repaired and reused in 
accordance with the conservation 
plans and legislation.
Conserved Building 
(baoliu jianzhu)
These are buildings with 
considerable levels of historical, 
cultural or architectural value, but 
not sufficient to mandate Protected 
Buildings status.
These cannot be demolished. 
Building facades, structures, and 
plan-layouts, buildings heights and 
key internal architectural features of 
these buildings cannot be altered.
Normal historic 
buildings (grade A)
Pre-1949 buildings possessing 
some historical, cultural or 
architectural value and of integral to 
the character of the area, but not 
sufficient to warrant conserved 
building status
They should not be demolished in 
whole, but should be repaired and 
rehabilitated.
Normal historic 
buildings (grade B)
Pre-1949 buildings having average 
historic character
Can undergo extension, alterations 
or reconstruction, but these must be 
in keeping with the character of the 
conservation area
Buildings requiring 
demolition
These include basic shacks, 
informal extensions, and 
dangerously dilapidated dwellings 
which do not fit with the character of 
the area.
These ought to be demolished and 
rebuilt in accordance with the 
planning guidelines.
Other buildings: These are buildings which do not fit 
in any of the formal categories
Can undergo extension, alterations, 
rebuilding, but in keeping with the 
character of the conservation area.
Source: Shanghai Municipal Government (2005)
While these were significant breakthroughs, local heritage experts and authorities 
point out that there remain significant uncertainties in the overall approach. Although 
buildings and areas are now statutorily protected, and future developments have a 
clear basis for regulation, there has so far been very limited private sector interest in 
rehabilitation or restoration.
Authorities in Shanghai consider that most of the historic buildings will need to over 
time undergo market-driven renovation or adaptive-reuse. Most residents are too 
poor to do this, so property developers are envisioned to play a key part. Like 
redevelopment, local authorities consider resident relocation to free up the buildings 
for private investment can be a part of the process. However, the costs of relocation, 
and strict density constraints associated with historic buildings are so far prohibitive. 
Most of the planning strategies developed so far are regulative tools to enhance 
development control, whereas there remains a lack of measures for market
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stimulation (i.e. building incentives for private investment). Thus, major questions 
remain regarding who can finance the renewal of protected heritage. To reverse 
physical decay and to ensure the long term viability of historic conservation, more 
financial subsidies and needs to be made available to support the private sector.
Furthermore, conservation was still highly selective. It concentrated on protecting 
various forms of high-profile public and institutional buildings, or more privileged 
housing types such as detached villas and new-style lilong housing. Old-style lilong 
housing was mostly graded “normal historic buildings”. Demolition is generally 
permitted, with only the requirement that new developments emulated its lane- 
based morphology. In sum, large-scale redevelopment, with substantial subsidies, 
was a consistent and key driver of housing renewal since 1990. Historic 
conservation was nevertheless by 2005 beginning to stand on its feet as a serious 
urban planning concern. What has so far been achieved is a system to ensure 
“protection” of heritage in conservation areas, but the prospects for on-going 
“renewal” remains so far unclear. Meanwhile, the most prominent aspect of housing 
rehabilitation after 2000 was the government’s continuation of housing amenity 
fulfilment renewal targeting the modernisation of substandard staff housing. This 
became a major alternative dynamic alongside on-going redevelopment.
4.5 The impact of market-oriented housing renewal
After outlining the key policies underlying housing renewal, this section provides an 
overview of its measurable impacts on the city. It examines transformations in the 
inner-city where urban renewal was concentrated, and also demonstrates the 
profound decentralisation effect of relocation since 1990. Figure 10 overleaf is a 
map of various districts in Shanghai. The ‘inner-city’ is here taken to comprise nine 
urban districts: the four most central districts of Huangpu (which merged with the 
former Nanshi district), Luwan, Xuhui, and JingAn, and the five districts immediately 
surrounding them: Hongkou, Changning, Putuo, Zhabei, and Yangpu. In 2000 these 
nine had a total geographical area of 289 km2 and a population of 6.28 million (SSB,
2001). Due to the concentric development of the city, older housing was 
concentrated these areas. The inner city districts are surrounded in turn by various 
suburban districts, which in 2000 covered a total land area of 3,635 km2 - more than 
12 times that of the inner city.
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Figure 4.10: Map of urban districts in Shanghai
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4.5.1 Production and consumption of up-market housing
Examining the inner city, one of the most direct outcomes of urban renewal since 
1990 was a rapid increase in total residential space and the modernisation of the 
housing stock through redevelopment. Table 4.18 and Table 4.19 show a dramatic 
transformation of the housing stock. In 1985, the housing stock comprised various 
forms of lilong housing (49.7% of the stock), post-1949 staff housing (40.3%), 
shanty (6.2%), detached villas (1.9%) and pre-1949 apartments (1.6%). “Staff 
housing” is a broad category which included multi-storey flats built during the 
socialist era, and also came to encompass new form of modern apartments. 
Between 1985 and 2005, about 16.3 million m2of lilong housing and 3.5 million m2 
of slums were demolished, representing 93% of the existing slums and 54% of all 
existing lilong housing stock (SSB, 1993, 2006).
Table 4.18: Housing composition in the inner city, 1985-2005
Unit: 1,000 m 2 floor area
Housing type 1985 2005 Change % change
All types 60,460 157,970 97,510 161.3
Villas 1,120 2,160 1,040 92.9
Apartment 946 4,380 3,434 363.0
Staff 24,376 136,570 112,194 460.3
Lilong 30,026 13,690 -16,336 -54.4
Shanty 3,749 260 -3 ,489 -93.1
Note: Districts included are Huangpu (including Nanshi), Luwan, Xuhui, Changning, JingAn, 
Putuo, Zhabei, Hongkou and Yangpu 
Source: SSB (1986, 2006)
Table 4.19: Housing composition in the inner city (percentages), 1985-2005
Unit: Percent of total
1985 2005
Subtotal 100 100
Villas 1.9 1.4
Apartment 1.6 2.8
Staff 40.3 86.5
Lilong 49.7 8.7
Shanty 6.2 0.2
Source: SSB (1986, 2006)
Old and dilapidated housing has visibly been replaced by vast quantities of modern 
residential forms including detached villas and apartments (staff housing). The total
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residential floor space in the inner city increased 160% during this time, from 60.4 
million m2 to 158.0 million m2. Assuming an average unit size of 85 m2, the newly 
added stock equated to roughly 1.15 million units. ‘Staff housing’ was one major 
outcome of housing renewal, with a total of 112.2 million m2 completed over the two 
decades. At the same time, luxurious forms of detached housing increased by about 
1.0 million m2 (SSB, 2006). By 2005, staff housing accounted for 86.5% of the total 
housing stock in the inner city, while lilong housing accounted for only 8.7%. Beyond 
redevelopment, rehabilitation programmes also upgraded almost 17 million m2 of the 
older staff housing by 2006.
Housing renewal was accompanied by a process of tenure restructuring, as mostly 
public housing were demolished and subsequently replaced by private 
developments. More and more citizens had moved into home ownership since 1990, 
in part by purchasing new housing in the inner city, and in part as a result of being 
given replacement housing or cash compensation. Due to rising incomes, 
demolitions and a pent up demand for better housing, there was a tremendous 
upsurge of housing consumption in the market. Total commodity housing sales in 
Shanghai increased from 5.56 million m2 in 1994 (about 55,000 units), to 54.56 
million m2 (about 550,000 units) in 2004 (SSB, 2005). By 2006, the share of public 
renting had accordingly declined to 23.8%, whereas different categories of owner 
occupation reached a total of 74.1% (SSB, 2007).
New housing produced in the inner city tended to be owner-occupied units geared 
towards higher-income groups rather than the poor. The source of demand for these 
developments can be attributed to the affluent groups including expatriates as well 
as the local entrepreneurs, professionals, managers and officials. As existing 
residents were displaced, higher income social groups tended to replace them in the 
new up-market housing developments, leading towards a ‘class transformation’ of 
the city, or state-sponsored gentrification’ (He, 2007). A clear price gradient in space 
was established, highest towards the centre of the city and falling progressively 
towards the urban periphery. In 2006 for example, average presale price for new 
housing was around 18,000 yuan/m2 in the inner ring road areas, dropping to 
around 11,000 yuan/m2 between the inner and middle ring roads. These compared 
to around 6,000 yuan/m2 in the outer ring locations and around 4,000 yuan/m2 
beyond that.7 In the competitive housing market the opportunity of gaining
7http://51.129.65.8:8#gate/bigE/finance.eastday.com/eastday/finance/node7728E/node7730Vnode
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ownership - especially in the inner city - remained largely out of reach of the urban 
poor.
4.5.2 Commercial spaces and new urban infrastructures
Redevelopment also involved a profound functional restructuring of land uses and 
the addition of new infrastructures. Roads, bridges, airports, rail links and public 
mass transit systems were deemed essential for sustaining economic development. 
Total investment to this end increased from 10.98 billion yuan in 1990 to 198.4 
billion yuan in 2005 (SSB, 2006). Key infrastructure projects completed in the 1990s 
included three bridges and two tunnels across the Huangpu River, an inner ring­
road, a system of elevated north-south and east-west throughways, and two new 
subway lines. By 2020, the city aimed to have built 11 underground lines with a total 
of 325 kilometres of subway and 136 kilometres of light rail (Wu, 1999).
Inner city land was also being restructured to reflect the market logic of higher value 
use, into a site for services and consumption. Industrial land uses experienced 
significant decline. As industries were relocated towards more peripheral areas, the 
total built space of factories and industrial plants decreased by about 17% from 
1990 to 2005 (SSB, 1996, 2006). At the same time, growth of office-based 
employment and service sectors sustained a massive supply of new commercial 
buildings and facilities in central locations.
The inner city has always been the centre of commercial activity in Shanghai, and 
this legacy has been reinforced. Table 4.20 overleaf charts the growth of retail floor 
space in inner city districts. Between 1985~2005, the amount of retail space in the 
inner-city relative to its population increased 370%, from about 450 m2 per 1,000 
residents, to more than 2,100 m2. In the late 1980s, Huangpu district was the 
commercial heart of the city and the only urban district offering more than 1,000 m2 
of retail space per 1,000 local residents. By 2005, six of the nine inner city districts 
had exceeded 2,000 m2per 1,000 residents.
156390/ula2267947.html. Retrieved 23 April 2008.
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Table 4.20: Retail space expansion in inner city districts, 1985-2005
Unit: m2/1000 residents in district
District 1985 2005 % change
Overall (N =9) 454 2,141 371
Huangpu 1,190 2,785 134
Luwan 367 3,107 747
Xuhui 289 1,098 280
Changning 386 1,520 294
JingAn 356 2,784 682
Putuo 390 2,392 513
Zhabei 417 2,997 619
Hongkou 344 1,889 449
Yangpu 350 703 101
Source: calculated from SSB (1986, 2006)
Table 4.21: Changes in building space in inner city districts
Unit: 1,000 m 2 of floor space
1995 2000 2005 Change
1995-2005
% Change 
1995-2005
Housing 153,910 120,830 157,970 4,060 +3
Offices 6,910 15,850 21,607 14,697 +213
Retail space 4,020 6,740 11,826 7,806 +194
Hotels 2,600 3,080 3,804 1,204 +46
Cinem a/Theatre 300 290 287 -13 -4
Schools 9,250 9,830 10,907 1,657 +18
Hospitals 1,950 2,560 3,158 1,208 +62
Factories 36,370 31,380 30,200 -6,170 -17
Source: Compiled from SSB, 1996, 2000, 2006
Table 4.21 shows the changing built space composition in the inner city. From 1995 
to 2005 a total of 14.7 million m2of commercial offices (the equivalent of almost 70 
Empire State Buildings in the U.S) was added. In addition to these were 7.8 million 
m2of new retail space and 1.2 million m2of hotels. These effectively doubled the 
existing commercial infrastructure. There was also a significant expansion of various 
public facilities alongside redevelopment. The total floor space of schools in the 
inner city increased by 1.7 million m2, or about 18%. Meanwhile hospital spaces 
increased by 1.2 million m2, or 62% (SSB, 1996, 2006). Attractive urban amenities 
are known to be important for sustaining a city-centre based housing market (Ley,
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1986). The enhanced housing stock, urban amenities and infrastructures that 
accompanied this phase of urban renewal were apparent place-related advantages 
compared to suburban areas. These helped sustain the popularity of the inner city 
as a locale for the relatively wealthy to live and work.
As a result of new building, the traditional low-rise form of the city has shifted 
towards a taller, tower-based form. Table 4.23 shows that between 1995 and 2005 
about 5,000 buildings of eight-stories or higher were built in the inner city. High-rise 
buildings exceeding 30 stories increased from 46 to 539. By this time, Shanghai is 
well recognised as one of the ‘tallest’ cities in the world.
Table 4.22: Buildings of 8 stories or more, 1995-2005
Unit: buildings
Urban districts 1995 2005 Change 1995-2005
Huangpu 99 394 243
Nanshi * 52
Luwan 56 297 241
Xuhui 252 916 664
Changning 152 662 510
JingAn 75 410 335
Putuo 129 1,073 944
Zhabei 104 421 317
Hongkou 181 591 410
Yangpu 124 1,359 1,235
Inner districts total 1,224 6,123 4,899
Shanghai total 1,484 10,045 8,561
Note: * Nanshi district merged into Huangpu district in 2000  
Source: Compiled from SSB, 1996, 2006
4.5.3 Population decentralisation
Redevelopment and relocation underpinned a profound spatial redistribution of the 
population. It was usually accompanied by the forced relocation of existing residents 
and other occupants. Table 4.23 overleaf demonstrates the progress of demolition 
and relocation in the whole city from 1992 to 2006. It shows that 1.11 million families 
were relocated between 1992 and 2006 as a result -  totalling more than 3 million 
residents. On average about 74,000 families were relocated every year, although 
relocation rates exceeded more than 90,000 households during 1994 and 2002. 
Given that there were officially 5.0 million registered households in 2006, a
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remarkable one in five households have been relocated (SSB, 2006).
Accordingly, there has been a strong decentralisation trend from the inner-most 
urban districts towards the middle zone urban districts and to suburban districts 
beyond. Although the inner city (or ' p u x i ' )  continued to be a thriving populated 
environment, residential densities rapidly decreased as crowded residences made 
way for business, services and more spacious modern dwellings. At the same time 
the suburban areas had become key arenas of growth, in no small part due to large 
numbers of people being relocated away or priced out from the restructured and 
ever-more expensive inner city.
Table 4.23: Housing demolition and resident relocations, 1992-2006
Year Households relocated Demolished residential 
buildings 
(1,000 m2)
1992 38,240 n.a
1993 86,582 n.a
1994 92,784 n.a
1995 73,695 2,539
1996 86,481 2,589
1997 77,388 3,632
1998 75,157 3,439
1999 73,709 2,482
2000 68,293 2,884
2001 71,909 3,867
2002 98,714 4,850
2003 79,077 4,755
2004 41,552 2,325
2005 74,483 8,519
2006 76,874 8,484
Total 1,114,938 50,362
Source: SSB (2007); n.a = data was not available
Table 4.24 overleaf shows the key relocation catchment areas for different inner city 
districts since 2000. Most of these areas were thought of as potential ‘new towns’ 
situated between 30 km and 40 km from the centre of Shanghai (Pan, 2006). For 
example, relocation housing for Huangpu and Luwan were principally situated in 
Pudong, Minhang and Nanhui districts, beyond the outer ring road. Figure 4.11 
shows accordingly the key directions of relocation from the inner city.
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Figure 4.11: Key directions of relocation in Shanghai
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Table 4.24: Key relocation catchment areas in Shanghai
Demolition district Areas in which relocation housing is offered
Huangpu and Luwan > Pudong district, areas beyond the outer-ring road
> Minhang district, around Pujiang area
> Nanhui district, areas such as Zhoupu
> Fengxian district
JingAn, Xuhui, Changning > Songjiang district
> Minghang district, around the Puxi area
Putuo > Jiading district, areas such as Jiangqiao
Hongkou, Yangpu, Zhabei > Baoshan district, areas beyond the outer-ring road 
such as Gucun
Source: Huang (2006: 214)
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Table 4.25 shows the population changes in the inner city alongside restructuring. 
From 1992-2000 the four inner-most districts experienced a dramatic population 
decline totalling 1.17 million. 8 Accordingly, their average population density 
decreased from 67,681 persons per km2 to 43,044 persons per km2 (SSB, 2004b). 
Over the same period, the 'middle-ring' zones of the city experienced apparent 
population growth. Districts such as Changning, Putuo, Xuhui, Minhang and Yangpu 
each gained between 100,000-300,000. This was partly the result of relocation from 
the inner-most areas as well as considerable new residential construction in these 
areas.
Table 4.25: Population in inner urban districts, 1992-2005
Unit: 1,000 persons
Districts Land area* 
(km2)
1992 2000 2005 Change
1992-2000
Change
2000-2005
Huangpu 
(and Nanshi)
12 1,505 575 509 -931 -66
Luwan 8 429 329 271 -100 -58
Xuhui 55 750 1,065 986 314 -79
Changning 38 596 702 672 107 -30
JingAn 8 442 305 257 -136 -49
Putuo 55 805 1,052 1,106 247 54
Zhabei 29 674 799 758 125 -41
Hongkou 23 839 861 783 21 -78
Yangpu 61 1,097 1,244 1,203 147 -41
Total 289 7,136 6,930 6,161 -205 -770
Notes: * Area as of year 2000. 
Source: SSB (1993, 2001, 2006)
Population growth was even more dramatic in the seven suburban districts. Table 
4.26 (overleaf) shows that between 1985 and 2000 their total population grew from 
3.84 million to 7.41 million, driven in part by deepening urbanisation. Of note, 
Pudong, Minhang, Baoshan and Jiading districts - which have been major relocation 
catchment areas for inner city redevelopment - gained on average about one million 
residents. With deepening urban renewal into the 2000s, the decentralisation trend 
continued. From 2000-2005 there was more significant reduction of population in all
8 Although part of this was also due to changing administrative boundaries, with Pudong district 
gaining some of the population.
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the inner urban districts and continued growth of the sprawling suburban districts. 
Total population in the inner city districts declined by more than 770,000 - from 6.93 
million to 6.16 million. Meanwhile the population in the seven suburban districts had 
increased by a further 2.11 million.
Table 4.26: Population in suburban districts, 1985-2005
Unit: 1,000 persons _________ _________ ________
Districts Land area* 
(km2)
1985 2000 2005 Change
1985-2000
Change
2000-2005
Pudong** 523 1,339 2,402 2,792 1,063 390
Minhang 372 117 1,217 1,305 1,100 88
Baoshan*** 415 499 1,228 1,305 729 77
Jiading 459 504 753 1,708 249 955
Jinshan 586 460 580 943 121 362
Songjiang 605 483 641 592 159 -49
Qingpu 676 440 596 886 156 290
Total 3,635 3,843 7,418 9,531 3,575 2,113
Notes: * Area as of year 2000. ** Data for year 1990 was used *** Data for year 
1987 used due to lack of 1985 figures. Source: SSB (2001, 2006) and various urban 
district yearbooks9
4.6 Conclusion:
In sum, against the backdrop of market transition, administrative decentralisation 
and economic restructuring urban renewal took off at a rapid pace from the early 
1990s. Inner city Shanghai - once dominated by vast quantities of ageing low-rise 
housing -  has been refashioned by modern high-rise residential and commercial 
developments, some rehabilitation, new infrastructures and public facilities. More 
than one million households have been relocated in the redevelopment process, 
largely towards the expanding suburbs, as the inner city was restructured for more 
privileged social groups. Although Shanghai is yet to become ‘post-industrial’ in 
terms of its economic base and extent of labour force professionalisation, 
redeveloped inner city neighbourhoods increasingly resembled a gentrified post­
industrial milieu, designed for the living, working and consumption demands of a 
moneyed middle class in ascendancy. This was also a physical landscape 
characterised by modernity and diminishing historical character.
9 http://www.shtong.gov.cn/node^node4/node2250/index.html, Retrieved 30 November 2009.
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This chapter demonstrates a key message: that urban housing renewal in post-1990 
Shanghai was underpinned by combination of national institutional reforms, local 
policies as well as socio-economic transformations. Several key issues have been 
discussed. The origin and nature of housing problems in Shanghai, the range of 
housing renewal initiatives enacted since 1990, setting these in the context of 
housing reforms and socio-economic change, and an overview of the most apparent 
impacts of urban renewal in the inner city. The findings concur with some of the key 
assertions of the Chinese growth coalition perspective, but also suggest that the 
role of the local government has been more complex than commonly assumed.
The analysis was set in a historical perspective, highlighting the long legacy of 
housing problems in the city. Shanghai flourished as a treaty port city from the 
middle of the 19th century. In this era it built up a rich legacy of cosmopolitan 
residential architecture, but by the 1940s population pressures, migration and the 
disturbances of war led already to widespread housing shortages and the 
proliferation of slums. Under the Communist Party leadership since 1949, Shanghai 
was then transformed into the leading industrial centre of China. However, 
continued population growth, under-investment in housing and the built environment 
and absence of comprehensive planning under the socialist system meant that the 
city endured a severe housing shortage and a degraded urban environment. By the 
1980s, millions of residents lived in over-crowded and run-down dwellings, and the 
city subsisted on infrastructure inherited from the early 20th century. Land-uses 
were mixed and incompatible, residential densities were extremely high, yet the 
government had insufficient resources to carry out comprehensive upgrading.
As recognised by the Chinese growth coalition perspective, a set of institutional 
transformations were important in setting in place the mechanisms and necessary 
local powers for large-scale urban renewal. The central government gave Shanghai 
the official mission to become the economic driver of the Yangtze River Delta 
Region, and in turn an international economic centre. This meant that economic 
growth became a local political priority. Beyond this, fiscal and administrative 
reforms readjusted central-local relations creating a more empowered local 
government in terms of urban policy-making, land use and planning.
Other major changes underlying the practice of housing renewal included the shift 
from public to private financing, the shift towards paid-transfer of land-use rights to 
developers, and the shift from community retention to a policy of resident relocation.
National housing and land reforms gradually established a housing market and set 
in place the important role of developers in a commercialised real estate. Land 
reforms made urban land a valuable resource and allowed property developers to 
lease urban land for development by paying a premium to the local government. No 
longer committed to the re-housing of original residents in-place, the 
institutionalisation of off-site relocation in 1991 allowed the government to free up 
valuable inner city land for higher value use and provided a strong financial rationale 
for private sector financing to flow into urban redevelopment. Thus, the prospect of 
speculative redevelopment of disinvested urban areas was released.
Apart from these institutional changes, profound economic transformations 
influenced both the profitability of up-market real estate investment and the nature 
of the urban landscape that emerged. The real estate market boomed in the context 
of rapid, more or less sustained economic growth and restructuring. Shanghai has 
experienced the beginnings of a post-industrial transition. The traditionally dominant 
manufacturing sector has upgraded towards high-tech industries and products. 
Meanwhile, growing tertiary sectors including finance, insurance, real estate, 
business services, retail, and catering grew rapidly to represent about 60% of the 
city’s GDP by 2008. Expansion of the service economy, under both global and 
domestic investment, generated a surge of demand for new commercial facilities 
including offices, hotels and retail centres in central locations.
With market reform, urbanisation and industrial restructuring, the occupational 
structure and income distribution in Shanghai has undergone significant changes. 
This included the growth of office-based, professional/managerial work, an upward 
shift in income, and greater inequality. Emerging affluence amongst more privileged 
social groups locally, and the influx of a foreign elite class created demand for new 
and better housing, and spaces for leisure and consumption. As existing lower- 
income residents could be relocated or were priced out, new uses and a more 
privileged class came to occupy the ‘revitalised’ inner city.
Economic forces did not in themselves dictate the process of urban renewal. The 
analysis showed that local government assumed a critical mediating role through its 
administration of land parcels and a series of local policies for urban renewal. 
However, the role of the local government appears to be more complex than that 
suggested by the growth coalition perspective. A number of evolving initiatives made 
up Shanghai’s overall approach to housing renewal since 1990. Socially-oriented
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programmes formed a consistent part of the overall renewal strategy. Throughout 
the 1990s, Housing Amenity Fulfilment Renewal was a programme which focused 
on rehabilitation and selective reconstruction of lilong housing to improve the living 
conditions of residents. Its central concern was community retention, based on 
privatisation to sitting tenants. A combination of favourable public subsidies and 
discounted sale of units to original residents formed the basic principles of their 
operation. Since 2001, improvement of large numbers of post-1949 socialist built 
flats also became a significant public commitment. These initiatives were broadly 
speaking welfare oriented, and their operational mechanisms will be considered 
more closely in Chapter 6.
On the other hand, the most significant mechanisms for housing renewal since 1990 
were based on redevelopment and relocation. These are well recognised within the 
growth-coalition literature. In the 1990s, a core focus was on the clearance of 3.65 
million m2of slums and dangerous dwellings, and subsequently almost 20 million m2 
of old housing has been targeted for clearance in the New Round of Urban Renewal 
from 2001 to 2010. In the 1990s, residents were offered compensation in the form of 
replacement housing. After 2001, monetary compensation became the predominant 
form, with which residents were expected to find their own resettlement housing in 
the market. By enforcing a policy of off-site relocation, the government overall 
helped release valuable inner city land for higher value uses. To channel private 
investment into designated clearance sites, the municipal government offered a 
range of positive incentives for local as well as foreign developers. These included 
measures to reduce development costs, land acquisition costs, and to relax 
bureaucracy and planning controls.
Historic conservation was a marginal concern at first, but became an important 
political issue by the mid-2000s. Increasingly, effective planning and reinvigoration 
of the historic heritage stock is seen as crucial for building Shanghai’s identity as a 
“cultural” modern city. The municipal government has led efforts to develop a local 
historic conservation system to reconcile heightened tensions between heritage 
protection and development, and this is increasingly tied into a broader agenda of 
building a positive city-imagery. Nevertheless, although recent strategies have 
enlarged designations, established legislations and detailed conservation plans to 
provide a basis for development control, it is still unclear how and who will finance 
the renewal of protected buildings in the future.
162
This chapter has outlined the context and institutional factors shaping housing 
renewal in post-1990 Shanghai. Detailed consideration ‘how’ different projects are 
implemented during this time will be the subject of subsequent chapters. These will 
in turn shed light on the complex socio-political dynamics at work. A key claim of the 
growth-coalition perspective is that alongside market reform, a new institutional 
arrangement of public-private collaboration was established to design and 
implement specific projects. This, and the tensions that emerged in the housing 
renewal process, will be examined in the next chapter through a large housing 
redevelopment project.
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5 The Redevelopment of Taipingqiao Area: A Case 
of Large-Scale Displacement
5.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a case study of the Taipingqiao area redevelopment project in 
the downtown Luwan district. As one of the largest on-going urban redevelopment 
projects in Shanghai, it reflects some of the key institutional features of China’s 
post-socialist transition, and provides some insights into how redevelopment has 
operated since 1990. Firstly, the chapter shall introduce the area context of 
Taipingqiao and describe the living conditions and social dynamics that 
characterised the run-down housing targeted for redevelopment. It then examines 
the process of redevelopment in a roughly chronological order, investigating the 
redevelopment plan, relevant policies, the roles and interaction of the different 
actors in the process, the implications of resident relocation, the nature of property 
development in the area, and the impacts of these processes on the neighbourhood. 
The case study, which covers a 12 year period, shows that redevelopment was 
dominated by a coalition of pro-business local government and powerful real estate 
actors for the purpose of promoting economic growth and capital accumulation. On 
the back of supportive public policies and private entrepreneurial initiative the city 
has turned into a post-socialist growth machine, restructuring places and extracting 
values through the intensification of land use. Involving displacement as a central 
strategy, the growth coalition has politically and spatially excluded large segments of 
local communities and neglected the residual use value of run-down central 
neighbourhoods.
5.2 A dilapidated central neighbourhood
5.2.1 History and Location
Taipingqiao (literally ‘Peace Bridge) is centrally located on the North-Eastern part of 
Luwan district. Its northern and eastern borders run adjacent to Shanghai’s 
premiere commercial centre, Huaihai Road. The area is well-served by public 
transport, and is well connected to major arterial routes including the North-South 
elevated expressway, the East-West axis Yan-An Road and Xujiahui Road.
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Figure 5.1: Lilong Housing against background of high-rise developments
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According to the Taipingqiao plan of 1997, the area covers a site of 52 hectares, 
with 23 urban blocks. Its population was approximately 70,000 (20,000 households) 
and there were more than 800 enterprises operating in the area. Luwan district had 
one of the highest population densities in Shanghai up to the early 1990s. Apart 
from a very small proportion of new style lilong housing and post-1949 staff housing, 
the vast majority of the housing stock was old-style (shikumen) lilong housing. The 
area was formed in the early 1900s as part of the former French Concessions. By 
the 1930s it has become a vibrant commercial and residential quarter. In total, there 
were approximately one million m2of lilong housing distributed along 193 lanes, 97 
of which were constructed between 1914 and 1930 (Xu, 2004).
Most of the dwellings had been appropriated by the state since 1950 as public 
housing, and up to the early 1990s accommodated a mix of higher-income and low- 
income residents. In 1993, 87.8% of the dwellings in Luwan district were public 
housing (LDH, 1998). Living conditions were officially deemed to be very poor after 
half a century of limited urban investment. Since 1992 the Taipingqiao area had 
been regarded a priority area needing renewal, because it had concentrated nearly
165
a quarter of the old dilapidated lilong dwellings in the entire district, and because of 
its prime location. Taipingqiao area formed a potential southern extension to the 
established district commercial centre on Huaihai road, which was a major focus for 
the district’s economic development. The district governments had made some 
efforts to attract developers for the task, however owing to the high population 
density of the area and potentially high resettlement costs, few developers were at 
the time interested to engaging in this area’s redevelopment.
5.2.2 Living conditions in dilapidated dwellings
To provide an indication of the pre-renewal living conditions, this section describes 
one ‘surviving’ cluster of lilong-housing in the area which by 2008 has not yet 
experienced either rehabilitation or redevelopment. “ X i c h e n g i r  (XCL) comprised 
more than 400 lilong dwellings built between 1925 and 1927 and accommodated 
approximately 1,200 households. The majority of the dwellings here were shikumen 
lilong, distinguished by their characteristic ornamental ‘stone gates’, compact floor 
plans of about 14m in depth by 4m in width, and the lack of indoor bathroom or 
sanitation facilities. To the northern end of the community were several rows of new- 
style lilong - the more modernised variant with indoor WC and bath.
Figure 5.2: Views of lanes and shikumen lilong housing at Xichengli
Most of these dwellings were owned and managed by local housing bureau as 
public housing. Despite a series of rent reforms since 1991, public rents remained 
very cheap even for the low income groups. Residents generally paid between 20- 
40 yuan rent per month, which represented a very small share of their living budgets, 
and less than three per cent of the incomes of those in bottom 20% of the income 
distribution (see table 5.3). Many residents attest to the dimension of affordability:
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The rent is fine , it  is very cheap! This p lace o f  mine costs... about 40  yuan. 
N ow  in terms o f  our income... the rent compared to the income is very cheap.
Resident (X22), male, age 60s
Table 5.1: Housing conditions of interviewees in Xichengli
Respondent
ID
Housing
space
(m!)
Family
Size
(persons)
Has 
indoor WC
Has
indoor
shower
Has
Private
kitchen
Satisfied
with
house
XCL4 10 2 - - - -
XCL6 40 2 Yes Yes Yes
XCL 7 20 3 - - - -
XCL10 20 2 Yes Yes - -
XCL 11 70 4 Yes Yes Yes Yes
XCL 12 35 3 Yes Yes - Yes
XCL 14 32 2 - - - Yes
XCL 17 40 3 - - - Partly
XCL 22' 20 4 - - -
(N=9) Median 
= 32 m2
Mean 
= 2.78
4 4 1 5
Source: author’s interviews
Residents also regarded their location very convenient. There was ample public 
transport within the inner city. The commercial environment was well established, 
with an abundance of shops and services to serve their everyday needs. They were 
walking distance from the local grocery market and there were many affordable 
stores lining the streets. The nearby Fuxing Park provided an important recreational 
area where many community activities were organised, including dance, exercise 
and singing groups. Children could go to primary and secondary schools locally. The 
elderly had easy access to two hospitals as well as an area healthcare centre. Many 
were attached to these features of the neighbourhood.
However, the physical living conditions were basic or poor. Over-crowding has long- 
been a feature of everyday living. A two-story lilong house of approximately 100 m2 
often accommodated between two to five families. Occasionally, families of two or 
three people occupied an entire floor of the lilong of 50 m2, which was considered 
relatively comfortable. Nevertheless, normally families seldom had more than 30 m2
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or space to themselves, with many crammed into the smallest room of 10-12 m2.
Because of the crowded living conditions, residents of lilong housing had relatively 
little privacy to speak of -  either w i t h i n  their own households or a m o n g s t  other 
households sharing the same house. Within the household, members of family - up 
to three generations, had to carry out all their living activities within a single room. A 
common expression was that in the lilong ‘eating, drinking, excreting, and sleeping’ 
all took place in one room, and it was a common aspiration for the residents to have 
a room to themselves. Sound-proofing across rooms and floors was generally poor, 
and noise can become nuisances that lead to tensions amongst neighbours.
Figure 5.3: Chamber pots used in lilong housing
All the households here had electricity and gas connections although in Shanghai 
many communities still relied on the use of cylinder gas for their cooking needs. 
These utilities were added in recent years as part of urban infrastructural 
improvements in the city. However, the deficiency of sanitation facilities was a key 
liveability problem for many residents. Shikumen lilong were built at the outset 
without indoor bath or WC. Residents relied on chamber pots which had to be 
carried outside and disposed throughout the day at an outdoor communal waste 
station. These outdoor waste stations included a waste disposal unit and a few 
urinal spaces for men. Commonly, residents washed themselves in various discrete 
places of the house with a bucket or basin, using hot water heated in the kitchen. In
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the summer children and men would wash themselves in the outside lanes with cold 
water hosed from the tap. To take a full bath residents had to go to a bath-house for 
a small fee of around 5-10 yuan, but which was often thought to be relatively 
inconvenient, especially in winter.
There’s no sanitation. You have to go to the public bath house to bath! When the- 
weather is hot it is alright... wash down with some cold water, it is still alright. When 
the weather is good the ‘scenery ’ here is good -  everyone’s washing down outside.
Where can you go?!
Resident (X4), male, aged 60s
Alongside the subdivision of the lilong house, another aspect of daily life was the 
shared use of the kitchen and shared utility bills. In the typical internal layout of
lilong housing, the kitchen was a space of about 10 m2 located at the back of the
ground floor, leading out to the back lane. Due to multiple-occupation they have 
become shared spaces used by as many as six families in same house. Typically 
one or two shared taps and sinks have been installed, and represent the only 
sources of water in the house. Thus the kitchen also functions as an essential space 
for washing and grooming needs. Possible tensions regarding the use of limited 
space and resourced required substantial mutual compromise. To ease demand on 
the use of the tap, many additional sinks and work counters for cooking and 
cleaning have generally been built outside against the back lanes. Much washing 
and cooking preparation activity is thus extended out here. Sometimes the kitchens 
had also been converted as a living space for one family. In these cases, or where 
there was insufficient space to share in the formal kitchen, it was also common for 
some households to appropriate spaces such as corridors, corners, and staircase 
landings to set up small gas stoves for cooking.
These houses are too old... and kitchens are not autonomous. Some may not even 
have kitchens -  they built a sink outside, and build another (counter) outside. Now it 
is called ‘illegal building’-  however there’s no choice here, you simply have to build 
them.
Resident (XI2) Male, aged 60s
Beyond maximising the use of any available space such as the stairwells, landings, 
corridors, and the kitchen, almost all the dwellings had undergone some informal 
alterations or extensions by the residents themselves. Ground floor living spaces 
were often extended out by building over all, or part of, the front courtyard. By 
incorporating an entire courtyard, almost 10 m2of space can be gained, which could 
become a bedroom or dining space. By incorporating half of the courtyard, a 
storage space, or a space for a toilet or shower can be created. Taking advantage of
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Figure 5.4: Shared kitchen in lilong housing, doubling as bicycle storage
lilong housing’s relatively high ceilings (generally 3.8~4.0m on the ground floor, and 
around 3.2-3.5 m on upper floor), a mezzanine floor was commonly built over part 
of the living spaces, adding 7-10 m2. This could be used as a storage space or 
bedroom for different members of family. Quite commonly parents and elderly 
members of family would live on the ground floor space, and children lived on the 
mezzanine space. The roof terrace (s h a i t a i )  -  originally an outdoor space for 
hanging laundry and for recreation -  was often built over to provide another small 
room of around 10 m2. This may be occupied by one family, or shared amongst 
different families in the house as a storage, or space for the washing machine. 
Nevertheless with housing space already constrained, most residents could not find 
any space to allow the addition of much needed sanitation facilities.
Physical decay was an obvious symptom of decades of under-investment. Ageing 
walls, staircases, windows, doors and fittings was often accompanied by problems 
such as leaking, dampness and poor insulation. There have been no 
comprehensive modernisation efforts over a period of at least fifty years. Residents 
generally considered repair works either ‘patchy’, cosmetic, or ineffective in relation 
to the scale and extent of the problems. Alongside housing commercialisation the 
government had aimed to reform the over-burdened municipal housing 
administration system by transferring housing maintenance functions to commercial
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Figure 5.5: Ageing fabric of the dwellings
housing management and repair companies, and increasing public sector rents. 
However, management services for these dilapidated housing have remained 
largely unchanged because public sector rents still did not yet reflect the actual 
costs of housing upkeep.
Correspondingly, management companies resorted to marginal upkeep and 
patchwork maintenance. The aim was to balance the budget while avoiding major 
technical and safety problems in the stock. Minor repairs such as repairing leaks, 
broken fittings, and other problems associated with the public spaces and facilities 
have been carried out free of charge. Major housing repairs -  which the state once 
suggested ought to occur once every fifteen years for old housing were never 
carried out. In practice, the scope of works for shikumen housing generally included 
checks for structural safety once or twice-a-year, cleaning the roof and drainage 
system every four or five years; satisfying requirements for fire safety; and some 
repainting every three years (Interview with director of a state owned housing 
management company, September 2007).
There was varied evidence of residential satisfaction in each community studied. On 
the one hand some residents expressed great frustration and dissatisfaction with 
their housing conditions. This was in particular the feeling of those who have the
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least housing space with no sanitation facilities. Some expressed the sense of being 
‘trapped’ in the substandard housing. Without personal capacity to move elsewhere, 
some of these look towards urban redevelopment and relocation as an only 
opportunity to improve their housing conditions.
The two o f us have not even 11 m2. Not even 11 m2 fo r two people. Eating, drinking, 
excreting all takes place in there. Sometimes we lie to ourselves - forget about it, it is 
much better than... those [migrants] from the outside who have no housing'. We can 
only think like this. In reality it is 'quite tough'. I t  is really, really quite tough.
Resident (XI8) female, aged 60s
[The houses] ought to be demolished! I f  they are not demolished the people here, 
how do these people live, right? There are no damn sanitary facilities, right? Bathing, 
and going to the toilet are all problems.
Resident (X4), male, aged 60s
On the other hand, others expressed being relatively satisfied with their homes. 
Many had lived in the same housing for long periods of time. Despite the difficult 
conditions, many residents had known no other alternatives and were accustomed 
to their homes. A sense of familiarity and the development of living habits (xiguan) 
were important factors behind residential satisfaction. In particular the elderly and 
long-term residents felt that they have developed significant attachment to their 
homes and felt it would be awkward for them to leave and live elsewhere. 
Furthermore, those with relatively more housing space or having (self-installed or 
existing) sanitation facilities may in contrast be relatively satisfied with their homes. 
For them, their dwellings are quite decent compared the new housing types.
A person has his living habits, living a place. There is a very significant habit.
I f  we were relocated, we elderly people would not be used to the new 
environment we move to. I f  they are not accustomed to it, then it is easy to fa ll 
sick.
Resident (XI4) male, age 60s
Old dwellings are very good. My house is really good... We have everything -  
we have a bathroom and so forth, i t ’s very comfortable. The advantage o f old 
houses is its height.... Ilik e  this house of mine.
Resident (X6), female, age 60s
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Figure 5.6: Interior view of a self-renovated ground floor unit
5.2.3 Social conditions in dilapidated dwellings
The social context of these dwellings was complex. Residents spoke about the 
problem of social decline at the same time as they acknowledged the existence of 
enduring neighbourhood ties. Mutual help and support was one feature of life 
among some long-term residents. It was explained that social relations in the 
community had historically been good and had been accumulated through decades 
of relatively stable residency patterns over the last five decades. Although crowding 
and multiple-occupancy created problems of ‘getting along’, multiple-occupation 
also meant more opportunities for socialisation amongst neighbours.
Many residents had lived in the same homes for many decades and had grown up 
or grown old together as neighbours. For many, minor disputes had been negotiated 
over time, and a degree of mutual tolerance had been achieved. Frequent 
interaction, mutual help and support has become an accumulated feature of life for 
long term residents, who often contrasted this supportive environment with the lack 
of it in newer forms of housing. Small favours included helping one another pick up 
items of grocery when going to the market, or collecting laundry from the 
clotheslines when the weather took a turn. Neighbours could be counted to keep an 
eye on each other’s homes when they were out or away for longer periods of time,
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and offered support in caring for children -  such as picking them up from the school 
occasionally. Neighbours also sometimes offered important support for the care of 
the elderly. To many of these residents, one hardly felt lonely living in lilong housing.
Amongst the residents, there are interactions. There are opportunities fo r  
interaction... The population is dense. There is plenty o f human vibrancy. I t  is not like 
some houses that are large, it is very lonely there. Living alone here in these places 
one would not be lonely... This is our special character.
Resident (X13), male, age 30s
The relationships with the neighbours are all really good... A ll very harmonious... 
mutually help one another. It  is very close, not like in new housing [where] all the 
doors are closed shut -  who cares about anyone, right?
Resident (X8), female, age 60s
Various forms of social interactions were common amongst longer-term residents. 
Many within the community engaged in various forms of informal as well as formal 
activities. Neighbourhood gossip, to the distaste of some, was nevertheless an 
engaging and common past-time for many residents. Card and chess games were 
often informally set up amongst groups of people in the lanes, or in people’s homes. 
It was also common for some residents to set their homes up as “Qipai-shi’ where 
members of community could get together and play the popular game of Majiang for 
a small fee.
Formally-organised community activities were also organised by the resident 
committees in each neighbourhood such as newspaper groups, cooking groups, 
and some organised morning exercise routines in the lanes. There was a small 
community library operated by retired volunteers within the community, where local 
residents could borrow donated books and magazines for free. In total a group of 
about 70 volunteers -  mostly retired workers -  took part in actively maintaining the 
local environment and managing some of the community services. Volunteering 
within the community was for some an important way to remain engaged after 
retirement.
Every Friday afternoon... the elderly people i f  they are happy to, come and 
read some newspapers together... Sometimes, i f  one feels like doing some 
cooking and whatever, we have a cooking class in our lanes ... The activities 
are quite diverse. [So] one wouldn't be lonely... everyone brags a little, 
exchanges some everyday gossip. This is quite good.
Resident (X22), male, early 60s
Nevertheless, just as residents spoke of the quality of social ties, they highlighted
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this was a fading phenomena. Alongside rising residential mobility, residents also 
increasingly encountered new problems associated with population change. 
Housing marketisation and the expansion of housing alternatives reinforced a 
process of social change involving the voluntary out-migration of better-off 
households and the subsequent influx of rural-migrant workers or local relocated 
households as private tenants. Due to the poor living conditions, there was 
substantial desire for residents to move and to improve their living standards. With 
the emergence of more housing choice in the market, many families and individuals 
that had the capacity to move onto home ownership had done so.
It was the affluent families and financially independent youth that dominated the 
outward migration. As a result of these movements, residents identified their 
communities to be comprised mainly of the elderly, the low-income and the 
unemployed. Many of those who remain would like to leave for better housing 
conditions, but have no means of affording housing in the market. Unemployment 
was perceived to be relatively common amongst the 40-50 year olds. In the context 
of industrial restructuring, many older workers experienced lay-offs and faced 
difficulties re-integrating into the job market. They had little capacity to buy houses 
in the housing market, and had little choice but to remain renting dilapidated 
housing.
The Shanghainese people still living here are poor people. Honestly. The
affluent people don’t live here. [They ve] rented it out long ago.
Resident (XI5), Female, age 40s
Vacant units have been rented or sold on within the housing market. Although these 
dwellings were public-owned, in the post-reform era they were no longer as strictly 
controlled via allocation by the housing bureau. Previously, public tenants were not 
permitted to sublet or induce any change of use to the allocated unit without the 
consent of the housing bureau. Nevertheless some residents did so informally. By 
the late 1990s, tenants had been extended the right to sell or sublet their tenancy 
rights (‘use rights’) in the housing market. The right to sublet (zhuanzu) the whole or 
part of their units to secondary tenants in the housing market was defined within the 
new legislation controlling rental housing in the city "Legislation for Housing Rental 
in Shanghai City" (SMG 1999, section 5, clause 31). Technically de facto tenants 
could not seek to profit from the rental of public housing (section 5, clause 36). 
However the policy allows tenants to determine the price, setting no clear regulation
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on rents. Thus, original tenants could keep their subsidised units but make a profit 
by renting them out at market price.
Those with the criteria have all moved out. There are many households here 
who’ve moved away... rented out their place here, and deal with it later when 
it is going to be demolished. Those who rent (here) are all those from outside 
provinces working here... Generally it is all migrants.
Resident (X3), female, aged 60s
New tenants were mostly migrant workers from rural areas. Many were young 
people working in low paid service jobs such as waiters and cleaners in surrounding 
restaurants, cafes, bars and hotels. There were also many middle aged and older 
migrants engaged in small businesses such as shops or who are informally selling 
food and produce in local markets. They tended to work long hours, and returned 
home late at night. For migrant workers, lilong housing still constituted a relatively 
more affordable form of privately rented housing close to inner city work 
opportunities. Often however, due to their low income, or due to exploitation by 
employers who provide them housing via the market (which is not regulated), it was 
common to find numerous rural migrants or an entire extended family crowded into 
one small rented room. These processes can be understood as part of wider 
patterns of residential differentiation in post-reform China. Institutionally, or socio­
economically advantaged residents have had superior means to move out of 
deteriorated public housing, while others have remained constrained to live in low- 
cost rental dwellings towards the low end of the housing stock (Huang 2003, 2005; 
Wang 2000; Li and Wu 2006).
With these social changes, emerging problems cited by residents include the social 
integration of rural migrants with the local population, the decline of accumulated 
social networks, and the concentration of the poor. Firstly, population change had 
meant the loss of many long-term neighbours and therefore diminishing social ties. 
There were fewer familiar people to interact with as before. Secondly there was the 
sense that the community had become more divided, with little interaction between 
original and newer settlers such as rural migrants. Original residents often did not 
identify with the new migrant settlers while migrants often kept to themselves as 
outsiders in the community. There was much apparent apathy or even latent hostility 
towards migrants, and little initiative on both sides for friendly interaction. Some 
local residents complained about their lower hygienic standards related to their 
improper maintenance of spaces.
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There are arguments. There are arguments too. Yes, migrants, all migrants. There are 
lot o f them living together in one house. Isn’t that annoying? It  was annoying enough 
beforehand. Now that [they’ve] come over it is so annoying. They are all migrants.
Resident (X3), female, age 50s
Therefore, residents spoke about the problem of social decline at the same time as 
they acknowledged the existence of enduring neighbourhood ties. Perception of 
safety was not problematic in Xichengli, although in some areas of Shanghai social 
change was also associated with increasing problems. This has included rising 
incidence of theft, gambling, the breakout of disputes, fighting, all of which 
contributed to a sense of instability (fieldwork in 2007~8).
Table 5.2: Social dynamics reported in Xichengli
Community dynamics
Positive aspects of social 
environment
Familiar with many immediate neighbours
Frequently see and interact with neighbours
There is mutual help and exchange
Participate in social activities in the neighbourhood
Residents participate in voluntary work in the neighbourhood
Feel reluctant to move away due to attachment to existing social 
relations
Feels that neighbourhood relations are better in old housing 
compared to new housing
Negative aspects of social 
environment
Have lost many established neighbours
There are tensions and disputes with neighbours
No interaction between migrants and locals
Feels population mix is inappropriate or ‘chaotic’
Neighbourhood has become widely more crime-ridden and unsafe
Source: author’s interviews
In sum, the analysis of this neighbourhood demonstrated that the physical problems 
of crowding, deficient amenities and physical decay inherited from history were 
predominant liveability problems of lilong housing the post-reform era. The social 
environment has been associated with downward filtering, the concentration of the 
poor and rural-migrants, and declining community cohesion. Communities in lilong 
housing have become increasingly socially heterogeneous, comprising both local 
residents and rural residents who have different needs, different property rights 
status, and who perhaps reside in lilong housing for different reasons. However,
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affordability and the convenient inner-city location have been two apparent 
advantages of lilong housing, and the basis of substantial place-attachment 
sentiments. Without personal capacity to move to better housing, many residents 
remained constrained to living in run-down housing. There were also heterogeneous 
perceptions of residential satisfaction. While some desperately sought to move out 
and looked forward to demolition, others were content with their conditions.
5.3 Early Operations of the Growth Coalition
5.3.1 Planning for redevelopment
In May 1996, the Luwan district government and Hong-Kong based Shui On Group 
signed a cooperative agreement for the redevelopment of Taipingqiao area. The 
redevelopment of the entire 52-hectare site was expected to be accomplished within 
10-15 years, during which time an estimated 25 billion (about US$ 3 billion) will be 
invested mainly by the Shui On Group. Rather than a single land-transaction, it was 
planned that every year two to three blocks will be leased out and redeveloped 
based on negotiated land prices. The leasehold term would be 50 years, 
commencing from the date when each individual leasing contact is signed (He and 
Wu, 2005).
Shui-On Group was established in Hong Kong in 1971. The chairman of the group 
is well known to be closely networked with top government officials in Shanghai. He 
entered the mainland market in 1985 and teamed up with the Communist Youth 
League in Shanghai to help finance and build City-Hotel, a 300-room hotel 
development. This early stage of operation built a platform for his connection to 
many mid-level bureaucrats, many of whom later rose to high-ranking positions. 
Notably, the first chairman of the hotel joint venture was Han Zheng, who became 
the governor of Luwan district in the late 1990s and in 2003 the Mayor of Shanghai. 
These early relationships solidified the company’s links with the local political elite, 
and differentiated the company from other foreign-based companies (Ren, 2008; 
China Daily - Hong Kong Edition, 14 April, 2004).
Although at the time Shui-On was a relatively small property developer, the group 
has had some success in developing a commercial building Rui-An Plaza nearby on 
Middle Huaihai Road in the early 1990s. Targeting the needs of multi-national
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corporations, the high-rise office development was successful in attracting several 
large corporate tenants including IBM, Bayer and McKinsey (Shanghai Foreign 
Economic Relation & Trade Commission, 2005). Thus, although the group was not 
one of the larger real estate companies in Shanghai or Hong Kong, it had a certain 
degree of local connections and track record in delivering projects in Shanghai.
In the property transaction deal, the land-leasing costs, removal costs and other 
details were negotiated by the district government’s senior leadership team (head 
and deputy heads of the district, as well as heads of various bureaus) with Shui On 
Group. The team made key decisions in the district concerning construction, such 
as leasing land and the appointment of developer (Yang and Chang, 2007). The 
actual prices for the land development right remains unknown, yet it is believed that 
the district governments may have provided favourable terms for the developer 
given Shui On Group's commitment to a very large investment arrangement at an 
uncertain economic climate. This period 1996-1999 coincided with the deepening of 
the Asian financial crisis, during which many development projects were postponed 
or eventually abandoned. While foreign investors withdrew from the market in 
droves, Shui-On Group - did the unexpected by deciding to transfer all of its Hong 
Kong operations to Shanghai and to take on the redevelopment of Taipingqiao area.
After signing the agreement of cooperation, Shui-On moved quickly to produce a 
master plan for the Taipingqiao area, engaging the renowned U.S architectural and 
planning design office Skidmore, Owens and Merill (SOM) as the principal design 
consultant. The master plan envisioned Taipingqiao to be redeveloped as a modern 
mixed-use district that served as an extension to the existing commercial centre on 
Huaihai Road. The final plan entailed a total of 1.6 million m2of new developments, 
with an overall gross Floor Area Ratio (FAR) of 3.12. Key parts of the plan included:
a) Luxury housing developments: The southern side of Taipingqiao, with a 
site of approximately 21 hectares, was dedicated to new residential 
development totalling approximately 550,000 m2 of floor space and a 
planned capacity of around 14,000 residents. Building density will be 
considerably increased, from the existing floor area ratio of 1.8 to 4.0~6.0.
b) Taipingqiao Park: A 4.4 hectare area at the centre of the overall 
development will be recreated as a park and an artificial lake. This was
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intended to enhance the environmental appeal of the overall development 
and to help raise its commercial value
c) A corporate headquarters zone: to the north of the site, adjacent to the 
Taipingqiao Park, will become Corporate Avenue. Upon completion, this six- 
hectare zone will provide eight ‘grade-A’ office buildings including high-end 
luxury retail stores. It would function as an extension to the commercial area 
along Huaihai Road and was designed to include a prestigious retail 
shopping corridor along the lakefront.
d) A cultural heritage preservation zone covering 3.5 hectares was located 
to the West of the site, with a limited planned FAR of between 1.3~2.5. The 
inclusion of this area takes into account the existence of the historically 
important and listed national monument building which housed the First 
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. The Shanghai municipality 
required the first CCP Congress Hall location to be strictly preserved, and 
the surroundings given a height limitation of 12m. However, apart from the 
congress hall itself, there were no requirements to physically conserve the 
surrounding buildings. These two lots were intended for restaurants and 
retail functions.
e) Commercial, retail and entertainment zones: two five-star hotels plus 
retail facilities were planned for the north-western corner of the area, and a 
complex of retail, cinema and theatre facilities were planned on the eastern 
edge of the area.
The plan was submitted for approval by the municipal urban planning bureau and 
efficiently approved in June 1997. It received great support from the local 
government, because it corresponded well to the commercial development 
objectives of the district government in creating an international business centre 
based on advanced service industries and multinational companies. According to 
the Foreign Economic Relations Commission of Luwan District (2007), the stated 
goals of economic development for the district were focused on the development of 
modern service industry, leisure service industries, modern retail industries and real 
estate development. With municipal planning approval, the detailed plan which was 
essentially developed by the developer became the official planning guideline for 
future developments in the area.
180
imtwtu
Figure 5.7: Concept model of the Taipingqiao master-plan
Figure 5.8: The Taipingqiao redevelopment plan
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Source: Adapted from plans provided by Shui-On Group
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Notably, no provisions were made to re-house any of the existing residents on-site. 
All of the existing site occupants (some 70,000 people and 800 enterprises) would 
eventually be relocated in the process to make way for new developments. This 
would be carried out in accordance to the housing demolition and relocation policies 
of the time, which stipulated off-site in-kind compensation as a main mechanism 
(details of relocation are discussed in sections 5.3.3). The municipal government 
would also support viability of Taipingqiao area by building two underground metro 
stations to serve each of the South-East, and South-West corners of the site (see 
figure 5.8) which began construction in 2006. This meant that the area would be 
accessible via three different underground metro lines.
5.3.2 Developing Xintiandi and Taipingqiao Park
The business strategy of Shui-On was to influence the spatial character and value 
of entire neighbourhoods in a way that generates monopolistic rents. According to 
an interview with its vice-chairman their operations centre on the principle of 
acquiring large plots of land so as to gain control over the integral planning, 
development, promotion and sale of real estate in an area over long periods of time. 
A large site will be developed and sold in phases, with proceeds from each phase of 
sales feeding into subsequent phases of development. Creating an attractive 
environment, using ample landscaping features and public space, providing a 
cultural focal point, such as selective historic conservation, and providing a mix of 
amenities including schools, entertainment and shopping, have been part of the 
planning strategies utilised by the developer to enhance the popularity and value of 
its developments.
We don't just grab a piece o f land. We're there fo r the long haul and look at 
things from a long-term investment angle... We seek to acquire the whole 
chunk of land where the development will be so that we can control the 
environment"
(China Daily - Hong Kong Edition, 14 April, 2004).
As the principle investor, Shui-On had relatively high autonomy in deciding the pace 
of implementation. Given the context of an economic downturn, it decided to avoid 
the risk of undertaking residential or commercial office development immediately. 
Instead, the strategy was to firstly develop the smaller historic conservation zone 
around the First Congress site and the major landscaped park Taipingqiao which 
would hopefully add value to the future phases of development. Land use rights for
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the 3.5 hectare historic conservation zone were negotiated for the site in 1996, with 
design and site clearance following in 1997-8. This was eventually developed into 
“Xintiandr (literally “New Heaven and Earth”), a now renowned retail and 
entertainment centre. Although this was in reality a small component of the overall 
development, it became the flagship project and a major icon of the city.
Opened in two phases between 2001 and 2002, the complex comprised a mix of 
upscale, retail shops and boutiques, coffee shops, restaurants, sidewalk cafes, art 
galleries, a museum and entertainment, cultural and recreational facilities. 
"Yesterday meets tomorrow" became the marketing slogan of "Xintiandi". The 
northern part which featured mostly restored Shikumen lilong houses, consisted 
primarily of specialist food and beverage, entertainment and retail. The facades of 
approximately 100 old shikumen buildings were selectively conserved at great cost, 
while the interior structures and spaces were modernised to meet the need of urban 
life in the 21st century (see figure 5.9). A central piazza running from north to south 
features landscaped open spaces, outdoor cafes and functions as a space for 
performances. The southern part of the Xintiandi site consisted of more restaurants, 
a mall, cinemas and a boutique hotel (88 Xintiandi). To realise this vision, all of the 
1,950 households who previously lived on this site were swiftly relocated to 
suburban districts in merely six months.
The project was developed as a joint venture between Shui-On Group and 
Shanghai Fuxing Construction Company - a company affiliated with the district 
government. The arrangement was that Shui-On held the majority shares, with the 
latter having a stake of only 1-3%. Shanghai Fuxing Construction was a state- 
owned property development company established by Luwan district government in 
1997. Since inception, it has been given responsibility for cooperation with external 
parties, coordination, communication and resident relocation in many urban 
development schemes. Its participation was the result of a request from the district 
government to Shui On Group, so as to give the district government greater ability 
to monitor the development process. For Shui On Group, the partnership with a 
local SOE was also indispensable for helping them coordinate with various public 
departments and navigating through relevant regulations (Wu and He, 2005; Yang 
and Chang, 2007). During this time, the municipal government did not provide 
generous subsidies for the redevelopment of lilong housing. Between 1996 and 
2000, the priority of the city was the elimination of even poorer quality slums (see 
chapter 4), and most of the favourable policies were directed towards the
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redevelopment of these sites. As a result, Shui-On Group was responsible for 
organising all of the financing. It invested 800 million yuan, with the rest of the 
money borrowed from four different banks.
Figure 5.9: Renovated shikumen lilong as a site of consumption at Xintiandi
The architects employed for the project included Wood and Zapata Inc., a Boston- 
based architectural firm specialising in the adaptive reuse of old buildings, and the 
Singapore office of Nikken Sekkei International Ltd. The Urban Planning, Design 
and Research Institute of Shanghai Tongji University served as the local 
architectural consultant who provided research and technical support. In this area, 
“The Site of the First Session of the National’s People’s Congress” was an important 
historic building which has been previously designated a protected area under the 
Law on the Protection of Cultural Relics of the People’s Republic of China. Initially, 
Shui-On's concept was to conserve only the listed First Congress buildings and 
rebuilt everything else as modern restaurants. Nevertheless, the architects Wood 
and Zapata proposed and eventually convinced the developer to adopt a strategy of 
adaptive re-use, saving and restoring most of the local architecture for 
contemporary use. The strategy was then shifted to selectively restoring the 
shikumen lilong housing, creating a distinctive atmosphere and turning the area into 
a high-end, fashionable and cultural district attractive to local and international 
consumers.
Alongside the first phase of Xintiandi development, Shui-On and the local 
government also undertook the development of the 4.4 hectare Taipingqiao Park on 
the nearby site, which was deemed a crucial part of the strategy to enhance the 
environmental quality and appeal of the neighbourhood (figure 5.10). The municipal 
government played a supportive role here by providing approximately half of the
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Figure 5.10: Taipingqiao Park and lake
costs for the park because it was sympathetic with the launch of a major city- 
beautification programme in which the government planned to build more green 
spaces throughout the city (realised largely through demolishing existing buildings). 
Some 3,800 households and 156 work units who had originally occupied this site 
were relocated to make way for the creation of the attractive landscape and a
10,000 m2 man-made lake. Under the co-ordination of the Luwan district 
government, all of these occupants were relocated within merely 43 days, making it 
the fastest record of resident relocation in Shanghai's history.
Shui-On Group was strategic in insisting that the first phase of Xintiandi and 
Taipingqiao Park be completed before July 1, 2001 -  the 80th anniversary of the 
Chinese Communist Party. On opening, it was offered as a “present” to the 
municipality, and later functioned as a reception site for the APEC meetings in 
October 2001. During these significant occasions, Xintiandi received visits by 
national and international leaders including Jiang Zemin and the Russian president 
Putin. With the southern part of Xintiandi completed and opened to the public on 
August 2002, and a wave of media attention in China and overseas reporting a rare 
“success story” of historic conservation in China, Xintiandi became one of the new 
icons of Shanghai’s transformation. It quickly gained great popularity amongst the 
city’s more affluent white collar consumers, expats and international tourists, and as
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a showpiece of local architecture and a trendy fusion of international dining, fashion, 
entertainment, and cultural events. Xintiandi became an enclave of the relatively 
privileged, whilst pricing out lower income groups. According to the poor residents in 
surrounding lilong housing:
Xintiandi now we call the “foreigner'splayground”. Those like us we can go 
in fo r browsing. However it is not possible to consume, right? ...Our 
retirement wages are not very high.
Local resident, (XI2), male, aged 60s
5.3.3 Relocating the residents
Before examining subsequent phases of development, this section scrutinises the 
terms and process of resident relocation underlying projects such as Xintiandi and 
Taipingqiao Park. Full-scale relocation of existing occupants was a crucial element 
of the redevelopment process, and a basis by which the speculative potential of 
land development could be realised. By providing alternative housing at cheaper 
locations elsewhere, inner city land could be revalorised and freed up for higher 
value land uses. The relocation process was carried out by specialist relocation 
companies affiliated to the district government. The property developer was 
responsible for providing the overall finances for resident re-housing, in line with the 
policies and recommendations provided by the district government. However it did 
not have direct contact with the local residents. The relocation company, under the 
monitoring and informal support of the district government, conducted all the 
frontline work.
According to the relevant laws for housing demolition and relocation at the time10, 
“in-kind compensation” was the main approach for public tenants, although private 
property owners were also entitled to the alternative option of cash compensation. 
In-kind compensation meant giving relocated households replacement housing at a 
different location, provided by the real estate developer. Reputedly, 670 million yuan 
was expended to facilitate the relocation of the 1950 households from the Xintiandi 
site (Shanghai Foreign Economic Relation & Trade Commission, 2005). 
Nevertheless this total also included various administrative fees and payment for the 
services of the relocation companies.
10 Regulations on the Management of Demolition of Urban Housing (State Council of China, 1991)
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According to research by Chang and Yang (2007: 29), residents of the Xintiandi plot 
and the Taipingqiao Park plot were eventually moved to new housing estates in 
Pudong and Minhang - two large suburban districts in Shanghai. Full ownership 
rights were given to the relocated households. The size of the dwelling given to 
households was calculated in relation to household size -  i.e. the number of 
persons in the household multiplied by a floor area compensation standard. 
Generally, a one-person or two-person household was entitled to a one-bedroom 
dwelling, a three-person household is entitled a two-bedroom dwelling, and so on. 
Households with more than six persons at the time of relocation may have the 
option of having two separate dwellings (such as one three-bedroom dwelling plus a 
one-bedroom dwelling). Reputedly such a compensation standard was relatively 
favourable, because the district government saw the project as a political priority 
and wished to ensure that it would proceed smoothly. At the time a household of 
three previously living in approximately 20 square metres of space was entitled to a 
new flat of 70 square metres in these new locations. If the household opted for 
monetary compensation, they could receive approximately 130,000 yuan in 
compensation. However, actual prices were subject to negotiation between the 
relocation-company and individual households in consideration of their 
circumstances.
Compensation in one sense offers an important, if not once in a lifetime opportunity,
to move into home ownership and to improve their physical living conditions.
Roughly speaking, residents could move from dilapidated housing into more
spacious new apartments, with the conveniences of modern facilities and better
privacy. From the viewpoint of the government, relocation was a necessary and 
pragmatic way of helping large numbers of urban citizens living in poor housing 
conditions to raise their overall standards of living. With relocation, they can acquire 
a house and become home-owners for the first time in their lives. Interviews with 
residents of lilong housing in the surrounding area revealed these perceptions:
Relocation is pretty good. There are benefits fo r us a ll There are benefits fo r  
us average citizens. I t  can improve the living conditions. For sure it is 
improving the living conditions, right?
Local Resident (XI3), male, age 30s
O f course I  wish (to be relocated). Wish that i f  they can carry out demolition 
then it would be possible to improve the living conditions. Resolved the 
problems o f the environment, right? Like us older people we just like to have 
a good environment.
Local resident (Y6), male, age 60s
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However, relocation also involved significant inequalities and injustices. Firstly, 
compensation policy only applied to those in possession of either ownership or 
public tenancy rights, and excludes private tenants who may be privately renting the 
premises. These tenants -  including a vast number of rural migrants -  will be 
displaced while their landlords are compensated. Little is known about the fate of 
any private tenants evicted during the process. Thus, the disadvantage of rural 
migrants and their lack of housing rights in the city translates into their disadvantage 
in the redevelopment process, and they must seek alternative shelter in the private 
market with no financial assistance.
Beyond this, the replacement housing did not necessarily meet the location 
preferences and needs of existing residents, and the process neglected the social 
cost of a move from a long-term place of residence. There was widespread concern 
that the replacement housing are generally situated areas with poorly developed 
services such as shops, post-offices, schools and healthcare facilitates. Residents 
may need to wait for many years before these become more mature. Disruptions to 
children’s schooling and lack of good healthcare facilities for older members of 
family were important concerns.
What benefits are there fo r the average citizens? There are no benefits... They 
haven’t given you any good policies. In one go they usher you to the 
countryside. When you go to the countryside the medical care is no good. 
Studying...children’s education is no good either. The entire environment is no 
good, right?
Resident (X7), male, age 50s
The citizens are the ones that suffer! ... When they are [relocated] out, after 
moving out the traffic is not convenient, and there are a lot o f elderly people, 
there are no hospitals; and there are a lot o f children, and no schools!... I f  
you go to those places the hospitals are damn it very, very fa r  ... [After 
relocation] my father now lives in... Pudong’s Dongle Xincun. In the third 
grade hospital -  even an injection takes three quarters o f an hour.... There 
are community clinics -  but they don’t open at night... Their standards are 
too low.
Resident (X4), male, age 60s
As indicated in section 5.1, the inner city neighbourhood provided a convenient 
place to live in for many residents. Comprehensive urban renewal in the last two 
decades has in many ways reinforced the desirability of the inner city, by enhancing 
transport infrastructures, modernising the built environment, and supporting the 
expansion of services. In addition the inner city offered ample opportunities for
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business and employment both formally and informally. The ‘locational-fit’ with a 
range of utilitarian needs, as well as accumulated social ties and sense of familiarity 
among the longer-term residents contributes to a strong sense of place-attachment.
In fact, the elderly people have gotten used to living in these old houses. Also 
with respects to the neighbours and so forth, one has quite good 
understanding. [ One] would not want to move.
Local resident (XI2), male, age 60s
Old housing has the advantages of old housing I  guess. There is more sense 
o f human affection (renqing wei). In [new housing] i f  everyone had 
autonomous units -  then the security door separates off all the human 
relationships.
Local resident (XI6), male, age 30s
The burden of transport and commuting were also commonly cited concerns. Even 
in areas where public transport may be relatively well developed, the significance of 
longer commuting times to get to the city, and the added issue of transport costs 
was seen as an undesirable burden on everyday life -  particularly for low income 
families. The underground metro system can provide a faster way of travel, but is 
considered too expensive to use on a frequent basis. The bus system and riding 
bicycles are the main affordable forms of transport for lower-income families, but 
with these it can take upwards of two hours to get from the suburban areas to the 
city centre. For some working households, getting to work may become a significant 
problem, and reputedly some residents relocated from Xintiandi eventually had to 
quit their original jobs and find employment closer to their new homes (He, 2004).
Many older residents who inevitably had greater physical mobility constraints also 
felt that they would be effectively excluded from visiting the city simply due to the 
burden of commuting. By 2006, alongside the continued expansion of the city, 
relocation housing was offered in newly developed neighbourhoods in areas such 
as Pudong district, Minhang district, Baoshan District and Nanhui district. All of them 
tended to be outside of the outer ring road of Shanghai, and residents may need to 
commute for one hour or more to get to the city centre.
Who wants to go so fa r  away? Sitting on a car back and forth would be 
several hours, right?! Even i f  in the future the underground connections are 
running, it is still going to cost money... For example from here to Xinzhuan 
say -  Xinzhuan is considered close even! I t  is about three to six yuan return
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already, don't you agree? This money you have to calculate... We won’t go!
[We] don’t want it.
Local resident (X6), female, age 50s
Once one moved over to the suburbs, even though the [public] transport has 
caught up - there are metros, and so forth. However the elderly people, they 
can’t possibly go in and out, not like the young people, they can take a metro, 
be crammed in a bus... [For] the young ones, it would also be complicated 
going to work i f  one moves over there, right, because there’s another thing of 
costs. Even though the transport is convenient, and the metro is provided and 
so on, however the metro costs are very high.
Local resident (XI2), male, age 60s
To many local residents, the Xintiandi site has been transformed from a space 
previously accommodating a plethora of low-income residents and ‘average citizens’ 
(laobaixing) to become a playground for the city’s middle class, local elites, tourists 
and expatriates. However, residents had little power to resist relocation. The 
relocation companies held the legal right to enact forced relocation if households did 
not cooperate and more out after a certain period of time. Residents may also be 
arrested if they come into conflict with the relocation officers. Thus, some see it as 
an unjust process pushed forth with brute authority that violates the interests of the 
powerless.
There’s no choice i f  it is going to be relocated... Even i f  you don’t want to 
go...you have no choice but to go! No matter how much grievances the 
average citizens have, there’s nothing you can do.
Local resident (XI2), male, age 60s
I f  you want to make a scene, then they take you away. You say the Chinese 
have laws, what laws are there? That there are human rights, are there 
human rights? Do citizens have human rights? These can’t be spoken about, 
you know...? The problem is that the People’s Government o f China is 
intrinsically like this, how can you talk about it?
Local resident (X7), male, age 50s
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5.4 Taipingqiao in the “New Round of Urban Renewal”
5.4.1 Luxury housing and corporate office buiidings
Over the following years, successive phases of property development completely 
transformed the image, functions, social profile and property value of the 
Taipingqiao area. After 2000, the real estate market in Shanghai has recovered from 
the depths of the Asian Financial Crisis and experienced strong signs of buoyancy. 
Property investments and sales were to once again soar for many years in the 
context of Shanghai’s continued double-digit economic growth and continuing influx 
of foreign investors.
Since 2001, the municipal government also shifted its attention towards the large- 
scale demolition of dilapidated lilong housing as the New Round of Urban Renewal. 
With this new political emphasis, favourable policies were provided to developers 
engaged in the demolition of sites with more than 70% composition of lilong housing, 
including the right to discounted land leasing prices, and exemptions of various 
administrative fees. Subsequently, redevelopment of the plots at Taipingqiao took 
place under these policies. According to Xu (2004), an officer in Luwan district 
government, these exemptions may reduce development costs by around 1,000 
yuan per m2. This could mean a total subsidy valuing hundreds of million yuan being 
available to Shui-On over the next ten years of the policy.
From this point onwards, Shui-On progressively launched its up-market residential 
and commercial real estate projects. According to the vice-chairman at Shui-On, the 
financing strategy was essentially to put up the land leasing and relocation costs up 
front, while construction costs were borrowed from banks (China Daily - Hong Kong 
Edition, 14 April, 2004). The first of the residential properties to be developed was 
“Lakeville”. This development comprised one detached villa, six townhouses and 
277 residential units in a variety of multi-rise residential buildings ranging from eight 
stories to 23 stories (see figure 5.11). It was located to the southeast of Xintiandi 
and was positioned to look over the manicured scenery of Taipingqiao Park and its 
artificial lake, and thus boasts an attractive environment.
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Figure 5.11; Lakeville residential complex
From the inception, Lakeville's was intended to be marketed for middle or upper 
income classes. Its apartments ranged in size from 105 up to 500 square meters. A 
range of luxurious facilities were included including 24-hour security, communal gym, 
sauna, indoor pool, and a golf practice range. The development was initially planned 
to be priced at around 12,000/ m2. This was based on the expectations of a 20% 
profit margin, with average construction and related costs at approximately 10,000 
yuan/ m2. However, by the time of its completion in 2003, Xintiandi had become a 
national success story and popular destination for the city's affluent class, fuelling 
the property price of the entire Taipingqiao area. Lakeville became one of the most 
talked-about pieces of real estate in the property market of Shanghai, and units 
were eventually put on sale at 20,000 yuan/ m2 or more. This gave the developer 
windfall profits of approximately 100%. Given that the total saleable area was
48,000 m2, Shui-On Land derived gross profits in the region of 480 million yuan. The 
new residents of Lakeville were some of the wealthiest households from within 
China as well as further abroad, including many investors from Hong Kong and 
Taiwan.
As well as targeting the demands of high-income households, commercial 
developments at Taipingqiao targeted the growing segment of corporate enterprises 
seeking high-quality office space in central Shanghai. Shui-On completed the first 
phase of the Corporate Avenue around March 2004, totalling about 80,000 m2 of 
commercial floor space (figure 5.12). Situated alongside the Taipingqiao lake, this 
development consisted of two lakefront commercial office towers and a retail
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Figure 5.12: Corporate Avenue commercial development
podium. The complex was owned and leased-out by Shui-On Land as rental 
property. By 2006 it had achieved an occupancy rate of 97%, and successfully 
attracted many multinational corporate tenants including Sony, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Amway, Oracle, Federal Insurance, and Citibank. Since 
then, Xintiandi and the Corporate Avenue have become significant sources of 
revenue for Shui-On Land. In 2008, the net income from these two developments 
was 516 million yuan, up from 412 million in 2007 (Shui-On Land, 2009).
Around this time, the central government was reacting to the problems of an over­
heating property market, while the municipal government attempted to impose more 
stringent urban planning controls to rein in the problem of over-dense developments 
in the inner city. In November 2003 the local government demanded that all 
property development in the inner city (apart from those already in construction) 
must not exceed an FAR (floor area ratio) of 4.0. After passing this requirement, a 
series of negotiations ensued to adjust the buildable volume of remaining projects in 
Taipingqiao area. The total buildable volume was significantly reduced from about 
1.60 million to 1.26 million square meters. Although this density regulation 
represented a significant intervention, it did not significantly challenge the nature of 
the plan or the profitability of the subsequent redevelopment.
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Corporate Avenue actually well matched with the interests of the Luwan district 
government, which has made great efforts to promote commercial expansion and to 
attract foreign businesses. The Luwan District Foreign Economic Relations 
Committee (LFERC, 2007) stated that: “[Corporate Avenue] creates an ideal office 
environment for transnational companies", acting as "the southward extension of the 
central business area on the east stretch of Huaihai Middle Road. The CBD [area] 
has gathered a large number of transnational companies, and the mature business 
circle is good for the enterprises to establish business partners and to achieve great 
ambitions...” 11
Over the subsequent years, Shui-On Group continued to expand as a successful 
real estate business. In 2004, the group underwent company restructuring and re­
formed under the incorporated entity Shui-On Land, with the purpose of grouping all 
its various subsidiaries into one flagship entity. Owing to its success at Taipingqiao 
in Shanghai, it has become a well established and trusted name in property 
development throughout China, and many local governments had invited them to 
invest in their cities.
The group had expanded their operations to cities such as Hangzhou and 
Chongqing, and was valued at US$ 1 billion. Its principal bankers included major 
Chinese and foreign brands: the Agricultural Bank of China Limited, China 
Construction Bank Corporation, Deutsche Bank AG, Hang Seng Bank Limited, The 
Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited (HSBC), Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China Limited and Standard Chartered Bank Limited. Shui-On 
Land has since adopted a strategy of accelerating growth by attracting various 
strategic business partners, with eight outside investors pumping US$ 350 million 
into its operations for its shares. The Company was listed on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange on 4 October 2006, with the international bank HSBC becoming a 
strategic partner with a US$100 million investment (Shui-On Land, 2007; Weekend 
Standard Hong Kong, 17-18 April, 2004). The director of Shui-On has by this time 
become an elite figure both in Shanghai and in Hong Kong. The following lists some 
of his key positions and honours, demonstrating that he has been drawn into 
various key political institutions:
11 http://wjw.luwan.sh.cn/webfronten/view_0.aspx?cid=57&id=l&navindex=0, Last accessed 10 
March 2009.
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• Member of The Tenth National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference. The “CPPCC” is a political advisory body in the 
-People's Republic of China, which holds a yearly meeting at the same time 
as the national People's Congress making important national level political 
decisions. Its role is analogous to an advisory legislative upper house.
• He became the President of the Shanghai-Hong Kong Council for the 
Promotion and Development of Yangtze (since 2003). This is a non­
government organisation established in 1998 which blends the political 
strength and connections of the Shanghai Municipal government with some 
of Hong Kong's leading business executives and investors in China to 
advance the development of the Yangtze Region. Its members include 
some of the most prominent and leading business persons in Shanghai and 
Hong Kong.12
• He was named Honorary Life President of the Business and Professionals 
Federation of Hong Kong,
• He was also the Vice Chairman of the Chamber of International Commerce 
in Shanghai - a non-governmental, non-profit organisation aimed to promote 
international business activities. It is composed of representatives from 
relevant enterprises, public institutions and economic associations.13
• He was the Non-executive Director of Hang Seng Bank Limited
Though many studies acknowledged the crucial role of public-sector support for 
private profit (e.g. He and Wu, 2005; Zhu, 1999), it is rarely acknowledge that 
certain private sector actors are becoming economic and political elites of great 
influence in their own right. Other executive directors of Shui-On Land also held 
important posts in public or private spheres between Hong Kong and Shanghai. For 
example, the vice-chairman and CEO (since 2004) was Deputy to The Tenth 
National People’s Congress (NPC) of China - the highest state body and only 
legislative house in the People's Republic of China.14 He was also board member of 
Hong Kong’s Airport Authority, and Vice President of the Shanghai-Hong Kong 
Council for the Promotion and Development of Yangtze (Shui-On Land, 2007).
12 http://www.shuionland.com/sol/tabid/27S/Default.aspx, Last accessed 24 August, 2009
13 http://www.coicsh.com/ccDit/en/aboutus3.asD. Last accessed 24 August, 2009
14 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/news/. Last accessed 24 August, 2009
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Figure 5.13: Lakeville Regency overlooking Taipingqiao Lake
Shui-On Land subsequently launched the second phase of residential development, 
known as the “Lakeville Regency” in partnership of another investor who held a 30% 
equity stake (figure 5.13). Sitting adjacent to the first phase the Lakeville, “Regency” 
was a much larger development comprising 645 residential units in 17 low to high- 
rise apartment buildings. In Shui-On Land's (2009) own words, the purpose of was 
now "targeting high net worth individuals and corporate customers in the Chinese 
Mainland". Apartment units ranged from two to five bedrooms, with floor areas 
ranging from 93 m2 to very spacious units of 660 m2.
Comprehensive community facilities for the development included a clubhouse, a 
multipurpose gymnasium, spa, sauna, an indoor golf simulator, indoor swimming 
pool, snooker room, and indoor tennis courts. Construction completed by 2006, and 
again, Shui-On Land experienced better than expected sales given the strong 
property market. The average construction and associated costs were 
approximately 10,750/ m2, but the average selling price achieved was approximately 
50,000/ m2 (Shui-On Land, 2007).
Apart from the very high property prices, these residences were also associated 
with high management fees, which often exceed the incomes of many lower income 
families. At 8.5 yuan/m2 per month, management costs in the Lakeville Regency
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could total 800 yuan for the smaller units to over 5,000 yuan for the largest 
apartments. Thus, redevelopment has brought about a remarkable disparity in 
housing quality and the status of residents, given that residents in lilong housing 
would have paid between 15-40 yuan/month for rent. Remaining residents living in 
surrounding dilapidated housing often commented on the increasing disparity 
between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’:
The surroundings have all been demolished... Like these [new] houses, they 
are all 50,000^60,000 per m2. The average citizens cannot afford them. I t  is 
all, the foreigners, the foreign Chinese... from Taiwan, from Hong Kong, 
those that are wealthy. The average citizens can’t afford them.
Local resident X I2, Male, age 60s
5.4.2 Relocation after 2001: the limits of monetary compensation
This section considers the continuing problems of relocation in the context of the 
New Round of Urban Renewal. Relocation policy changed significantly during this 
time. In June 2001 the State Council of China issued the revised policy “Regulations 
on the Management of Demolition of Urban Housing” which made additional 
provisions to establish market oriented principles for compensation. Notably, 
relocation has shifted towards monetary rather than in-kind compensation. In 
Shanghai, this was reflected within the local government document “Detailed 
Implementing Regulations on the Management of Demolition of Urban Housing” 
(SMG, 2001).
Although the law required the developer provide a certain amount of housing stock 
for resettlement, it emphasised monetary compensation. Residents were expected 
to resettle themselves in the housing market, by renting or purchasing a home. The 
new law was launched in part to avoid inhabitants inflating the number of persons in 
a particular household after the announcement of demolition plans, thereby 
fraudulently increasing removal costs. The standard of compensation to a 
household was to be calculated with respect to the market value of the existing 
housing times the size of space demolished, rather than the number of persons in 
the household.
Monetary compensation is a complex issue and is difficult to generalise. It has 
differed over time with the changing real estate prices. It differs from project to 
project depending on the market value of the location concerned as well as the
intentions of the local authorities and developers. Actual compensation is usually 
determined in negotiation between the district government and developer. According 
to Shui-On Land, the government determined a lump sum value required for the 
compensation of residents in accordance with the market values at the time, and the 
developer made relevant payment in accordance with these requirements. However 
if the developer wished to ensure more speedy and efficient relocation it may agree 
to offer significantly higher standards.
Residents were not given a say over what forms of re-housing are appropriate, or 
what level of financial compensation is sufficient. Shui-On did not engage in any 
dialogue with the local community or with the relocation process directly. "For the 
whole process, Shui-On is only responsible for back-up financing. The frontline work 
is all done by the government" (Weekend Standard HK, 17-8 April, 2004). A lump 
sum fee was handed over to relocation companies, who dealt with local residents on 
a one-to-one basis.
Relocation work for the Lakeville Regency was enacted in accordance with the new 
law regarding monetary compensation, and removed approximately 2,000 
households. Compensation was calculated in relation to the market price of 4,009 
yuan/ m2 of demolished space, based on the formula, “living area x 1.54 * 4,009 
yuan.” In other words, residents previously living in a home of 20 m2were entitled to 
123,477 yuan (Yang and Chang, 2007).
The new mode of compensation entailed certain injustices. Firstly because policy 
gave no consideration to household size, large families living in very crowded 
conditions did not necessarily get paid sufficiently to resolve their housing needs 
(Wu, 2004). Secondly, the standard of compensation was roughly identical to the 
amount paid out to residents of the Xintiandi site years earlier, but by this time the 
housing price in Shanghai had escalated substantially, and residents faced 
considerably more constraints in finding resettlement housing in the market. In other 
words, the adjustment of monetary compensation during this time was greatly 
disproportionate with the climbing property price (He, 2004).
With no direct access to the government or developers, residents could only attempt 
to bargain for higher compensation with the relocation company. The key strategy is 
to squat and refuse to move, even if demolition has begun around them, until better 
compensation is given. This was aptly outlined by local residents:
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You have to stand your ground. Calculating according to your ‘hukou ’, you 
[must] not walk off without 300,000 [yuan per person]. Continue to stay at 
home, who cares about them. The key is that...the key depends on whether 
you can ‘stand your ground'... Like I ’ve told my wife already, i f  the People’s 
government comes to do relocation, don’t even take heed o f them. Don’t go 
without getting 1.5 million, 1.8 million. Don’t go.
Local Resident (XI5), Male, age 50s
This practice of bargaining has become prevalent and has had a degree of 
effectiveness, but it also contributed to inequalities and a lack of transparency. 
‘Compliant’ households who left quietly and did not bargain with the relocation 
company got the first and ‘worst’ compensation offer, while households who “held 
their ground” until the very end may have gotten substantially more. Thus, often the 
old and frail were disadvantaged. In the bargaining process however, residents often 
had to withstand considerable harassment, sometimes physical abuse in order to 
force residents to leave.
As a result, conflicts of residential relocation became more and more intensified 
across the city. In 2002, there were reputedly 285 petitions including 172 collective 
petitions relating to demolition in the city (He and Biddulf, 2006). Inequitable 
compensation relative to rising property prices was one principal reason, but there 
were also a range of other reasons, including oppressive tactics adopted by 
relocation companies to enforce relocation, and instances where rightful 
compensation have been obscured. Demolition companies were profit-seeking 
enterprises who sometimes sought to limit the actual amount paid out to residents 
and to maximise their own profits. They held the upper hand in one-to-one dealings 
with households because residents did not have access to proper information about 
entitlements. This was also perceived by many residents facing relocation:
How can relocation be transparent...? In fact the relocation units -  their 
incomes are [linked to] how much the residents take, linked to these. Any 
surplus belongs to them, don’tyou know...? There are no standards!
Resident (X4), male, age 60s
Beyond this, the practices of relocation companies were not properly regulated. 
Often their staff resorted to harassment and even violence to enforce the speedy 
compliance of residents. Residents referred to instances where individuals have
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been beaten because they attempted to stand up to the relocation companies. 
Water, gas and electricity supplies could be cut off, and remaining residents may 
have to live in the rubble as demolition begins around them. Without a transparent 
operation mode, considerable misunderstandings and hostility between relocated 
residents and demolition companies emerged (He, 2004; He and Biddulf, 2006). 
Furthermore, residents’ capacity to bargain have ultimately been limited, because 
the government usually sets a deadline for relocation after which 'forced relocation' 
was allowed.
Apparently, monetary compensation has had different implications for households 
with different socio-economic situations. Compensation policies reinforces socio- 
spatial differentiation -  in other words, the ‘sorting’ of people according to socio­
economic status to different areas (He and Wu, 2007). Thus, options and outcomes 
could vary significantly depending on individual families’ own savings, incomes and 
capacity to take out a mortgage, as well as their housing aspirations and 
preferences. For better-off households with some savings, or with the capacity to 
acquire a mortgage, they may be able to double up these sources of financing and 
they may have few problems in resettling.
However, among those relocated to build the Lakeville Regency, about 70% were 
working class people and more than 30% were unemployed workers (Yang and 
Chang, 2007). Poor residents inevitably faced greater compromises between 
affordability, neighbourhood quality, and accessibility given the competitiveness of 
the housing market. Their re-housing options have often been restricted to the more 
peripheral locations where they may suffer from poor accessibility and services. 
There was a common perception that standards of compensation have not been 
sufficient to ensure a satisfactory relocation outcome.
I f  you have money then it doesn’t matter. I f  you had money then...they give 
you a little fo r the relocation -  and [with] the money you have yourself 
you...purchase (a house). But i f  you can’t afford to purchase then you’d just 
have to go to the suburbs. What can you do right? Normal elderly workers 
like us, how much money can we have?
Resident (XI), female, aged 60s
How can people buy houses with such standards? ... Basically it is 
completely impossible to be within the inner ring. In the middle ring, the 
outer ring -  it is too far.
Resident (X4), male, age 60s
200
One way of protecting themselves from the problems of displacement and/or to 
save the compensation for other personal uses has been to move back into 
dilapidated lilong housing elsewhere. Rather than moving to a new house in the 
suburbs, many older households chose to rent, or purchase the use right of older 
housing such as the lilong after relocation. This highlights the persistent role of the 
lilong within the housing market to accommodate those with little purchasing power. 
However, with on-going redevelopment and large demand from tens and thousands 
of relocated households every year, relocated residents and other urban poor have 
had diminishing choices of housing in the inner city and faced the prospect of future 
demolition.
5.4.3 Policy and area developments since 2005
Nationally, discontent arising from housing demolition was recognised as a major 
problem that affected many urban construction programs and threatened social 
stability. These were intensified by isolated incidents of protests and even suicides 
in some cities. In an effort to appease conflicts, the central government has since 
2003 advocated better regulation of relocation practices as a key aspect of creating 
a “Harmonious Society” -  the key principle of development under President Hu 
Jingtao and Premiere Wen Jiabao (Ren, 2008). As relocation became more 
politicised and a threat to social order, the Shanghai municipal government passed 
the “Notice on strengthening management tasks of the demolition of urban housing” 
in March 2005, with the purpose of slowing down the pace of redevelopment, 
regulating relocation practices, enhancing its transparency, and ensuring a better 
co-ordination between demolition and new affordable housing supply.
In this set of interventions, commercial real estate redevelopment was to be strictly 
limited. Apart from those for which planning approval has already been given (like in 
Taipingqiao area), additional demolition was to be in principle limited only to major 
municipal projects such as for infrastructure. District and county governments were 
required to work together to promote coordinated development of suitable housing 
stock that would suit and assist the proper relocation of families. If new construction 
projects do not provide for at least 70% of the population to be relocated, the 
demolition permit may not be approved.
A new ‘sunshine policy’ was implemented to enhance the transparency and 
openness of demolition practices and to safeguard the legitimate rights and
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interests of residents. The standard of compensation eligible for each household 
was to be published for each community facing demolition, so as to properly inform 
residents and to prevent serious inequalities between different households. Strict 
standards of conduct and legal sanctions were introduced to ban conducts that may 
harm citizens, such as violent behaviour and cutting off water, electricity and gas 
supplies while people still lived in their properties. In addition, special attention must 
be given to the relocation of families in difficult circumstances.
Some residents concede that since then, relocation practices and standards of 
compensation have been improved. By late 2006, monetary compensation in 
Taipingqiao redevelopment was around 20,000 yuan/ square metre of space, or 
alternatively 200,000 yuan per person (or 600,000 yuan for a family of three). For 
comparison, this compensation standard was about 8.5 times the average annual 
per capita income in Shanghai.15 Actual calculations also by this time take into 
consideration the household composition and their housing needs. Beyond the 
entitled compensation, the government may provide additional financial aid to 
families (between 30,000~60,000 yuan) experiencing particular hardships, such as 
sickness, unemployment, or old age. Other positive incentives for households to 
move may involve job offerings, the choice of replacement apartments elsewhere, or 
better retirement pension and medical insurance for the elderly. These specific 
terms are negotiated according to each family's circumstances and vary case by 
case (Ren, 2008).
Yet despite official efforts to bring about increasing compensation standards, 
residents still faced difficult compromises in the transition from lilong housing into 
the housing market. Residents report that displaced households were still 
constrained to resettling in the “middle-ring”, or “outer ring” parts of the city. There 
was a clear price gradient for housing price in space, highest towards the centre of 
the city (about 18,000 yuan/ m2) and falling lower progressively towards the urban 
periphery (about 4,000 yuan/m2 beyond the outer ring). A 600,000 yuan 
compensation for a three-person family could afford them a small 60~70 m2 unit 
between the middle and outer ring regions, and between 90~100 m2 of space 
around the outer ring region. It was difficult to find smaller, affordable units within the 
high-cost inner city. Thus, a move towards the suburbs was still the most likely 
impact.
15 Which was 23,623 yuan per capita in 2007 (SSB, 2008)
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This standard is too low... With 500,000 or 600,000 yuan -  fo r a family of 
three, what house can you buy? It  is now not possible to buy a house in 
Shanghai.... (So) There was a lot of arguing andfussing...
Resident (XI7), male, age 60s
For some, an alternative ideal solution was for the government to help rehabilitate 
their homes - first and foremost through measures such as the installation of 
sanitation facilities.
Install some showers... flushing toilets... and so on. Spend some money! That 
is ‘repair the old in keeping with the old’. That is it looks old to the eye, but 
inside the facilities and so forth can be exchanged with some good ones... The 
residents here... all are wishing fo r this - that it can be modified a bit.
Resident (X22), male, age 60s
Changes in relocation policies also made little impact on the already determined 
path of transforming Taipingqiao area into an affluent commercial and residential 
area, devoid of affordable housing or low-income residents. Construction of the 
third-phase of residential units - “Casa Lakeville” - commenced during the third 
quarter of 2006. Comprising 82,000 m2of new residential units and 14,000 m2 of 
retail properties, the development was launched for sale in early June 2008. 
Demand for these properties remained strong. 126 units were sold within the first six 
months, generating net revenues of 1.96 billion yuan. The average selling price 
achieved was a remarkable 85,300/m2, almost 56% more than that achieved by 
Lakeville Regency in 2007 (Sui-On Land, 2009). A local resident nearby remarked:
Demolishing continuously...Now [we] are renting housing...There’s bound to 
be one day when there are no more of these rental houses left. Then you ’d 
have no choice but to go to the suburbs...
Local resident (XI1), female, age 40s
By this time Taipingqiao area was one of the most sought after places in Shanghai 
to live, work and play by the wealthy citizens. The Luwan District proudly advertises 
its achievements in transforming the district and its role as a magnet for business 
and investment.
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... We have fo rm ed  the [basis o f  a ]  central business area with complete 
infrastructure, advanced commercial offices, [ a ]  beautiful environment and  
quality residential [areas]. With im proving business functions, [the district] 
w ill p la y  a more and more im portant role in attracting investment... 16
Shui-On’s contribution as a long-term partner in transforming the fortunes of Luwan 
district has been profound. This favourable relationship was to be sustained in the 
foreseeable future. Follow-up phases of the Corporate Avenue ensued from the 
first-half of 2008. Retail and entertainment outlets, including movie cinemas and a 
Broadway-style theatre, have been planned. The remaining residential land lots 
were expected to be completed in stages from 2009 to 2012. To create a high- 
profile international community, a private international school and a local school will 
be constructed. Shui-On’s expanding operations in other parts of China were also 
successful. It was simultaneously involved in eight projects in prime locations across 
six cities (Shanghai, Hangzhou, Chongqing, Wuhan, Foshan and Dalian), with a 
gross floor area of 13.2 million m2. A similar institutional model of public-private 
collaboration in the reconstruction of cities had facilitated tremendous opportunities 
in private wealth creation. It achieved net profits of 2.46 billion yuan in 2007, and 
2.48 billion yuan in 2008 (Shui-On Land, 2008, 2009).
Figure 5.14: Redeveloped environment of Taipingqiao area in 2007
Corporate Avenue (phase I) Lakeville
Lakeville Regency
16 http://wjw.luwan.sh.cn/webfronten/view_0.aspx?cid=57&id=l&navindex=0, Last accessed 10 
March 2009
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5.5 Conclusion:
This chapter examined the planning, organisation and outcomes of redevelopment 
at Taipingqiao over a decade-long period. It demonstrates that redevelopment was 
planned and enacted by a project-based, enduring partnership between the local 
government and property developer. In the process one of the most run-down 
neighbourhoods in the downtown area with a significant portion of lower income 
residents was transformed into a globally-oriented mix of luxury apartments, 
corporate offices, retail, and entertainment facilities. Original residents have been 
politically excluded, and forcefully displaced towards cheaper suburban locations. 
This represents a classic case whereby the manipulation of place for 'exchange 
value’ by powerful place-entrepreneurs conflicted with the contested use value of 
place.
The case highlights some features of the post-socialist urban politics in Shanghai. 
The district government and property developer were key actors in the 
redevelopment process, and they operated within an evolving, yet on the whole 
supportive institutional environment provided by the state and municipal 
governments. Market-oriented redevelopment based on the off-site relocation of 
residents became feasible since the 1990s because of major reform policies and 
housing demolition policies enacted by the central government. In Shanghai, the 
municipal government was influential in establishing local priorities for urban 
renewal via a combination of redevelopment programmes and local policies 
regarding relocation. Urban redevelopment was a major governing concern in 
turning Shanghai from a disinvested industrial centre into a global city. Physical 
rebuilding was needed not only to modernise the built environment and to enhance 
standards of living, but also to help build a service-based economy, to increase the 
local tax base, to create positive city imagery and to attract private investment. 
These ambitions and policies helped shape the targets and mechanisms for urban 
district governments in urban renewal.
Nevertheless, the municipal government was a relatively indirect actor in specific 
urban redevelopment projects. Its key responsibilities were comprehensive city 
planning, enacting macro-level regulations and policies to guide urban development, 
and implementing civic infrastructure projects. With administrative decentralisation 
the district government was a relatively empowered tier of administration. It 
negotiated land-leasing deals with property developers, channelled available
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subsidies to redevelopment schemes, and supported the resident relocation 
process to make way for private investment. Throughout the process, it was keen to 
demonstrate to private investors its achievements in remaking urban districts as 
modern, business-friendly environments.
Property developers have played an indispensable role as partners of the 
government in urban redevelopment. Although the two sides have some different 
agendas, they have been united by the vision of promoting urban growth through 
property-led redevelopment. The relation has been a collaborative one based on a 
pooling of resources. While the local government provided subsidies, favourable 
land-use transfers and support to assemble and clear sites, developers were 
responsible for sourcing financing and carrying out the redevelopment of run-down 
areas. The land-leasing mechanism transfers the right of land development to the 
developers, who then enjoyed considerable scope to control the spatial qualities 
and property values of a location. In the context of economic and social 
restructuring, new properties were built to profit from the demands of the growing 
segment of corporate businesses, the middle-class and wealthy households from 
within China as well as abroad. Local governments have largely supported the 
process of capital accumulation and to date have exerted only limited constraints in 
the development process such as regarding overall density requirements, and 
historic conservation.
Developers as a group were not place-bound, and could set up operations in 
multiple cities within the booming mainland market in search of favourable sites and 
circumstances. Powerful private sector actors often had positive social connections 
with local officials, which provided a foundation of mutual trust and gave them 
advantages in securing large deals and land in advantageous locations. Although in 
the context of political centralisation they should not be seen as driving urban 
policies, they have increasingly become elites in society, well represented by 
various business organisations, and even within government bodies such as the 
local and national People’s Congress. The operations of developers have been 
directly supported by a range of other domestic and foreign institutions including 
banks, professional design consultants, and other property investors, all of whom 
were part of the urban “growth machine” who had direct interest in promoting 
redevelopment and maximising the exchange value of place.
Excluded from direct participation in urban planning and relocation decisions have
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been the “local community” in each redevelopment project. Due to the lack of 
democratic mechanisms or a framework for political representation, residents had 
no say in the reshaping of their neighbourhood by more powerful actors. Problems 
such as physical decay, over-crowding and deficient facilities inherited from history 
continue to be profound liveability problems in communities targeted for demolition. 
In the context of market reform, these places experienced significant population 
change, migrant influx, and the decline of social networks. The better-off have 
moved away to be succeeded by new lower-income tenants. Thus, many residents 
were those who had limited purchasing power in the housing market, including 
public tenants and private renters.
Their relationship with the “growth coalition” was complex. On the one hand, state 
policies guaranteed some forms of compensation and re-housing for owners and 
public tenants in the redevelopment process. Thus, some residents supported and 
look forward to relocation as a way to move away from substandard housing and to 
enhance their living condition. On the other hand, redevelopment often conflicted 
with the demands of local residents affected by redevelopment. Dilapidated housing 
can have significant use value for its residents. For many, their affordability, central 
locations, sense of familiarity, and social networks often contribute to a sense of 
place-attachment. Beyond this, physical living conditions varied to some degree, 
and some are satisfied with their homes.
There has been a lack of detailed quantitative data regarding relocation outcomes. 
However, qualitative evidence suggests that there can be profound costs as well as 
benefits. Private tenants and rural migrants had no entitlement to compensation and 
must find alternative accommodation themselves. While owners and public tenants 
were generally assured of a move to better quality dwellings, their displacement 
towards suburban areas have been associated with a range of problems such as 
deficient local services, costly transportation, exclusion from inner city employment 
opportunities, and the disruption of social and psychological ties to people's original 
places of residence. Lack of right to stay in favourable locations in the city, 
insufficient compensation relative to housing price, lack of clear standards, and 
oppressive relocation tactics have all fuelled profound conflicts between residents 
and the growth coalition relentlessly pushing forth demolition.
Residents have resorted to bargaining with relocation companies, refusing to leave, 
or protests and petitions to local authorities to assert their voices. The government
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has had to co-opt the support and co-operation of residents in relocation by 
modifying its policies. In the interest of maintaining social stability, and sustaining 
the long-term agenda of urban growth, the central and local governments both 
made various moves to promote fairer compensation and more transparent 
relocation since 2003. However, these “concessions” were apparently intended to 
appease local discontent while sustaining the established model of urban 
redevelopment. There have been no significant moves to empower the residents 
within the urban (re)development process, or a shift towards protecting the social, 
psychological and everyday use value of place for existing residents.
This chapter has shed light on the uneven politics of redevelopment in Shanghai, 
demonstrating the dominance of a growth coalition promoting large-scale rebuilding, 
and its conflict with communities living in run-down neighbourhoods. However, cities 
are complex entities whose processes can rarely be neatly encapsulated in a single 
model. As described in chapter 4, Shanghai has pursued several approaches and 
strands of policies towards the immense task of urban housing renewal. The next 
chapter shall attempt to refine these findings by examining an apparently 
contrasting case which emphasised community retention as one of the core 
objectives.
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6 Redevelopment of Fukangli: A Case of Community 
Retention
6.1 Introduction
Alongside the rise of market-oriented housing redevelopment, Shanghai has also 
developed an alternative, apparently more socially-oriented policy for housing 
renewal under the title “Old Housing Amenity Fulfilment Renewal” (OHAFR). To gain 
a more comprehensive understanding how such a policy was pursued and its 
impact on older neighbourhoods, this chapter examines the redevelopment of 
Fukangli neighbourhood, one of the largest initiatives implemented. The chapter 
firstly outlines the initial conditions at Fukangli and the key policy agendas 
underlying subsequent processes of change. It then examines the nature of the 
public-private partnership established for project delivery and the decisions and 
negotiations that underpinned the actual redevelopment strategy. Thirdly, it 
examines the processes of resident resettlement and the outcomes of housing 
renewal in terms of housing transformations, tenure change and the community 
composition. The final sections discuss the limits to the pursuit of social objectives in 
housing renewal.
The case study reinforces the view that urban redevelopment was orchestrated by a 
growth coalition comprising the local government and powerful private sector 
enterprises as the main actors and decision makers. However, it shows that in some 
instances the growth coalition appeared to have acted to include the interest of local 
residents. The local government functioned as a mediator between private wealth 
accumulation and social interest, and its ability to deliver socially oriented housing 
renewal was closely related to its continued bureaucratic influence over various 
quasi-governmental real estate enterprises.
6.2 Initiation
6.2.1 Initial conditions and project agendas
Fukangli occupies a very convenient location in the inner city JingAn district. It is 
minutes by underground from People’s Square in central Shanghai, or from the 
city’s main Train Station, while one of the city’s most major commercial centres,
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Nanjing West road, is within walking distance to the south. Prior to comprehensive 
renewal in 1998, it was a sizable residential complex of around 400 shikumen lilong 
and new-style lilong housing. The complex occupied a site of 3.8 hectares, with a 
total floor area of around 48,000 m2. This accommodated a population of around 
1,500 households, or 4,300 residents (Tian and Wong, 2007). With architecture 
dating back to 1927, the community had suffered many of the problems typical to 
old-style lilong housing. Houses had been subdivided for multiple-occupation, 
sometimes up to four or five families, there was a legacy of physical decay due to 
the lack of property maintenance, most households did not have indoor sanitary 
facilities, kitchens were generally shared by multiple families and lacked gas 
connections. Nevertheless average housing space per family at the time was 35 m2, 
which was above the usual standards of lilong housing.
Figure 6.1: Fukangli interior conditions, before renewal
Source: New Fukangli public exhibit
A number of demographic and socio-economic features of the sub-district Fukangli 
belonged to are discernible according to the 2000 population census (see Table 6.1). 
Fukangli was located in the sub-district of ‘Shimen Er Road’, which had about
62,000 residents in 2000. In terms of age structure there was an over­
representation of the elderly population -  with 18% of the population in the sub­
district aged 65 or over. (This compared to a city-wide figure of 11%). The socio­
economic composition was relatively mixed. Looking at the occupational distribution, 
about one third of the population was engaged in commercial service jobs and
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about one quarter was engaged in manufacturing, transportation, and machinery 
operation. Professional and technical staff accounted for about one-fifth of the 
population, while less than 6% were managing level staff in state institutions or 
enterprises. However, there was a high degree of unemployment, with about 19% of 
the working-age population out of work. By residents and officials own accounts in 
the author’s interviews, most residents within Fukangli were relatively speaking 
'average' or 'above average' in terms of socio-economic status.
Table 6.1: Employment structure in Shimen-Er Road sub-district, 2000
Job type % share of working 
population
Professional and technical staff 19.5
Manufacturing, transportation, or manual operators 24.1
Commercial services 33.6
managing level staff in state institutions or enterprises 5.6
Unemployment rate 18.8
Source: 5th population census, cited in Li (2003)
In 1998 the JingAn district designated the Fukangli for renewal, with the objectives 
of enhancing the neighbourhood's comprehensive living amenity, maintaining the 
character of lilong housing and realising community retention. The terms of renewal 
followed the municipal housing bureau policy of Old housing Amenity Fulfilment 
Renewal - ‘OHAFR’. This policy emphasized the rehabilitation of lilong housing and 
targeted structurally sound dwellings with a lack of basic amenities and which have 
not been planned for demolition. In 1997 the Shanghai Municipal Government 
stipulated that 8 million m2of old housing could be targeted for upgrading in the short 
term (EBSREH, 1999).
This policy derived from a series of experimental housing rehabilitation projects in 
the 1980s and early 1990s (refer to Chapter 4, section 4.1). These small-scaled 
projects aimed to enhance the living standards of structurally sound, or 
architecturally distinct, lilong housing. The original structure and building facades 
were retained, and the focus was to re-build and modernise the interior space so 
that each household had an autonomous flat with a private kitchen, bathroom, and 
utility connections. Unit sizes typically remained small and tight, but where possible, 
extensions and an addition of an extra story helped alleviate congestion, or as 
surplus space to be sold to help finance the rehabilitation. Figure 6.2 shows a 
modestly rehabilitated lilong community, modified from two to three-stories in 1991-4.
211
Figure 6.2: External view of rehabilitated lilong housing
Initially, local housing bureau and work units were responsible for most of the 
financing of these schemes, with residents only required to pay nominal 
contributions. However, by the mid-1990s, privatisation to sitting tenants was 
introduced as a key mechanism. Upgraded units would be sold to eligible sitting 
tenants to help finance the interventions. Redevelopment as multi-storey flats also 
gradually became the norm rather than rehabilitation. Local officials were not 
satisfied with the results of modest rehabilitation, because it achieved only the most 
basic housing standards, and did not do much to achieve the municipal- 
government’s goal of lowering residential densities. It was deemed that 
redevelopment could more effectively modernise the built environment, alleviate 
congestion, and to generate surplus units to sell for profit.17
The renewal of Fukangli took place in the wake of these changes. Detailed 
guidelines for OHAFR were by this time set out in the documents “ I m p l e m e n t a t i o n  
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  t o  S p e e d - u p  H o u s i n g  A m e n i t y  F u l f i l m e n t "  and its technical 
guidelines in “ T e m p o r a r y  r e g u l a t i o n s  f o r  S h a n g h a i ’s  o l d  h o u s i n g  a m e n i t y  f u l f i l m e n t  
r e n e w a l” (SHLAB, 1997). Similar to the earlier schemes, the stated objectives of 
these policies were to allow residents to move back into the upgraded housing by
17 The pictured project and these insights were from the author's pilot case study.
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offering them the chance to purchase full property rights at a discounted price. 
Housing space per household was to be increased to more than 40 m2 and direct 
lighting and ventilation must be available for every bedroom. The policies also 
sought to promote better quality residential planning and architectural design -  with 
more emphasis on quality of public spaces, increasing landscaping and the 
integration of communal facilities or services, and at the same time raising the 
standards of housing to be achieved. Furthermore they called for the integrated 
upgrading or renewal of entire urban blocks. This emphasised the government’s 
desire to speed up the process of old housing renewal by facilitating larger schemes 
and to shift towards a ‘neighbourhood scale’ of renewal. Figure 6.3 shows that 
Fukangli was eventually comprehensively redeveloped.
Figure 6.3 New Fukangli before and after renewal
A fte r: New Fukangli after redevelopmentB e fo re : An old photograph of Fukangli
Source: New Fukangli public exhibit (left), author (right)
6.2.2 The quasi-governmental enterprise
The operational principle underlying the renewal of New Fukangli was “ G o v e r n m e n t  
s u p p o r t ,  e n t e r p r i s e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  m a r k e t  o p e r a t i o n s ,  a n d  p a i d  o n - s i t e  r e s e t t l e m e n t ”  
(Shimen-Er Road Street Office, 2005). According to the government ordinances a 
number of agencies were fundamental to the implementation of the project. The 
municipal government and the municipal housing bureau provided the overarching 
guidelines, policy and administrative support for the process. A commercial property 
development enterprise was to implement the scheme, but the district housing 
bureau would act as the facilitators. The latter was responsible for the planning and 
project approval processes as well as to commission commercial developers to
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carry out in the process. The executive arm of the district housing bureau was the 
designated Old Housing Renewal Office.
Because the scheme coincided with the Asian Financial Crisis around 1997-1998, 
Shanghai was amidst a property slump and the local housing bureau was unable to 
attract investment interest from private developers. Instead, it commissioned a 
state-owned, quasi-governmental development company Jingan Property Holdings 
Group (JPHG). Under the directive of the local housing bureau, JPHG then 
established JingAn Property Stockholding Co. Ltd as the subordinate company to 
carry out the task of renewing Fukangli. State-owned enterprises were the dominant 
force in the property development sector in China up to the mid-1990s. JPHG was 
formed from a branch of the JingAn District’s Land and Housing Administration 
Bureau in 1996 as what is known as a “third sector enterprise” (sanchan qiye). In 
the 1980s and 1990s, many local government bureau in China set up property 
development and commercial property management companies as their subsidiary 
operating branches, either to take advantage of the profit opportunities of market 
reform and to augment bureaux finances or to streamline the public sector (Duckett, 
1996).
There was often no clear line between the local bureaux and these state-owned 
enterprises. Officials and company managers often shifted between key posts. For 
example, the director of the Old Housing Renewal Office was simultaneously a 
manager within JPHG Furthermore, according to the JingAn District Commission of 
Construction and Management, the director of JPHG was a political elite as well as 
business elite in Shanghai. He was a distinguished member of the Communist Party, 
has ten-times been named a "Major Contributor to Shanghai’s Construction", and 
was a representative in Shanghai's 12th People's Congress.18 The congress plays a 
role in monitoring the enforcement of laws and regulations regarding local 
development, and can influence local legislation and policies by drafting reports and 
providing feedback directly to the relevant government officials.19
A combination of favourable government support and unique market circumstances
18http://jianwei.jingan.gov.cn/jajwinfoplat/platformData/infoplat/pub/jajw_10^docs/200412/d_344 
9.html, Last accessed 2 September 2009
19 Before the reform, most of the PC members were previous government bureau chiefs, government 
officials and party secretaries. However, in recent years, the numbers of local entrepreneurs and 
academic experts have also been increasing.
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sustained the rapid expansion of these developers in the 1990s, often giving them 
extremely lucrative returns. Close ties with government confers such enterprises 
with a favourable position because to nurture their own subsidiary companies and to 
realise its urban development plans. For example local authorities often agreed to 
speed up land allocation or to transfer land use rights at extremely discounted rates. 
This often allowed them to build up impressive land banks (Tang, 2003). With strong 
backing from the local government, JPGH grew to be the top 10 property 
developers in Shanghai by 2003. The activities of the group now spans across five 
different sectors from real estate development, to real estate management, to real 
estate brokering, interior decorating, and tourism. Its total asset valued over 7 billion 
yuan. By 2008 it had land holdings totalling 3,500 acres in Shanghai as well as 
neighbouring cities such as Suzhou, and Wuxi.20
Nevertheless these developers could be distinguished from fully fledged private 
enterprises in terms of their administrative structure and decision making. Although 
they have been restructured to function like other private or joint-venture companies 
in the market, in reality they were often initially regarded as ‘administrative work 
units managed in the form of enterprises” (shiye danwei qiye guanli). Many were still 
accountable to different degrees to their former superior government departments 
(or ministries), and had to shoulder certain administrative functions. Because in 
these quasi-governmental companies a director’s career to some extent depended 
on his relationship with officials in government, the investment decisions were often 
not made solely on the basis of the economic interest of the company. Fulfilment of 
bureaucratically defined ‘production targets’ rather than profit levels was sometimes 
the primary criterion for staff performance appraisals. They acted in some ways as 
the executive arms of the public sector, and acquired projects either through direct 
government appointments as well as by competitive tenders (Tang, 2003).
For example, the JPHG acted as an instrument of the government to carry out its 
policies and plans, and together with the local authorities orchestrated many 
renewal schemes in the district. This included many slum clearance and housing 
rehabilitation schemes - some with significant profit potential, others less so. It also 
inherited the public housing management tasks of the government bureau. In this 
sense, these quasi-govemmental enterprises sometimes acted in a non-profit 
capacity in the economic system, realising some socially oriented initiatives for the
20 http://www.jazy.cn/docc/jj2.htm. Last accessed 20 November 2009.
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government.
6.2.3 The design process
The Fukangli renewal scheme was the largest project of old housing amenity 
fulfilment renewal in the city at the time. It thus enjoyed substantial political attention, 
and also the direct support and monitoring of the deputy mayor. The district old 
housing renewal office and JPHG became the key actors responsible for developing 
the precise renewal strategy. Working closely with local government and its 
administrative bodies, the district housing renewal office and JPHG successfully 
negotiated various fiscal subsidies and favourable planning concessions to make 
the project more financially feasible. The scheme was exempted from land use 
charges, infrastructural provision costs, as well as other administrative costs in the 
construction process. In addition to these, the developer was granted a low-interest 
Joan of 100 million yuan (one-fifth of total project investment) from the housing 
provident fund of the local housing bureau. This became a key component of the 
developer’s initial investment into the project.
Shanghai Institute of Architectural Design and Research (co., ltd) was engaged as 
the architectural consultant (SIADR) for the project. Again, this appointment 
reflected a strong institutional connection between the government and powerful 
state-owned enterprises in urban redevelopment projects. SIADR was a large-scale, 
state-owned architectural design and research corporation with a long history of 
working for the municipal government. Formerly known as the Shanghai Municipal 
Institute of Civil Architectural Design, it has been directly commissioned for a string 
of high-profiled landmark projects by the Shanghai Municipal Government, including 
the Shanghai Stadium, Shanghai Library, Shanghai Museum, and Shanghai Pudong 
International Financial Building.21 On the other hand, residents had no involvement 
or say in the design of their neighbourhood, and were not informed of these 
decisions until they were notified to be relocated so that construction could take 
place.
According to the formal terms of the OHAFR policy, a rehabilitation approach 
keeping the original structure and fabric was meant to be the focus. However, in 
reality the district housing office and property developer had substantial leeway in
21 www.siadr.com.cn. Last accessed 1 November 2009.
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determining the actual development strategy. Fukangli was not part of a designated 
conservation area, and was not perceived to have particular historical significance. 
They argued that former rehabilitation projects in the city did not achieve the kinds 
of results the government aspired to, that conservation of the old housing was at 
odds with the wider objectives of increasing housing space and environmental 
quality, and proposed a comprehensive redevelopment scheme to replace the 
existing stock with a modernised residential complex. It was also clear that 
demolition and rebuilding at higher densities would enhance the financial feasibility 
of the overall scheme, because this could generate more surplus housing that could 
be sold in the market to cross-subsidise discounted units that would be sold to 
existing residents.
In the end, comprehensive redevelopment of the site at higher density was swiftly 
granted. The developer was allowed to demolish all of the original housing, and the 
original floor area density (FAR) of the site of 1.3 was raised to a value of 2.8 -  
allowing developer to more than double the original amount of floor area on the site. 
The eventually executed design was a modern residential complex comprising a 
range of multi-rise and high-rise apartments. The development had a total floor 
space of 108,000 m2, and 1,176 dwelling units. The complex included 16 eight- 
storey flats, 6 five-storey terraced flats, and two high-rise apartments of 22 and 28 
stories.
Taking into account the policy emphasis on the ‘integrated planning’ of residential 
areas, the developer placed considerable emphasis on creating a residential 
environment with abundant public spaces, landscaping and communal facilities. 
While in traditional lilong housing the public spaces were the narrow lanes, New 
Fukangli boasted a system of open plazas, landscaped gardens, and sheltered 
recreational spaces totalling 8,000 m2. Landscaped gardens separated rows of 
housing, while covered plazas created at the ground floor level can be used as all- 
weather recreational and circulation spaces (see figures 6.4). These were equipped 
with seating and exercise equipment. A range of communal facilities were provided, 
including a medical centre, kindergarten, computer classrooms, grocery shops, 
convenience store, hair salon as well as a recreation centre. There was a basement 
level dedicated to car-parking, and in total about 50 shops along street-fronts.
217
Figure 6.4: Living environment of Fukangli before and after renewal
Source: New Fukangli exhibit (left), author (right)
All of the housing units were designed as much as possible in accordance with up to 
date planning regulations for space and amenity. Each flat had indoor bathroom(s), 
an autonomous kitchen, and emphasised natural lighting and ventilation in the toilet 
and kitchen spaces. To better justify and make up for the demolition of existing 
housing, the developer, architect and the district urban planning bureau sought to 
incorporate some of the characteristics of lilong housing into the final design, even 
though the scale and layout no longer resembled lilong housing in any way. The 
design principles were described by the architects as " r e s p e c t i n g  h i s t o r y ,  
e m p h a s i s i n g  c u l t u r a l  c o n t i n u i t y ,  m a x i m i s i n g  l i m i t e d  s p a c e ,  d e s i g n i n g  f o r  t h e  a v e r a g e  
c i t i z e n ,  a n d  c r e a t i n g  a  h i g h  q u a l i t y ,  e c o l o g i c a l  e n v i r o n m e n t "  (SIADR, 2001). Most of 
these intentions were reflected in the cosmetic features of the building elevations, 
and in the row-like placement of new multi-rise apartments on site.
Because original residents were to have a priority right to purchase the finished flats, 
economical concerns were integral to the architectural design so as to ensure better 
affordability. A variety of small, one- and two-bedroom apartments that varied from 
50 m2to around 85 m2 were included in the design. In negotiation with the municipal 
urban planning bureau, some regulations that applied to the construction of new 
residential buildings -  such as minimum room dimensions -  were slightly relaxed in 
order to facilitate the provision of more compact and economical housing units. 
Beyond these, more luxurious residential units were also provided intended for sale 
to the more affluent buyers in the market, ranging from larger apartments to a small 
number of terraced housing located at the centre of the complex offering four-
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bedroom duplexes of around 400 m2. Thus, the dwelling unit design was relatively 
diverse and reflected the intention to cater for the needs of a range of households, 
from those of modest means to relatively affluent ones.
Overall, public policy emphasising community retention clearly influenced the design 
strategy of the property developer JPHG, who paid considerable attention to varying 
the dwelling types and to affordability. However, it was also clear that the developer 
had considerable say in determining the development strategy. It effectively 
negotiated for demolition when the original policy had intended for modest 
rehabilitation. At the same time, the local government was keen to promote high 
quality modern residential developments, seeing little value for the existing vintage 
stock. It supported a much more ‘scaled-up’ redevelopment proposal via the 
relaxation of planning regulation, density allowances, and provided subsidies to 
smooth the renewal process.
Figure 6.5: Street-view of redeveloped New Fukangli
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6.3 Resident resettlement
6.3.1 Mixed-mechanisms
The resulting residential complex -  ‘New Fukangli’ (NFKL) was constructed in two 
phases, with a total investment of around 500 million yuan. Implemented from 1998, 
the construction was completed towards the end of 2001. Project financing came 
from three different sources: self-raised funds from the developer, a low-interest 
loan from the municipal government, and contributions from residents who 
purchased part of the new flats.
Resident resettlement occurred in two phases, starting in September 1998, at which 
point residents were free to choose from two different forms of resettlement. The 
main part of the scheme was on-site resettlement -  which was an important source 
of financing for the project. For those families who wished to resettle back into New 
Fukangli they were offered to purchase the new units at highly discounted prices. 
For those who could not afford, or preferred to move elsewhere, cash compensation, 
or allocation of replacement housing were the alternatives. In total 52 percent of the 
initial 1,500 families moved back into redeveloped flats, while the rest were 
relocated on the basis of monetary compensation or allocation of replacement 
housing. After allocating about 800 housing units to returnee families, just over 400 
units were left to be sold at market price to new buyers in the market. These were 
marketed at about 7000 yuan/m2 -  which meant that a 100 m2 unit cost around 20 
times the average annual disposable income (35,154 yuan) of a three person 
household in 2000 (SSB, 2001).
6.3.2 On-site resettlement
For those who intended to resettle back into NFKL, they were offered to choose 
their own desired housing units off plan, and were required to pay for the housing at 
the time of relocation. This was effectively a privatisation process. Full property 
rights were subsequently transferred from the housing bureau to those who opted 
for on-site resettlement. The housing price was highly discounted for returning 
households. On average, returnees paid 120,000 yuan for an average sized flat of 
just over 70 m2. This equated to an average price of around 1,700 yuan/ m2, which 
was only 34 percent of the market price at the time of 5,000 yuan/m2. Families 
purchased different apartments depending on individual circumstances and financial
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capacity. The majority could only afford the smaller one-bedroom or two-bedroom 
flats at between 50-80 m2. On the other hand some bought larger three or four- 
bedroom units, and some even purchased more than one unit.
The exact housing price was calculated in a complicated manner with six different 
price components (Table 6.2), and was dependent on the size of the original house 
occupied, the size of the flat the family chose to purchase, and the number of years 
the head of household had in state-employment. Furthermore, there was a 20 
percent discount for one-off payment of the total cost -  which many residents took 
advantage of. For example, a household with 30 m2 original inhabited floor area, 
and 20 years in state employment, buying a 70 m2flat needed to pay 186,200 yuan. 
For a one-off payment he would be entitled to a discount of 20%, reducing the sum 
to 148,860 yuan
Table 6.2: Housing price formula for on-site resettlement in NFKL
Price
mechanism
Housing
price
component
Calculation logic
Discounted
price
components
A Original occupied floor area x 1.35, charged at 1200  
yuan/ m2
B The above price (A) discounted at a rate of RMB 15 x 
(number of years in state employment)
C 8 of additional floor area charged at 1,200 yuan/
D 10 m* of additional floor area charged at 'half market 
price’ of 2400 yuan/ m 2
Market price 
component
E Any additional floor area beyond the above charged at 
market price of 5 ,000 yuan/ m2
Incentive
discount
F 20%  discount off total cost for one-off payment within 
one week
Total (A -B  + C + D + E) -  F
Source: interviews with the developer and residents, 2007
Although the privatisation process was heavily subsidised, the process of housing 
allocation was highly bureaucratic and opaque. Residents were shown the floor- 
plans of available housing types as a basis for selection, but had no other 
information about the design and quality of the housing or the overall master-plan. 
They then had to pay for the total cost of their housing, and then arrange for their
221
own interim accommodation while construction was taking place. This turned out to 
be about 2.5 years. After New Fukangli was built the developer was responsible for 
allocating the available houses and determining where and in which building each 
family would eventually be settled. Essentially, residents had to pay for the housing 
renewal with little idea of what they were buying until they moved in.
Originally (we) didn't expect it to be so good... At the time of allocating 
houses one didn’t know which unit o f which building it one was going to be 
either. I t  was never mentioned ... [ You knew] which floor you were on, and 
which fla t number. That was it. ... [ It  was] not transparent... I t  was not like 
the commodity housing now -  you can go and have a look first... They didn’t 
even let you see the model.
Resident (F20), female, age 60s
Despite the considerable uncertainties, many of the residents were enthusiastic to 
move back. ‘On-site’ resettlement was attractive for a number of reasons. Residents 
felt considerable sentiments for the area they had lived in for a long time, they 
preferred the convenience of its central location to the choices of suburban living, 
and some did think that the cost of resettlement on-site was relatively favourable.
[Moving back was] quite good...because we have gotten...used to living here.
I  was bom here... and (have) lived here fo r over 60 years, so there were 
sentiments, and didn’t want to move to other places. So I  moved back...
Resident (F20), female, age 60s
6.3.3 Off-site relocation
Although on-site resettlement was the most preferred option, some residents could 
not afford on-site resettlement. Households needed on average 120,000 yuan to 
purchase their housing, but this represented about 6 times the mean annual 
disposable income of a family with two earners (SSB, 2000). Most residents would 
have needed to get a loan in order to make the payments. Apparently, socio­
economic status and the original housing conditions both influenced the capacity to 
purchase the redeveloped housing. Basically poorer families and families with less 
housing space to begin with were more disadvantaged, and found it more difficult to 
move back. Families with less space to begin with needed to pay a greater share of 
the cost at full market price. Thus, the privatisation process tended to reinforce 
some pre-existing housing inequalities.
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We o f course wished to come back. To come back [however]...the average 
citizen paid too big a price. Yes...the wages at the time...the cost was too 
great. The price was not reasonable... [ I f  there were] major discounts then 
everyone would have come back!
Returnee resident (F10), male, aged 60s
At the time I  [purchased it] it was almost 95,000 yuan fo r a flat 
approximately. But fo r you to be able to pay this fee, it was also not an easy 
feat, because at the time the wages were lower... I t  was very rare fo r the 
average person to [do so] without borrowing any money. Normally there 
were inevitably some loans or whatever.
Returnee resident (F9), female, aged 50s
Relocation housing was offered in various suburban districts including Xinzhuang, 
Jiading and Pudong, near the middle ring road. At the time these were peripheral 
areas of the city. Housing was allocated in relation to household size - at a standard 
of about 24 m2 per person. In other words, a family of three could receive a two- 
bedroom flat of around 72 m2. In some cases they were also supplemented with a 
cash compensation of around 20,000~30,000 yuan - which was two or three times 
the mean annual per capita disposable income (SSB 2007). The author was unable 
to interview relocated residents, but a number of returnee residents expressed that 
relocation would have at least ensured them physical dwelling improvements, at no 
cost. On the other hand, many felt that relocation housing occupied undesirable 
locations, in terms of accessibility and services.
Table 6.3 compares the location characteristics of Xinzhuang, Jiading and Pudong 
districts with Jingan district - where New Fukangli was located. Given data 
limitations, it shows differences at the urban district level, rather than comparing 
specific neighbourhoods. It compares the availability and density of distribution of 
retail facilities, offices, schools and hospitals in each district in the year 2000. As the 
four districts differed significantly in geographical size and population size, the 
analysis considers quantity of services in relation to population and to geographical 
area.
In terms of retail space, JingAn district was particularly well developed, offering 
almost 67,000 m2 every square Kilometre, or more than 1,600 m2 to every 1,000 
residents in the district. The suburban areas were deficient by comparison, with less 
than 2,000 m2 of retail space per square Kilometre. Pudong and Minhang districts 
provided less than 400 m2 of retail space per 1,000 residents. This was less than
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one quarter of that available in JingAn district (calculated from SSB, 2001).
Table 6.3: Services in JinAn district vs. relocation destinations
JingAn Pudong Minhang Jiading
Location Inner city Suburb Middle Ring Outer
Suburb suburb
Geographical Area (km2) 7.62 522.75 371.68 458.8
Area ratio to JingAn district 1 68.6 48.8 60.2
Population (1 ,000 persons) 358 1651.4 654 486 .4
Secondary Schools
Number in district 19 100 47 31
Schools/ km2 2.49 0.19 0.13 0.07
Population /  Schools (1,000 18.8 16.5 13.9 15.7
persons)
Full-time teachers per school 85.4 65.4 58.5 53.4
Primary Schools
Number in district 19 136 63 35
Schools/ km2 2.49 0.26 0.17 0.08
Full-time teachers 1,191 6,396 2,254 1,632
Full-time teachers per school 62.7 47.0 35.8 46.6
Commercial facilities
(1,000 m2)
Total retail space 510 250 720 580
Retails space / km2 66.93 0.48 1.94 1.26
Retail s p a c e /1,000 persons 1,620 309 382 1,480
Total office space 2000 3520 470 920
Office space/ km2 262.47 6.73 1.26 2.01
Office s p a c e /1,000 persons 5,587 2,132 719 1,891
Healthcare services
Number of hospitals in district 16 46 26 21
Hospitals/ km2 2.94 0.07 0.07 0.05
Hospital beds per 1,000 persons 11.2 3.4 5.8 4.2
Source: Calculated from SSB (2001)
In terms of secondary and primary schools, the suburban districts had significantly 
lower densities of provision as well as relatively fewer teaching staff. For example, 
JingAn district offered on overage one secondary school every 0.2 of a square 
Kilometre, compared to approximately one to every 5 square Kilometres in Pudong, 
every 8 square Kilometres in Minhang and one every 15 square Kilometre in Jiading. 
In other words, while schools would have been walking distances away in JingAn 
district, access to schools would likely have been be far more demanding for the 
relocatees. Schools in JingAn districts also offered significantly more full time
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teachers per than any of the three suburban districts, which indicates that they were 
better resourced than the suburban schools.
In terms of healthcare services, the suburbs were also associated with relatively 
lower levels of availability. Jingan district was well served by hospitals, with on 
average one hospital in every 0.34 square Kilometre. In contrast, there was one 
hospital to every 14 square Kilometres in Pudong and Minhang districts, and one to 
almost 20 square Kilometres in Jiading district. All these suggest that relocated 
residents would have experienced significantly lower levels of service provision than 
they had been accustomed to in JingAn district.
As an alternative to housing compensation, monetary compensation was offered by 
the developer, at the rate of around 150,000 yuan per family. Most residents were 
thought to have purchased a home rather than rented with this money. Table 6.4 
compares the compensation of 150,000 yuan to 2006 rental prices for one and two 
bedroom flats in the city, in various locations. (Note that the actual time of relocation 
was around 2001 and that rental prices for 2006 had risen significantly). According 
to the data from the internet real estate site sofun.com, the average price for a two- 
bedroom flat in Shanghai was around 2,200 yuan per month, at which rate the 
compensation would have lasted a mere 5.6 years. Even if the household 
compromised by moving to cheaper suburban locations like Minhang district, the 
compensation would not cover more than 8 years for an average one-bedroom flat. 
Clearly, given the rapidly inflating market rents, private renting as an option could 
quickly exhaust a household’s compensation. It would not be sustainable if a family 
did not have sufficient regular income to cover the housing costs themselves.
In relation to housing prices, the compensation also offered households relatively 
limited purchasing options. Poor families in particular would have had to 
compromise either in terms of location or in terms of housing quality. At the time, 
city-wide average housing price was 3,326 yuan/m2 (SSB, 2001). This meant that 
the compensation was only sufficient to purchase an average 50 m2 unit. Thus, 
most relocates had to resettle towards the cheaper suburban neighbourhoods. In 
general only families with personal savings or the capacity to take out a mortgage 
will be able to afford decent quality housing in central neighbourhoods with cash 
compensation.
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Table 6.4: Comparison of compensation with rental price in 2006
Monthly rent 
(yuan)
Number of years of rental 
600,000 yuan compensation 
equates to
1 bedroom flat, JingAn district 2,557 4.9
2 bedroom flat, City average price 2,227 5.6
1 bedroom flat, City average price 1,884 6.6
2 bedroom flat, Minhang district 1,776 7.0
1 bedroom flat, Minhang district 1,547 8.0
Prices from sofun.com for month of December 2006
6.4 Outcomes of housing renewal:
6.4.1 Housing improvements
With the majority of housing units New Fukangli sold to sitting tenants at subsidised 
price, the scheme overall did not make any profit. Thus despite the inevitable costs 
of displacement to the resettled families, this was deemed officially as an exercise 
balancing social interests and the desire for physical modernisation. Interviews with 
returnee households revealed relatively high satisfaction with the outcomes. 
Redevelopment had improved their standards of living significantly - including 
enlarged housing space, the addition of modern amenities, more public spaces and 
communal facilities. The average household space increased from 35 m2 before 
renewal, to 70 m2 after renewal. All of the flats provided modern facilities including 
independent kitchen, indoor W.C, bathroom and air conditioning. The outdoor 
environmental quality and public spaces were also though to have greatly improved. 
A system of open plazas, landscaped gardens, and sheltered recreational spaces 
created a safe and attractive public realm for a variety of recreational and social 
activities to take place. Many residents used them regularly, as a site for 
conversations, chess games, daily exercises and for children to play in. These were 
the most apparent results housing redevelopment for the returnee residents.
The fee lin g  is quite good (here). Whether the environment, the security -  it  is 
a ll  quite good  ... You see the landscaping here and so fo rth , there’s a very 
intricate feeling.
Resident (F20), female, aged 60s
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The renewal improved our lives, our living conditions. Originally the 
shikumen housing didn’t have such good criteria. There was no independent 
bathroom. Furthermore the kitchen...and the entire environment o f the 
residential complex, was different. It  has improved a lot. Originally there 
wasn’t so much landscaping (either). It  is really a lot better...
Resident (FI7), male, age 60s
When asked about the issue of historic conservation, some returnees felt that 
shikumen lilong housing did have distinct architectural value, and others did not. 
Frequently, demolition was thought to be justified given the possibility of greatly 
enhancing housing quality. Given the choice between quality of environment and 
historic conservation, residents apparently emphasised the former over the latter.
Shikumen housing has a kind of Chinese character. And these housing now.... 
well isn’t time moving forwards? Architecture is also continuously moving 
forward. So the new replacing the old, this is completely in accordance with 
these changes - moving forward. Some people are nostalgic o f course. 
Nostalgia is good... [but] old concepts cannot [override] new concepts.
Resident (F5), male, age 60s
Favourable opinions of the housing environment were largely echoed by the newly 
settled residents, who purchased their homes here at market price. Some of these 
were high income households, while others were only able to afford the dwelling by 
trading up from their former homes purchased through the favourable privatisation 
of public housing. Their socio-economic characteristics are examined in section 
8.4.3. All of the newly settled residents interviewed expressed satisfaction with living 
in NFKL. The housing price they paid was deemed to be reasonable. They were 
attracted by its very convenient, central location. Walking distance from the Nanjing 
West Road commercial centre, the community was well situated for access to work, 
to schools and was well supported by transport, shopping and other services. They 
were also attracted by the environmental design -  with its abundance of public 
spaces.
Oh, the living environment is now pretty good! Yes the landscaping is quite 
good. It's pretty comfortable! There are many exercise facilities...the cleaning 
is also done well. The property management is...quite well done. I t ’s quite 
good!
Resident (FI), male, age 50s
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It is very convenient [here]. The location is central, plus the transport is 
convenient. The surrounding environment and the supporting facilities are all 
very good.
Resident (F I9), male, aged 30s
Figure 6.6: Public environment in New Fukangli
6.4.2 Property gains
Beyond enjoying great improvements in their housing conditions, the shift from 
public renting to home-ownership also had profound implications for the returnees. 
After they moved back into NFKL, they were property owners and enjoyed the 
benefits of soaring property values alongside a strong property market. This more 
than made up for what they paid for the flats in the first place. Because the central 
location, and in particular its proximity to the commercial centre on Nanjing West 
Road, there was strong demand for housing in this neighbourhood from a range of 
well-off local and foreign workers. The housing price at NFKL rose from about 5,000 
yuan/m2 in 1998, to around 7,000/m2 in 2000 and 18,000/m2 in 2006. The price of a 
100 m2 flat in 2000 was around 14 times the annual disposable income of a middle 
income household, and by 2007 it had reached about 36 times (see table 6.5). 
According to some residents, this meant that many households could sell or rent off
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their homes to reap significant capital gains.
Now to think o f  it, it was quite a good deal, because this place has risen in 
value... So then there’s nothing you can [complain about]... After moving 
back, many peopled have let out [their] house here... For sure they are 
expensive. Like, a better, fully decorated [unit], would be over 3,000 yuan...
There are also foreigners who come and rent houses, yes, business-owners 
who come here to rent houses. Normally the people here -  those with good  
criteria, or whose kid has grown up a bit - i f  they had the capacity to, they’d  
buy a house outside, and rent out this place.
Resident (F9), female, age 50
While residents were no doubt pleased with the wealth implications, another 
perspective to view this phenomenon is that the long-term affordability of this 
development was not a concern of the government. In the absence of measures to 
regulate or maintain the housing price, good quality privatised dwellings in central 
locations increasingly become unaffordable to middle or lower income groups. Thus, 
a corresponding implication of housing renewal was the depletion of affordable 
housing and public housing from valuable inner city locations.
Table 6.5: Housing price in New Fukangli, 20(30 -  2007
2000 
Sale price
2007 
Sale price
2007 
Rental price
Approximate unit price 
(yuan/ m2)
7,000 18,000 60/month
Price for 100 m2 flat (yuan) 700,000 1.8 million 72,000 /year
Shanghai’s average capita 
income (yuan/ year)
10,529 16,774 16,774
Ratio of housing price /mean 
household income*
14 36 1.4
Note: * household income assumed for a family of three
Sources: House prices from local estate agencies and local residents, Income data from SSB, 2001, 
2008
6.4.3 A mixed community
To scrutinise the implications of housing renewal on the socio-economic 
composition, the following compares the characteristics of returnee residents - those 
who achieved on-site resettlement and 'newcomers' who subsequently purchased 
their way into New Fukangli. One expectation was that since privatisation the 
community would have become an exclusive place to live for the relatively affluent.
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However, a household survey of New Fukangli in 2007 (Wang, 2009) revealed that 
the resultant community was still socially mixed. It showed that overall the newly 
settled households were of significantly higher socio-economic status than the 
returnees, and that even after many years the policy of on-site resettlement had 
retained a significant portion of residents that were of low socio-economic status in 
NFKL.
The age profile of the entire community was high (Table 6.6), with overall 37% of the 
household heads being aged 61 and above, and a significant 43% aged between 
46-60. Corresponding to this, retirement rates were also high: 61% among the 
returnees and 51% among the newcomer households.
Table 6.6: Age of heads of households in New Fukangli, 2007
Unit: Percent
Age group Returnee
households
Newcomer
households
Whole community
Below 25 0.0 2.4 1.4
26-45 14.3 21.6 18.4
46-60 57.2 33.5 43.1
61 and above 28.7 43.0 37.1
Mean 57 55 56
Note: Data based on a household survey of NFKL in 2007 with the assistance of the local 
resident committee. Source: Wang (2009).
In terms of household income, returnee residents were heavily represented in the 
lower-income categories, while most newly settled households were of above- 
average incomes (see Table 6.7). For comparison, Shanghai’s mean income for a 
family of three in 2007 was 5,062 yuan/month (SSB, 2008). In contrast, a significant 
proportion of the returnees (12.8%) reported very low household income of less 
than 1,600 yuan/month. 41% had low incomes of between 1,600-2,999 yuan/month. 
Only 2.6% had above-mean incomes of 6,000-14,999 yuan/month. Newcomer 
households were in comparison significantly better off. 46% of them were earning 
above average incomes of more than 6,000 yuan/month, within which 11% earned 
high incomes of 15,000-29,999 yuan/month.
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Table 6.7: Socio-economic composition of New Fukangli, 2007
Unit: Percentage
Returnee
households
Newcomer
households
Em ployment status (of household head)
Employed 24.4 42.6
Retired 61.0 51.1
Laid-off/unem ployed 9.8 2.1
Others 4.9 4.3
Position at work (of household head)
Principal or senior director 33.3 35.0
Middle level management 0.0 0.0
Administrative & technical staff 0.0 40.0
General/basic staff 66.7 25.0
Monthly household income
< 1,600 yuan 12.8 6.5
1,600-2,999 yuan 41.0 26.1
3,000-5,999 yuan 43.6 30.4
6,000-14,999 yuan 2.6 26.1
15,000-29,999 yuan 0.0 10.9
> 30,000 yuan 0.0 0.0
Education status (of household head)
Primary school and below 9.8 0.0
Junior high school 7.3 6.4
High school 56.1 29.8
Technical college 19.5 31.9
University (under-graduate) 4.9 14.9
University (post-graduate) 2.4 17.0
Source: Wang, R. (2009).
Differences were also apparent in the occupational status of the residents. A high 
proportion of the returnee households were unemployed (10%), compared to the 
newcomers (2%). The majority of the newly settled residents were managerial staff 
(35%) or administrative/technical workers (40%). One quarter was basic staff. In 
comparison, one third of the returnees were also classed as managerial staff, but as 
many as two thirds were basic staff in various state owned or private enterprises. 
These results demonstrate that although property commodification led to
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gentrification by introducing newcomers of relatively high socio-economic status, 
favourable policies for original residents moderated the extent of change, and NFKL 
was still relatively socially mixed almost ten years after completion.
What were the social relations like in the resultant community? Some of the 
residents interviewed cited a strong sense of community as one of the stand-out 
features of NFKL. Many praised its sense of ‘human vibrancy’ (renqi), which they 
thought was usually missing in new housing developments. The sense of human 
vibrancy was felt mostly in terms of visible people presence. The quality of outdoor 
public space was clearly conducive for fostering such an atmosphere, and in 
providing a platform for socialisation to take place. Beyond this, some thought that 
on-site resettlement was beneficial because it maintained some pre-existing ties 
and mutual knowledge. Thus, if one got to know one person, it was easy to get to 
know the others.
The key is that the neighbours are pretty good. [In  other] newly [developed] 
housing the environment or planning aren't inferior to this place, however 
there’s no human vibrancy... Over here I  guess that the reason that it has 
human vibrancy... is that there are many resettled households. After they 
came back, they already had familiar relationships among them, and so fo r  
those from the outside it became very easy to mingle with them, because when 
you got to know one person you got to know everyone. [Normally] in the 
commodity properties when you go in nobody knows anyone.
New resident (FI9), male, age 30s
On the other hand, many returnee families expressed a different view. They noted a 
significant decline in the quality of community relations as a result of redevelopment. 
Off-site relocation of almost half of the original residents had altered the existing 
social structure, and those that returned were not necessarily those initially known 
to one another. Many neighbourhood connections had inevitably been lost. The 
perceived decline in sense of community was also the result of moving into a 
different form of housing. Residents explained that different housing types 
engendered different ‘cultures’ of living. Lilong housing fostered greater frequency of 
interaction with immediate neighbours because it was unavoidable under multiple- 
family occupancy. In the new flats, residents found themselves living more 
autonomous lives. Neighbourly interactions declined as a result.
The thing is...the interactions between people, there is less and less of
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that...unlike before... Now everyone just closes their doors... so it seems that 
these relationships are, Ifeel, fading. It  has dissipated.
Returnee Resident (F7), male, age 30s
In shikumen housing...there was more contact with the neighbours. Now in 
this place everyone shuts their doors. In fact there's not much contact 
between neighbours. (In) shikumen housing, its advantage is that the 
neighbourly relations are better. Right? The quality, the quality o f the culture 
is different. So we say in Shanghai that shikumen have the culture of 
shikumen -  the basic culture is different.
Returnee Resident (FI7), male, age 60s
However, it is important to bear in mind that on the whole the returnee residents 
expressed that this was a project that genuinely benefited the ‘average citizens’ 
(laobaixing).
I f  the government really wanted to do something fo r the average citizens, then 
this approach would be completely feasible! ... I f  the government really 
wanted to think about [housing renewal] from this perspective, then there 
wouldn’t be any problems with the renewal o f old areas.
Resident (F4), male, age 50s
6.4.4 The role of quasi-governmental developers
Supporting community retention through subsidised sale to sitting tenants was a 
feature of the Housing Amenity Fulfilment programme in the 1990s, of which NFKL 
is one well-known example. Pleased with its overall outcomes, the local government 
designated NFKL as a ‘Showcase Community of Inner City Old Districts Renewal’. It 
is now frequently used as a demonstration project for many political delegations 
from abroad. However, due to its limited profit-potential, this approach to the 
renewal of lilong housing was not sustained into the New Round of Urban Renewal.
Instead, the approach was adapted towards the rehabilitation of large quantities of 
substandard staff housing -  mostly industrial-built workers’ flats dating to the 1950s 
and 1960s (see Chapter 4, section 4.4). Older but essentially structurally sound flats 
with shared kitchen and toilets were rehabilitated as self-contained units and then 
sold to sitting tenants at a discounted price. More than one thousand buildings were 
upgraded each year since 2000 (Law et al, 2009: 134). Local housing bureaux and 
quasi-governmental enterprises were still instrumental in delivering these projects.
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The scale of these schemes has grown substantially, and In 2006 alone a total of 56 
projects were initiated across the city. This covered a total floor area of 5.87 million 
m2 and affected about 95,000 households.22
The process and outcomes of projects like New Fukangli thus had much to do with 
the nature of quasi-governmental property enterprises such JPHG. To some extent 
acting as executive arms of the local housing bureaus for various policies and 
programmes, many undertook a mixture of commercial, profit-oriented as well as 
more socially-oriented functions including public housing management and 
affordable housing provision. Collaborations between these institutions constituted 
an important part of how local governments were able to test out, develop and 
implement programmes that were not necessarily profitable from a market- 
perspective.
JPHG was certainly not a unique example of such enterprises in Shanghai. Another 
example would be Yongye Group - formed in 1994 from the Luwan district 
government.23 It has since become one of the ‘backbone’ real estate development 
enterprises in the city. On the one hand, most of its work focused commercial 
properties and middle-or high end residential development, often through joint 
ventures with large foreign property investors. Yet other operations of the group 
included the management of public housing in Luwan district, and the construction 
of low-income housing. These were essential to help the government to extend 
housing opportunities for lower-income groups, and to ensure sufficient re-housing 
options in the market for the tens of thousands of relocated households each year. 
Another example would be Nanfang Group, which was formed out of the former 
district housing bureau of Nanshi district in 1996, with a registered capital of 1.5 
billion yuan.24 Apart from carrying out real estate development, it took over the 
former responsibilities of the local housing bureau in managing all 3.28 million m2 of 
public housing in Huangpu district. All these functions were deemed to important in 
addressing the deficiencies of the market. A manager of this enterprise aptly 
summarised the nature and role of these companies:
Like this enterprise o f ours, we are also not very emphatic o f profits (xiaoyi),
22 http://www.shfa.aov.cn:82/qate/bia5/www.shfa.aov.cn/fadoc/azcip/200910/t20091023 329636.html. 
Retrieved 1 December 2009.
23 See http://www.voneve.com.cn/. Last accessed 1 November 2009
24 See http://www.nf-window.com/. Last accessed 1 November 2009
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rather we emphasise completing the missions given by the government... Iam  
speaking very honestly. My work is about completing the missions given to me 
by the government.
The government will not support us economically... I t  also wouldn’t give us 
very significant economic pressure - to pursue so much... so much production 
value or however much profit.... However every year it gives us so goals, for 
example the renewal o f certain places, construction works in certain areas, 
servicing the citizens and so forth. So some o f the benefits we get from 
property development [would be spent] to do some things fo r the average 
citizens... because we are not yet private enterprises.
This is also a kind of making up for the market economy perhaps. Making up 
fo r the [deficiencies] o f the market economy...
Local authorities nevertheless had a complex relationship with these enterprises. 
While it could to some degree direct them to fulfil public agendas, it was also 
cautious about creating excessive burdens on their financial performance. Quasi- 
governmental property enterprises were often a significant direct contributor to 
government revenues or to the incomes of local officials (Duckett, 1998; Tang, 2003). 
Thus the government had an interest to ensure their strong financial performance, 
by offering them favourable policies and by not giving them excessive loss-making 
responsibilities. These considerations meant that there were always significant 
constraints to their ‘social role’, and why schemes such as NFKL has been pursued 
in a more circumscribed manner, in areas and projects that would not pose 
significant financial losses.
6.5 Conclusion
This chapter has scrutinised the policy and practice of Old Housing Amenity 
Fulfilment Renewal. This programme, which proliferated from the early 1990s, was 
premised on supporting community retention, offering existing households the right 
to ‘paid onsite resettlement’. The case study provided several important insights. 
One is that housing renewal in post-1990 Shanghai was sometimes socially- 
oriented. To some extent the government devised and implemented schemes which 
aimed to improve resident’s living conditions while minimising the cost of 
displacement. As seen in NFKL, these schemes had limited or even no profit 
potential for its developers, and relied on substantial public support. Local 
government’s continued influence over investment decisions of various quasi- 
governmental enterprises, and its discretion over the use of land and fiscal 
resources to shape urban development were critical ingredients underlying more 
socially-oriented outcomes in housing renewal. This finding challenges the often
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taken for granted view of the local government as paying no attention to balancing 
social and economic concerns, or that it uses housing renewal merely as a tool for 
promoting growth (Ren, 2008; Zhang and Fang, 2004; Zhang, 2002).
The case study nevertheless still confirmed the view that housing renewal in post- 
reform Shanghai was dominated by coalition of local government and property 
developers. While the local government was an important coordinator and facilitator 
of housing renewal through its policies and its control of land, property developers 
were critical partners in the design and implementation of housing renewal. The two 
sides were closely inter-linked, and the collaborative relationship was enduring, 
especially since many developers were formed out of local housing bureaux. Past or 
present local officials often occupied key positions within powerful state-owned 
enterprises. Local communities were always entirely excluded from decision making. 
Although in occasionally some of them were intended beneficiaries of favourable 
policies, decisions were made for them from above and they received very little 
information regarding what would occur in their neighbourhoods.
In explaining how socially-oriented housing renewal was carried out, the findings 
here challenge the prevailing interpretation of quasi-governmental enterprises being 
essentially commercially oriented actors in the growth coalition (Zhang and Fang, 
2004; Zhu, 1999). Quasi-governmental enterprises also sometimes played an 
important role complementing the market under bureaucratic command of the local 
government. Due to lingering administrative ties to the public sector, some of them 
were responsible for policies and projects with little or no profit-potential, but which 
address wider public objectives. This includes socially-oriented housing renewal, 
affordable housing construction, and public housing management. Conversely, the 
local government provided them with generous administrative as well as fiscal 
support. Together, this form of partnership wielded both political and financial power 
to orchestrate and execute large scale urban redevelopment, often to ‘commercial’ 
ends, but sometimes to social ends. This is an important, often neglected dimension 
in the rebuilding of neighbourhoods in post-reform China. It is an important part of 
how local governments could depart from purely business interest in urban 
development.
Amenity-fulfilment renewal constituted a model of ‘community retention’ that helped 
urban residents improve their housing conditions and achieve home-ownership in- 
place. As seen in NFKL, it produced some affordable housing for sitting tenants,
some market-rate housing, and therefore fostered a degree of social mix in targeted 
neighbourhoods. This often meant moderated or ‘low-level’ gentrification rather than 
full-scale displacement. Yet this approach can still be associated with some social 
costs. An overarching emphasis on privatisation, physical modernisation and 
market-oriented property development limited the degree to which the interests of 
low-income households could be properly safeguarded. In NFKL, although original 
residents were offered the right to on-site resettlement, almost half were relocated, 
making way for higher-income housing to cross-subsidise the development. Poor 
families and those with too little housing space to begin with often had little choice 
but to accept relocation. For them, compensation was sufficient to significantly 
improve their physical living conditions. However the replacement housing available 
to them occupied suburban locations that did not necessarily fit their preferences or 
needs.
So far, two contrasting case studied have demonstrated how the local government, 
in conjunction with different property developers, carried out speculative and more 
socially-oriented housing renewal projects. Both cases had illustrated a strong 
concern for physical modernisation, privatisation, and the dominance of a pattern of 
public-private collaboration. The next chapter examines a contrasting case, of how 
official interest in growth combined with societal interest in heritage to drive the 
market-led rehabilitation of a long-neglected neighbourhood.
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7 Rehabilitation of Taikang Road Tianzifang: A case 
of Piecemeal Gentrification
7.1 Introduction
Although demolition has been the predominant mode of intervention in the built 
environment since 1990, selective conservation of historic buildings and 
neighbourhoods became an explicit political concern of the local government by the 
2000s. This chapter examines the rehabilitation of Taikang Road Tianzifang 
neighbourhood -  one of the most renowned examples of ‘bottom-up’ housing 
conservation in China. It examines over a ten-year period how an area with little 
recognised conservation value came to be rehabilitated as a ‘creative industry 
cluster’ and tourism hotspot, dispelling government plans for demolition. It highlight 
the emerging role of some grass-roots actors in driving neighbourhood upgrading 
and gentrification, whose combined efforts can influence planning decisions and 
trigger a neighbourhood conservation movement. The findings sheds light on the 
possibility of ‘counter-dynamics’ to top-down planning and redevelopment in 
Shanghai, but also raises questions regarding its social implications.
7.2 From run-down neighbourhood to commercial ‘art-street*
7.2.1 Area context
Prior to its revitalisation, Taikang Road was a quiet and unspectacular street 
situated in an old area known as Dapuqiao, in the inner city district of Luwan. The 
area is conveniently located, within 20 minutes walk to Shanghai’s main commercial 
centre on Huaihai road. There are two universities, more than 20 high-schools, 
middle schools and elementary schools in the vicinities, offers a vibrant range of 
shops and services, and Ruijin Hospital -  one of the city’s best, is within a short 
walking distance.
Physically however, the Dapuqiao area was one of the grittier parts of the central 
city. One part of the area was characterised by shikumen, new style lilong and 
detached villas dating back between the 1910s and 1930s. The rest of the area was 
historically characterised by large quantities of informal housing and slums. Up to
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1949 almost half of the area’s residents were poor workers living in these slums. 
Industrial and residential developments were also intertwined throughout much of 
the area’s development. From the 1930s various small food, textile and equipment 
factories were built as insertions into the residential fabric, resulting in a 
constellation of ‘lane factories’- small-scale factories located in the residential lanes. 
By 1949 there were some 30 industrial enterprises operating on Taikang road alone, 
engaged in the production of a wide rage of products, including tobacco, fragrances, 
watches and plastics.
Into the 1980s and 1990s, Luwan district embarked on comprehensive urban 
development programme, and the Dapuqiao area was gradually transformed into a 
modern commercial and residential area. From the 1980s, larger, environmentally 
polluting industries were relocated towards new industrial districts in the city 
outskirts. In the climate of industrial re-organisation and increasing competition, 
many remaining industrial enterprises became redundant. Many premises were left 
vacant, and others were rented out to various small traders and small businesses. 
From 1992, with the reform of the land and housing markets, a new phase of urban 
redevelopment ensued, focusing on slum clearance. Through the land leasing 
mechanism and the attraction of private capital for property development, over
100,000 m2 of designated slums were redeveloped. By 2004, the area boasted 26 
new commercial office buildings totalling almost half a million m2 of floor space, and 
24 modern residential apartment clusters totalling over one million m2. Several 
municipal projects were also carried out in Dapuqiao area, with the expansion of 
major arterial road Xujiahui Road from 1993, the construction of Luwan District 
Sports Centre from 1994, and the creation of new landscaped parks (Dapuqiao 
Street Office website, 2005).
In the midst of this restructuring a substantial stock of old-style lilong housing 
nevertheless remained untouched (see figures 7.1, 7.2). Most of these were 
municipal housing, managed by the local housing bureau. Residents still paid very 
low rents, at around one yuan/ m2 per month in 2007. These often amounted to no 
more than two percent of household incomes. Public housing provided a stable and 
affordable environment for the residents, but physical conditions were relatively poor. 
After over 60 years of disinvestment, physical deterioration was apparent. Many 
households suffered from problems of damp and leaking.
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Figure 7.1: Old lilong housing around Taikang Road
Figure 7.2: The aged physical environment
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Figure 7.3: Atypical back lane and kitchen within
Lacking modernisation, most dwellings did not have internal sanitation facilities such 
as W.C and baths. Residents used chamber pots which had to be carried outside 
and emptied out throughout the day at a communal waste station. Residents mostly 
lived in crowded conditions. Almost every dwelling here was occupied by multiple 
families. A three-story lilong (approx. 150 m2) often accommodated up to six families. 
The majority had only one room of between 10 m2 to 25 m2, and seldom more. Not 
all houses had gas connections, and many relied gas cylinders for their daily 
cooking needs.
Alongside the deepening of housing reforms, this community has also experienced 
substantial social change. This entailed the out-migration of many better off families, 
working-age youth, and subsequent influx of rural migrants. With the emergence of 
more housing choice in the market, families and individuals that had the capacity to 
acquire better housing tended to do so. Interviewed residents estimated that in 
some of the lanes about one quarter of the original residents had moved away since 
1999. As a result of these movements, residents identified this as a community 
comprising mainly of retired pensioners, low income workers or business owners, 
and the unemployed.
After opening up and reforms, a lot o f  the younger lads -  those that started  
businesses by themselves out there -  after they made it they went out and 
bought houses... Over ten or so years, here about over 25 percent have all 
moved out.
Resident (T15), male, age 80s
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Figure 7.4: migrants selling produce in the lanes
Alongside outmigration of the better-off, there was also influx of numerous rural 
migrants and some relocated households from other parts of the city. New tenants 
were mostly migrant workers from rural areas. Many worked as service staff in the 
flourishing hotels, shops and restaurants in the inner city. Others were small traders, 
selling food and produce around the nearby market (figure 7.4). They tended to 
work long hours, returned home late at night. Many lived regular, quiet lives and 
their influx did not cause major social disturbances. However, migrants had different 
‘culture’ and living habits than the local residents, which became a potential source 
of friction. There was much apathy and little incentive for friendly interaction. 
Discontent arose relating to the use of various public or shared spaces and to their 
lower levels of cleanliness.
Many remaining households expressed the desire to leave and to live somewhere 
better, but they had no means of affording a move.
Those that live here the majority are elderly - elderly people! Furthermore, I  
tell you, the majority o f  those that live here are those that...at the moment, 
can ’t afford to buy houses. Those that can afford other p laces have gone!
These can ’t afford houses, so they ‘have to ’live here! They ‘have to ’live here!
Resident (T03), female, age 60 
Some looked forward to redevelopment a way of improving their housing conditions.
For the residents it is quite simple...The only way out would (be to) wait fo r  
the government redevelopment, fo r  relocation... Otherwise there aren’t any 
options.
Resident (TL2), male, age 60s
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Figure 7.5: Neighbours gathered around a card game outside
On the other there were those who had little inclinations to leave. Some felt 
attached to their homes for a variety of reasons. The location at Dapuqiao was 
conveniently located for access to work, to shopping, to schools and hospitals, and 
many were concerned that government relocation would mean displacement to very 
distant locations.
I f  you want the government [to relocate you] then it would be very far. Then 
going to the hospital would be inconvenient. In the city centre there are large 
hospitals, in the suburbs the hospitals are not convenient...The government 
can't solve [our problem]. The solution is being fa r  away...
Local resident (T21), female, age 60s
Residents also valued the familiarity of the environment. Many had lived in the same 
house for several decades. Despite the difficult conditions, residents were used to it, 
and many felt sentimental attachment to their homes. Community relations amongst 
the longer term residents were relatively positive. The community was a lively place 
filled with neighbourly exchanges including casual conversations, card games, and 
sharing of meal together. After decades of living together or growing up in the same 
community, long-term residents knew their neighbours well and there was plentiful 
interaction and mutual support:
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As soon as you opened the door you’d see neighbours... As soon as you 
opened the door it was all very familiar -  ‘Hello uncle Huang!’, Hello 
auntie Zhang!’ I t  was quite harmonious...This was a very good thing, you 
know?
Resident (TL7), male, age 60s
There are people around as soon as you come out... Open your door, go visit 
here and there...This was its characteristic. [ I f  you] didn’t see someone for  
two days -  ‘Eh! What’s happened to him, gotten sick or something? Oh! Went 
to the daughter’s house I  see ’-you  knew immediately...
Resident (TL4), male, age 60s
7.2.2 Forming a post-industrial Art-Street
In 1998, within the wider context of Dapuqiao area's changing functions into a 
middie-class residential and commercial area, the Dapuqiao Street Office (the sub- 
district) developed a proposal to revitalise the various industrial premises in Taikang 
Road for new uses. As the sub-district levels of administration, Street Offices are 
responsible to manage a wide range of services for local communities. Its 
responsibilities range from sanitation, maintenance of public spaces, community 
security, traffic control, to family planning, employment and labour force 
administration (Zhang, 2002b: 312-3). Street offices have also come to pay a 
significant role in local business development. They are often actively involved in 
setting up stores and shops in neighbourhoods, developing these into a wide range 
of commercial and industrial businesses, and even entering into joint ventures in 
small scaled real estate development (Wu, 2002; Friedmann, 2005).
The then director of the Dapuqiao Street Office was a leading advocate for 
revitalising Taikang Road. Borrowing ideas from his visits to areas such as Soho in 
New York, and commercial streets in Osaka, Japan, the specific idea emerged to 
utilise the old industrial buildings to create an art and commerce orientated 
'character street'. The concept was to acquire a collection of factories and 
warehouses and to convert them into a breeding ground art galleries, artist studios, 
craft workshops, boutiques as well as ancillary spaces such as cafes, bars, and 
teahouses. The goal was to create a cosmopolitan environment for artists, as well 
as a showcase for cultural production and consumption.
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With approval from the Luwan district government, the street office became 
responsible for the initiative, setting up the Taikang Road Art Street Management 
Committee as an executive body in 1999. Long term lease agreements with various 
enterprises owning the industrial premises were negotiated. Because these 
enterprises had mostly ceased their productive activities, they were keen to vacate 
the premises and to gain a stable rental income from the government. In this way 
the art-street management committee acquired the right to manage and sublet the 
premises for non-industrial uses. The aged and slightly dilapidated outward 
appearances of the industrial buildings were mostly conserved, but their internal 
spaces were cleared for conversion to studio and working spaces for creative firms 
and artists (figure 7.5). Tenants would be completely free to modify, design and re- 
appropriate the spaces into useable and individualised spaces.
Figure 7.6: Interior of one converted warehouse
The art street management was quick to find tenants for the acquired industrial 
buildings. The first tenant to settle in was the Chinese artist Chen Yifei - a friend of 
the management committee director. In August 1999, Chen took over a 700 m2 
warehouse and converted it into a studio for oil painting, sculpture, ceramics, and 
photography. Chen was by this time one of the most prominent contemporary artists 
from Shanghai. He rose to prominence in China's art world in the 1960s and 70s for 
a series of oil paintings depicting historical events, moved to and worked in New 
York in the 1980s and established an international reputation. Chen returned to 
Shanghai in the 1990s to eventually setting up a successful business empire, which 
included Shanghai Tatler magazine, the Layefe and Layefe fashion brands. He then
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became a powerful advocate and figure-head for the continued development of 
Taikang Road as a hub for the visual arts. Other tenants soon followed. In May 2000, 
Shunjii Cultural Arts Center, an art gallery, settled into two adjacent warehouses. 
Prominent architectural and landscape photographer Derek Erh acquired and 
settled into two adjacent warehouses in 2001, converting it into an art centre, 
including an exhibition and event space, cafe, bookshop and studio. The personal 
renown of Chen and Erh lent a certain ‘celebrity aura’ for the industrial spaces at 
Taikang Road, and attracted numerous followers to the previously neglected street.
Figure 7.7: Converted industrial buildings at Taikang Road
In 2001, the lane and its collection of industrial conversions was officially rebranded 
“Tianzifang”-  after an ancient Chinese painter. Largely through word of mouth in the 
cultural circle, and active promotion by the art-street committee, Tianzifang soon 
tapped into strong demand from a range of artists and creative enterprises, both 
foreign and local. After renovations by artists and designers, these industrial 
buildings soon came to be considered highly fashionable places for work, exhibition 
and cultural events. Taikang Road became a budding cultural hub with an 
increasingly international tenant profile as foreign creative enterprises that were well 
attuned to the notion of industrial warehouse conversions flocked to set up base 
here. By 2004, approximately 18,000 m2 of industrial buildings have been converted 
into artist’s workshops, design offices, art galleries, exhibition spaces and 
showrooms (figure 7.5). Tenants included more than 160 artists, creative design 
firms or individuals from 18 different countries including China, Australia, America, 
France, Denmark, England, Canada, Singapore and Japan.
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7.2.3 Revitalising lilong housing
As Taikang Road revitalised, it acquired emerging popular interest from visitors and 
other businesses. From October 2004 onwards, the conversion of lilong housing 
around the revitalised industrial spaces began to take place. An increasing flow of 
businesses wanted to situate their boutiques, art galleries, design offices and cafes 
in the up-coming lanes. They individually rented lilong housing from the local 
residents and gradually revitalised the residential lanes into a collection of upscale 
shops, cafes and art galleries, mostly orientated for tourists and affluent consumers. 
Between October 2004 and December 2006, the first 50 conversions had occurred, 
and by September 2008, over 300. Lilong housing became the target of market-led 
commercial gentrification (figure 7.8).
The early ‘pioneers’ that settled into the lanes were small art galleries, independent 
craft-based boutiques, or fashion and accessory shops. Many of the operators had 
backgrounds in the cultural industries, and had education, professional or business 
experience in art, fashion, and design. They were drawn to the area due to Taikang 
Road’s emerging reputation as an ‘art street’ and appreciated its unique cultural 
atmosphere. They began settling into the lilong housing the industrial buildings in 
the neighbourhood had become fully occupied, and realised the option of renting a 
space in lilong housing. Aside from the general cultural milieu, many appreciated the 
aesthetic character of lilong housing. There was a consensus that the architecture 
of lilong housing Was central to the identity of these lanes, and that it was important 
to preserve the ‘authentic’ character of the lilong housing whilst bringing new 
commercial use.
I t  is all ‘old colours and old scents’here you see... so people can on the one 
hand look at the architecture and so forth, and on the other hand [the] can 
browse the shops -  [it is] a different atmosphere! Like the big malls have the 
atmosphere o f the big malls...
Owner of Chinese fashion store
[This house was] run down and dilapidated... However... you know, I  quite 
like that kind offeeling... every house [had] those old timber doors ...The 
[feeling] was really especially, especially good! And then so I  thought I ’m 
going to set up here.
Owner of fashion and accessories shop
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Figure 7.8: Lilong housing after conversion
The physical and environmental changes they brought were apparent, offering an 
eclectic mix of art, craft, fashion, and other designer products from across the world, 
including China, Japan, Korea, Thailand, India, and New Zealand. The defining 
features of shikumen housing such as the aged brick walls, the heavy black-painted 
timber gates, and the internal wooden doors and shutters have remained. 
Nevertheless the interiors were redesigned and redecorated to match the highly 
individualised and expressive content of the businesses. Some opted for sleek 
modern interiors that contrasted with the exterior fabric. Some retained and 
emphasised the traditional and Chinese character. Others emphasised alternative 
regional characteristics. It all contributed to a new cosmopolitan identity (figure 7.9).
The process of rehabilitation was also selective from the outset. Businesses 
targeted mainly the ground-floor spaces which were more conducive as commercial 
premises and possessed aesthetic frontages. In contrast, there was relatively little 
interest in the upper floor premises where many families also lived. Thus, what 
emerged was an unusual mixed-use scenario where commercial spaces took the 
ground floor while upper floor spaces continued to be inhabited by original residents 
who did not have the same opportunities for rental. Visitors to the area could 
wander the intimate lanes, experience the historic architecture, and browse 
designer items and artworks, while simultaneously getting a sense of the local way 
of life.
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Figure 7.9: Interior of a renovated fashion store
Adaptive reuse of the historic residential spaces provided an unusual environment, 
and came to attract growing numbers of visitors and tourists from abroad (figure 
7.10). An article in the New York Times Asia called the transforming 248 lane "a 
high-fashion lane in Shanghai", “where the restoration of old buildings has created a 
chic shopping district” (The New York Times, 2007, March 4). By 2008, as many as 
6,000 visitors walk Taikang Road's converted lanes in a single weekend (China 
Daily, 18 February, 2008). Visitors could brose from a variety of Chinese artworks on 
display as well as unusual items like Japanese kimonos, German-designed jewellery, 
soft furnishings made from Tibetan fabric, or designer candles and perfumes 
imported from France. There were Chinese tea-houses, a Japanese teahouse and 
restaurant, while more recently a number of western-style cafes and patisseries 
opened up. At the same time, the shikumen lilong was said to possess an air of 
‘authenticity’ in that the original characteristics of the housing was still clearly 
recognisable. The area now has an online review by the international tourism guide 
Lonely Planet:
This warren o f  shikumen architecture offers tranquil doses o f  genuine charm.
A community o f  art galleries, studios, pocket-sized WI-FI cafes, petite  shops 
and boutiques - the perfect antidote to Shanghai's oversized malls and 
intimidating skyscrapers.25
25 http://www.lonelyplanet.com/china/shanghai/sights/369197. Last accessed 28 September 2009
249
Figure 7.10: Visitors browsing shops in converted lane
This was all an informal process enacted by individuals. Local residents were key 
agents of change, as actual ‘suppliers’ of housing space for business conversion. 
Their participation was based on the desire to capitalise on the value of their 
properties as informal landlords, and the opportunities that this gave them to 
enhance their living conditions. In 2004, a retired local resident was the first to 
capitalise opportunities of informal rental. Witnessing the transformation of nearby 
industrial buildings into highly sought after properties, he had the idea to convert his 
33 m2 home into shop to augment his low retirement incomes of 600 yuan/month. 
On completion of some modest renovation, a visiting fashion designer made a 
surprisingly lucrative offer to rent and use the space for a showroom. Previously, the 
house may have only been worth 800-1000 yuan/ month as rental housing in the 
market. However, with the cultural appeal of Taikang Road then emerging, rent was 
agreed at the price of 3,500 yuan per month. The resident thus agreed to move out 
of the space to capitalise on the opportunity. With the new income he sub-let a 
vacant room from a neighbour for 1,000 yuan/month, and was able to gain a 2,500 
yuan monthly surplus income. (Official attitudes to these speculative activities in 
public housing will be discussed in later sections.)
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Figure 7.11: Lettings notice board used by residents at Taikang Road
Table 7.1: Sample of rental contracts signed in June-August 2006
Size of space let 
(m2)
Monthly rent (yuan) Rent/ m2/ day Duration (Years)
1 62.5 8,000 4.3 3
2 35 5,000 4.8 5
3 12.3
(+ mezzanine 8.8)
3,000,
+ 12% yearly after 6th year
4.7 8
4 6.1 1,500,
+ 12% yearly after 6th year
8.2 8
5 7.73 1,800,
+ 10% yearly after 4th year
7.8 8
6 13
(+ mezzanine 7.5)
3,300,
+ 5% yearly after 4th year
5.4 8
7 33 5,600 5.7 3
8 30 4,500 5 2
9 25 3,500 first year, 4000 second 
year, 4500 thereafter
4.7-6.0 5
10 50.2 6,000 4.0 2
11 34 6,000 5.9 3
12 21.4 4,300 6.7 3
13 36 6,000 5.6 3
14 32.7 5,500 5.6 3
Note: n.a. means the information was not available; Source: author’s fieldwork
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After the first conversion, other businesses and residents followed suit. One by one, 
businesses approached households in the lanes for spaces to rent and convert. 
Subsequently, prices continued to increase. Table 7.1 demonstrates a sample of 14 
rental agreements signed between June and August 2006. It can be seen from this 
incomplete sample that the spaces being rented were relatively small, ranging from 
6 -  62.5 m2. Typically, the duration of the lease agreements ranged from two to 
eight years. Total monthly rents varied from 1,500 yuan for a 6 m2 space, to 8,000 
yuan for the largest space of 62.5 m2. Rental rates achieved varied between 4.3 up 
to 8.5 yuan/ m2/ day, which was in fact significantly higher than normal commercial 
properties in the inner city.
Upon signing the lease, residents could also expect to be paid earnest money plus 
the first months of rent, which could total more than 30,000 yuan. This was a very 
considerable income. In sum, by mid- 2006, rents for a 25-30 m2 space had 
reached around 4,000-5,000 yuan per month (about US$ 500), and by late 2007 as 
much as 8,000 yuan per month. The Street Office and art-street management 
committee was at first not involved with the issue of housing renewal, but saw these 
developments as a positive continuation of their efforts in forging a cultural and 
commerce oriented cluster.
Table 7.2: Rental housing price in Shanghai, 2006
Housing type and location Monthly rent (yuan)
2 bedroom flat, City average price 2,227
1 bedroom flat, City average price 1,884
2 bedroom flat, Minhang district 1,776
1 bedroom flat, JingAn district 2,557
2 bedroom flat, Luwan district 2,806
Source: Real estate website sofun.com, for the month of December 2006
Commercial lettings facilitated a process of voluntary relocation for those that 
previously had little housing choice. By subletting their public housing at Taikang 
Road to businesses, residents could move into better housing in the private rental 
market, where they had considerable choices in terms of housing type, size as well 
as location. Table 7.2 demonstrates the average private rental prices for one and 
two-bedroom flats in different parts of the city in 2006. Average rental price for a 
self-sufficient two-bedroom flat overall was 2,227 yuan, which was well within the
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commercial rents at Taikang Road. A two-bedroom unit in Luwan district, where 
Taikang Road was located, was a little more than 2,800 yuan/month. This meant 
that residents could also choose to resettle relatively nearby.
Due to the lucrative outcomes, many local residents became keen to let out 
whatever space they had. Most were very small living spaces of 25 or 30 m2-ju s t  
enough for a very small boutique or showroom. Residents demonstrated 
considerable organisational capacity to take advantage of the emerging commercial 
opportunities as market demand for their homes became apparent. A few newly 
turned ‘landlords’ organised themselves to form an informal ‘shikumen landlord 
committee’ that then helped facilitate the letting process. They set up an office which 
became a point of contact and bridging service between local residents and 
prospective tenants. Local residents with intent to let could post details at the office, 
which would help introduce them to prospective tenants. Nevertheless, the contract 
negotiation process was always conducted one-to-one between the relevant 
household and the prospective tenants.
7.3 Negotiating the neighbourhood rehabilitation vision
Although the rehabilitation of lilong housing was enacted as a decentralised process, 
changes in the neighbourhood could not have occurred without the consent of local 
officials and ultimately the local government. Negotiations amongst local officials 
regarding the future of the area were eventually crucial in determining its future. 
This section thus turns to the role of various tiers of the local government and the 
politics which underpinned the continued development of Taikang Road Tianzifang.
7.3.1 The support of the sub-district
Formally, although residents of public housing had the right to sublet their properties 
for residential use, use conversion and speculation was illegal. Thus in reality, the 
‘bottom-up’ process of revitalisation was able to proceed because local authorities 
from the start turned a blind-eye to its illegality.
To be honest... this cannot be separated from the support o f the government.
Without the support o f the government, without the support o f the leaders, 
there was no way you could have opened up [these shops].
Resident (TL1), male, age 60s
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Officials within the Dapuqiao Street Office and Taikang Road Management 
committee were from the start highly supportive, not only because this process 
enabled the expansion of the commercial milieu of Taikang Road, but because they 
also perceived the model of development to benefit local residents:
[There are] no arguments or conflicts, [this is] 'harmonious society', 
equalising the rich and poor.... So this is a positive cycle... in fact citizens got 
employment, old housing is conserved, the original residents' lives are 
improved - there are benefits on multiple dimensions...
Manager of the art street management committee
You’ve developed the ‘social co-operation’ o f contemporary societies -  
‘public participation ’ -  a kind o f concept o f contemporary societies, right?
This is a kind of path o f ‘harmonious development’ that every country ought 
to pursue.
Former administrative head o f the Dapuqiao Street office
These administrators saw the future of Taikang Road as becoming a unique mixed- 
use district combining renovated historic buildings, art-galleries, studio workshops 
and commercial activities, and saw their interests aligned with local residents. In fact 
they began to assist the housing rehabilitation process by encouraging local 
residents and putting forth some investment for the environmental improvements to 
the lanes -  including new paving, street furniture and lighting -aimed to turn it into a 
more visitor friendly environment. None of the renovation works were required to go 
though formal planning application procedures and none of the businesses had 
approved operating business licenses. The absence of government regulation 
created a relatively favourable climate for business investment. Incoming 
businesses enjoyed the benefits of an unofficial tax break and the freedom to rent 
and renovate public housing at will.
7.3.2 The district's demolition plan
However, there was no easy consensus over time. At the higher level the Luwan 
district government eventually advocated a competing vision for the area, which 
ultimately led to a battle for conservation. Luwan district saw its priorities in urban 
regeneration in terms of promoting real estate development. Under plans for the 
period 2001~2010, it planned to remake Dapuqiao sub-district into a commercial 
centre and a modern residential area. The focus was three pronged -  including the 
expansion of business services, recreational services, and modern residential
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developments. Property-led redevelopment through the extraction of land value was 
cited as one of the main strategies for achieving these objectives. The explicit target 
was to redevelop a total of 700,000 m2 of the existing building stock, and to 
accelerate the development of modern commercial facilities - including large scale 
shopping malls, mixed use commercial facilities, as well as modern residential 
buildings.
In March of 2004, the District Government accordingly announced plans to 
redevelop the area including Taikang Road. Proceedings for land leasing to a 
Taiwanese property developer were initiated, and notice of impending demolition 
was posted. Taikang Road Art Street, it seemed, would be redeveloped into a luxury 
residential complex comprising four high-rise apartments. According to municipal 
transport planning, a new metro station was to be built over the next few years 
across the road, and would form a major transport node accompanied by new 
commercial development. All of the occupants in the area were informed of 
impending relocation. Clearly, this meant a clash of vision, in which conservation 
was pitted against real estate development.
The concepts were not unified. At the time in Luwan district those o f 
leadership positions ...of the decision making level...their main concept was 
to do real estate, [and they thought] doing this has no value!
Former administrative head of the Dapuqiao Street Office
The demolition notice had different repercussions. Some of the local residents were 
anxious for relocation to take place. Others were concerned about losing their city- 
centre homes. Ultimately however the stakeholders understood that the municipal 
and district governments will be the decision makers who have the authority to 
determine the future of the area.
But in the end, the government...this is the government’s affair... What it is 
exactly in the end, we have no power. What we say don’t count you see, to 
speakfrankly.
Local resident (TL5), male, age 50s
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7.3.3 A neighbourhood conservation movement
Faced with the prospect of demolition, the artists, designers and businesses, and 
the Art Street Management Committee were proactive in organising themselves to 
voice dissent. At first, 17 expatriate studio owners in the street wrote a letter to the 
Municipal Urban Planning Bureau, calling on the officials to save the art street. 
“Beginning in 2000, we started to gather on this street to create art”, the letter said. 
“If it is demolished, there will never be another road like this. Shanghai will lose a 
piece of its history” (Shanghai Daily, 2004, 31 March). However, these small 
businesses had little effective influence on decisions of the local government.
Also threatened by the redevelopment plans were the Street Office officials and the 
Art Street Management Committee who instigated the vision of Taikang Road as an 
art cluster and hoped to ensure its survival. In order to protect their own vision, they 
were intent to mobilise their own institutional resources to negotiate with the district 
government and to persuade it to changes its plans. One of the first allies they 
sought was the National Economics Institute (NEI) of the Shanghai Academy of 
Social Sciences. The academy is China’s second largest institution for the 
humanities and social sciences. It is administered and mostly funded by the 
Municipal Government of Shanghai, and functions as a leading think-tank for 
government. Due to its close links with government, its leading scholars occupy 
influential positions.
The NEI was commissioned to produce a report highlighting the cultural as well as 
economic value of Taikang Road and to make a case for its conservation. The 
director the National Economics Institute was a renowned local academic, a 
member of the tenth National People’s Congress and the deputy director of the 
eleventh Shanghai People’s Congress Standing Committee. He has been an 
influential consultant for the Shanghai Municipal Government. Thus it was 
calculated that his political status might help lend weight to the conservation 
campaign.
With the help of the NEI, it was decided that Tianzifang would be marketed as a 
‘creative industry cluster’ -  a concept drawn from recent economic policies from the 
UK and Australia, denoting a geographical concentration of individuals and 
enterprises centred on the creative sectors of the economy. Previously unknown to 
Chinese policy, the concepts of 'creative industries' and 'creative industry cluster'
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became the central rhetoric underlying the conservation campaign. This NEI report - 
“Proactive nurturing and support for the development of the Cultural Industries, and 
increasing Shanghai’s composite urban competitiveness: the case of Taikang Road 
Creative Industry Cluster” (NEI, 2004) became an landmark document which not 
only highlighted the economic and cultural significance of an industrial cluster like 
Taikang Road, but set out the development of the creative industries as a critical 
economic development strategy for the city.
Borrowing from a range of literature and policy documents from advanced Western 
nations, the report introduced and defined the foreign concept of Creative Industries 
as an important and growing economic sector of the advanced nations in the 
knowledge-intensive world economy:
Entering the knowledge economy, the rapid growth of the creative industries 
has become a pronounced trend in the industrial development o f advanced 
countries and regions. Furthermore, with increasing globalisation, the 
creative industries, which have the cultural industries as the core, has 
become an important indicator o f a city's level of composite competitiveness.
It then overviewed the embryonic status of the creative industries in Shanghai 
(notably in the cultural industries), and emphasised the development of the creative 
industries as being congruent and beneficial to the city’s economic agendas. Then, 
the study presented Taikang Road as “The largest and most influential site of the 
development of Creative Industries in Shanghai”. It was described as a unique 
landmark of Shanghai's cosmopolitan culture, and as a valuable tourism and 
recreational destination. The cultural value of the built environment at Taikang Road 
was also emphasised, argued to be conducive to the continued development of the 
creative sectors as well as leisure and tourism functions.
In fact Taikang Road Art Street has become renowned throughout Shanghai 
as a... fashionable and leisure tourism location which fuses together history 
and modernity and possesses the cosmopolitan character mingling Chinese 
and Western cultures (ibid: 11-12).
Taikang Road...possesses both Shanghai’s unique Shikumen (lilong) 
residences, as well has having preserved various contemporary industrial 
architecture. Thus, whether in terms o f architectural character or the living 
environment it possesses deep layers o f history and cultural underpinnings.
Thus, couched on the banner of the ‘creative industries’, the street office and the 
NEI developed a discourse regarding the city-wide significance of Taikang Road as
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an icon of Shanghai’s emerging creative economy and cosmopolitan culture. The 
local media was also engaged to promote these ideas. A string of articles in local 
newspapers followed (in Chinese):
• Wenhui News (2005, 4 September) ran the title "Culture facilitates the re­
awakening of shikumen: The new experiment of Taikang Road residences in 
restoring character, and continuing heritage".
• Xinming Evening News (2005, 22 August) highlighted the transformation of 
Taikang Road buildings as: "A new model in which conserving historic 
character, enhancing the living environment, developing the creative 
industries occurring in harmony is born here".
• Laodong Daily (2006, 20 May) ran a feature article describing in sensational 
terms how "foreign artists are anxiously queuing up" to settle down in the 
lane houses and industrial premises in Taikang Road.
The art-street management committee also developed a conservation planning 
proposal for the neighbourhood by eliciting the help a distinguished professor in the 
College of Architecture and Urban Planning at Tongji University. The plan, entitled 
“Planning Proposal for the Conservation and Re-use of Taikang Road Historic 
Character Area” identified the 7.2 hectare area around Taikang Road as being an 
outstanding show-case of Shanghai’s early 20th century architecture -  
encompassing the iconic lane-based fabric of lilong housing, industrial heritage, as 
well as large numbers of historic villas. The vision for the area was for it to become 
a mixed-use area comprising residential, creative industries, leisure and commercial 
functions. The plan was submitted to the People’s Congress for consideration, with 
the recommendation that the entire area be officially designated as Shanghai’s 13th 
historic conservation area.
These ideas were widely disseminated through the media, throughout local 
academia and to the government. It soon found considerable support from local 
academics in the economic, urban planning and architectural fields. Critical to this 
process was the hosting of the “Shanghai Cultural Creative Industries Development 
Symposium”, held on 24 April 2004, at Taikang Road. The event was jointly held by 
the Taikang Road Art Street Management Committee, the Shanghai Academy of 
Social Sciences, Shifan University School of Fine Art, Wenhui Newspaper, as well 
as M50 -  another emerging ‘creative industry cluster’ in Shanghai. Participants to
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the symposium included representatives from major newspapers in Shanghai, 
prominent cultural sector professionals, local academics from economics, 
architecture and urban planning backgrounds, as well as government officials at 
district and municipal levels. All in all, there was strong representation amongst the 
political, intellectual, and cultural elite in the city.
7.3.4 Reaching a consensus on conservation
Through the dissemination of these ideas, and continued discussions within 
government, increasing awareness of the value of Taikang Road was established. In 
March 2004, the Deputy Director of the Municipal Urban Planning Bureau 
announced to the press that the Shanghai Municipal Government will intervene on 
the issue, although no formal decisions have been made. In September 2004, it 
announced that the existing art-related premises would be preserved in order to 
facilitate the formation of a ‘cultural street’ (Shanghai Daily, 21 September 2004; 
China Eastday, 27 September 2004).
With substantial press and official attention, many local as well as national public 
officials visited Taikang Road to witness it as an icon of not only a new culture- plus 
economic development strategy, but of a model of market-led development process 
of renewal involving no government capital input and voluntary relocation of 
residents. A formal visit by the Party Secretary of Shanghai further signalled that the 
area had gained considerable official recognition.
It is important to note that historic conservation was by this time seen as an 
important issue by the municipal government. Places such as Taikang Road had 
obvious value as a tourism hotspot. Since the 1990s, Shanghai has made efforts to 
develop the city tourism economy featuring the three themes of "city scenery", "city 
culture", and "city commerce", in which cultural heritage sites played a prominent 
part (Shanghai Municipal Tourism Administration, 2007).
Another important reason for accepting the conservation cause was that the 
municipal government was highly receptive to the potentials of the creative 
industries as a direction for economic development. Following the work of the 
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, the ‘Creative Industries’ was formally 
incorporated as a component of Shanghai’s 11th five year economic development 
plan -  for the first time in China. The municipal government formally designated
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Taikang Road as a ‘Creative Industry Cluster’, and established a Creative Industries 
Centre to help promote research and development of more creative industry cluster 
districts in Shanghai. Industrial building conversion was announced as being central 
to the future development of creative industries in Shanghai, and in 2004 alone, a 
total of 18 clusters of creative firms or artist colonies across the city (mostly 
industrial space conversions) were designated. Ideas were changing. The former 
administrative head of Dapuqiao street office stated that:
I  tell you now... the vast majority [o f government officials], have understood 
it already. Those who opposed it before all think it is correct... Perhaps what 
the leaders are most impressed by is [that]... this industry type is good, this 
kind of utilisation o f space is good, and that the method o f realisation is good.
The Luwan District government announced in April 2008 that it would invest 10 
million yuan (US$ 1.46 million) to upgrade and maintain public facilities in the 
popular area (Shanghai Municipal Government, 22 August 2008). According to the 
the art street management committee, the number of converted residences is 
expected to reach more than 700 by 2011 as the process expands west towards the 
neighbouring Ruijin Road. By then, the total floor area of the stores is expected to 
reach 75,000 square meters, making it the largest area of converted shikumen lilong 
housing in Shanghai (China Pictorial, March 4, 2009). Although a formal 
conservation plan has not yet been approved, preliminary planning work was being 
carried out by the municipal urban planning bureau to guide its future development.
7.4 Uneven social consequences
The above discussions demonstrated that a bottom-up conservation dynamic, 
media coverage and negotiations amongst various tiers of the local government 
made possible a profound change of strategy from demolition to conservation. In 
Shanghai this has been a rare case of effective opposition to the redevelopment- 
based growth-strategy. However, the benefits and costs of this conservation 
movement were actually unevenly distributed. This section analyses the 
experiences of different residents affected by the processes of change at Taikang 
Road. Although the process benefited many residents, by supporting 
commercialisation of the neighbourhood the government has also neglected the 
interests of others.
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7.4.1 Capital gain and voluntary relocation
One segment of the local residents can be identified as winners in the process. By 
becoming informal landlords, many local residents profited from the revitalisation 
process. With the inflated rental income residents could easily afford better housing 
in the private rental market. Many spent in the order of 1,500~2,000 yuan/month to 
privately rent a small two bedroom flat between of 60~70 m2, saving the rest as 
surplus income. Some chose to settle close to their original neighbourhoods - 
enjoying access to the same living amenities and in the familiar environment. Others 
also moved into larger apartments in less central locations such Pudong and 
Yangpu districts. After the move, these residents enjoyed improvement in the 
standards of living. Being able to bath at will, having an indoor toilet and having 
enough space to accommodate families or visitors were considered major gains for 
all the residents.
Now [we have] two rooms. Originally it was shikumen housing... there was 
no ...toiletfor example... Originally we were using... the gas cylinder... Now 
there is gas here. Furthermore ...at least there is a shower... Bathing...has 
become convenient! Life — in fact fo r us average citizens, i f  life can... take a 
step up, then we feel satisfied...
Former resident (TL4), after moving into a larger flat
In moving from their original homes, they did however make some compromises. 
Those who moved further out towards the suburbs experienced some 
inconveniences of longer travelling time to get to shops and services, and lower 
standard of service -  in particular healthcare. Many also found their new living 
environments in flats and apartments more alienated from neighbours. Improved 
privacy was a plus, but households kept to themselves and rarely interacted. It was 
difficult to get to know anyone and the sense of mutual-care amongst old 
neighbours had all but disappeared.
The people, the people's relations are not as good as in Taikang Road. 
Taikang road, because it was old housing... there’s people as soon as you 
come out. Neighbours and neighbours deal with each other more... Over 
here... all [the flats are] closed offfrom one another. The neighbours just nod 
a little, say hi. They don’t visit, or whatever. This is the place o f distinction. In 
the old house there'd be so-and-so playing chess and so on...it is 
more...more...everyone’s relations were closer.
Former resident (TL4), male, age 60s
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All the interviewed landlords were however overall satisfied or very satisfied with 
their moves. Beyond voluntary opportunity to move into better housing, they enjoyed 
the benefits of additional income. This helped resolve the economic hardship they 
may have experienced previously whether due to retirement, unemployment, or low 
job status. They set aside the remainder of the rent for their living expenses, better 
diets, for medical care, children’s education, or to save towards buying their own 
house in the future. For some, this economic gain was a life-changing experience.
I t  is an indescribable feeling it seems... For me, I  had 600 yuan a 
month...how could [ I  have] continued making a living, right? Couldn’t 
continue living... Like this has improved my life, and also improved the 
housing problems o f other people, these are all very good, fo r the individual, 
right?
Former resident (TL6), male, age 60s
After I  got the 6,000 yuan [rent] I  moved into a high-rise house fo r a rent o f 
1500 yuan. A two bedroom [unit], fo r 1,500 yuan, and there was still 4500 
yuan (left). With 4,500 yuan that now covers the expenses in Shanghai, and 
thing are more comfortable.
Former resident (TL5), male, age 50s
Beyond the individual gains they experienced, some residents also highlighted the 
wider significance of heritage conservation for Shanghai. Resettled residents felt 
that they were playing a positive part in safeguarding heritage for future generations 
as well as promoting local culture to visitors. Clearly, the relatively unique process of 
commercial gentrification facilitated a novel approach to the conservation of 
shikumen lilong housing, an issue so far neglected by the wider development and 
urban planning policy. Given the conservation of their original homes and tenancy 
rights, most still felt strongly attached to their former homes, expressing positive 
sentiments towards them. Some expect one day to move back into them.
Accruing tangible benefits from the process, these newly turned landlords 
expressed strong support for the continued commercialisation of Taikang Road 
Tianzifang. Many argued that the model of development benefits ‘everyone’ - 
offering residents a chance for improving their lives, as a rare opportunity to 
conserve shikumen housing for prosperity, for allowing the area to flourish as a 
cultural tourism destination, and as a new approach to the development of historic 
areas:
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The key is that everyone wins. The government wins, we also gain, and the 
person...doing business they of course will need some profits....Every one 
receives benefits, so then this thing can be accomplished well, right?
Former resident (TL1), male, age 60s
7.4.2 Displacement of rural migrants
For other remaining residents however, the experience was sometimes different. 
One of the groups negatively affected by commercial gentrification were rural 
migrants. Different to the formal public tenants, migrants had no formal tenancy 
rights and had come to occupy lilong housing though private renting since the 1990s. 
By the time gentrification started to take off at Taikang Road they represented a 
significant minority group.
Prior to the rehabilitation process, a room of 25-30 m2 in this community could be 
rented for around 1,000-1,500 yuan/month. However, with rising rents and shifting 
demand, migrants began to face the pressure of displacement. In order to maximise 
their rental returns, local residents (i.e. holders of public tenancy rights) increasingly 
sought to rent their premises to businesses rather than migrants. In such a context, 
ah existing rental agreements run their course, it appeared that they will have little 
choice but to seek housing in cheaper locations. Although this process was 
occurring only gradually, their lack of formal property rights meant that migrants had 
little protection from changes in the market.
7.4.3 Conflict with existing residents
Because rehabilitation did not involve formal tenure restructuring or involuntary 
relocation procedures, there was no immediate risk of displacement for official 
public tenants or owners. Existing tenancy rights were preserved and these 
residents were free to exercise the choice to stay in place. Families with elderly 
members and for those who felt satisfied with their existing living conditions often 
decided to remain in place. Key reasons to remain in place included a sense of 
familiarity and sentimental attachment to where they lived, or a degree of 
dependence on local shops and hospitals:
What I  wish is to stay here... The Ruijing Hospital is very close, and the city’s 
shopping environment is also very good... Living here is quite comfortable.
My home is on the second floor, with a balcony, it is quite good. I f  I  am forced
to move, then I ’d have no choice but to move. Now that no-one forces to me 
I ’d continue to live here.
Local resident, male, age 80s
However, gentrification was not necessarily beneficial for all of them. These 
residents continued to live in basic conditions, without sanitation, in over-crowded 
condition. While some were content with the status quo of their living conditions, 
others still wished to leave but because they occupied spaces with limited 
commercial demand, they could not. Some had looked forward to undergoing 
demolition and relocation when word was released a few years ago, and were 
disappointed to find today that the area was apparently being conserved with 
unclear prospects for relocation. Some of these residents felt ‘trapped’ in 
substandard housing, with options closing in on them. Others expressed the wish 
that the government could help address their lack of space, WC, bath, or even gas 
connections through residential rehabilitation.
Although many admitted that renovation improved the image and cleanliness of their 
lanes, others felt that their homes were no longer ‘peaceful’ places to live. The 
conversion of an established residential area into a commercially orientated 
destination shifted the utility of these places towards businesses and consumers. 
Increasing noise from the outdoor cafes and bars, visitor flows, and the noise of 
incessant renovation work became a part of the daily life. Other conflicts between 
residents and businesses unfolded.
Businesses soon filled up the lanes with outdoor tables, seating and displays, and 
so residents lost out on the use of lanes as communal recreational spaces. To some 
remaining residents, those on the ground floor that, have let out their units at very 
high prices were 'liberated'; businesses were seen to have benefited from the 
conversion process, and have little respect or regard for the interests of the existing 
residents. Those who remain have no apparent prospect of benefiting and must 
bear the deterioration of their living amenities.
Now that this happened, those that have rented out the housing they’ve been 
liberated’. The businesses can now profit on this plot o f lane, right? And as 
fo r the [ remaining]  residents? There’s nothing. What is generated are noise 
and disturbance.
Resident (T9), male, age 60s
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This is not a commercial street! This is a residential area. It's not 
appropriate... completely inappropriate! It does not f i t  the requirements o f  us 
residents.
Resident (T7), male, age 70s
Thus, commercially-oriented housing rehabilitation had uneven social implications. 
While government, businesses and a many local residents looked to exploit the built 
environment for cultural and economic gain, their actions to some extent conflicted 
with those who were still reliant on the lilong as housing. Nevertheless, with 
government support for continued commercialisation, local authorities did not 
respond to their complaints. Remaining residents became a marginal group and 
their opinions have been systematically excluded from media coverage and official 
discussions regarding Taikang Road:
Where can the citizens go and voice their complaints? No-one...not a single 
governmental...official...listens to the opinions o f  the average citizen... So we 
don ’t have any place to say things.
Resident (T7), male, age 70s
Figure 7.12: Visitors crowding the former residential lanes
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7.5 Conclusion: Grassroots matter
Grassroots activism and resistance to urban redevelopment are important 
components of urban politics in liberal democracies - but they have so far been 
sporadic and remained poorly understood in the Chinese context. This unusual case 
study showed, over a period of about ten years, how an informal coalition of grass 
roots actors, local officials, the media and local institutions came to drive a 
neighbourhood conservation movement, dispelling higher-level plans for 
redevelopment. These actors were united by the idea that the conservation and 
rehabilitation (rather than demolition) of Taikang Road Tianzifang was economically, 
culturally and even socially beneficial for the city. It presented a powerful example of 
local opposition to redevelopment which successfully demanded changes to official 
plans.
These findings challenge the monolithic conception of housing renewal being 
necessarily determined in a top-down fashion by the growth coalition. The 
processes were more decentralised, more flexible and more informal than 
commonly depicted. The street-office (sub-district) was a key catalyst in this case. 
Acting as a proactive entrepreneur within its administrative means, it acquired and 
managed old industrial properties to attract artists and creative firms, and somewhat 
unintentionally kicked off the first stage of ‘commercial gentrification’. The resulting 
cultural presence transformed the image of the previously neglected area, and 
initiated a process of rehabilitation by other artists, designers, and small businesses. 
Soaring property values, speculative behaviour, and progressive erosion of the 
neighbourhood’s role as low-cost sites of production and housing ensued. Under 
individual activism, and limited government regulations, the area became a budding 
commercial and ‘creativity industry cluster’ characterised by hundreds of creative 
studios, art galleries, boutiques, restaurants and cafes.
Unlike the case in developed countries, the participation of the grassroots in 
neighbourhood rehabilitation is not commonplace nor promoted by urban policy in 
China. In fact, there remains an absence of policies promoting individual housing 
rehabilitation. Nevertheless, a key implication of this case study is that although 
grass-roots actors do not play a significant role in the Chinese city, some are 
becoming more active than others. It demands a view of urban politics which pays 
attention not only to the decisions of elites, but also to a plethora of lower level
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actors and to how local institutions respond and interact with grass roots activities.
The urban realm is increasingly plural. Outside of the core coalition of property 
development enterprises and local governments a segment of the grass roots 
sometimes yield sufficient ingenuity and resources to themselves lead the 
reinvestment processes of neighbourhoods. Notably, these included various middle 
class entrepreneurs, the creative class and residents in privileged positions. This is 
rather in line with international experiences of market-led gentrification (Ley, 1996; 
Zukin, 1982; Hackworth and Smith 2000).
Intriguingly, the case study suggests that even in China their combined activities can 
comprise a strong force of neighbourhood change, especially when they provoke 
support from public officials, the media and the wider society. The local government 
may support their activities where the reinvestment process taking place is seen to 
be of value for urban growth and for heritage conservation. Thus, although grass­
roots power is weak and not institutionally supported a consistent way, it can 
potentially influence planning and policy decisions or at least trigger significant 
public debate. This issue has been so far neglected by the growth-coalition 
perspective, which pays limited attention to the role of non-elite actors.
Yet, all this was still different to political pluralism. The local government was still the 
key actor which held overwhelming power over land use and planning. 
Rehabilitation of dilapidated housing remained a contested issue in urban 
development and involved substantial negotiation amongst different tiers of the local 
government. In this case sub-district officials had different visions to the district 
government. To secure its visions, it had to lobby hard for the support of higher level 
officials from, in conjunction with the local media and politically endowed local 
institutions such as the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. Together, they made 
a successful case for preserving Taikang Road. Since then, the municipal 
government made the ultimate decision for conservation. It provided formal 
recognition and support of ‘creative industry clusters’, and allowed a process of 
illegal lettings and use conversions to continue in Tianzifang.
It is important to acknowledge the political background of this decision. For many 
years, lilong housing had an under-valued and contested role as urban heritage. Its 
association with dilapidation and crowding made it an unpopular aspect of the past 
few city officials believed were worth conserving. But into the 2000s, the notion of
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heritage conservation has become better integrated into the considerations of the 
local government. This was clearly linked to the desire to harness the historic built 
environment for commercial and cultural development, rather than to sustain their 
use value as affordable places to live. Gentrification of the kind found in Taikang 
Road was thus expediently aligned with the broader agendas of creating the 
imagery and functions of a modern world-class city.
The social implications of ‘bottom-up’ rehabilitation were also examined. In a sense, 
the process was more socially inclusive of local residents than planned 
redevelopment. Some local residents played an important and autonomous role as 
informal landlords, and their support for continued commercialisation was motivated 
by the desire to advance their economic and living conditions. They gained the 
opportunity to enhance their financial status, and with this, to move up the housing 
ladder. Without government involvement in relocation, the decision to relocate, and 
the price at which relocation is based on, was largely determined by their own 
interests.
Though seemingly benign, the rehabilitation movement nevertheless still privileged 
‘growth’ over the use value demands of the poor. Rural migrants and those tenants 
who did not have formal property rights faced displacement alongside rising 
property prices. Another major limitation was that remaining residents continue to 
endure substandard housing conditions. Without proper management, there may 
also be various adverse effects associated functional transformation from residential 
to commercial use. The case suggests that more privileged grassroots actors and 
the local government tended to dominate the rehabilitation process. Their goal was 
to benefit from the value of residential heritage as carriers of new economic 
activities, somewhat the expense of weaker groups who relied on neighbourhoods 
as places to live.
So far, the thesis has presented three contrasting case studies of housing renewal 
to shed light on different aspects of housing renewal in post-1990 Shanghai. The 
redevelopment of Taipingqiao area (chapter 5), the largest of the three, was 
speculative and involved massive resident displacement. The New Fukangli project 
(chapter 6) was a case of residential redevelopment with more limited profit- 
motivation and partial community retention. Finally, the Taikang Road Tianzifang 
project entailed a process of piecemeal rehabilitation in which various local 
residents supported gentrification by renting to incoming businesses. Evidently
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housing renewal in a broad sense has entailed a range of different actors, relations 
and impacts. The next chapter shall provide a comparative analysis of these case 
studies and a synthesis of the insights derived.
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8 Case Comparisons and Discussion
8.1 Introduction
This chapter offers a comprehensive overview and analysis of the material 
discussed in Chapters four to seven, and puts them in perspective in light of more 
recent policy developments. In doing so, it shall attempt to arrive at a more holistic 
understanding of the socio-political dynamics driving housing renewal in post-1990 
Shanghai. A number of key themes are drawn out. Section two reviews the 
structural context and neighbourhood conditions framing the case studies. Section 
three compares the distinct models of renewal observed. Section four reviews the 
role of the local government in light of earlier findings. Section five discusses the 
public-private relations at work and the need to distinguish different actors. Section 
six examines the social implications of relocation and how government has 
attempted to address signs of resident discontent. The chapter concludes with an 
overview, highlighting the need to move away from a monolithic conception of the 
local state and the nature of the growth-coalition in Shanghai.
8.2 The context of housing renewal
8.2.1 Institutional reform and socio-economic restructuring
As outlined in chapter 4 (Section 4.5), the most apparent effects urban housing 
renewal in Shanghai since 1990 include a considerable expansion and 
modernisation of the housing stock, a massive surge in commercial developments 
replacing former residential or industrial buildings, and new municipal infrastructures. 
By 2005, almost all the officially designated slums and dangerous dwellings, and 
about 55% of the existing lilong housing stock have been demolished and 
redeveloped. Rehabilitation progressed slowly in the 1990s, but up to 2005 more 
than 17 million m2 of substandard workers’ housing had undergone extensive 
upgrading, or ‘Amenity Fulfilment Renewal’. While rehabilitation schemes often 
retained most of the residents, redevelopment involved massive displacement of 
existing lower-income residents towards the expanding suburban zones and their 
succession by more privileged groups. Between 1992 and 2005 some 1.04 million 
households were relocated, and total population in the inner city declined from 7.14 
million to 6.16 million (SSB, various years).
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It was shown that these broad outcomes cannot be understood in isolation from the 
institutional and socio-economic transformations occurring across China and in 
Shanghai. Alongside the country’s progressive economic liberalisation, housing and 
land reforms gradually eroded the former welfare oriented housing system and set 
in place the important role of developers in a commercialised real estate system 
(Wang and Murie, 1996; Wu et al, 2007; Zhu, 2004). In 1990 the National Congress 
of the Chinese Communist party approved a 10-year national economic and social 
development plan which determined to increase the production value of property 
development to about 10% of the GNP by 2000. The property development industry 
has since grown tremendously, and real estate became a key growth sector in the 
economy (Tang, 2003:180).
Following a period of modest growth after the inception of China’s economic reform, 
Shanghai engaged a period of sustained and very rapid economic development 
from the 1990s. Business expansion and the shift towards a more global, more 
service-oriented economy underpinned sustained demand for new, high-quality 
commercial premises in inner locations. At the same time, rising incomes amongst 
the better-placed in society sustained strong demand for better homes and for real 
estate as channels of investment. Local as well as foreign entrepreneurs, 
professional workers and managers formed an enlarged moneyed middle class who 
could access higher earnings to consume better quality housing. As real estate 
became more liberalised, property investors from the mainland, Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
Macao, and further abroad, competed to take advantage of the emerging markets.
While these changes created opportunities for the privileged segments of society to 
gain a foothold to real estate and to better housing, the benefits of housing reforms 
and economic growth were unevenly distributed. At the lower tiers of urban society 
includes a large population of low-paid workers in low- or semi-skilled manufacturing 
or service labour, and unemployment rose significantly alongside the painful 
restructuring industry. Among the low-paid workers are also millions of rural 
migrants - the “non-official urban poor” (Wang, 2000) who have limited citizen rights 
in terms of access to public services, housing and employment. These people have 
been largely excluded the privatisation programme or the housing market. As 
numerous official urban poor with local hukou (household-registration) status remain 
dependent on a declining public housing stock, rural migrants mostly turn to private 
renting in dilapidated housing or peripheral informal settlements (Wu, 2002, 2005).
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8.2.2 ‘Pre-renewal’ neighbourhood conditions
It is within such a context that the renewal of Taipingqiao, Fukangli and Taikang 
Road Tianzifang can be understood. Table 8.1 overleaf summarises the observed 
pre-renewal conditions of the case studies. Although these neighbourhoods 
experienced very different processes of renewal, the pre-renewal conditions were 
fairly similar. In each case study, public ownership of housing was predominant. 
Non-self-sufficient dilapidated housing could not be privatised thus remained mainly 
in public ownership.
Despite over two decades of housing commercialisation, the public rental system 
remained deeply rooted in the socialist principles of highly subsidised (and almost 
negligible) rents. Rental information was lacking in Fukangli, but in both Taikang 
Road and Taipingqiao area, public rents remained around 20~40 yuan/month/ 
family -  a very small component of living costs even for low-income residents. 
Despite public ownership, informal lettings to private tenants meant that these 
dwellings were also to a great extent being exchanged in the housing market. Given 
low quality but central locations, they have become an important housing choice for 
relocated households who wished to remain in the city centre, or for migrant 
workers attracted to work opportunities in the central districts.
A long list of physical problems could be identified in each case. Linked to low-rent, 
lack of proper maintenance had left dwellings in each area visibly deteriorated, 
suffering from material decay, damp and leakages. Numerous families lived in 
crowded rooms of no more than 20-30 m2. They shared or lacked sanitation facilities, 
kitchens, taps and gas connections, and had limited privacy. Many residents 
attested to substantial housing hardships, and the desire for renewal was apparent. 
On the other hand, generalisations about deprivation do not capture the complex 
reality of conditions on the ground, or subjective judgments regarding the adequacy 
of place. Logan and Molotch (1987) argued that the ‘use value’ of place derive from 
its ability to support the daily routines and that emotional sentiment and practical , 
material purposes are closely intertwined in people’s experience of use values. This 
perspective helps us to understand the value of dilapidated older neighbourhoods in 
Shanghai whilst also recognising their accumulated problems.
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Table 8.1: Pre-renewal housing conditions reported in case studies
Taipingqiao area 
(TPQ)
New Fukangli 
(NFKL)
Taikang Road 
(TT)
Location
characteristics
Luwan district, well 
connected and well 
serviced. Very high 
property values
JingAn district. Well 
connected and well 
serviced. High property 
values
Luwan district. Well 
connected and well 
serviced. High property 
values
Building type and 
date of origin
1920s shikumen lilong 
and new-style lilong
1920-1930s shikumen 
and new style lilong
1920s shikumen lilong 
and 1930s industrial 
buildings (lane 
factories)
Predominant
tenure(s)
Municipal housing and 
informal private renting
Municipal housing and 
informal private renting
Municipal housing and 
informal private renting
Residential
satisfaction
Mixed feelings: some 
satisfied and settled, 
others dissatisfied with 
physical aspects
Mixed feelings: some 
satisfied and settled, 
others dissatisfied with 
physical aspects
Mixed feelings: some 
satisfied and settled, 
others dissatisfied with 
physical aspects
Affordability Very affordable for 
formal tenants
Very affordable for 
formal tenants
Very affordable for 
formal tenants
Housing space Variable, but commonly 
crowded. Minimum 
around 10 m2 fora 
family
Some crowding, but 
many were ‘decent’ 
(average 35 m2/ 
household)
Variable but commonly 
crowded. Minimum 
around 10 m2 for a 
family
Kitchens Shared Shared Shared
Sanitation
facilities
Most households 
lacked facilities, some 
self-installed
Most households 
lacked facilities, some 
self-installed
Most households 
lacked facilities, some 
self-installed
Gas connections? Yes Yes Some did not have gas 
connections
Physical
deterioration?
Yes Yes Yes
Perception of 
poor hygiene?
Yes Yes Yes
Reported social 
composition
Mainly low-income, 
elderly and migrants
Generally average or 
better-off residents
Mainly low-income, 
elderly and migrants
Trend of social 
change reported 
1990-2000S
Concentration of poor, 
migrant influx , loss of 
youth, ageing 
population
Relatively stable prior to 
renewal in 1998
Concentration of poor, 
migrant influx , loss of 
youth, ageing 
population
Social networks 
perceived
Well established among 
long-term residents, but 
this was eroding 
alongside population 
change
Well established among 
long-term residents, 
and relatively stable 
prior to renewal
Well established among 
long-term residents, but 
this was eroding 
alongside population 
change
Sense of safety Basically problem-free Basically problem-free Basically problem-free
Time-frame
described
2007-8 Before renewal in 1998 Before onset of renewal 
in 2004
Source: author’s analysis
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Several ‘strengths’ in these areas were perceived by many residents -  including 
location, social environment, affordability, familiarity, and to some extent 
architectural characteristics. These contributed in different ways to residents’ sense 
of satisfaction or attachment to their homes. There were tangible variations in 
physical housing quality amongst households. Some expressed an explicit 
appreciation of lilong housing compared to modern forms of housing -  due to their 
architectural character, higher floor-to-ceiling heights, and association with what was 
perceived to be Shanghai’s authentic urban identity. Beyond differences in formal 
living space, some families have carried out self-extensions and renovations to 
improve their living environments. Where some space was available, the informally 
installed kitchens or sanitation facilities always significantly improved individual 
perceptions of adequacy. Many residents had lived the same place, and in poor 
conditions for most of their lives. Given lack of choice within the socialist allocation 
system, and subsequently in the housing market, many residents had made do with 
what they had. However, many of these features were also being eroded.
In all three cases local residents often regarded the central location as a significant 
advantage. Inner city districts had always been characterised by good accessibility 
and abundance of services compared to suburban districts. They offered good 
quality public services such as hospitals and schools, as well as easy access to 
formal or informal work opportunities. These attributes meant that although crowded 
dilapidated housing was no longer the choice of upwardly mobile households, it still 
performed an important role for those with limited means.
Due to the lack of quantitative data it was difficult to understand the socio-economic 
characteristics and social dynamics in these areas. Nevertheless the case studies 
did afford us several key insights. Fukangli was perceived to be relatively speaking 
average or above-average in socio-economic status before its redevelopment 
(1998-2001), although the survey data in 2007 reveals that it also accommodated 
various low-income and unemployed households. Population was thought to be 
relatively stable up to the 1990s, and no significant migrant presence was reported 
in the interviews. In contrast, major social changes were reported by residents in the 
Taipingqiao and Taikang Road studies since the late 1990s, coinciding with the 
deepening of housing market reforms and rising residential mobility. With widening 
housing choice in the market, these communities experienced substantial 
outmigration of youth and of better-off families, and the subsequent influx of migrant 
workers as new informal tenants. As a result, remaining residents identified the
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communities as predominantly made up of the low-income, the unemployed, the 
elderly, and numerous rural migrants. Indeed studies of older deteriorated 
neighbourhoods in China all suggest that poor quality housing increasingly 
concentrates those of low socio-economic status (Wu and He, 2005; Wang, 2004).
All three areas were nevertheless deemed safe places to live. Mutual support within 
social networks, a culture of social interaction, and the comparative lack of it in 
modern housing complexes were important themes in each case. For long-term 
residents, living in old housing was characterised by a stronger sense of 
neighbourhood bonds because many residents grew up or grew old together in the 
same place, and because the unusually crowded aspect of living demanded a 
culture of ‘getting on’ with neighbours in everyday life. On the other hand, existing 
communities’ social relations were also increasingly undermined. Population change 
has contributed to a heightened sense of social disconnection, and differences 
between the local and non-local residents - the urban and rural lifestyles - have 
created new tensions. In other words, these were dynamic neighbourhoods 
undergoing changes as part of a broader process of residential re-differentiation (Li 
and Wu, 2006).
8.3 Contrasting models of housing renewal
8.3.1 Distinguishing the models
Despite having relatively similar pre-renewal conditions, Taipingqiao, Fukangli and 
Taikang Road experienced very different trajectories of renewal. The cases span 
across large-scale redevelopment involving massive displacement (TPQ), to modest 
scale redevelopment involving some community retention (NFKL), as well as a more 
piecemeal process of private rehabilitation involving voluntary relocation and some 
market-driven displacement (TT).
Overall, three distinct models of housing renewal can be discerned from the 
preceding chapters. Table 8.2 overleaf summarises their features. The most well 
known and prevalent model has been private-funded and government-subsidised 
speculative redevelopment, based (primarily) on off-site relocation of residents. This 
has commonly been termed the "property-led redevelopment model” and is seen to 
typify housing renewal in post-reform China (He and Wu, 2005; He, 2007; Shin, 
2007). The case of TPQ best represents this model of intervention.
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Table 8.2: Models of housing renewal in post-1990 Shanghai
Property-led
Redevelopment
Community Retention 
model
Bottom-up rehabilitation 
model
Key driving 
policies in 
1990s
365 slum clearance 
(1992-2000)
Lilong housing 
rehabilitation experiments 
(early 1990s);
Housing Amenity 
Fulfilment Renewal (1995- 
2001)
No specific housing 
policies
Key driving 
policies in 
2000s
New Round of Urban 
Renewal (2001-2010)
Amenity Fulfilment 
Renewal & Flat-to-pitched 
roof renewal focusing on 
staff housing
No specific housing 
policies
Physical
interventions
Usually redevelopment, 
with occasional selective 
conservation
Rehabilitation of 
structurally sound- 
dwellings where 
financially feasible, or 
redevelopment
Piecemeal rehabilitation of 
the existing stock
Key mode of 
resettlement
Mainly off-site relocation 
(monetary compensation 
or in-kind housing)
Mainly on-site 
resettlement, sometimes 
via privatisation to sitting 
tenants. Some relocation 
off-site for poorer 
residents.
No formal relocation 
mechanism. Mainly 
voluntary relocation as 
original residents sell/rent 
housing and move away. 
Some market-led 
displacement.
Key
procurers
Property developers in 
conjunction with local 
government and bureaux
Usually quasi- 
govemmental developers 
in conjunction with local 
government and bureaux
Small investors, 
businesses and 
households, with little or 
no formal public planning 
or support at the outset
Built
outcomes
Usually high-standard 
residential and 
commercial developments
Usually mix of affordable 
housing and some 
market-rate housing
Existing stock gradually 
upgraded or converted for 
commercial use
Social
outcomes
Usually lower-income 
communities are 
displaced and replaced by 
higher-income groups and 
businesses
Partial retention of 
existing community and 
moderate influx of higher- 
income households
Gradual gentrification as 
existing households 
replaced by better off 
households or businesses
Profit
margins
expected
Usually 30%~50% for high 
standard properties
Limited profit
expectations, can be 10% 
or lower in practice
Insufficient data
Case study 
example
Taipingqiao (TPQ) New Fukangli (NFKL) Taikang Road Tlanzifang 
(TT)
Source: Author’s analysis
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Since 1992, property-led redevelopment characterised the "365 slum clearance" 
programme and underpinned most redevelopment schemes involving lilong housing. 
It remained a key component of the "New Round of Urban Renewal" (2001-2010), 
under which almost 20 million m2 of old housing was to be demolished. Although 
new construction has been its main focus, it is important to acknowledge that it also 
occasionally incorporates historic conservation selectively. Expectations of profit 
margins in these schemes are very high, commonly cited as varying between 30% 
and 50% for high-standard properties (Quan, 2006; Haila, 1999). Occasionally, they 
are even higher. In the Taipingqiao redevelopment project, the Lakeville apartments 
made closer to 100% profit.
A second model can be termed the “community retention model”. More akin to the 
principles of housing renewal in the pre-reform era, this model emphasises on-site 
resettlement of sitting tenants instead of relocation, and rehabilitation instead of 
redevelopment where feasible. The purpose was to turn substandard lilong housing 
or staff housing into self-sufficient units with independent bathroom, kitchen, and to 
upgrade their public environment and community facilities. Initiated in the early 
1990s, the model progressed at a small scale under the “Old Housing Amenity 
Fulfilment Renewal” programme from 1995-2001, which upgraded 2.08 million m2of 
mostly lilong housing (Ji, 2002a). Among the three case studies examined, the case 
of NFKL best represents this model, though it involved redevelopment rather than 
rehabilitation and a higher level of relocation (49%). In the New Round of Urban 
Renewal, the community retention model has expanded rapidly as a complementary 
strategy to redevelopment, though its focus has shifted away from lilong housing 
towards the ‘flat-to-pitched roof rehabilitation of 1950s-1960s workers’ housing 
(‘staff housing’). More than 17 million m2has undergone renovation by the end of 
2005 (Law et al, 2009). In 2006 alone a total of 56 rehabilitation projects with 
combined floor area of 5.8 million m2were initiated across almost all urban districts. 
26 In contrast to the property-led redevelopment model, quite modest profits can be 
expected from this model - around 10% from some of the early 1990s projects. It 
uses a combination of government, developer and resident finances, selling off 
upgraded units to original tenants. Off-site relocation is often a complementary 
measure, but usually affects no more than 30% of the original households.
26 http://www.shfa.aov.cn:82/aate/bia5/www.shfa.aov.cn/fqdoc/azcio/200910/t20091023 329636.html 
(6.12.2009)
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A third, and least common, model of housing renewal was the “bottom-up 
rehabilitation model”. This entails piecemeal housing rehabilitation enacted on the 
ground by small investors, residents or businesses with limited or no planning 
interventions from local authorities. It resembles the process of piecemeal 
gentrification widely experienced in revitalising city centres in the west (Smith and 
Williams, 1986; Ley, 1996; Atkinson and Bridge, 2005). The case of Taikang Road 
Tianzifang represents one striking example of this model. Being a bottom-up 
process, the model does not involve state-facilitated relocation, but takes place on 
the basis of some voluntary resident relocation as well as market-led displacement - 
i.e. pricing out of private tenants alongside inflating house-prices. Widespread 
proliferation of bottom-up rehabilitation has possibly been constrained by various 
factors: the high-degree of public ownership, fragmented property rights due to 
multiple occupancy, dominance of state-led demolition programmes, and also in part 
the low-quality (and thus limited middle-class demand for) of most dilapidated 
dwellings. There are no formal policies supporting unplanned, bottom-up renovation 
by individuals, but local authorities may support the process once it has taken off.
8.3.2 Neighbourhood impacts of the modeis
These models of renewal have contrasting impacts for neighbourhoods and 
communities, as observed in the three case studies. Table 8.3 overleaf summarises 
the contrasting impacts of housing renewal in the three case study areas in terms of 
their physical, social, tenure and affordability transformations. Evidently, the 
"property-led redevelopment" model is a process of profound physical, tenure, land- 
use and socio-economic restructuring. Existing housing is generally demolished or 
selective restored to provide upmarket residential and/or commercial developments, 
new municipal infrastructures, and existing tenants are displaced. Housing is usually 
privatised, and prices generally become exclusive of the poor. It has thus been 
described as a process of intensive "state-sponsored gentrification" (He, 2007). 
Relocation is somewhat beneficial for residents in terms of supporting physical 
housing improvements, but it is also socially confiictive due to factors including the 
mismatch between compensation and residents’ expectations, and people's 
reluctance to part with their homes and neighbourhoods.
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Table 8.3: Trajectories of place-transformation in the three case studies
Taipingqiao area 
(TPQ)
New Fukangli 
(NFKL)
Taikang Road 
(TT)
Dates 1996~on-going 1998-2001 1998-on-going
Site area 
(approximate)
52 hectares 4 hectares 7 hectares
Housing policy 
initiative
New Round of Urban 
Renewal, from 2001
Old Housing Amenity 
Fulfilment Renewal, 
from 1995-2001
None, but linked to 
economic policy: 
promotion of creative 
industries
Physical 
transformations 
and purpose
Demolition of existing 
housing and creating a 
new mixed-use district 
that would complement 
the existing commercial 
centre on Huaihai 
Road
Demolition of existing 
housing and creating a 
modem residential 
complex. To enlarge 
housing space and 
raise standards of 
amenity for original 
residents
Piecemeal 
improvement of the 
existing housing and 
industrial stock for 
commercial and 
cultural uses, to help 
symbolise the creative 
economy and stimulate 
tourism
Total construction 
floor area (m2)
1.66 million, 
subsequently adjusted 
to 1.3 million
About 100,000 Renovated area 
expected to reach 
70,000 (by 2010)
Number of dwelling 
units planned
About 14,000 
households
About 1,200 
households
Not known
Mode(s) of resident 
resettlement
Off-site relocation of 
about 70,000 residents 
over 15 years
Paid on-site 
resettlement (52%), 
plus some off-site 
relocation (48%)
Voluntary, off-site 
relocation of residents, 
plus some market- 
driven displacement
Tenure
transformations
Full privatisation took 
place after 
redevelopment
Full privatisation took 
place after 
redevelopment
Shift towards informal 
private renting
Affordability for 
original residents
New housing costs 
more than 50,000 
yuan/m2 - generally 
unaffordable for original 
residents even with 
compensation
Subsidised units at 
around 120,000 yuan - 
affordable for better-off 
households but not the 
most disadvantaged 
residents
Welfare rents of around 
1yuan/m2/ month 
persisted for formal 
tenants. However 
private tenants were 
increasingly pressured 
as private rental soared 
above 6,000 yuan for 
30m2 space
Population
changes
Original residents were 
displaced, and new 
premises marketed to 
very affluent 
households and large 
corporations e.g. 
SONY and Disney
A mix of original, lower- 
income residents and 
more affluent home­
owners was achieved
As original tenants 
moved or were 
displaced they were 
succeeded by 
upmarket businesses 
and visitors
Source: author’s analysis
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In contrast, the "community retention" model is arguably the more 'socially oriented’ 
of the three. It involves either rehabilitation or redevelopment of the targeted 
housing, but usually produces considerable affordable housing which most sitting 
tenants can purchase at considerably discounted prices. Often most of the 
community is retained, a smaller part is relocated, and some surplus market-rate 
housing units are sold off to better-off households. Thus, the model facilitates 
privatisation and engenders low-level or moderate gentrification. As seen in NFKL, 
the social mix of original and new households may persist many years after 
completion. Onsite resettlement is generally popular with residents, but it can have 
affordability problems for poorer households, who still have little choice but to be 
resettled elsewhere.
The "bottom-up rehabilitation" model in contrast leads to the formation of 
progressively gentrified historic neighbourhoods. It entails physical rehabilitation, a 
gradual process of formal or informal privatisation, selective conversion into 
commercial functions, and the influx of upmarket businesses or well-off households 
replacing former (usually lower-income) households and tenants. As a piecemeal 
process however, these neighbourhoods may exist in a transitional state for a long 
time or retain a mix of socio-economic groups, run-down and upgraded dwellings, 
and even public and private tenures. As seen in the Taikang Road case, former 
public-owned neighbourhood can become progressively dominated by private rental 
relations, yet retain many formal public tenants. In contrast to the property-led 
redevelopment model, it is also a form of moderate or low-level gentrification.
8.4 Role of the local state
8.4.1 Shanghai’s urban and housing agendas
Different models of renewal serve somewhat contrasting purposes for the local state, 
and involve different forms of public intervention. This section reviews the role and 
agendas of the local state in housing renewal, and makes clear the distinctions 
among them. Local state behaviour needs to be placed in a wider context. As noted 
in the literature review, political decentralisation from the centre to localities and the 
shifting role of the local state from a resource distributor towards a rather 
autonomous market-actor are among the key institutional changes in China since 
the 1980s. This has been conceptualised in terms of the emergence of 
'entrepreneurial' local states (Wu, 2003; Wu et al, 2007). Fiscal reforms and
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administrative decentralisation meant that local governments have gained 
increasing fiscal autonomy, and more direct responsibility for urban planning, the 
administration of urban land, and for economic development (Oi, 1992, 1995; Wu et 
al, 2007). Inter-urban competition for growth has intensified as cities became more 
reliant on locally generated revenues and the performance of local leaders 
increasingly came to be judged by their achievements in urban development (Zhang, 
2002; Zhu, 1999). As a result of all these changes, local officials have become 
highly motivated to expand the local economy, while social welfare have arguably 
become less prominent concerns (Wu, 2007; Walder 1995).
As discussed in Chapter 4, Shanghai’s governing goal since 1990 was to become a 
world city: a major economic, financial, trading and commercial centre. The agenda 
for housing renewal from the 1990s was imbued with a strong modernisation 
ideology. Key goals were to relieve the dire housing shortage, to modernise the 
housing stock and to raise overall standards of living. This would be achieved 
through a combination of new building, eliminating substandard units, and 
upgrading some of the better-quality stock. The attitude towards the poorest quality 
dwellings was to channel private investment to demolish these areas and to 
decentralise the population by relocating existing residents towards suburban 
districts.
In the context of housing and land reforms, market-orientated mechanisms were 
quickly introduced to achieve these goals. The local government was a key 
facilitator in the process. As emphasised by Fulong Wu (2007: 18), Chinese cities 
came to be characterised by a “combination of strong state intervention and radical 
market orientation, in which state intervention is moving away from redistribution to 
supporting the market by putting in place relevant conditions.” Due to the peculiar 
socialist legacy, local governments in China monopolised the primary land market 
and retained a high share of ownership of housing. It thus played a crucial role in 
the housing renewal process by contributing the essential resources of land, land- 
use regulation, the power of eminent domain and financial subsidies, whilst the 
private sector provided much of the capital for development. Because capital was a 
critical resource for growth, local governments became proactive to attract 
investment and to work with the private sector. They offered preferential taxes and 
exemptions in their jurisdictions and fostered more efficient and business-friendly 
governments (Wu, 2007).
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8.4.2 Facilitating growth via property-development
As recognised by several authors (e.g. Wu and He, 2005; He, 2007), property-led 
redevelopment provided a practical and expedient strategy to attract and channel 
large quantities of capital to redevelop decaying neighbourhoods, to modernise the 
image of cities, and to rationalise land-uses. Real estate is a significant contributor 
to the urban economy and thus on its own is sufficient as a justified realm for the 
public sector to promote. Where land-leasing premiums are not exempted, the local 
government can derive substantial direct revenues from leasing land-use rights to 
developers. Subsequently, district governments can also expect to extract taxes 
from businesses activities attracted to any newly developed commercial premises.
Thus, property-led redevelopment quickly became a dominant urban growth 
strategy. During the 1990s, the local government spearheaded property-led 
redevelopment to eliminate 3.65 million m2of designated slum housing. It provided a 
plethora of positive inducements for developers which included reduced or 
exempted land-leasing premiums, density concessions and administrative costs. 
Similar policies were extended into the New Round of Urban Renewal (NRUR) in 
the period 2001-2010. While the municipal government set the overall agendas, 
targets and made available relevant subsidies, district governments were given the 
role of designating specific sites for renewal, attracting private investment, and 
facilitating specific redevelopment projects. As discussed by He (2007), by 
assembling land and facilitating relocation, municipal and district authorities in 
concert helped resolve the problem of fragmented property rights and free up land 
for development. The practice of subsidised land transactions from the government 
to enterprises was seen to give tremendous advantages to the private sector, and 
created the basis for windfall profits (Zhu, 1999).
The redevelopment of Taipingqiao area was an illustrative case which was driven by 
a clear economic growth agenda: to facilitate the development of Luwan district by 
expanding an existing commercial centre - Huaihai Road. Accordingly, the old 
neighbourhood was restructured into a new mixed-use district comprising luxury 
housing, top quality office developments as well as an upmarket tourism and 
entertainment centre (Xintiandi). Low-income residents were excluded from the new 
developments. The district helped seal a deal with Hong-Kong based developer 
Shui-On Group and facilitate the relocation process of all existing occupants. Under 
the New Round of Urban Renewal, land transactions did not need to go through
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public auctions but could be negotiated at reduced costs. The municipality provided 
two new underground metro stations to service the site and half of the finances for 
Taipingqiao Park.
Yet as property-led redevelopment facilitated private capital accumulation, 
resettlement and compensation of residents was always an integral requirement. 
This undeniably carried a significant social purpose. The government saw it as a 
major responsibility to help resettle households living in over-crowded or 
substandard conditions into larger, self-sufficient flats and apartments. In the 1990s, 
replacement housing (in-kind compensation) was the predominant mechanism. After 
2001, cash compensation became more prevalent to in-kind compensation. While 
displacement was in numerous ways crude as a ‘solution’, it was seen by officials as 
the most feasible way of enhancing the housing standards of large numbers of 
citizens with limited public investment. To complement this process, large amounts 
of affordable housing was built on cheaper land in districts such as Pudong, 
Minhang, Baoshan, Songjiang and Jiading -  most of which were envisioned to 
eventually become new towns situated between 30-40 km2 from the city centre (see 
Chapter 4).
8.4.3 Community-retention and housing renewal
Property-led redevelopment highlights the ‘growth-seeking’ nature of the 
authoritarian local state in urban China. Nevertheless varying approaches to growth 
were pursued. The community-retention model serves a physical modernisation 
agenda, but is more resident-oriented rather than concerned with revenue- 
generation. Its main purpose is to improve urban housing standards and arguably to 
boost political legitimacy by appealing to the communities who receive its 
preferential terms. The public sector usually allocates the land plot at an exempted 
or reduced cost to the property developer, and can provide subsidies or low-cost 
loans. There is little direct revenue generating potential for the local state. Sitting 
tenants are the intended beneficiaries who are offered the right to purchase 
renewed units at a discounted price at the time of resettlement, and their 
contributions are also used help finance the renewal process. Property developers 
provide the rest of the financing required, and are usually allowed to build a certain 
amount of market-price units which can be sold to cross-subsidise on-site 
resettlement and yield a profit.
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It is important to note that this model has been a complementary, although less 
prominent, aspect of Shanghai’s housing renewal. It provides evidence of the local 
government attempting to incorporate some social welfare concerns within the 
constraints of a more market-oriented and pro-growth policy framework.
8.4.4 Historic conservation
Throughout the 1990s historic conservation was a relatively marginal concern in the 
redevelopment process. Conservation planning was for the most part poorly 
understood by local officials, planners, and development controls were vaguely 
established. However, selective conservation was becoming a significant political 
issue in Shanghai by the 2000s, alongside increasing acceptance of heritage as a 
valuable asset both for place-making and for capital accumulation purposes. The 
local government has designated 12 historic conservation areas, more than 600 
listed sites, developed a legislative basis for conservation, and taken greater care in 
the planning of conservation areas. The adaptive re-use of industrial or residential 
heritage - a relatively common part of post-industrial urban revitalisation in the West 
- has also become a recognised approach in China. However, there are still no 
financial instruments or subsidies to promote the restoration or renovation of historic 
buildings, and the process has largely been relegated to the actors in the market -  
who often take the lead in initiating conservation.
Both the Taikang Road (TT) and Taipingqiao (TPQ) case studies represent well- 
known, if still rare examples of privately funded historic conservation in Shanghai. 
They show that historic conservation may be pursued either as part of property-led 
redevelopment, or a more decentralised and individual-led process. In Taipingqiao’s 
‘Xintiandi’ development, historic housing was conserved as an attractive and 
nostalgic setting for leisure and consumption. It was an integrated part of a much 
larger property development strategy. Its popular success helped redefine the image 
of the entire neighbourhood and consolidate the area’s appeal as a locale of high- 
end consumption, business and living. As illustrated by the case of TT, the bottom- 
up rehabilitation model is expedient for the local state, because it requires little 
public resources to achieve historic conservation and housing renewal.
Bottom-up rehabilitation may contravene with existing urban plans and may be an 
illegal process in some neighbourhoods, as seen in the case of TT. This means that 
the government may be inclined to choose to proceed with demolition in order to
realise its urban planning objectives. However, the rehabilitation process presented 
itself as an easy way for the government to capitalise on culture, and to revitalise 
run-down housing with limited direct investment. Given that no formal relocation 
procedures are involved, bottom-up renewal also relieves the state of the complex 
responsibility of mediating the resident resettlement process, which is socially 
conflictive. This was eventually seen as an attractive alternative then in the eyes of 
local officials. The government thus provided a relatively relaxed regulatory 
environment for illegal conversions and business influx to take place. Social 
objectives were not necessarily part of the initial motivations, although when 
benefits to some residents became apparent these became a way for local officials 
to justify the continued transformation of the neighbourhood.
Both case studies also demonstrate that there exists considerable demand for the 
‘heritage experience’ (Hewison, 1987) from a range of local consumers and 
international visitors, and that restored heritage environments could help foster a 
unique identity, attract businesses and visitors, and potentially raise the exchange 
value of a neighbourhood. Rather than being based on a concept of community 
retention however, it was apparent that historic buildings with recognised aesthetic 
or cultural value have predominantly been converted for higher-value uses such as 
retail, dining and tourism, involving considerable displacement.
8.4.5 Market regulation and ‘balanced development'
Asides from recognising the developmental role of the state, it is also important to 
consider its role in growth regulation and in addressing issues relating to social 
equity. Although the role of the central government was not apparent in the case 
studies, it is important here to acknowledge its efforts as a macro-regulator, and its 
bearings on local policies (Zhang, 2002; He and Wu, 2005). After two decades of 
pursuing a ‘growth-first’ strategy, the national leaders Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao 
increasingly advocated a different approach in the 2000s. As Premier Wen stated in 
a speech to the Central Party School in early 2003, the new approach to 
development should mean "economic and social development that are 
comprehensive, well-coordinated, and sustainable", and that which has the welfare 
of human beings in mind (cited in Lam, 2006: 42).
A major initiative developed by the CCP leadership by this time was building “a 
harmonious society". This is meant to feature "socialist democracy, rule by law,
equity, justice, sincerity, amity and vitality." These became key themes in the Fifth 
Plenary Session of the Central Committee in October 2005, as well as the Eleventh 
Five-Year Plan (2006-2010). In accordance with these concepts, the leadership 
have vowed to "adequately mediate among the interest relationships of various 
sectors, and to correctly handle inner contradictions within the people" (citied in Lam 
2006: 251-2).
As identified by Wang (2004:145), maintaining both economic growth and social 
stability were increasingly the two top priorities of the Communist Party leadership. 
More effective regulation of the urban development process was deemed necessary 
to achieve these aims. Officials at different levels were given instructions since 2004 
that they must not try to out-do each other with superficial signs of prosperity. 
Cadres would be assessed not only by producing high levels of GDP or attracting 
investment, but by various other criteria including generating employment, lowering 
the wealth divide, ensuring stability, environmental sustainability and promoting 
effective rule by law (Lam, 2006: 44).
The centre has made efforts to address the widespread housing affordability crisis 
which particularly affected major cities such as Beijing and Shanghai. Between 2003 
and 2007, successive macro-regulations were rolled out to prevent excessive 
speculative behaviour and overheating of the market. This included policies to 
restrict loans from state-owned banks for property development, to limit land 
provision and construction volume in cities (Wu et al, 2007; Yin and Zhang, 2007). 
Although they did not necessarily have the intended effect at the local level, nor did 
they radically alter the politics of urban development, they do indicate the interests 
of the central government to ensure more balanced development in the long term 
through fiscal and policy interventions.
Important shifts in local housing policies were also occurring by the late 2000s, 
signalling greater concern for growth control and for expanding the housing choice 
of lower-income groups. The new principles of urban development advocated well- 
balanced development, for example between cities and villages, between different 
regions, and between economic growth and social welfare (Lam, 2006). In October 
2006, the Shanghai Municipal Government published the “Shanghai City Housing 
Construction Plan (2006-2010)”.27 Reflecting on the imbalances of earlier periods of
27 http://www.sh.gov.cn/shanghai/node23lVnode2319/nodel234'Vuserobject26ai8616.html. Last
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development, particular emphasis was made by this time to resolve the practical 
housing problems and needs of low-income and mid-low income households. A key 
emphasis was to promote a more balanced housing supply structure, by enlarging 
the supply of 'ordinary commodity housing' (putong shangping zhufang) rather than 
luxury housing. It has since been regulated that small and medium sized units of not 
more than 90 m2 in floor area must comprise not less than 70% of the overall 
housing supply (SMG, 2006)
The central government has also continued to reform the overall housing system in 
order to widen the housing opportunities for low-income groups. In August 2007, the 
State Council issued the document "Several Opinions of the State Council on 
Settling the Housing Problem of Low-income Families in Urban Areas".28 This 
emphasised the need for cities and towns to expand low-income rental housing 
provision so as to help resolve the housing problems of some 7.5 million 
disadvantaged urban households. It marked a significant milestone in housing policy 
by recognising the importance of rental housing to complement the previous 
emphasis on home-ownership. In response to central government mandates, the 
local government has very recently developed the "Shanghai City Development 
Plan for Resolving the Housing Problems of Low Income Households (2008-2012)” 
which aimed to further modify the structure of housing supply by enlarging the 
supply of middle and low-cost, middle and small sized units. The plan for 2009 was 
to initiate the construction of 4 million m2 of affordable housing and 4 million m2 of 
housing for relocation purposes (peitao shangpingfang) - which together was to 
constitute 45% of the new housing supply.
8.4.6 A multi-faced role of the local state
These findings suggest that local state’s role in housing renewal since 1990 was 
evolving, and increasingly multi-faceted. As recognised by most authors, the local 
state was largely and consistently driven by the agendas of physical modernisation 
and economic growth. Local officials acted to promote higher living standards and 
economic growth through redevelopment and even historic conservation (He and 
Wu, 2005; Zhang, 2002). While local state intervention has been significant and 
efficient in areas of greatest growth potential, resources and effectiveness have
accessed 15 November 2009
28 http://www.gov.cn/ziliao/flfg/2007-ll/27/content_816644.htm, last accessed December 22,2008
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been more limited in the realm of efforts to alleviate the conditions and demands of 
the poor. Yet, a more nuanced reading acknowledges that within the constraints of 
its pro-growth orientation and market-oriented policies, the local state has 
developed some socially-oriented renewal programmes, and emerging measures to 
ensure better market regulation and greater housing equity. Whereas these were 
relatively minor components in the 1990s, they have become more significant and 
visible by the late-2000s. A part of this may be considered rhetoric, and it would be 
challenging to put these agendas into practice. Nevertheless, these measures 
signalled a shift from a “growth-first” mode of entrepreneurial governance to a more 
socially responsible mode of entrepreneurialism, one where issues of equity and 
social harmony are considered integral aspects of competitiveness. The central 
government has made some impact in this transformation through its political 
direction, its reform policies and macro-regulation measures.
8.5 The growth-coalition in Shanghai
8.5.1 Public-private relations in housing renewal
This section examines how the local state pursued its objectives by working with the 
private sector. Hall and Hubbard (1998) characterised urban entrepreneurialism 
through two basic characteristics: a political prioritisation of pro-growth local 
economic development rather than social redistribution, and secondly, the embrace 
of 'partnerships' or 'coalitions' with the private sector. In order to achieve its 
ambitious and multi-faceted agendas in urban housing renewal, the local state in 
Shanghai has also had to act in conjunction with a range of private sector actors.
In line with the argument of Logan and Molotch (1987), Chinese scholars have 
argued that the search for financial gain from intensifying land came to occupy a 
core part the urban development process in urban China. In this view, a pro-growth 
political climate and favourable policies have bound local officials, local businesses 
and incoming foreign capital into an informal urban coalition -  particularly in the 
arena of land and property development. Thus, elite enterprises together with the 
public sector largely orchestrated urban development, commodifying places and 
extracting values with limited opposition. Involving displacement as a central 
mechanism, the growth coalition is seen to have politically and spatially excluded 
large segments of local communities (He and Wu, 2005; Zhang and Fang, 2004). A
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key insight from this study is that while the above view captures general trends, it is 
useful to move away from a monolithic conception of the growth coalition in order to 
account for local variations or different models of renewal.
Table 8.4: Public-private relations in the case studies
Taipingqiao area 
(TPQ)
New Fukangli 
(NFKL)
Taikang Road 
(TT)
Delivery
organisation
Private-funding, with 
public sector support, 
in multiple phases
Public leadership, 
private financing and 
some resident 
involvement, in two 
phases
Market-led, by 
individual investors, in 
an ‘organic’ process
Principal developer Shui-On Land -  
a private developer 
from Hong Kong. 
Publically listed 
company by 2004
JingAn Property 
Holdings Ltd -  a state- 
owned, quasi- 
govemmental property 
developer
Various small 
businesses and 
investors from China 
and abroad
Other supporting 
institutions
Banks, architectural 
firms, local 
architectural design 
institute
State-owned 
architectural design 
company
Shanghai Academy of 
Social Sciences 
(helped support area 
conservation)
Developer’s 
relationship with 
local government
Chairman has well- 
developed social 
networks with city 
leaders, and increasing 
integration into political 
institutions
Formed out of local 
housing bureau, and 
retained administrative 
links. Often received 
projects by 
appointment
No apparent 
relationship or 
communications
Developer’s role in 
design or planning
Provided detail 
development plan for 
Taipingqiao area, with 
approval from urban 
planning bureau
Provided detail design 
for the project, in 
negotiation with 
housing and urban 
planning bureau
No role in influencing 
area-planning, but 
responsible for 
renovating individual 
properties
Preferential 
policies for 
developer(s)
Negotiated land- 
transactions, 
infrastructural provision 
for the site, and 
subsidies for 
Taipingqiao Park
100 million yuan low- 
interest loan, land 
leasing fee exemption, 
building density 
concessions
No subsidies or 
preferential policies.
Key regulations 
and requirements 
imposed on 
developer(s)
That heritage listings 
must be protected: that 
maximum FAR must 
not exceed 4.0; that 
relocated urban 
households be 
compensated in 
accordance with official 
guidelines
That the development 
must be aimed towards 
onsite resettlement of 
existing households: 
that maximum FAR 
does not exceed 2.8; 
that relocated urban 
households be 
compensated in 
accordance with official 
guidelines
No official planning 
regulations were 
imposed
Source: author’s analysis
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Table 8.4 (previous page) summarises the public-private agency relationships in the 
three case studies examined. Although the local government overall acted to 
channel, attract and ‘smooth’ the flow of private investment into the built 
environment by removing various supply-side constraints, there were different 
actors and institutional relations at work. Large property enterprises were sought as 
partners in property-led redevelopment, individual gentrifiers were allowed to 
rehabilitate some historic neighbourhoods, and quasi-governmental enterprises 
were usually engaged to deliver socially oriented projects in the community- 
retention model.
8.5.2 Partnering with real estate developers
A close collaborative public-private relation underpins both the property-led 
redevelopment and the community retention models. This was apparent in the 
Taipingqiao and New Fukangli projects. While the local state provides the 
overarching policies, land, and the authority for relocation, property developers were 
crucial partners in planning, financing and implementation. The property-led 
redevelopment model is predominantly financed by the private sector, though self- 
raised capital, loans, and/or even presale. Residents are not expected to input 
finances, but are compensated for their resettlement.
In contrast, the community retention model utilises a mix of financing from the public 
sector (usually housing bureaux), property developers as well as residents. 
However, property developers are still expected to provide much of the financing. 
They are usually allowed to build a certain amount of market-price units which can 
be sold to cross-subsidise on-site resettlement and yield a profit. In both models, the 
renewal process tends to involve a range of other players including professional 
design consultants, banks, and other property investors, all of whom work as part of 
the urban growth coalition.
Close working in the planning stages of renewal has been a feature of the public- 
private relationship in Shanghai. Urban master planning is a key responsibility of the 
local government alongside its role as managers of urban land. However, detailed 
planning of specific areas was often carried out between property developers and 
the local government, with the support of various architectural and planning 
consultants. For example, detailed plans for the 52-hectare Taipingqiao area was 
largely prepared by the developer. Negotiations within the public-private partnership
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shaped the overall renewal strategy and the spatial form of neighbourhoods.
While the local government increasingly places restrictions on building density, 
architectural quality, the protection of any listed buildings, and the standards of 
compensation, many site planning and design decisions were left to developers. 
Various positive inducements were provided to elicit the investment of property 
developers, but at the same time, compensation to sitting tenants was always a 
requirement. In relocation, households had to be compensated in accordance with 
the prevailing standards set by the government, and in relation to the market-price 
of properties demolished. In the community-retention model, affordable housing 
must be made available on-site for original households. In other words, the 
government extracts various quid pro quos in the public interest while ensuring 
private sector profitability. In fact the requirement for proper compensation is a 
formidable part of development costs, and increasingly challenges the profit margins 
feasible in redevelopment.
Beyond these formal arrangements, both the NFKL and TPQ cases also highlight 
enduring formal or informal relations between property developers and the local 
government that seem to underpin successful partnership arrangements. Zhang 
(2002) has argued that compared to countries such as the U.S the Chinese political 
system is more autonomous from business influence because local officials are 
appointed by the Communist Party centrally, and are exempt from processes such 
as business sponsorship. While this is true, it is also important to remember that 
China remains a country where ‘guanxi'- personal relationships based on long-term 
reciprocities are the key to get things done (Friedmann, 2005: 123). Businesses 
often hold close formal or informal social connections with local officials, which can 
reinforce a privileged position in negotiating deals, accessing land and forming 
partnerships with the local government.
It is important to note that most property developers at the outset were state-owned 
enterprises. They were set up by the government for taking up the function of 
comprehensive urban development and realising the urban master plans for the 
local governments. Some were subordinate organisations and quasi-government 
enterprises set up by local government bureau or central government ministries. 
Their corporate mission and personnel arrangements were linked to local authorities, 
though they were increasingly required to be self-financing in their operations. 
Current or retired officials often occupied key posts between their ‘parent’ institutions
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and these enterprises.
This was evident in the case of New Fukangli, whose principal developer was 
formed out of the JingAn district housing bureau and has since become one of the 
top 10 property development enterprises in Shanghai. Its company director was a 
member of the local People’s Congress, which provides opinions and feedback to 
the municipal government regarding local policy-making. A combination of 
favourable government support and profitable market circumstances sustained the 
rapid expansion of these developers, which included cheap land grants, soft- 
budgetary constraints, and other state subsidies.
Because local officials were interested in attracting capital investment, private 
enterprises also increasingly built up strong networks with government officials by 
collaborating over urban development projects. In the Taipingqiao redevelopment 
project, the principal developer Shui-On Group was well networked with senior local 
officials including the city Mayor. This social base provided the company with a 
privileged position to negotiate deals. It was at least in part an important basis by 
which Shui-On -  at the time a small property developer - could acquire the sole 
development rights to a very large area in a prime location.
Business leaders have been actively incorporated into various formal political 
institutions as privileged representatives of society. Over time, there was evidence 
that Shui-On’s commercial success as a developer consolidated its position as an 
elite business. Its top company officials became incorporated into the machinery of 
government, and were representatives of political institutions including the National 
Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, and the 
National People’s Congress. They also occupied key positions in various non­
governmental interest groups including the Chamber of International Commerce in 
Shanghai. Although there was insufficient information to understand what issues 
these actors were able to influence in these positions and how, it should be 
recognised that elite businesses were becoming well-represented in economic 
affairs and in the policy-making process both nationally and locally.
The relationship between public and private elites reflects changes in the post­
reform society. Ya Ping Wang (2004: 42) has argued that at the top of the social 
hierarchy in post-reform China is a ‘new rich class’ which includes senior 
government and party leaders, managers of state owned-enterprises, as well as
owners and managers of private businesses - capitalists who were now ironically 
invited to join the Communist Party. Though this remains a small group in 
proportional terms, their dominance in economic, social and political affairs should 
be recognised. In the process of urban development, resource-rich businesses have 
not only been materially supported to make investments, but with political 
representation which could further their capacity to participate in pro-growth 
endeavours.
8.5.3 Quasi-governmental enterprises: a dual role
While mutual interest in growth amongst property developers and the local 
government have been well acknowledged in the recent literature, it would be too 
simplistic to see it as the only basis for public-private collaboration. As demonstrated 
by the NFKL case study, quasi-governmental real estate enterprises assume a 
rather more complex role in urban development and should be distinguished from 
other private developers. On the one hand, the purpose of their establishment was 
in part to separate commercial functions from the state and for them to become 
financially independent enterprises. They are profit-seeking enterprises and have 
indeed been key actors in speculative redevelopment (Duckett, 1996; Zhang and 
Fang, 2004).
On the other hand, many operated in accordance with various bureaucratic 
instructions rather than merely market considerations. They often carried a basis of 
a dual mission -  to carry out normal profit-seeking functions, as well as to satisfy 
various responsibilities set by their superior public authorities. This meant being 
assigned various socially-oriented projects with limited or sometimes no profit 
potential -  such as housing rehabilitation or affordable housing construction. Indeed, 
quasi-governmental enterprises are usually the developers assigned to carry out the 
community-retention renewal model. There is a lack of detailed data to quantify how 
many property developers behave in this capacity, and what share of their 
operations have been socially-oriented endeavours. However, the expanding scale 
of socially-oriented housing rehabilitation indicates their pervasive and persistent 
role working with local authorities. This institutional relation is crucial to explaining 
how local governments can deliver certain policies and plans that are unlikely to be 
delivered by ‘the market’. Thus in NFKL, the local state was able to impose 
significant restrictions regarding on-site resettlement of residents and to ensure that 
the developer provided affordable units that for sitting tenants.
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The limitation here is that the community-retention is more difficult to sustain 
financially. It yields limited profit, is sometimes financially risky for developers, and 
needs to be supported by considerable public subsidies, loans or free land 
allocation. Thus, the government is cautious and somewhat unwilling to promote it 
as the dominant approach. This may also be because some quasi-governmental 
enterprises function as ‘cash cows’ who offer important incomes for government 
departments and bureaux (Duckett, 1996), and so local authorities are unwilling to 
require them to carry out excessive loss-making ventures. Thus socially-oriented 
renewal has so far been pursued in a more circumscribed extent, in neighbourhoods 
and projects that would not pose significant financial losses.
8.5.4 Grass-roots actors and housing renewal
While property developers were institutionally advantaged actors to participate in 
housing renewal, this study also identified the significance of bottom-up 
rehabilitation. This process echoes the widespread experience of gentrification in 
western cities (Smith and Williams, 1986; Ley, 1996; Atkinson and Bridge, 2005), 
though they have only been sporadic in Chinese cities. It is an emerging, and rarely 
acknowledged phenomenon.
One example examined was the rehabilitation of Taikang Road Tianzifang 
neighbourhood. Here it was an informal ‘conservation coalition’ comprising sub- 
district officials, artists, small businesses, creative firms, and many local residents 
who led a process of informal piecemeal upgrading. On the ground, various 
individuals and small businesses were responsible for the renovation of industrial 
and residential spaces. Although this was to some extent supported by the Street 
Office, they had little direct interaction with local authorities, and were not supported 
in the way of preferential policies apart from enjoying a relaxed regulatory 
environment. Suffice to say, with increasing marketisation, housing renewal was no 
longer entirely monopolised by the public sector and specialist property enterprises.
One way to view this phenomenon is that so long as the government continues to 
centralise political power, control urban planning process and retain land ownership, 
these incidences are likely to be rare and feasible only when they advance the 
development interests of the state. On the other hand, it is important to bear in mind 
its deeper significance. Heightened individual autonomy in cities - notably with 
respects to the moneyed middle class in society - may increasingly come to assert
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themselves directly or indirectly in the shaping of Chinese cities.
Though Taikang Road was a rare case involving illegal conversions of public 
housing, entirely legal processes of gentrification has also taken off in 
neighbourhoods where private ownership was more prevalent. As pointed out by the 
international experience, gentrification is most likely to take place in areas with 
spacious, aesthetic housing stock and good urban amenities (Shaw, 2005; 
Beauregard, 1986). Various historic neighbourhoods in Shanghai characterised by 
higher quality historic dwellings -  ‘garden villas’ or new-style lilong housing -  have 
since the late 1990s been subject to gentrification by wealthy households. The 
process could be found in several inner city districts such as Xuhui, JingAn and 
Changning -  corresponding to the former International and French Concessions.
The rarity and architectural value of these properties -  increasingly protected by 
Shanghai’s conservation system - meant that they now occupied the top end of the 
local housing market. High demand for these dwellings as places to live in or as 
aesthetic commercial premises considerably pushed up their value as properties 
and led to commercial conversion and gentrification. Like in Taikang Road, 
individual investors rather than large property development enterprises have often 
played a key role in these instances.
They also often involved a proactive role of the local residents as landlords or 
home-owners providing the housing supply, whether in a formal or informal capacity. 
As Logan and Molotch (1987) suggested, community groups are sometimes active 
participants and supporters of land-use intensification and gentrification. When 
conditions are right, those in the position to gain from the exchange value of their 
properties may help carry it along. In one sense, market-led rather than state- 
initiated rehabilitation was more inclusive of local residents than planned 
redevelopment. Fortunate landlords or home-owners in gentrifying areas may be 
able to significantly improve their financial status and move up the housing ladder 
as property prices become inflated.
The Taikang Road case suggested that the combined reinvestment activities of 
individuals can pose an alternative force of neighbourhood change, when they 
provoke support from public officials, the media and the wider society. Similar to the 
experience in other countries (Smith and Williams, 1986; Smith, 2002), 
‘spontaneous gentrification’ is often welcomed by local authorities -  both in
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designated conservation areas as well as in other areas neglected by official 
redevelopment plans. It was an expedient phenomenon for local governments and 
understood to be crucial to its interests in preserving architectural heritage. By 
changing public perceptions of certain neighbourhoods, for example regarding their 
aesthetic, cultural or economic value, and gaining support from local officials, 
bottom-up gentrification can potentially influence urban planning decisions.
8.5.5 Differentiating the growth-coalition
Looking across the range of public-private relations underlying housing renewal in 
Shanghai, a key insight is that it is important to move away from a monolithic 
conception of China’s growth coalition. It is clear that the local government acts as 
an entrepreneur to promote the physical and functional restructuring of the city in 
partnership with the private sector. Beyond supporting private accumulation, the 
local state plays an increasing role in market regulation and in addressing overall 
imbalances in the urban housing supply. The growth-coalition however was also not 
homogenous. It included different relationships amongst the local state, private and 
quasi-governmental sectors, which formulate across different places and under 
different policy agendas. These intricacies require us to look beyond the concept of 
a coherent growth coalition predicated on maximising growth and wealth 
accumulation, and to pay attention to the emerging role of grass-roots investors in 
influencing the fates of some neighbourhoods.
8.6 Local residents and the growth-coalition
8.6.1 The reiocation of residents
After reviewing the nature of public-private relations in housing renewal, this section 
scrutinises the implications of forced resident relocation and the complex 
relationship between residents and the state. David Harvey (1989) long highlighted 
that entrepreneurial strategies could be a source of urban divisions and instability 
when they become an excuse for extracting and enhancing of property values, 
rather than the amelioration of the conditions of the city. In Shanghai, the need to 
generate profit via property development generated conflict with the use-value of 
numerous older neighbourhoods. Residents have been excluded from decision 
making, and have been subject to immense pressures of displacement. Most 
scholars thus interpreted communities as essentially excluded actors in Chinese
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urban redevelopment (He and Wu, 2005; Zhang, 2002; Zhang and Fang, 2004). In 
one view, “residents [are] virtually shut out of the redevelopment decision- making 
process” and “local officials [do] not need to care about or be responsible to the 
residents, as [they are] appointed by upper level governments rather than elected” 
(Zhang and Fang, 2004: 294).
All three case studies involved the relocation of at least some existing residents, 
albeit to different degrees and through different mechanisms. In the redevelopment 
of Taipingqiao area, no provisions were made to re-house any of the 70,000 
inhabitants and 800 work units back in the original neighbourhood. Relocation was 
enacted in line with phases of development corresponding to the investment 
strategies of the developer. In New Fukangli, the local government supported on­
site resettlement. This was largely popular with better off household, and minimised 
the social disruptions of displacement. Nevertheless the cost implications meant 
that many poorer households could not afford the option. In contrast, piecemeal 
rehabilitation as seen in Taikang Road was based on a process of 'voluntary 
relocation'. Original tenants transferred their housing rights for additional income, as 
a basis for a move up the housing ladder. These residents were able to act in an 
autonomous manner in their self-interest, and there was no pressure of planned 
relocation. Thus, voluntary relocation was relatively popular, for those who were 
faced with the opportunity. Nevertheless rising prices associated with gentrification 
inevitably led to some pressures of displacement upon private tenants, including 
numerous migrants.
In comparison to voluntary relocation and onsite resettlement which were relatively 
popular with residents, the social cost of involuntary relocation has been visibly 
more pronounced and politically sensitive. Whether or not involuntary relocation was 
overall beneficial for the residents was a highly subjective matter. In each case 
study some interviewees did regard the process as a positive one, because it was a 
tangible channel for improving urban residents’ living conditions. While private 
tenants were not eligible for compensation officially, residents with ownership or 
public tenancy rights were entitled to proper resettlement and compensation.
In general residents could expect to resolve problems such as crowding, lack of 
facilities, or physical decay. They could expect to move into more modern forms of 
flats or apartments, more spacious units, with better privacy. They would also have 
the rare opportunity to become home-owners. Thus, a survey of relocated
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households in Shanghai in 2001 suggested that more than a quarter of residents , 
displaced from real estate schemes expressed satisfaction (25.8%) or high 
satisfaction (4.3%) with the outcomes, while about half (52.7%) were overall neutral 
about the outcomes -  perhaps acknowledging a mixture of benefits and costs (Wu, 
2004).
Nevertheless, relocation was also often perceived as an oppressive practice that did 
not take into consideration the real needs and preferences of citizens. The findings 
in this study reinforce that of other recent studies (Wu, 2004; He and Wu, 2007; 
Shin, 2007). They demonstrate that relocation could be a process of marginalisation. 
While it resolves some apparent physical housing problems, it can introduce new 
dimensions of inequality and disadvantage. Residents had no say in what 
constitutes ‘fair compensation’. This has been determined in a top-down manner 
between developers and the government. Communities facing redevelopment 
comprised a mix of urban and rural status, formal and informal tenancy. Migrants 
were in many ways the most disadvantaged. As informal tenants with no property 
rights they had no entitlement to compensation and must find alternative 
accommodation themselves. There has been no formal record of their resettlement 
outcomes. The power relationship underlying relocation has also been asymmetric, 
and at times oppressive. The government maintains the right to pursue for forced 
relocation if residents do not move out after a certain amount of time. Relocation 
staff sometimes resorted to harassment and even violence to enforce the speedy 
compliance of residents. They sometimes withheld rightful compensation form 
residents to increase their own profits, because residents were not properly 
informed of compensation standards.
Their lack of choice to ‘stay-put’ was evidently problematic. Many families felt 
relatively satisfied and attached to where they lived, and had little desire for moving. 
Many were concerned about losing their existing social ties, becoming more socially 
isolated, and being disconnected from places they have become deeply connected 
with. Many obstacles existed for residents to attain a satisfactory relocation 
experience. While owners and public tenants were generally assured of 
compensation, resettlement housing tended to be located in distant, poorly 
connected suburban areas, while monetary payment has often been insufficient to 
allow them to move to a neighbourhood of choice within the city. Thus, residents 
voiced considerable concerns that relocation would bring about additional living 
difficulties - such as living in an inconvenient and less accessible location, facing
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high commuting costs, and losing access to quality schools and healthcare. 
Regardless of the objective gains they may derive in relocating, they may face great 
difficulties adjusting to all of these changes.
Monetised relocation mechanisms, which prevailed across China after 2001, tended 
also to reinforce socio-spatial differentiation, by sorting the poor out to cheaper 
urban locations. As discussed by He and Wu (2007) residents’ capacity to resettle 
themselves was significantly contingent on their individual socio-economic status. 
Affluent families who had already moved out of their dilapidated homes benefited 
the most by reaping in cash compensation. Poor families were inevitably the most 
constrained in their re-housing choice. In the short term as some quantities of 
deteriorated housing still remained circulating in the market, some residents have 
been able to rent or purchase these dwellings. This allowed some of them to protect 
themselves from the adverse effects of a move to peripheral locations. However 
with continuous demolition, affordable older housing is a rapidly depleting resource. 
However, all the residents interviewed felt that they had too little means to resist. At 
most, some suggested that they may resort to squatting to slow down 
redevelopment and to bargain for higher pay-offs.
8.6.2 Grassroots resistance and the state
While the case studies overall demonstrated substantial government authority to 
enforce resident compliance, there is additional evidence to suggest that the state- 
community relationship has been more dynamic. Some citizens have taken more 
aggressive action to voice their discontent, and in response to these, the state has 
acted with care to grant certain concessions and to appease social conflict.
Lack of right to stay put in their neighbourhoods, insufficient compensation, lack of 
clear compensation standards, and oppressive relocation tactics have all fuelled 
profound discontent among residents. Although relevant data is scarce, it has been 
noted that residents have organised protests, petitions and class-action suits 
against developers and even local governments (Zhang and Fang, 2004). For 
example in Shanghai there were a total of 285 petitions with 172 collective petitions 
regarding relocation in 2002 alone (He and Biddulf, 2006). The U.S Congressional- 
Executive Commission on China (CECC), which monitors human rights issues, also
299
records numerous incidents.29 In January 2003 a group of 132 residents upset at 
being evicted from their homes protested in front of municipal government buildings 
in Shanghai. In August, 2003, residents of Jingan District residents filed a lawsuit 
against a property developer Zhou Zhengyi, alleging that the eviction of the 
residents from their homes had been unlawful.
Citizen resistance was a nation-wide, rather than a local phenomenon. From 
January to July 1995 alone a total of 3,151 people registered 163 collective 
complaints about housing redevelopment projects with the Beijing Municipal 
Government (Wang 1996, 35, cited in Zhang and Fang, 2004). In September 2003, 
a 45-year-old peasant from Anhui, committed self-immolation in public in Beijing to 
protest his forced eviction. In November 2003, a group of 40 protesters from 
Qingdao (Shangdong province) sat in front of Zhongnanhai in Beijing to protest their 
unlawful eviction. In May 2004 a total of 400 residents in Shenzhen protested the 
demolition of their homes in front of the proposed site and then took a hostage. 
Many incidents are never publicly reported, and the number of actual incidents is 
very likely much higher than reflected in media reports. Most protestors are normally 
detained by the police and their grievances barred (CECC, 2005). Nevertheless, 
cumulatively, these have come to be regarded by the authorities as a major problem 
and a crucial nexus for managing social and economic development.
In response to growing tensions the central government has since 2003 set in place 
efforts to promote higher compensation, more transparent relocation procedures 
and to ensure more emphasis on affordable housing construction. Especially under 
the principles of well-balanced development in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006- 
2010), levels of government have devoted more resources to resolving conflicts and 
lessening the difficulties of vulnerable groups (ruoshi tuanti) in society. Notably this 
included the willingness to handle and appease complaints and grievances voiced 
by the masses (Lam, 2006). Chapter 5 showed that relocation policies have been 
constantly evolving. Since 2005, Shanghai implemented measures to enhance the 
transparency of compensation, to control the rate of commercial development, to 
outlaw oppressive relocation tactics, and to ensure an adequate supply of 
resettlement housing is always available. In other words, relocation was not a story 
of one-sided top-down determination, but a dynamic arena of conflict resolution. In
29 http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/rol/forcedevictionchart.php, Last accessed 14 December 
2009
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the 11th five-year plan period a key task was to focus on affordable housing 
construction to keep up with the diverse demands of relocated households. New 
policies also stressed that relocation housing needed to be better designed and 
integrated with public transport, in particular the metro system, so as to enhance the 
convenience of residents’ everyday lives (SMG, 2006). These represented some 
concrete actions taken to diffuse widespread social discontent and to ensure better 
incorporation of social interests in urban redevelopment.
Reflecting upon these changes, Ren (2008: 41) recently argued that the growth 
coalition should be seen to be “under constant challenges from community 
residents”. In his view, residents actions such as squatting, petitions and protests 
can be effective forms of informal resistance that have “significantly changed the 
pace of urban development [projects], and forced the state to change its response to 
resettlement issues” (ibid: 40). A different, more accurate view is that indeed 
resident resistance do matter and can cumulatively and over time influence the 
policies of the state. However its capacity for influence remains limited. The above 
changes in policy were not major victories to the grassroots. Instead they were 
‘small concessions’ intended to appease local discontent while sustaining the 
established model of urban growth.
Power and resources remain concentrated in the growth coalition, and policies 
remains firmly committed to substantial relocation. The call for greater transparency 
in relocation did not mean that residents would be given opportunities to converse 
with local authorities or to influence development plans, only that they would be 
better assured of their entitlements. The locations of affordable housing to be built 
for the poor were still far from desirable. The “Shanghai City Housing Construction 
Plan for 2006-2010” (SMG, 2006) identified several key sites for relocation housing: 
Gucun area in Baoshan district, Jiangqiao area in Jiading district, Caolu area in 
Pudong district, Kangqiao area in Nanhui district and Pujiang area in Minhang 
district. All of these were peripheral areas generally more than 30 km from of the city 
centre. Transport infrastructures and living amenities are yet to be developed.
The weak position of grassroots actors can be understood in relation to underlying 
economic and political factors. In liberal democracies public elections, political 
grass-roots groups and the disabling effects of social movements constitute 
important political forces that can influence state policies and to demand changes 
from the local government (Fainstein, 1987; Mollenkopf, 1983). Thus, in countries
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such as the U.S and the UK, governments have been pressured to significantly alter 
or discontinue their major demolition programmes, and to promote ‘genuine’ citizen 
participation (Teaford 2000; Gibson and Langstaff, 1982). In China however popular 
representation remained all but absent and civil society has not yet been allowed to 
claim a significant role in urban renewal (Friedmann, 2005). The division between 
those wishing for relocation and those who did not, coupled with the lack of 
resources, lack of democratic representation, and fear of state authority all 
prevented neighbourhoods from becoming a strong political force in urban change. 
Although citizen unrest can prompt the state to respond -  an important issue in itself 
- the public sector's command power has not been fundamentally challenged. It 
could be said that the state has so far been effective in terms of setting in place 
measures of social control that appeased the majority and avoided mounting 
opposition.
8.7 Conclusion:
Housing renewal since 1990 has been a complex, multi-faceted process involving a 
range of actors and evolving institutions. This chapter demonstrates that the widely 
held conception of a monolithic growth coalition driving housing renewal overlooks 
the complexities of underlying social relations. To properly account for the socio­
political dynamics underlying housing renewal post-reform Chinese cities such as 
Shanghai, greater attention needs to be given to the evolving, multi-faceted role of 
the local state, and to its varied inter-relations with society. A number of key findings 
are summarised here.
In the wake of administrative and fiscal decentralisation, the entrepreneurial local 
government has been a key actor promoting and regulating processes of housing 
renewal at urban level. The central government remains important only as a macro- 
regulator and in its steering of continued institutional reforms. At the local level, 
rapid economic growth and physical modernisation were key governing concerns. 
Accordingly, the local state' has intervened most effectively and decisively in those 
areas conducive to economic growth and in producing the types of spaces and 
facilities serving large businesses and more affluent residents. As claimed by the 
growth-coalition literature, local officials, local businesses and incoming foreign 
capital have been bound into an informal coalition. Real estate development and 
planned relocation was a central set of mechanisms for housing renewal. The local 
state has been strategic in setting in place conditions to attract and sustain the
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participation of the private sector as partners in urban redevelopment. Complex 
administrative and informal networks between real estate actors and the local 
government underpinned enduring partnership arrangements across a plethora of 
projects.
However it is necessary to move beyond a simplistic pro-growth characterisation of 
the state. The state at various levels acted also to sustain legitimacy in the eyes of 
less privileged citizens, and it has promoted some complementary housing 
initiatives aimed to appease inequality and to service lower-income urban citizens. 
The central government has enacted policies to promote the construction of 
affordable housing. It has also issued macro-policies to curb housing price inflation, 
albeit with limited effectiveness. At the local level, the municipal government has 
gradually expanded housing rehabilitation and redevelopment programmes 
supporting community retention, and it has in recent years stepped up regulation of 
the market to enhance housing access for lower-income groups. Apparently, the 
urban growth coalition was not internally ‘homogeneous’ or solely dedicated to profit 
maximisation. Various quasi-governmental enterprises played a crucial role 
delivering projects with apparent welfare agendas. These enterprises were curiously 
both profit-seeking and tied to the legitimating public functions of the state. Their 
operations, partly influenced by public authority, to some extent complemented the 
deficiencies of ‘the market’.
As pointed out by the existing literature, tensions between the pursuit of 
modernisation and private profit with the use and conservation value of old 
neighbourhoods were apparent. Dilapidated housing targeted for demolition had 
some under-appreciated aesthetic, cultural and historical significance. Many were 
also relatively socially inclusive in terms of their central locations, established social 
bonds, and affordability for the poor. Large scale demolition incurred substantial 
cultural well as social costs, as older affordable housing was eliminated and the 
poor were moved, often involuntarily, towards the urban peripheries.
Adding to these insights, this study showed that ‘counter-dynamics’ to the 
redevelopment coalition have emerged, with varying impacts. Grass-root actors 
such as small businesses and individuals have revitalised some run-down 
neighbourhoods with perceived aesthetic or location value, sometimes with only 
limited government intervention. At times, coalitions of local officials, local 
institutions and the media may converge to mount a conservation movement for
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specific neighbourhoods, and challenge redevelopment plans.
The study also highlighted that relocation was not merely a story of one-sided, top- 
down determination, as claimed in the growth coalition literature. The state- 
community relationship here has been more dynamic. As citizens have taken more 
aggressive action to voice their discontent, the state has had to act carefully to grant 
them certain concessions and to appease social conflict. Accordingly, there has 
been a shift towards more sophisticated measures to co-opt resident acceptance of 
redevelopment. Yet, the state has so far been effective in terms appeasing the 
majority and avoiding mounting opposition, without significantly altering existing 
models of development, without empowering residents, or indeed without 
significantly lowering the rate of displacement. These suggest that while grassroots 
activities do have some influence on urban policies, state authority remains a 
dominant force in on-going housing renewal. Chapter 9 concludes the research by 
evaluating the academic and policy implications of these findings.
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9 Conclusions
9.1 Introduction
Socialist China was well known for the low quality of its urban housing. Associated 
with the country’s long development history, many older cities inherited significant 
quantities of traditional housing with outdated amenities. The socialist housing 
system offered an unfavourable framework for sustaining housing quality. Under the 
economic principle of 'production first', and ‘consumption’ a distant second, the 
Chinese state consistently under-invested in housing provision and maintenance of 
the urban environment. As a result, by the 1970s Chinese cities were plagued by 
severe housing shortages, over-crowding, deficient infrastructures, and physical 
decay (Wang and Murie, 1996; Lee, 1998). However, it was shown that against the 
backdrop of market transition, administrative decentralisation and economic 
restructuring, a wave of housing renewal took off at a dizzying pace from the early 
1990s.
This thesis intended to address both empirical and analytical shortcoming in the 
literature. China's urban housing problems and more recent efforts in housing 
redevelopment has become the subject of a growing body of research (e.g. He and 
Wu, 2005; Wang, 2004; Zhang and Fang, 2003, 2004; Shin, 2007; Tian and Wong, 
2007). However, compared to the scale of operations carried out, the amount of 
research has been relatively small. Furthermore, while redevelopment has been the 
focus of most recent research, very few studies have examined housing renewal as 
a broader set of interventions. Consequently, relatively little is known about the 
evolving policies and practices concerning housing rehabilitation, historic 
conservation, or community retention, and how different approaches work together 
as part of China's endeavours to address housing problems. It was argued that a 
more holistic understanding of the topic must embrace these different components.
This thesis also raised analytical questions about the socio-political drivers behind 
housing renewal in post-reform China. In recent years, the “Chinese growth 
coalition” perspective has become a key approach to analyse the institutional 
features of urban redevelopment (Zhang and Fang, 2004; Zhang, 2002; Zhu, 1999; 
Fu, 2002b; He and Wu, 2005). This perspective, which has origins from the “urban
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growth machine”, “entrepreneurial city”, and “urban regime theories" in western 
literature, asserts that urban redevelopment in post-reform China is driven by a 
growth coalition of public and private elites. Their quest to maximise economic 
growth through the intensification of land-use takes place at the cost of large-scale 
displacement of the poor. The perspective emphasises the primacy of 
“entrepreneurial” local government as a key driver of the coalition who provided the 
conditions for market-oriented development, and the political exclusion of 
“communities” in the urban redevelopment process.
Although this perspective has been widely accepted, it is still based on a limited 
number of studies. Chapters one and two of this thesis pointed out that some of its 
core assertions require further scrutiny. For example, the perspective assumes that 
both local government and property enterprises operate primarily in the interest of 
boosting local growth and wealth accumulation. This potentially overlooks the 
evolving “social” role of central and local government. It also appears to overlook 
the complex role of state-owned enterprises in fulfilling 'public' purposes, 
traditionally to the neglect of market rationality or profit-motivation. Whether growth 
should be considered the only government agenda in housing renewal, whether 
local enterprises are necessarily profit-seeking actors in the growth coalition, and to 
what extent urban citizens can impact policies are issues requiring further 
qualification. Given that the growth-coalition perspective has so far been developed 
through examination of urban redevelopment projects which involved significant 
displacement of residents, it is also important to evaluate the accuracy of its claims 
by examining other kinds of housing renewal interventions.
To provide a more holistic understanding of urban housing renewal in post-reform 
China, to assess the validity of the Chinese growth-coalition perspective, and to 
consider how it might otherwise be enhanced, this thesis examined two central 
questions:
• How has Shanghai responded to the task of housing renewal -  including 
redevelopment; historic conservation and rehabilitation - since 1990?
• Does the “Chinese growth coalition”perspective adequately capture the 
social and political dynamics of housing renewal in post-1990 Shanghai? If 
notf how can it be modified?
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Accordingly, the preceding chapters have examined the evolving policies and 
practices of urban housing renewal in Shanghai since 1990, with a particular focus 
on the renewal of older inner city housing. Adopting a broad approach, this study 
clarified the nature of urban housing problems in Shanghai, the governing agendas 
underlying housing renewal, the kinds of policies, interventions and organisational 
forms mobilised in the process, and the kinds of impacts these had on targeted 
neighbourhoods and communities.
The study was based on a mix-method approach including interviews, case studies 
and a range of secondary data. It drew on 21 interviews with local officials, real 
estate enterprises, urban planners and academics, 2 pilot case studies, 3 in-depth 
case studies documenting contrasting renewal processes, and included 35 
interviews with residents of dilapidated housing. The combination of methodologies 
and the selection of contrasting, “critical incidence” case studies (Savitch, 1988: 24) 
enabled the researcher as much as possible to build a holistic view of urban 
housing renewal and the range of institutions and processes it involved.
This concluding chapter revisits the research questions and summarises the main 
findings. Section two summarises how Shanghai addressed the problem of housing 
renewal since 1990. It argues that housing renewal has involved a more complex,
i
more diverse set of measures and organisational forms than commonly 
acknowledged. Section three draws conclusions about the validity of the Chinese 
growth coalition perspective. It argues that although the perspective correctly 
captures some essential features of the socio-political dynamics in urban China, it is 
overly monolithic in its conceptualisation of the local government, the nature of 
public-private relations, and the role of grassroots actors. An original, modified 
perspective deriving from the key findings is provided -  one that offers a more 
nuanced interpretation to the topic. Section four outlines some policy 
recommendations in light of the key findings, linking these to various issues 
requiring further research. The closing section considers the future prospects of 
urban development and redevelopment in China, highlighting the issues that should 
continue to interest researchers in the coming decades.
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9.2 How Shanghai engineered housing renewal
This section summarise how Shanghai has addressed the complex task of urban 
housing redevelopment, rehabilitation and historic conservation since 1990. In the 
prevailing accounts of housing renewal, local and international property developers 
have entered into coalition with local government in the interest of promoting growth, 
and redevelopment has inevitably meant the displacement of the poor, 
accompanied by the production of amenities for higher-income groups (e.g. Zhang 
and Fang, 2004; Zhang, 2002; He and Wu, 2005; He, 2007;). This study shows that 
these analytical abstractions are useful, but can be extended in several ways. A key 
insight is that housing renewal entailed not a single, but a range of different 
approaches, involving different actors and different specific objectives in intervention. 
The heterogeneity of renewal processes in urban China has been a relatively 
neglected issue because many scholars have been preoccupied with delineating 
and explaining the most salient processes. This has been at the expense of 
providing a more nuanced reading of the city and its transformations.
9.2.1 Housing problems in Shanghai
What urban housing problems did the local government seek to address?
Shanghai is not unique in China in terms of the urban housing problems it faced by 
1990, although the symptoms were among the most acute. The city flourished as a 
treaty port from the middle of the 19th century and emerged as the financial centre of 
the Far-East by the 1920s, inheriting a rich legacy of cosmopolitan-styled residential 
architecture including villas, apartments, lane-housing (lilong housing), as well as 
more informally constructed slums. Over-crowding and physical decay already 
became significant problems by the 1930s. Since 1949, Shanghai was gradually 
turned into the leading industrial centre of China’s centrally planned economy. 
However, limited capital investment and the absence of comprehensive planning 
over the subsequent decades meant that the housing shortage and a degraded 
urban environment became more widespread. By the 1980s, millions of residents 
lived in over-crowded and run-down dwellings in the inner city, sharing basic 
sanitation facilities. Residential densities in inner-city Shanghai was amongst the 
highest in the world (67,700 persons/km2), and the city subsisted on infrastructure 
inherited from the early 20th century (SSB, 2004b). In 1985 about one-third of all 
households had less than 6 m2 of housing space per capita, 44% shared running
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water with multiple families, and abut 57% did not have an indoor WC. These were 
the major problems the local government sought to address through a complex and 
ambitious set of urban renewal interventions.
These symptoms were most acute in old neighbourhoods in the inner city. Most of 
the dwellings here originated between the late 19th century and the institution of the 
People’s Republic of China in 1949, although significant numbers of 1950 and 
1960s flats (“staff housing”) were also in dire need of improvement by 1990. Though 
much of the historic fabric had some under-recognised value as local architectural 
heritage, most were classified as dangerous dwellings or slums. 3.65 million m2 was 
designated for demolition in the 1990s, and an additional 20 million m2 between 
2001-2010. In general, their problems they exhibited had much in common with 
poor neighbourhoods in other Chinese cities and other developing countries, 
including over-crowding, physical decay, leaking, poor sound or thermal insulation, 
deficient sanitation facilities, shared cooking facilities, increasing concentration of 
the poor and workless, systemic under-maintenance and low institutional capacity 
for comprehensive neighbourhood upgrading. The dwellings were concentrated in 
inner city districts - well-connected places with mature urban amenities, where land 
prices had become very high and thus attractive for real estate development.
In the wake of market reform, poor quality housing began to experience significant 
social changes -  a consequence of heightened urban residential mobility and socio­
economic disparity (Huang, 2005; Li and Wu, 2006). Similar to the experience of 
many European countries (Lee and Murie, 1999; Primus and Dieleman, 2002), 
home ownership in China has expanded considerably as market-based housing 
production grew exponentially and access to loans for house purchase have 
widened, reaching 71% by 2005 (SSB, 2006). Predictably, the better-off population 
moved away from substandard older housing as more attractive housing 
alternatives emerged in the housing market, and rural-urban migration brought in 
migrant workers to succeed them.
Yet against the background of deepening social divisions and diverging 
requirements for housing, a paradox emerged between old, run-down housing as a 
liability for urban authorities, and as a resource for the poor. For example, the 
municipal housing system remained very affordable for low-income urban residents, 
despite some advances in rental reform. Their central locations were often valued, 
because residents could easily travel to and from a host of urban services, formal,
309
formal and informal work opportunities, and reduce transportation time and costs. It 
is also important to recognise that apparent physical problems of Chinese cities 
were not historically associated with pronounced social problems such as crime or 
conflict. Because there was limited residential mobility under the centrally planned 
system, community composition often remained stabile and neighbours were able to 
develop substantial social networks over time. Thus, run-down neighbourhoods 
sometimes continued to retain substantial social networks of significance for mutual 
support and residential satisfaction. The complex mix of problems and assets has 
been a crucial determinant of social conflict in the housing redevelopment process.
9.2.2 The socio-economic context
What economic and social context conditioned housing renewal in post-1990s 
Shanghai?
There is considerable agreement internationally that socio-economic conditions 
influence the broad contours of property demands, household preferences, and also 
the social-disparities that underlie social exclusion <(e.g. Ley, 1996; Lupton 2003; 
Grigsby et al 1987). These turn can support or constrain the options and parameters 
of policy-making and implementation at the urban level (DiGaetano and Strom 2003; 
DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1999). Globally, the long-term shift towards a service- 
based economy brought new demands for urban land use. It also drove 
occupational changes involving the increasing concentration of professional, 
managerial and technical workers, alongside the deepening of social inequalities. 
These trajectories are said to in turn underpin the refashioning of the city centre as 
a site for business, consumption and middle-class living - the gentrification of 
numerous industrialised cities since the 1970s (Sassen, 2000; Ley, 1996; Marcuse; 
1986; Smith and Williams, 1986).
Key writers contributing to the analysis of China’s urbsan development recognise that 
socio-economic restructuring provided a supportive context for large-scale housing 
redevelopment. Since the economic reforms Clhina has experienced rapid 
urbanisation and sustained, rapid economic growth as an international 
manufacturing centre. Large cities, such as Shanghai and Beijing, have become 
major generators of economic growth and have attracted substantial investment 
from both international corporations and domestic investors seeking better returns in 
large cities. A process of industrial restructuring amd emerging patterns of social
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inequality also conditioned the uneven patterns of urban renewal and the 
distribution of its benefits and costs observed (e.g. He and Wu, 2005: 6; Zhang, 
2002; Wang, 2004).
Although Shanghai remains a significant industrial centre, the traditionally dominant 
manufacturing sector has declined in importance, while growing tertiary sectors 
including finance, insurance, real estate, business services, retail, and grew rapid to 
represent about 60% of the city’s GDP and the labour-force in 2008. The expansion 
of key sectors of the service economy under both global and domestic investment 
created a surge of demand for commercial facilities including new office space, 
headquarters, hotels, and retail centres, much of it in central locations previously 
occupied by dilapidated housing or factories. The occupational structure and income 
distribution in Shanghai has also changed, characterised by an upward shift in 
income as well as greater inequality. Although the extent of professionalisation of 
the labour force has been modest compared to global cities (at around 13% of the 
workforce), there has been a notable growth of entrepreneurs, professional and 
managerial workers. In addition, almost 150,000 expatriates and employees of 
foreign funded enterprises now constitute another sizeable segment of the urban 
moneyed class with strong demand for housing and services (SSB, 2004b, 2009). 
Rising affluence amongst more privileged social groups sustained demand for new 
and better housing in the city, alongside spaces for leisure and consumption. Thus, 
the apparent urban form and social composition of revitalised inner city 
neighbourhoods increasingly resembled a gentrified post-industrial milieu, designed 
for the living, working and consumption demands of a new middle class in 
ascendancy.
Nevertheless, China’s reforms and economic transformations simultaneously led to 
deepened social inequalities. Registered unemployment has risen from 0.2% in 
1985 to 4.9% by 2003 (SSB, 2004). At the bottom end of urban society exists a 
large population of low-paid workers engaged in low- or semi-skilled labour, and 
growing numbers of the unemployed who were casualties in the painful restructuring 
of SOEs and industrial enterprises (Wang, 2004). As institutional reforms in the 
1980s loosened previous institutional constrains regarding population movement, 
almost six million rural migrants have moved into Shanghai (SSB, 2006), forming a 
new class of “non-official urban poor” (Wang, 2000) As these disadvantaged groups 
disproportionally become residualised in the poor quality housing stock, they 
became the principle targets of planned redevelopment and relocation. The
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conflicting and uneven claims on urban space between the privileged and 
disadvantaged citizens originate from these socio-economic cleavages.
9.2.3 Underlying agendas of housing renewai
What were the government’s agendas in housing renewal?
Shanghai’s experience of urban renewal was not simply ‘demand-driven’. The 
country’s gradualist, ‘two-tracked’ reform meant that state has maintained significant 
ownership and political control in the hands of the Communist Party, while 
liberalisation and market mechanisms have been developed in the economic sphere 
(Wang, 2004). It is also well recognised that in the wake of administrative and fiscal 
decentralisation, local government has become a key actor in urban development. 
While central government has been a crucial steering force through its reform 
policies, its role in urban development has been scaled back as a macro-level 
regulator. The empowered local government was a key driving force in terms of 
setting urban agendas and targets, regulating the pace of urban renewal, and 
opening up opportunities for property development (Zhang, 2002; Zhu, 1999; Wu, 
2007; He and Wu, 2005).
The primary interests of local government in enacting housing renewal were to carry 
housing reforms as defined by the state, to modernise the urban environment, to 
raise urban living standards, and to promote local economic growth. In 1991, 
Shanghai was officially designated by the central government as the "dragon's 
head" of the Yangtze River Delta region, and the Shanghai Municipal Government 
has increasingly since embraced the goal of becoming a global financial, trading 
and commercial centre. It actively promoted urban restructuring, in which housing 
renewal was an important component part. Public resources have since then been 
geared towards restructuring the city and attracting the urban functions that serve 
this over-arching purpose (Li and Wu, 2006b).
After decades of sustained under-investment in the built environment, 
modernisation dominated the political agenda, and the clearance of slum areas 
became a core concern. Like many other developing countries, dilapidated older 
housing caime to be regarded as a major urban ‘problem’ rather than an important 
component of housing solutions and of community life. As real estate became one 
key pillar of the economy and land-leasing a major source of local revenues, there
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was strong motivation to promote the real estate sector to drive slum clearance (Wu 
et al., 2007). China's housing policy since 1990 also carried the idea that 
households in substandard inner city housing would be better off if they could be 
moved to less crowded and better serviced housing elsewhere. A major 
preoccupation was to ease pressures in the over-crowded inner city by 
decentralising the population towards suburban areas through relocation, and to put 
inner city land to higher value use. This would not only help relieve over-crowding 
and modernise the built environment, but also help promote economic development 
and increase local revenues.
Conservation of locally distinctive yet low quality housing was a marginal concern of 
the government in the 1990s. Shanghai was formally designated as one of the 
“Renowned Historic and Cultural Cities” by the State Council in 1986 - an accolade 
which came with the responsibility to facilitate historic conservation. The “Shanghai 
Historic and Cultural City Conservation Plan” was prepared in 1991, although these 
early plans did not lead to effective protection of historic areas. They did not set out 
in sufficient detail the conditions and regulations for specific areas, there was no 
legislative basis for enforcing development controls, and in practice urban planners 
found them too vague for discussions over specific development proposals.
Nevertheless, local governing agendas were evolving. During the “New Round of 
Urban Renewal” (2001-2010), a more sophisticated approach advocating 
“demolition, rehabilitation and improvement” (chai, liu, gai) was gradually rolled out. 
Since then, while redevelopment remained a driving component, housing 
rehabilitation and conservation became increasingly prominent complementary 
concerns. By the 2000s local officials began to understand that heritage represented 
a vital cultural and economic resource for the city. A clear political agenda for 
selective heritage conservation has emerged, to help retain the linkages to 
Shanghai's cosmopolitan past and as a tool for tourism and commercial expansion. 
It appears that, whether in European cities or Asian cities, a restored and aesthetic 
historic environment has become a crucial part of local efforts to build a distinctive 
city imagery, to attract tourist dollars and to support the development of leisure and 
recreational consumption industries (Bianchini and Parkinson, 1993; Pendlebury, 
2000).
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9.2.4 The strategies and organisation of housing renewal
What key strategies did the iocal government adopt to achieve intended goals? 
Through what organisational forms was housing renewal conceived and 
implemented?
In response to the varied agendas of the government, one intriguing issue this study 
demonstrates is that “housing renewal” in increasingly involved a range of 
interventions in post-1990 Shanghai. It included large-scale redevelopment, 
selective rehabilitation and heritage conservation, alongside forced relocation, and 
some community retention. Up to the 1980s, housing renewal in Chinese cities 
tended to be government-funded, limited to small scale-repair works or selective 
redevelopment, and premised on the ‘on-site resettlement’ of residents back to the 
new housing, often free of charge (Xu, 2004; Wu and He, 2005). Key changes in 
housing renewal from 1990, alongside market reforms and political decentralisation, 
included the shift from centrally planned to market mechanisms, from free
administrative land provision towards leasing of land-use rights to developers, and 
the shift from community retention to a policy of resident relocation. While local 
government dominated policy-making and setting of targets, a new institutional 
arrangement of 'public-private partnership' was established to finance, design and 
implement specific housing renewal projects (Wu et al, 2007; He and Wu, 2005). Yet, 
several models of renewal evolved.
The most well known and prevalent model has been private-funded and
government-subsidised speculative redevelopment, based (primarily) on off-site 
relocation of residents. This has commonly been termed the "property-led
redevelopment model” and is seen to typify housing renewal in post-reform China 
(He and Wu, 2005; He, 2007; Shin, 2007). Since 1992, property-led redevelopment 
characterised the "365 slum clearance" programme and underpinned most
redevelopment schemes involving lilong housing. It remained a key component of 
the "New Round of Urban Renewal" (2001-2010), under which almost 20 million m2 
of old housing was to be demolished.
Here, the private sector was an essential partner responsible for organising 
investment, producing detailed plans and architectural designs and delivering 
projects. Meanwhile, local government activities used public resources and its 
authority to remove difficulties with respect to factors such as ownership, resident
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relocation, infrastructure and financing. Many favourable supply-side subsidies were 
provided to maintain the investment momentum of developers and to channel 
investment towards targeted renewal areas. These included for instance 
streamlined application processes, reduced administrative charges, relaxed 
planning controls, subsidised land transfers, direct subsidies or low-interest loans to 
developers. As a major property owner and manager of urban land, local 
government also facilitated the relocation of residents away from targeted 
neighbourhoods and supported the replacement of older housing by high-end 
commercial and residential developments. In the 1990s, residents were offered 
compensation in the form of replacement housing. After 2001, monetary 
compensation became the dominant form through which residents were expected to 
find their own resettlement housing in the market. With the proceeds from land- 
leasing revenues, local government also invested heavily in infrastructure provision 
and landscaping projects. Thus, decaying inner city areas were transformed into 
tracts of highly valuable land for the real estate industry and commercial users.
While the above features are by now increasingly well recognised, this study 
highlights that socially-oriented renewal programmes supporting community- 
retention has been a complementary, and actually growing aspect of housing policy. 
This “community retention model” was more akin to the principles of housing 
renewal in the pre-reform era. It promoted on-site resettlement of sitting tenants 
instead of relocation, and rehabilitation where feasible instead of redevelopment. 
The purpose was to turn substandard lilong housing or staff housing into self- 
sufficient units with independent bathroom, kitchen, and to upgrade their public 
environment and community facilities.
Originating from public-led experiments in small-scale residential rehabilitation, this 
model evolved slowly in the 1990s as a marginal policy initiative. Since 2001, 
however, it expanded considerably as the improvement of large numbers of 
substandard post-1949 staff housing became a significant public commitment. The 
local government mobilised quasi-governmental enterprises to undertake these less 
profitable ventures, pooling together financing from local residents, property 
developers and public resources to achieve more socially balanced development. 
Discounted sale of units to sitting tenants rather than displacement formed the basic 
principles of their operation. To ensure overall financial viability, a number of 
concessions were generally offered to the property developers, such as density 
bonuses, exemption of land-leasing premiums, direct fiscal loans and the relaxation
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of certain building regulations. In other words, public subsidies had also flowed to 
some extent into socially oriented projects.
Meanwhile, to address emerging concerns for protecting locally distinctive 
architectural heritage, local government has been active in enhancing its urban 
historic conservation planning system since 2002. This comprised a system of local 
building listings, historic conservation areas, and a set of local legislations to 
enforce conservation planning. The “Shanghai city conservation reguiations for 
historic conservation areas and outstanding historic buildings” was rolled out in 
2003 to give legislative basis for heritage protection. 12 historic conservation areas 
totalling 27 km2 (about one-tenth of the inner city area) have come under detailed 
planning protection. In these areas about 12 million m2of villas, historic apartments, 
new-style lilong and old-style lilong housing were given different levels of protected 
status -  representing about 8% of all inner city housing stock in 2005.
What has so far been achieved is a conservation planning system to ensure 
“protection” of heritage in conservation areas, but the prospects for on-going 
“renewal” remains unclear. In contrast to many developed countries, most of the 
conservation strategies developed so far have been regulative tools to facilitate 
development control, whereas there remains a lack of measures building incentives 
for private investment. Thus, major questions remain regarding who can finance the 
renewal of protected heritage. More recently, historic conservation has occasionally 
and selectively incorporated into market-based real estate development schemes, 
where it has a role in fostering a unique identity and raising the cultural appeal of 
projects, but the trend was towards conversion of residential legacies into up-market, 
globally oriented spaces of consumption and recreation.
Widespread private-funded rehabilitation has so far been constrained by various 
factors: high cost implications of relocation, profitability limits of conservation, 
fragmented property rights due to multiple-occupancy, and also in part the low- 
quality (and thus limited middle-class demand for) of some older dwellings. 
Nevertheless, the thesis showed that a “bottom-up rehabilitation” model was 
emerging. Increasingly, it is regarded by government in some neighbourhoods as an 
expedient phenomenon beneficial for historic conservation and for avoiding large- 
scale relocation, which is socially conflictive.
Similar to the experience in various industrialised economies, historic
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neighbourhood with recognised aesthetic or location value may be gradually 
revitalised through individual private initiative without prior government planning or 
intervention. As is often found in the West (Ley 1996; Zukin, 1982), leading actors 
can include artists, people in the creative industries, and a variety of small 
businesses or households who either have a special appreciation for historic 
properties, or can in some way stand to gain from the transaction of these 
properties. Marketisation has given greater autonomy to these actors to exchange, 
acquire and upgrade properties.
Being a bottom-up process, bottom-up rehabilitation does not usually involve state- 
facilitated relocation, but takes place on the basis of voluntary resident relocation as 
well as market-led displacement - i.e. pricing out of private tenants alongside 
inflating house-prices. Local residents may here play an active role in transferring 
properties, sometimes illegally, to incoming gentries, even profiting from rising 
property values. Private sector upgrading has been welcomed by local authorities 
both in conservation areas as well as in areas neglected by official redevelopment 
plans.
9.2.5 The impacts of housing renewal
What impacts did these interventions have for targeted neighbourhoods and 
residents?
The impacts of housing renewal since 1990 have been highly visible. A modernised, 
high-rise urban landscape comprising new commercial facilities and up-market 
residential apartments has been the most observable output of Shanghai's housing 
renewal endeavours. Nevertheless, a more nuanced reading showed that different 
models of renewal have had contrasting impacts for neighbourhoods and 
communities, as observed in the three case studies.
Property-led redevelopment helped channel vast quantities of capital investment to 
restructure the land-use patterns and the built environment, previously neglected 
under the socialist regime. From the 1990s, industrial land uses and buildings 
experienced significant decline alongside the wholesale eradication of poor quality, 
older style housing. Between 1990 and 2005, more than 50 million m2 of old 
residences were demolished. This included almost all of the existing slums and 
about 55% of the existing old style lilong housing (SSB, 2006). Total residential
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space increased significantly, as old and dilapidated housing have been replaced by 
vast quantities of modem residential forms including detached villas and apartments. 
Rehabilitation progressed very slowly in the 1990s, but expanded significantly into 
the 2000s. By the end of 2005 some 17 million m2 of structurally sound older 
dwellings had undergone some degree of upgrading, benefiting between 60,000 to 
90,000 households per year. Most of this involved post-1949 built workers flats. 
Redevelopment and rehabilitation cumulatively helped ease the housing shortage 
and the extent of physical deprivation, boosted home-ownership, while also creating 
a landscape more suited for modern services and consumption.
The "property-led redevelopment" model is a process of profound physical, tenure, 
land-use and socio-economic restructuring. It commodified land boosted private 
ownership. Reflecting the logic of “highest and best use”, redevelopment sharply 
reduced the supply of affordable housing in the inner city and the capacity of lower- 
income groups to access its location benefits. It was accompanied by the forced 
relocation of existing residents and other building occupants. Overall, some 1.11 
million families were relocated between 1992 and 2006 -  totalling more than 3 
million residents. On average about 74,000 families were relocated every year 
during this time, as the inner city was restructured for a more affluent class of 
residents, companies and consumers (SSB, 2000-2007).
With the widespread enactment of relocation, new forms of inequality and injustice 
have become apparent. Planned relocation was premised on the resettlement or 
compensation of urban residents, and carried the broad social agenda of enhancing 
citizens’ housing conditions. It guaranteed most urban residents access to better 
quality replacement housing, but was also often a crude and divisive process. It did 
not compensate private tenants or rural migrants. Limited attention has been paid to 
the interests of low-income communities displaced from their neighbourhoods. It did 
not allow community voices to be heard. It did not provide the kinds of social 
support and relocation advice that are known to be crucial to ensure a better 
relocation outcome.
Resettlement housing tended to be located in peripheral locations and did not 
necessarily offer appropriate levels of services or connections to work and 
education that residents depended on. Standards of monetary compensation were 
determined in a top down fashion, and did not necessarily reflect the housing needs 
of households or reflect rapidly inflating housing prices. Limited transparency of the
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compensation mechanisms and discretionary decisions by relocation companies 
made many citizens unsure and distrustful of the process, fearful that they would 
lose out. All these findings echo the insights from recent empirical studies (Wu, 
2004; He and Wu, 2007; Shin, 2007; He and Biddulf, 2006).
Yet, relocation was not the only outcome accompanying housing renewal. The 
parallel community-retention model often meant substantial, if not whole-scale 
community retention. It produced mostly affordable housing, and allowed the 
maintenance of a certain degree of social mix in some urban areas. For former 
tenants who could afford to purchase the renewed units, it provided the benefits of 
remaining in familiar locations, housing modernisation, and assisted home- 
ownership. On the other hand, onsite resettlement was not always affordable. It was 
more accessible for those urban residents with better financial capacities, as well as 
those that were better housed at the outset. This finding corresponds with more 
general insights about the inequality of privatisation -  in that it tends to be the socio­
economically better off or institutionally privileged who stand to gain (Wang and 
Murie, 2000).
Aside from physical redevelopment, the study showed that adaptive-reuse for 
higher-value uses has begun to facilitate the spectacular renovation or restoration of 
run-down historic housing -  more often than not for well off consumers or 
businesses. Either as part of larger redevelopment schemes, or through piecemeal 
gentrification, the value of heritage for capital accumulation and creating a magnet 
for visitors was increasingly recognised in Shanghai. Yet, existing functions as 
housing for lower-income groups have generally been eroded in the process.
Emerging incidences of bottom-up market-led rehabilitation have led to the 
formation of some gentrifying historic neighbourhoods. As a piecemeal process, 
these neighbourhoods may exist in a transitional state for a long time or retain a mix 
of socio-economic groups, run-down and upgraded dwellings, and even public and 
private tenures. However private tenants in particular experienced the risk of 
displacement and other residents may come into conflict with the changing functions 
and users of the neighbourhood.
Overall, the above components of the study has provided a more nuanced view of 
what actually constituted housing renewal in Shanghai since 1990, and the range of 
impacts these have had for neighbourhoods and communities. The broader purpose
in detailing these intricacies of these processes is to advance our analytical 
understanding of the socio-political drivers of housing renewal in Shanghai, and in 
particular to evaluate the accuracy of the Chinese growth coalition perspective.
9.3 Assessing the Chinese growth coalition perspective
Does the Chinese growth coalition perspective adequately capture the socio­
political dynamics of housing renewal in post-1990 Shanghai? If  not, how can 
it be modified?
This section summarises key findings from the study which reinforce, challenge and 
advance various aspects of this now widely accepted perspective. The evidence 
shows that although this perspective captures some essential institutional features, 
it is deficient in several ways.
9.3.1 The growth coalition in Shanghai
Was housing renewal driven by a growth coalition of public and private sector elites 
in the quest for to maximise exchange value through land-use intensification?
It is now a widely accepted view that "...in China, the unprecedented central city 
redevelopment has been fuelled by emerging local elites taking advantage of the de 
facto devolution to pursue growth during explosive urbanisation in a transitioning 
economy" (Zhang and Fang, 2004: 295). Adapting western theories of urban 
governance, the Chinese growth coalition perspective contends that common 
interests in local economic expansion and wealth accumulation has bound local 
governments, property developers, construction companies, and financial 
institutions together into an informal coalition (He and Wu, 2005; Zhu, 1999; Fu, 
2002a; Zhang and Fang, 2004). These actors acting in concert over specific 
projects dominate the urban redevelopment process and a result, the city has been 
turned into an engine for the growth coalition “to maximise exchange value at the 
expense of local communities’ use value" (Zhang and Fang, 2004: 294).
The evidence suggests that the Chinese growth coalition perspective has been 
valuable in capturing some essential aspects of urban politics and social relations in 
post-1990s Shanghai. Key writers recognise that socio-economic restructuring drive 
physical changes, but that all of these are mediated and bolstered by the activities 
of the growth coalition. The perspective recognises the profound influence of market
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reform in setting off speculative behaviour in urban development, but also correctly 
highlights the persistence of considerable public authority. Despite the embrace of 
market mechanisms as a basis for housing renewal, the Chinese state remained 
authoritarian and interventionist. Considerable public-sector interventions were 
evident in housing renewal processes. These meant that neither a 'free-market' nor 
'pluralist negotiation' perspectives of urban change were adequate analytical lenses 
to capture the transformation of Chinese cities.
The Chinese growth coalition perspective is also correct to recognise the context of 
administrative decentralisation, and to forefront the role of local government working 
in closer collaborative relationships with the private sector in urban development as 
a key dynamic. Fiscal reforms and the empowerment of local governments as more 
autonomous decision makers in urban planning and local development meant that 
housing renewal was no longer a centrally-planned process dictated by the central 
government. Market reform has increased the importance of private business in the 
economy and in real estate development. In line with Clarence Stone's (1989, 1993) 
conception, the capacity (and resources) to realise urban development goals came 
to be increasingly divided between the government actors who controlled public 
authority and land resources and the private business elites who determine 
important capital investment decisions. To be effective at achieving their objectives, 
governments must therefore “blend their capacities with” those of businesses 
through negotiation and coalition (Stone, 1993; 6).
These meant that the 'statist' perspective of urban change was no longer an 
adequate depiction of the Chinese context. Instead, urban development in general 
came to be facilitated by 'entrepreneurial' local governments who facilitated 
marketised operations to address the political priority of local economic 
development and to attract investment capital into the locality. It has used various 
measures to elicit and work with powerful private and quasi-governmental real 
estate interests to promote urban restructuring and the intensification of land use.
Key private sector actors involved in housing renewal included local as well as 
international developers. They have been directly and indirectly supported by a 
range of auxiliary actors including banks, design and planning professionals, the 
media, and at times local academic institutions who provided planning and policy 
advice/services to either the government or developers. Together this informal 
coalition of interest groups wielded political and financial resources to orchestrate
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and carry out large-scale urban redevelopment, advancing urban growth, while 
excluding the participation of local communities and other non-elites.
The study has shown that business links with local officials have been pervasive. 
Given that the property development sector comprises a large number of 
enterprises corporatised from former state institutions and government bureaus, the 
distinction between public and private interests was sometimes blurred. Many state- 
owned enterprises have retained strong links to the state through the Chinese 
Communist Party, which has an official presence in most state-owned enterprises 
and retains significant influence in decisions.
Increasingly, powerful business elites from the private sector have also been 
actively incorporated into various formal political institutions or non-governmental 
interest groups, meaning that business interests are well represented in key 
decision making processes either in policy or detailed planning of renewal areas. 
These have been important local officials to carry forth ambitious development 
projects, and for private businesses to gain privileged positions to negotiate deals 
and access land. Together the informal coalition pooled political and financial 
resources to orchestrate and carry out large-scale urban development projects, 
advance urban growth, while excluding the participation of local communities and 
other non-elites.
In borrowing essential insights from the urban growth machine theory (Logan and 
Molotch, 1987), the perspective also correctly recognises the socially contentious 
nature of urban development. In line with Marxist thinking, it rejects the liberal myths 
that growth benefits everyone and that state interventions in the built environment 
are politically neutral. Instead, a conflict exists between those attempting to 
maximise the value of land and properties for wealth accumulation (exchange value) 
and those who depend on its everyday utility and sentimental value (use value). 
State interventions have often been biased in favour of the former, often at the 
expense the latter.
These are the ways in which the prevailing perspective has been particularly useful 
in comparison to other analytical traditions. However, the perspective is also limited 
in a number of important respects. These will be discussed in the following sections.
9.3.2 Role of the local state
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Aside from facilitating economic growth and capital accumulation, did the 
government also act with a concern for social equity and the welfare of the poor?
One limitation of the Chinese growth coalition perspective is its characterisation of 
the local government. In the prevailing literature, the local state plays a key role in 
creating conditions for local growth. The concept of “entrepreneurial” urban 
governance (Harvey, 1989) which originated from advanced capitalist economies 
has been used to conceptualise its role. This posits that local governments have 
become more directly engaged in economic development, whilst shifting away from 
its traditional role of service and welfare provision. Its behaviour is akin to a risk- 
taking ‘entrepreneur’, and its primary goal is to enhance a city’s structural 
competitiveness, by organising and promoting the city as a site for capturing mobile 
capital investment (see He and Wu, 2005; Wu, 2007; Zhu, 1999). But does this 
characterisation adequately capture the role of the local government?
This study demonstrated that the role of the local state in Shanghai was more 
complex. It is important to consider that urban entrepreneurialism is always context- 
dependent, evolving and can be expressed in many ways. As emphasised by Hall 
and Hubbard (1998), it can be misleading to assume entrepreneurial cities as simply 
having abandoned the “traditional” role of redistribution and public service provision. 
This depends on the local institutional context. Political realities are often more 
complex, and entrepreneurial local states often tend to play a persistent role in 
mediate competing demands from different interests in society. As recognised by 
Wang (2004), economic growth and social stability, are in fact two simultaneous 
governing interests of the central government in China. This was also critical for 
understanding the role of the local government.
One side of the findings showed that local government was indeed biased towards 
the growth. In general it has intervened most effectively and decisively in those 
areas conducive to economic growth, in attracting capital investment, and in 
producing the types of spaces businesses and more affluent residents could afford. 
According to the Marxist perspective, because the private sector controlled crucial 
productive resources in the market economy, the state is placed in a position of 
having to facilitate accumulation in order to advance the material development of 
the city and the urban economy. Local fiscal pressures also conditioned the kinds of 
policies pursued by the local government. Similar to the U.S (Peterson, 1981; 
Fainstein et al., 1986), cities in China raise significant revenues locally and are
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under pressure to maintain its revenues by attracting and keeping investments (Zhu, 
1999). Because land-leasing, real estate investment and upper income residents 
can better contribute to these revenue streams, local government tends to be 
predisposed to promoting socially-exclusive property-led redevelopment.
Nevertheless, as social inequality has deepened alongside urban restructuring, the 
local government has exhibited some concern for balancing social interests, 
addressing the quality of life of citizens, and maintaining social order. Although its 
traditional role was diminishing, the local government continued to be the major 
provider of public housing at heavily subsidised rents to sitting tenants. It is 
important to bear in mind that this still represented 25% of housing tenure (SSB, 
2006). Local government also continued to control some crucial resources including 
land, planning regulations, finances, and administrative influence over quasi- 
governmental enterprises to address the needs of less privileged urban residents. 
Thus some housing policies, such as housing rehabilitation, conferred considerable 
benefits to a range of sitting tenants. Because redevelopment was socially 
conflictive, both the central and local governments have attempted to maintain 
social stability in the redevelopment process by adapting their policies to 
accommodate the interests of the poor. Since 2003, various concessions were 
gradually being put in place, including better compensation, more transparent 
relocation procedures, and greater emphasis on the delivery of affordable housing. 
Sustained urban redevelopment, given its acutely conflictive nature, could only have 
taken place on the back of a more sophisticated juggling of competing interests.
Thus, local government played various indispensable roles in urban housing 
renewal. It provided the general prerequisites for economic growth and maintained 
an environment for capitalist accumulation. It also acted to maintain social order and 
to alleviate heightened housing inequality by the creation of institutions to contain 
social conflict, by the use of authoritative power, and by the introduction of policies 
containing concessions to more marginalised groups. In performing these functions 
and addressing its governing interests, local government has maintained a certain 
degree of autonomy from capitalist interests. Its role was biased toward growth, but 
it in no way acted as a mere instrument of elite businesses.
Since 2004, under the principles of “scientific development” and “harmonious 
society” promoted by the national leadership, local government also began to 
emphasise a concept of “balanced development” -  social and economic urban
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development that is comprehensive, well-coordinated and sustainable. Arguably, 
this has signalled the beginning of a shift from a “growth-first” mode of 
entrepreneurial governance to a more socially responsible mode of 
entrepreneurialism, one where issues of equity and social harmony are considered 
integral aspects of competitiveness. Up now, the performance of local officials was 
often judged in relation to achievements in local economic development. Being able 
to carry out large-scale, high-profile redevelopment schemes was thus an important 
priority of local officials to demonstrate their political achievements to national 
leaders and to further their own careers (Zhang, 2002). Nevertheless, there are 
signs that this is changing, and a range of other issues including social stability and 
addressing wealth inequality are also becoming more important issues for local 
officials (Lam, 2006).
In sum, Shanghai’s entrepreneurial governance is becoming more complex. Beyond 
understanding the local government as a “market facilitator” and driver of growth, it 
is now necessary to acknowledging its evolving, multi-faceted role of the local state. 
This is crucial for explaining the heterogeneous patterns of housing renewal 
observed in Shanghai.
9.3.3 Distinguishing coalition dynamics
Were property developers homogenous in terms of their role and interests, or were 
there distinctions among them that significantly affected housing renewal outcomes?
This study also extends the prevailing perspective by emphasising that there are 
different kinds of property enterprises in Shanghai, and that they sometimes play 
different roles in housing renewal. In applying the urban growth machine theory, 
researchers often treat businesses and property developers as a relatively 
undifferentiated interest group, in the sense of having a common agenda of 
maximising the exchange value of places. This is also the common conception of 
the growth coalition in China. For example, according to Zhu (1999: 538) “Business 
elites, whether they are foreign investors or local public enterprises... are motivated 
to pursue local growth as they have strong stakes in the locality ... [They] are the 
actors who actively materialise gains from land through property development.”
This study showed that in the context of market transition, the government has 
maintained various quasi-governmental enterprises as part of the local growth 
coalition, whose role varied in between purely profit-driven operations and as
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instruments of the government to address various public objectives. In the context of 
market transition, favourable policies and strong economic growth, the property 
development sector in China has quickly evolved into a competitive arena 
comprising state-owned enterprises, private enterprises and increasing numbers of 
foreign-funded or joint-venture firms. It is undeniable that profit-seeking did underpin 
the general activities of the real estate sector. However, an important differentiation 
can be made between private enterprises and certain quasi-governmental 
enterprises in the local growth coalition. These are enterprises initially formed from 
government bureaux in order to help the government realise its urban plans. While 
they mostly faced increasing pressures for financial efficiency and market 
operations, they have come to play a complex role in urban development.
Many of these enterprises respond not only to market conditions or their self interest 
but also in part to bureaucratic command. Various formal and informal connections 
to their former parent bureaux kept them tied to the local authorities. Initially being 
executive arms of the government, they played a key part in realising the ‘growth’ as 
well as ‘legitimating’ purposes of the local state. Since these local businesses were 
closely associated with the public authorities, the government helped nurture their 
commercial (and profitable) operations by offering cheap land and subsidies. On the 
other hand, they have also been held responsible for a plethora of socially-oriented 
tasks in return. Though the government does not risk placing excessive ‘social 
responsibilities’ on these enterprises that may jeopardise their financial performance, 
it has maintained some capacity to direct them to carry out projects with limited 
profit potential.
This institutional arrangement is a very important one underlying how the 
government tests out and then puts local policies and plans into concrete 
implementation. It also ensures that the government can deliver some projects that 
would otherwise have been neglected by the market. It is a distinct kind of public- 
private relation born out of the process of post-socialist market transition which has 
been largely neglected by scholars, but which also explains why certain schemes 
have exhibited a less for-profit orientation than most others. The complex 
relationship between state-owned property enterprises and the local state demands 
a more nuanced reading of so-called ‘entrepreneurial’ urban politics. It requires a 
careful understanding of state policies and China’s peculiar path of institutional 
reforms. Although the local government has become highly entrepreneurial, it has 
done so whilst maintaining various means of discretion and ‘market influence’.
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These have allowed the local government to exercise a degree of political autonomy 
from capitalist interests necessary to ensure sustained (and perhaps more 
sustainable) growth.
9.3.4 Counter-dynamics to the growth-coalition
To what extent can grass-root actors challenge the growth coalition and have an 
impact upon urban policies? Organised resistance to growth-coalitions from the 
grassroots or civil society have been an important part of contemporary studies of 
urban politics (e.g. Fainstein, 1987; Mollenkopf, 1983; Logan and Molotch, 1987), 
but its capacity to influence local development policies in China is not well 
understood. On the one hand, this study shows that although there has been clear 
conflict of interest over housing renewal and displacement, local residents have had 
limited power to formulate co-ordinated resistance. Unlike liberal democracies 
where local government policy is circumscribed by popular pressure, the Chinese 
government is well known to hold much stronger command over society. Grass 
roots actors have been shut out of formal urban planning decisions and the local 
state as the major land and housing manager may easily over-ride their interests.
Furthermore, poor neighbourhoods are typically those with the least capacity to 
create and sustain effective mobilisations (Logan and Molotch, 1987:135-7). 
Dilapidated housing has experienced substantial filtering and residualisation, so it 
was increasingly the lower-income households who faced the threat of demolition. 
Fear of public authority, lack of political representation, increasing heterogeneity of 
the local population and declining community bonds all mean that most residents in 
run-down neighbourhoods lacked the kind of coherency and resources necessary to 
pose effective challenges to top-down redevelopment plans. These largely echo 
existing views regarding the weakness of community power in China (He and Wu, 
2005; Zhang, 2002; Zhang and Fang, 2004).
Nevertheless, it is useful to move beyond a monolithic conception of ‘communities’ 
or of urban citizens as passive actors in urban development. Since the 1990s, 
conflicts, protests and petitions to government authorities regarding unfair 
displacement or compensation have become widely reported forms of citizen 
resistance in numerous cities. Because escalating citizen discontent and resistance 
is regarded as a major source of social instability, these activities have prompted 
different levels of government to adjust their policies. Accordingly there has been
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greater attention paid towards enhancing transparency of the relocation process, 
fairer compensation, outlawing oppressive relocation practices, and more broadly 
stepping up the supply of affordable housing to fulfil the demands of more 
disadvantaged groups. Although these did not mean fundamental changes to the 
model of housing renewal or to the political system in which it operates, they meant 
the arrival of a more sophisticated and more socially equitable framework for 
redevelopment. They suggest that grass-roots resistance can cumulatively and over 
time demand tangible concessions.
Other findings also showed that although grass-roots actors did not play a 
significant role in rebuilding the Chinese city or as a voice, some have become more 
active than others. In the context of marketisation and rising affluence, instances of 
unplanned, market-led neighbourhood revitalisation and/or land-use change are 
emerging. This bottom-up dynamic, sometimes informally constituted, challenges 
the common reading of urban change being ‘controlled’ by economic and political 
elites. Like in most other market economies, society has become more diverse, and 
some citizens have come to yield sufficient resources in their own right to lead the 
reinvestment processes of neighbourhoods. Even in China, such a process can 
comprise a force of neighbourhood change and may provoke urban planning debate 
when they contradict existing plans. When their activities are seen to be of value for 
urban growth and/or for heritage conservation, their cause may provoke support 
from public officials, the media and can even trigger a neighbourhood conservation 
movement. As such, some grass-root actors may indirectly influence public values 
and urban planning decisions.
Certainly, such forms of grass-roots influence have remained sporadic. It is also 
difficult to characterise bottom up rehabilitation necessarily as ‘oppositional’ forces 
to the growth-coalition -  since gentrification tends to be promoted by growth- 
oriented residents and/or businesses. Nevertheless, at least in some instances they 
have represented the battlegrounds of those fighting for historic conservation and 
heritage recognition rather than demolition, and for community decision making 
rather than government planning. More broadly, it provides indication of the growing 
diversity of urban society in China and the complex way in which the state has 
responded to their actions.
These findings do add to our understanding of urban transformations in China. 
While the existing view of community exclusion in the political sense remains valid,
perhaps a more flexible and dynamic conceptualisation of urban politics is more 
accurate. Rather than assuming urban transformations to be controlled by the 
growth coalition, a more nuanced view would acknowledge that contrasting visions 
for the city exist and action from the grassroots, outside of the core coalition, can 
also be a force of urban change. This conception is different from political pluralism, 
but embraces a degree of flexibility in China’s urban planning and development.
9.3.5 Summary:
In sum, this thesis has provided a new, modified perspective of the politics of urban 
housing renewal in transitional Shanghai. This provides a more nuanced and more 
dynamic conception of urban socio-political relations than the original Chinese 
growth coalition perspective. It is situated within a holistic view of China’s political- 
economic and urban restructuring, it adopts a nuanced view of the entrepreneurial 
local state as a mediator of complex social interests, it acknowledges internal 
differentiations of the property development sector in China, and it sees grassroots 
actors as having a role in affecting urban change. Table 9.1, over the next few 
pages, summarises the main arguments and shows how they extend the existing 
perspective.
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Table 9.1: Modified perspective of housing renewal in post-1990 Shanghai
Existing perspective and key 
claims
Modifications made by this 
thesis
Who drives 
urban
renewal, for 
what?
"...in China, the unprecedented 
central city redevelopment has 
been fuelled by emerging local 
elites taking advantage of the de 
facto devolution to pursue growth 
during explosive urbanisation in a 
transitioning economy." (Zhang and 
Fang, 2004: 295). Pursuing 
common interests in local economic 
expansion and wealth 
accumulation, growth coalitions 
between local government, 
construction companies, and 
financial institutions have been 
formed to facilitate inner-city 
redevelopment (He and Wu, 2005: 
18). As a result, the inner city has 
been turned into an engine for the 
growth coalition “to maximise 
exchange value at the expense of 
local communities’ use value" 
(Zhang and Fang, 2004: 294)
Although the existing view is valid, 
the local state-capital relationship 
in urban China is more complex 
than acknowledged. Rather than 
being driven by a monolithic 
coalition of interest centred on 
profit-maximisation and urban 
growth, there are different kinds of 
property enterprises with different 
roles in urban renewal and 
different relationships to 
government. In the course of 
gradual market-transition the 
government has retained 
administrative influence over 
various state-owned quasi- 
governmental property enterprises, 
which also carry out non-profit or 
social projects under public 
direction.
The role and 
agendas of 
the local 
government 
in housing 
renewal
The municipal government is an 
essential player in urban 
development possessing political 
and land resources, and controlling 
financial leverages. It acts as the 
mediator and supervisor of the 
redevelopment process (He and 
Wu, 2005:1,16). "...urban 
redevelopment programs in China... 
used government authority and 
subsidies to make large scale 
private or quasi-private investment 
attractive” (Zhang and Fang, 2004: 
294). The local government "opens 
up opportunities for property 
development and provides various 
types of support to accelerate the 
redevelopment process" (He,
2007). “Two considerations 
motivate a municipal government in 
facilitating urban growth: exhibiting 
achievements to the central 
government and promoting 
economic development to serve 
interest groups and the 
constituency” (Zhang, 2002: 493, 
see also He and Wu, 2005, Zhu, 
1999).
Rather than merely facilitating the 
conditions for local growth and 
wealth accumulation, the local 
government has a more complex 
role in urban development. It has a 
concern for balancing social 
interests and maintaining social 
order, which require it to address 
the needs of disadvantaged 
groups, albeit within the constraints 
set by market-oriented 
development and the general pro­
growth political orientation. Socially 
oriented activities undertaken by 
the local government include the 
provision of public housing, 
promoting the construction of 
affordable housing, giving 
favourable policies for privatisation 
to sitting tenants, and adjusting 
redevelopment programmes and 
policies to appease citizen 
discontent.
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Existing perspective and key 
claims
Modifications made by this 
thesis
Socio­
economic 
driving forces
Urban renewal has been underpinned 
by profound economic changes in the 
wake of market reforms. China has 
been shifting towards a decentralised 
economy with a mixture of market 
mechanisms and planning controls 
(Zhu, 1999). Its cities have experienced 
rapid urbanisation accompanied by 
economic growth (Yeh and Wu, 1996; 
Wu, 2001; Zhu, 1999; He and Wu, 
2005).
Large cities, such as Shanghai and 
Beijing, are in particular generators of 
economic growth and have attracted 
more investment from both international 
corporations and domestic investors 
that are seeking better returns in large 
cities (Zhang, 2002: 480). With 
industrial restructuring, office buildings, 
commercial and recreational facilities 
have dramatically increased. At the 
same time, the progression of housing 
privatisation, the globalised property 
market, together with the emergence of 
urban affluence and local elites, 
stimulated demands for luxury 
residential complexes (He and Wu, 
2005: 6).
Economic growth and rising affluence 
was not the whole story the uneven 
politics of urban renewal. Market 
reform, rapid economic growth, post­
industrial restructuring and deepening 
social inequality shaped the conditions 
for real estate speculation and uneven 
distribution of benefits and costs.
These processes simultaneously led to 
deepened social and housing 
inequalities, with a large population of 
unemployed or low-paid urban workers 
and increasing numbers of rural 
migrant workers representing the lower 
classes.
The conflicting and uneven claim on 
urban space between the privileged 
groups and the disadvantaged groups 
should be seen to originate from 
widened socio-economic cleavages.
As the poor disproportionally become 
concentred in the poor quality housing 
stock targeted for renewal, they 
become the principle targets of 
planned relocation with very limited 
power or resources to resist top-down 
decisions.
Counter­
dynamics to 
the growth- 
coalition
Due to the lack of democratic 
mechanisms and the persistence of 
state power, “Neighbourhoods are still 
excluded from the growth coalitions 
constituted by local government and the 
private sector. They do not have a 
share in the decision-making and 
implementation processes, nor do they 
even know how and when the 
redevelopment projects operate” (He 
and Wu, 2005:16). “Driven by profit 
seeking ... thriving urban 
neighbourhoods are displaced by high- 
value property development, and suffer 
from uneven redevelopment” (ibid: 1)
Due to the centralisation of political 
power and government control of 
urban planning there has only been 
limited counter-dynamics to the growth 
coalition. Though the existing view of 
state power and community exclusion 
is valid, a more flexible and dynamic 
conceptualisation of the politics of 
housing renewal is more accurate -  
one that acknowledges that contrasting 
visions for the city exist and social 
action from the grassroots can prompt 
some changes to the urban growth- 
coalition’s activities.
In the context of marketisation, 
instances of unplanned, market-led 
neighbourhood revitalisation and/or 
land-use change are emerging which 
can challenge or prompt the 
government to change existing 
redevelopment plans. Isolated 
incidences of citizen resistance such 
as protests and squatting regarding 
demolition and relocation can prompt 
the government to adjust its policies 
and grant concessions for citizens, 
even though they are not sufficient to 
cause radical changes in urban policy 
or the political arrangement.
Source: author’s analyses
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9.4 Policy implications
Urban renewal is a complex task for which the capacity of government is frequently 
seen to be inadequate. In the developed world, programmes designed to eliminate 
or reverse decay have often failed to match the scale and extent of the problems, or 
have themselves contributed to new forms of social or economic deprivation 
(Hartman, 1964; Power, 1999; Keating and Krumholtz, 1999). In Chinese cities, the 
relentless drive of urban governments for modernisation and economic growth too 
often takes place at the expense of less privileged groups. Demolition and 
relocation -  still predominant dynamics of change - remain a leading edge of social 
conflict and marginalisation. As housing renewal remains a formidable task for 
China in the foreseeable future, these are major contradictions that are yet to be 
resolved. This section discusses some policy options that might make housing 
renewal more socially equitable in China. Although the ideas respond principally to 
the experience of Shanghai, and other large Chinese cities, they also have 
relevance for other cities adopting a combination of strong government intervention 
and market-oriented policy to address housing renewal.
9.4.1 A note on political realities
As noted by Gilbert and Varley (1990) any policy recommendation for housing is 
linked to a set of political and philosophical issues which tends to be contentious -  
such as the relative roles to be played by the state and the private sectors, the 
relative desirability of different forms of tenure, the necessity and desirability of 
providing for the poor. They (ibid: 182) also remind us that in considering policy, 
consideration must be given to the ability and willingness of the state apparatus to 
implement it in the intended manner. There may be little point recommending 
specific forms of intervention if the state is incapable of implementing the policy. A 
question mark need to be placed against the belief that state intervention is 
necessarily humane or efficient.
All these raise important questions regarding political realities. If the state or elite 
partnerships dominate policy-making and implementation and has undesirable 
consequences for many, what other forms are desirable and how might they be 
brought about? For Clarence Stone (1989), who sees businesses as a proactive 
force, the solution lies in redressing the power imbalances in society and in 
particular reducing business influence. Politically, we need checks and balances in
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the political system to represent different interests and to create more sophisticated 
policies. We also need good leaders who keep themselves informed about society 
and who have a concern for social equity and balanced growth. For Gilbert and 
Ward (1985: 254), if the state does not act in the interest of the poor it may be best 
to devolve power and resources towards communities themselves rather than to 
increase state intervention.
China however presents a complex paradox. There is considerable interest amongst 
those beyond China's borders regarding whether economic reform and the 
circulation of global ideas will eventually lead to a political transformation towards a 
more pluralist form. As Friedmann (2005) points out, the prospect for change may 
not be optimistic. There is no imminent likelihood that those in power will tolerate 
challenge to its monopoly power, and rapid economic growth will continue in the 
foreseeable future to be the major governing preoccupation. In a country were 
guanxi (personal relations) remains the key to get things done, we are also unlikely 
to see a shift away from elite networks.
These are political realities, and any policy discussion needs to be mindful of these 
facts. On the other hand this study has highlighted that there remains a space for 
government decision making and for the evolution of policy. The state apparatus can 
make policy choices that better steers a course mediating competing interests, and 
it may also tolerate the development of interest representation that do not directly 
challenge the state. It is therefore hoped that the act of discussing alternative policy 
options can in some way help alert governments and scholars to think more deeply 
about the issue of housing renewal and its implications for society.
9.4.2 Balancing social and economic interests
A fundamental issue in discussing housing lies in debating its main objectives. The 
author takes the view that physical, economic and social development needs to be 
properly balanced. Evidently, a growth-oriented policy framework in Shanghai has 
placed significant burdens on the poor communities living in poor quality housing 
while limiting the spatial choice, educational and employment opportunities of poor 
families affected by redevelopment. It is important for the local government to 
address social equality and to take more responsibility for welfare provision in the 
urban development process. Urban poverty and inequalities are apparent and 
deepening problems alongside economic change, and lie at the roots of housing
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inequality. These deep issues clearly need to be tackled in order to enhance the 
options of the poor within the housing system or at least their capacity to cope with 
the pressures of survival and access to housing.
Urban administrators should strive towards a more holistic urban agenda that 
promotes balanced growth and supports different communities in their housing 
choice and their links to places and opportunities. In the realm of housing policy, I 
concur with Gilbert and Varley (1990: 181), the goal ought to be widening the range 
of housing options by ensuring accommodation under different forms of tenure, in 
different locations and with a range of prices and quality, so that different families 
can obtain something near the kinds of accommodation they need.
There are some general dilemmas for policy makers in dealing with housing decay. 
Reliance on the market to provide for the complex needs of society is inadequate 
and carries significant uncertainties. Creating favourable conditions for real estate 
development can help accelerate investment into urban renewal, but has 
problematic consequences such as displacement, affordability, and hasty 
construction of replacement housing. If housing renewal as an activity is to become 
less speculative and more welfare oriented, the risk is that it might be slowed down 
by fiscal constraints. China has made the wholesale transition from the latter 
towards the former, yet, it is perhaps a more sophisticated middle course through a 
range of instruments that should be the future direction of change. There is unlikely 
to be a simple set of solutions to housing that can aptly satisfy increasingly diverse 
demands of different social groups, especially the poor. Governments face 
significant economic constraints, and under the pro-market ideology it may be 
extremely difficult to divert significant resources from highly profitable endeavours to 
areas which are inherently less profitable. Yet, a few important areas for intervention 
are outlined below.
9.4.3 Supporting marginal communities
One of the most problematic long-term consequences of large-scale urban renewal 
is the formation of areas of extreme deprivation in the outskirts of city, concentrating 
marginal people in marginal areas. These have since posed major challenges for 
communities and policy-makers across Europe and North America (Keating and 
Krumholtz, 1999; Power, 1999; van Kempen etal, 2005; Lupton, 2003). Accordingly, 
cities need to pay significant attention to the plight of communities already displaced
334
to peripheral areas. Various positive measures may be essential over time to 
prevent the formation of extreme areas of social and economic deprivation in 
peripheral neighbourhoods. The task of future urban planning is to ensure the 
proper integration of marginal neighbourhoods by channelling more resources to 
these areas, linking them into a comprehensive transport network, raising the quality 
of public services and to ensure that they do eventually function as healthy 
communities. Policy-makers should attempt to understand better the problems 
these areas and their residents. Given the limited understanding we still have 
regarding conditions and life in suburban estates, there is considerable scope for 
more empirical research to help clarify possible interventions needed.
9.4.4 Expanding affordable housing assets
Expanding affordable housing in a variety of tenures, and upgrading dilapidated 
housing will also be important policy areas for innovation. Since 2007, the State 
Council has put increased emphasis upon investment in new urban rental housing, 
to complement existing emphasis on affordable home-ownership. This is an 
important policy development to help address the housing needs of the poor. Large 
numbers of the urban and rural poor are excluded from home-ownership, so it is 
likely that they will continue to rely on renting in the future. Expanding new 
affordable rental housing may help over time to alleviate pressures of over-crowding 
in the existing stock and support the mobility options of poorer households. Local 
governments still need to follow through these initiatives in the coming years, and 
the impact these initiatives make is also a worthwhile area for future research and 
monitoring. The objective should however not only be to increase the supply, but to 
do so in a manner that fosters greater socio-spatial integration (i.e. to avoid 
polarised development). Attention to curb the strengthening association between 
location and socio-economic status is desirable. More regulatory and financial 
instruments are needed to ensure the delivery of affordable housing near transport 
hubs and higher-cost inner locations, rather than only at the peripheries.
China can perhaps experiment with practices in the U.S and Europe such as 
‘mixed-income’ or ‘inclusionary housing’ which link the construction of low or middle 
income housing to market-based developments (Mallach, 1984; Calavita, 2006). 
These impose requirements for developers to include affordable homes when they 
build a particular number of new market-rate homes, in particular in higher cost 
locations. Some price-control period is also necessary to keep the affordable units
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from disappearing from the affordable housing pool too quickly (Brown, 2001). Since 
the requirement to build a larger percentage of low or very-low income housing will 
inevitably encounter developer resistance, a range of fiscal subsidies, planning 
controls and tax incentives are needed.
However, the sole emphasis on new construction is perhaps misguided. A more 
immediate part of a solution to ensure housing choice for the poor is to promote 
retention and upgrading of the existing low-cost housing assets rather than 
recklessly demolishing them. China's housing policy has carried an implicit 
assumption that households in crowded and run-down dwellings will be better off if 
they are moved to less crowded and better serviced housing elsewhere. However, 
elsewhere it is better recognised that inner-city slums are important physical and 
human assets (UN-Habitat, 2003). As some urban scholars in China also now argue 
(Wang, 2004; Chang and Tipple, 2009) it is important to recognise that old 
neighbourhoods remain a significant source of public as well as private rental 
housing in China. Despite apparently poor living conditions and deficient services, 
their central locations and affordability mean that they have a vital inclusive role to 
play.
Needless to say, to support retention and upgrading instead of redevelopment 
requires major changes in political attitudes regarding housing quality, housing 
provision and urban planning. Sound public finances also need to be made 
available to sustain what remains a largely state-owned asset. The problem of 
decaying rental housing is linked to its unprofitability. The remnant of the socialist 
welfare housing system continues to cripple efforts at improving public-sector 
housing maintenance. There may be no panacea to induce adequate investment 
while maintaining affordability for low income groups. However increasing rents 
towards levels that closer reflects the real costs of housing maintenance and 
upkeep will provide a more robust basis for raising the quality of the older stock. On 
the other hand more effective housing allowances may need to be established to 
help minimise the adverse effects of rent increases for the poorest tenants.
Policies in China tended to favour privatisation of upgraded units once they are self- 
contained. Indeed one possible method of financing the upgrading process is for 
tenants to purchase their homes. However this may not be the most effective or 
inclusive solution, as some poor households may be reluctant to purchase given 
they already enjoy minimal rents. Furthermore, shifting existing units into the owner-
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occupied sector may reduce sources of central accommodation for newcomers 
(Gilbert and Varley, 1990:198).
Policy-makers can perhaps use other positive measures to encourage residents to 
participate in housing rehabilitation. Many rooted residents remain committed to 
their homes and neighbourhoods. A system of renovation grants for structural 
improvements, repairs, modernisation of the building fabric, and the installation of 
missing amenities should be made available to support individual investment in 
housing at a variety of scales of intervention. A flexible and comprehensive system 
of grants may help open up possibilities to residents in a range of different housing 
scenarios and with different degrees of financial capacity. The regeneration of these 
deprived communities may increasingly require more than physical upgrading. Apart 
from supporting economic capacities necessary for self-investment, some efforts to 
bridge social differences and to create opportunities for people to form bonds may 
be important to sustain the long-term health of poor neighbourhoods.
9.4.5 Reforming redevelopment processes
Though a significant part of the older dwellings stock may be rehabilitated, a 
considerable part may be structurally unsafe and therefore more radical measures 
such as redevelopment should continue to be a relevant task for urban authorities. It 
is far from straightforward to resolve the conflict between the interests of individual 
households and the wider agendas of demolition. The loss of one’s home can have 
a profound impact on individuals and result in considerable anxiety and emotional 
distress. Yet, there is scope for displacement to be minimised in the first place, and 
a robust affordable housing framework as described above might help expand 
housing choice for those displaced.
Central and local governments should further their efforts in promoting more 
sophisticated approaches to redevelopment that promote community retention and 
minimise displacement. Existing measures such as the paid onsite resettlement 
policy should be given greater political emphasis. Yet this also means that more 
public sector resources should be made available to enhance the attractiveness and 
financial sustainability of these schemes to developers. Beyond this, mixing tenures, 
and including a range of unit types and sizes may be one way of ensuring a more 
inclusive redevelopment.
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Large numbers of residents will continue to be relocated if major reforms do not take 
place. In such a scenario it should become fundamental to the goal of housing 
renewal to ensure that relocation processes are sensitively managed - meaning that 
the economic, psychological, social and environmental disruptions caused to 
households are minimised and that relocation actually makes an important 
contribution towards improving the quality of life of all residents (Cole and Flint, 
2007: 53). Continued grievances regarding the procedures of relocation and 
compensation suggest that policy-makers should continue to make adjustments.
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It is in the interest of the state to improve relocation procedures, to avoid 
marginalising urban citizens and exacerbating social discontent. Apart from ensuring 
an attractive affordable housing supply, government should ensure that standards of 
compensation are fair at the outset, and that people are not disadvantaged by 
agreeing early to resettlement while other households reap greater discretionary 
compensation after aggressive bargaining. Authorities need to continue 
strengthening the standardisation and transparency of housing relocation work. 
Strict legal sanctions must be imposed regarding oppressive tactics, the use of 
violence and other behaviours that may cause psychological or physical harm to 
residents. Absence of these guarantees about demolition and relocation raises 
levels of uncertainty and reduces the trust and confidence amongst local 
communities. Beyond protecting the lawful housing rights of those being relocated, 
support services including housing market information, resettlement advice and 
social support should also be offered to help residents navigate through the 
resettlement process. Experience in the West has shown that these can be 
essential in ensuring that the disruption and anxiety caused by losing one’s home 
and moving into a new property is minimised (see Cole and Flint, 2007; 
Cunningham, 2004).
9.4.6 Historic conservation and piecemeal gentrification
In terms of heritage conservation, cities in developing countries are in some ways 
gradually following in international footsteps, though there remains considerable 
progress to be made. In China there is now greater awareness of the fact that two 
decades of redevelopment has eradicated irreplaceable architectural heritage and 
the historical character of the city. One particular issue this study observes is that 
adaptive re-use strategies are becoming more popularised in various privileged 
locations. Successful adaptive reuse will have its role in supporting broader
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conservation agendas. It can restore and maintain the heritage significance of a 
building or an area and help to ensure its survival. Yet there often remains a large 
gap between physical and social conservation.
The rise of market-led, commercially oriented historic conservation often based on 
replacing low-cost residential functions faces the complex issue of how local 
residents can benefit from the process. It is worth noting that a narrow emphasis on 
the historical city as 'commodities' to stimulate economic development so may have 
at times 'superseded attention to the human ecologies that produced and inhabit 
them' (Sorkin, 1992: xiv). Local governments need to be conscious of how to 
minimise its social costs and to properly distribute the benefits. It should be seen as 
part of a more inclusive revitalisation strategy allowing for individual residents to 
take part and to benefit from. This study suggests that rather than relying on large- 
scale interventions involving forced relocation, historic conservation can be 
approached from more piecemeal processes which allow grass-root actors and 
residents more autonomy of decision making.
Low-level gentrification -  involving individual appropriation and renovation of 
buildings in a neighbourhood - can be in line with the aspirations of residents if they 
are in control of the process as owners or landlords and can benefit from rising 
property values or from the positive effects of upgrading. These residents may 
therefore voluntarily participate to derive financial gains from the process. However 
the public sector has a role to support the interests of those in the community who 
are in a more disadvantaged position. It also needs to establish measures to 
minimise potential tensions between changing functions and the residential 
demands of existing residents. Supporting the right and capacity of existing 
residents to improve their dwellings, effective regulation of compatible business 
activities, and allowing proper channels of communication to be set up amongst 
different parties are essential to mediating these interests. The public sector should 
also ensure the resultant loss of affordable units from restoring older properties is 
adequately replaced within a broader housing strategy.
9.5 Future outlooks for urban China
Chinese cities have experienced remarkable transformation over the last three 
decades, and they continue to evolve under the complex interactions of state, 
market and society. This study has merely shed light on a small part of the puzzle,
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over a limited, if significant timeframe. Various strands of this thesis can be 
extended for future research. As mentioned, the government’s recent pledge to build 
affordable housing in suburban areas is another major policy issue deserving 
continued monitoring. There is scope for a more systematic analysis of the role and 
activities of quasi-governmental enterprises in urban development. This should help 
further clarify (and better quantify) their presence in cities, how their operations are 
distributed between ‘profit-centred’ and ‘social responsibility’ projects, and to 
consider how their links with local government might evolve over time. More recent 
projects corresponding to the community retention model (such as staff housing 
rehabilitation) should be carried out to clarify their impacts. Given that conservation 
planning is still a recent development, case studies of more recent renewal projects 
in conservation areas can help clarify whether and how tensions between renewal 
and conservation are being managed.
As emphasised by John Friedmann (2005:125) China’s transition is an on-going 
story, and its outcomes are unpredictable. Looking ahead to the future of Chinese 
cities, other major questions that one can ask are how far socially and economically 
“balanced development” might materialise, and what factors might engender these 
changes. Interestingly, the current global economic downturn has curtailed though 
not severely challenged nation’s prospect for significant growth. China and Asia’s 
‘emerging economies’ on the whole are largely leading the global economic 
recovery. China’s industrial production, of note, rose by 11% in the 12 months from 
July 2008 to July 2009. Home-sales across the country have risen 70%. In major 
cities such as Shanghai and Hong Kong, house prices have rebounded strongly. On 
the other hand, significant set-backs to the nation’s export industries had incurred, 
which have led to increased lay-offs (The Economist, 2009, August 15).
At the same time, the recent policy environment signifies some important changes, 
including efforts to respond to some of the excesses and imbalances of earlier 
periods of economic development. Affordable housing and social welfare are 
evolving policy arenas where innovations may yet come to shape the nature of 
urban development. Growing concern with environmental sustainability amongst 
national leaders -  in no small part linked to the nation’s unrivalled thirst for steel, 
glass and concrete to build their cities -  may yet trigger changing attitudes to urban 
development (The Economist, 2008, 7 June). The eventual resolution of these 
policy issues, and whether these will make a real difference to the lives of urban 
citizens and to the politics of the Chinese city, remains open, and should continue to
340
preoccupy scholars in the coming decades.
On a less optimistic note, what this thesis does suggest is that the pre-conditions for 
an enduring coalition between elite business and government appear to be firmly 
established. Short of a major redistribution of political power and economic 
resources it is unlikely that urban policies will shift significantly away from a bias 
towards capitalist demands and business interest. Thus, the urban growth-coalition 
may well continue to be a key institutional arrangement shaping the Chinese city, 
though greater attention will need to be paid to how its internal dynamics may 
evolve in tandem with a host of political and economic developments - from the 
international economic and policy context, to national policies, to the changing ties 
between state-owned enterprises and governments, and no less to how an 
increasingly plural society express their demands in cities.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Interview schedules
Note: All of the interviews (except one) were carried out in Chinese. The following
provides the English version. Interviews were semi-structured, thus the question
schedules were used as a basis for more open discussions.
Section 1: General Issues
Housing problems in Shanghai
•  What is/has been the nature of urban housing problems in Shanghai?
•  What are the conditions of the old housing stock?
•  What factors contributed to these problems?
•  How is the older housing stock being managed/ maintained?
•  What are the key challenges in maintaining older housing?
Official strategies for housing renewal
•  What are the government’s agendas for housing renewal?
•  What were/are the major policies underlying housing renewal?
•  How is housing redevelopment carried out? Who are the key actors or decision 
makers and what are their roles?
•  How do the public and private actors work together in housing renewal? Is 
there a strong collaborative relationship?
•  What kinds of regulations apply in the housing redevelopment process? Have 
there been changes over time, what are they and why?
•  How are residents compensated in the process?
•  What are the known implications of resident relocation? Do you think the 
standards are fair?
•  When, and how does the government promote on-site resettlement?
•  What are the key problems and challenges in the experience of housing 
redevelopment? How are these being dealt with?
•  How is the government dealing with the housing/re-housing difficulties of the 
lower income groups?
343
Housing rehabilitation and historic conservation
•  How is government dealing with the issue of protecting urban heritage and 
historic housing stocks?
•  What is the nature of the historic conservation system in Shanghai? How has it 
evolved?
•  What were/are the government’s efforts and strategies regarding housing 
rehabilitation?
•  How is/ has housing rehabilitation been carried out? (How are these financed? 
Who is responsible? What kinds of developers are/ have been involved?)
•  What are/have been the results, problems and challenges in your experience?
Section 2: Case-specific interviews
Case of Taipinaaiao (TPQ1
1. Inception: how did TPQ project come about?
2. What was its significance for Luwan district?
3. What was the overall redevelopment strategy/vision?
4. What was the nature of the neighbourhood prior to renewal?
5. Who were the key actors? What were their roles and mutual organization?
6. How did you come to be involved, in what capacity?
7. What kind of an enterprise is Shui-On Land? How did it come to lead the
project and what distinguished it?
8. How did the government support the project?
9. How was the planning/ design process carried out?
10. What principles and regulations were considered?
11. How was the issue of historic conservation addressed?
12. How were residents resettled? What terms and options were made 
available?
13. What are the known implications of relocation?
14. How has the project been received? From the developer’s perspective? 
By the government?
15. What was special about this development model?
16. What is the status of the project now? What are future developments
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Case of New Fukanali (NFKL)
1. Inception: how did NFKL come about? What were the project goals and
parameters?
2. What was the overall redevelopment strategy? What was its significance for
JingAn district?
3. What was the nature of the neighbourhood prior to renewal?
4. Who were the key actors and what were their roles?
5. What kind of an enterprise is JPHG? How did it come to be involved?
6. Why was the redevelopment approach chosen rather than rehabilitation?
7. How was the planning/ design process carried out? Who were the decision
makers?
8. How did the government support the project?
9. What principles and regulations were considered?
10. How was the project financed? Who provided the financing?
11. How were residents resettled? What terms and options were made 
available?
12. What are the known implications of this relocation approach?
13. How were the project outcomes received? From the developer’s 
perspective? By the government?
14. In what ways was NFKL distinct as an approach?
15. Will it be replicated in the future? Why/ why not?
16. How have redevelopment policies and practices changed since NFKL? 
Why?
Case of Taikana Road (TT)
1. How did TT evolve? What was the background of its development?
2. What was the nature of the neighbourhood prior to renewal?
3. What/ who initiated the processes of revitalization, with what purpose?
4. Who were the key actors and decision makers?
5. What were the principles and strategies in the revitalization of the buildings?
6. What are the underlying urban planning visions for the area?
7. What do you perceive as the value of the model of revitalization at TT?
8. What has been the role and attitudes of district and municipal governments?
9. How did district or municipal governments affect TT?
10. What were the roles of local residents? How were they involved and 
affected?
11. What lies in the future for TT?
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Section three: Case-specific resident interviews
Pre-renewal living conditions
• What are your thoughts about lilong housing?
• What are the living conditions like?
• What are the benefits of living here?
• What are the problems of living here?
• What kinds of people live here?
• How has the population changed in recent years?
• How are the local neighbourhood relations?
• What do you think about the location here (including services and
accessibility)?
Housing renewal process and impacts
• What are your thoughts regarding Shanghai’s urban renewal in general?
Why?
• Do you think old housing ought to be conserved? Why?
• What are your thoughts about the issue of relocation and what it means for
residents? Why?
• How did the renewal of this community take place, in your experience?
• What are your overall opinions of this project?
• What policies and information did the government provide at the time?
• Who do you think were controlling the processes?
• What could residents do in the process? Did you have a role?
• What were the impacts of interventions on the neighbourhood (in terms of
physical, social, location and affordability)?
• How did relocation work in this community? What were the standards of
compensation and what did these mean for different residents?
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Appendix 2: Lists of Interviewees
Table A1: List of interviewees (officials/ developers/ professionals/ academics)
Respondent’s institution(s) Position/ role Subjects discussed Date of 
interview
Duration
1 Development Research Centre of 
Shanghai Municipal Government
Senior official Shanghai municipal government’s economic 
development strategy, and economic development in 
Shanghai
29/12/2006 1 hour
2 (Formerly) Nanshi District Land and 
Housing Administration Bureau; 
(Currently) Nanfang Group Property 
Management co. ltd.
Former senior official 
in district housing 
bureau
Urban housing reforms, official housing renewal 
strategies, housing rehabilitation projects, official plans 
for historic conservation, old housing management, the 
practice of resident relocation in urban renewal
16/01/2007;
7/09/2007
4 hours
3 JingAn Property Holdings Group 
(Property developer)
Manager, former 
official in JingAn 
district housing bureau
Housing redevelopment, resident relocation, New 
Fukangli project
02/04/2007 1 hour
4 Nanshi District Land and Housing 
Administration Bureau
Former officer of 
district housing bureau
Housing rehabilitation in early 1990s Shanghai 19/01/2007 1 hour
5 JinAn district Urban Planning and 
Management Bureau
Head of a division Shanghai’s urban planning system, housing 
redevelopment procedures, resident relocation policies, 
affordable housing plans in Shanghai
28/09/2007 1 hour
6 Shanghai Xufang Property Group 
Co.,Ltd.
(property developer)
Mid-level Manager Real estate development process; recent historic 
conservation projects in Shanghai
03/08/2006 1 hour
7 Management Committee of Taikang 
Road Art Street
Head official Inception and evolution of Taikang Road Tianzifang 24/07/2006 1.5 hours
8 Shanghai City Luwan District 
Science and Technology 
Commission; Luwan District 
Dapuqiao Street Office
Secretary; Former 
street office official
Inception and evolution of Taikang Road Tianzifang 19/3/2007;
17/4/2007
1.5 hours
347
Table A1 continued...
Respondent’s institution(s) Position/ role Subjects discussed Date of 
interview
Duration
9 Faculty of Social Development Studies, 
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences
Professor of Sociology Rural-urban migration and migrants 
housing access
05/09/2006 1 hour
10 Tongji University Institute of Urban 
Planning and Design
Deputy Chief Planner Urban redevelopment and historic 
conservation planning in Shanghai, 
resident relocation problems
02/05/2005 2 hours
11 Tongji University Institute of Urban 
Planning and Design
Vice-director of planning studio Urbanisation and land policies in China 10/8/ 2008 1 hour
12 Tongji University Institute of Urban 
Planning and Design; National Research 
Centre of Historic Cities
Urban planner The preparation of detailed plans for 
historic conservation areas in Shanghai
06/1/2006 1 hour
13 Expert Committee for the Preservation 
of Historical Areas and Heritage 
Architecture in Shanghai;
Tongji University College of Architecture 
and Urban Planning
Professor of Architecture Historic conservation planning in 
Shanghai; -national and local institutional 
frameworks
28/04/2005;
20/10/2005
1.5 hours
14 Shanghai urban planning commission 
Tongji University College of Architecture 
and Urban Planning
Urban Planning 
Commissioner;
Professor of Architecture
Plans and legislations for historic 
conservation in Shanghai
06/01/2006 30
minutes
15 Expert Committee for the Preservation 
of Historical Areas and Heritage 
Architecture in Shanghai;
Tongji University College of Architecture 
and Urban Planning
Professor of Architecture Urban redevelopment processes, resident 
relocation problems, conservation 
planning in Shanghai and exemplary case 
studies;
30/03/2007 1.5 hours
348
Table A1 continued...
Respondent’s institution(s) Position/ role Subjects discussed Date of 
interview
Duration
16 China Institute of Architects 
Architectural Creation and Theory 
Academic Committee;
Tongji University College of 
Architecture and Urban Planning
Commissioner; 
Professor of 
Architecture
Design and implementation of Taipingqiao 
redevelopment project
06/04/2006 1 hour
17 Benjamin Wood Architects Chief Architect Design and implementation of Taipingqiao 
redevelopment project, in particular Xintiandi project 
and Lakeville
29/3/ 2007; 
26/4/ 2007
2 Hours
18 Zhoujiaqiao Cultural Development 
Company
Manager Adaptive-reuse of industrial buildings, formation of 
creative industry clusters
05/09/2006 1 hour
19 Tonglefang Development Company Director of marketing Revitalising historic buildings as a real estate 
strategy, the collaboration of public sector and 
private developers in the process, the formation of 
creative industry clusters in Shanghai
11/09/2006 3 hours
20 Bund 18 Real Estate Management 
Ltd.
Director Revitalisation of listed historic buildings in Huangpu 
district; the role of foreign investors and architects
06/09/2006 2 Hours
21 Zhuowei 700
(State-owned industrial enterprise)
Senior manager of work 
unit
Restructuring of manufacturing industries, its 
impacts on work units; how enterprise respond to 
fiscal pressures through property development, the 
commercial office market in Luwan district
07/09/2006 1 hour
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Table A2: Respondents in Taipingqiao (TPQ) case study
Total: 9 respondents
ID Age
group
Sex Persons in 
family
Family form Household 
housing space 
(m2)
Possession 
of kitchen/ 
bathroom for 
self-usage?
Tenure of
current
residence
Employment
status
Monthly
family
income
X4 60s M 2 Elderly couple 10 No Public renting Retired NA
X6 50s F 2 Elderly couple 40 WC and 
shower
Public renting Retired 2,000-3,000
X7 60s F 2 Single mother + 
daughter (working)
50 WC and 
shower
Public renting Working NA
X11 50s M 4 Parents + two 
children
70 Shared
bathroom
Public renting Laid off/ Qipai l o
 
o 
o
 
o 
o
<=><*
CO
X12 60s M 2 Man + elderly 
mother
10 Shared
bathroom
Public renting Retired 3,000
X14 50s M 2 Elderly couple 30+ NA Public renting Working NA
X17 60s M 3 Couple + son 30+ NA Public renting Retired NA
X18 50s M + F
*
2 Elderly couple 11 No Public renting Retired 1,000
X22 60s M 4 Elderly couple + 
young couple
32 No Public renting Retired/ 
voluntary work
10,000
Notes: NA: information was not provided by respondent; * both members of couple interviewed
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Table A3: Respondents in New Fukangli (NFKL) case study
Total: 10 respondents
ID Age 
group .
Sex Persons in 
family
Family form Household 
housing space 
(m2)
Possession 
of kitchen/ 
bathroom for 
self-usage?
Tenure of
current
residence
Employment
status
Monthly
family
income
F5 60s M 5 Three generations 90 Self-sufficient Private
ownership
Retired NA
F7 30s M 3 Couple + son NA Self-sufficient Private
ownership
Working NA
F9 60s F 4 Couple + elderly + 
son
2 units Self-sufficient Private
ownership
.NA NA
F10 50s M . 2 Couple + child 
(university)
70 Self-sufficient Private
ownership
Working NA
F11* 50s M 2 Couple NA Self-sufficient Private
ownership
Retired NA
F12 50s M 3 Couple + son NA Self-sufficient Private
ownership
Retired NA
F15 50s M 2 Couple 86 Self-sufficient Private
ownership
Working NA
F16* 40s M 3 Couple + middle 
school child
120 Self-sufficient Private
ownership
Working NA
F19* 30s M + F** 3 Couple + son
NA Self-sufficient Private
ownership
Working NA
F20 60s F 4 Elderly couple + 
young couple
70 Self-sufficient Private
ownership
Working but 
retired
NA
Note: * = newly sett ed residents after redevelopment. Other respondents were original returnee residents; ** both members of couple
interviewed; NA = information was not provided by respondent
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Table A4: Respondents in Taikang Road Tianzifang (TT) case study
ID Age
group
Sex Persons in 
family
Family form Household 
housing space 
(m2)
Possession of 
kitchen/ 
bathroom for 
self-usage?
Tenure of
current
residence
Employment
status
Monthly
family
income
T4 50s F 3 Couple + elderly 
mother
NA NA Public renting Retired NA
T7 70s M 5 Three generations NA NA Public renting Retired NA
T9 50s M 3 Couple + son 10 None Public renting Employed NA
T12 60s F 2 Single mother + 
daughter
12 None Public renting Retired NA
T13 70s M 2 Couple NA None Public renting Retired <1,000
T14 60s F 2 Couple NA None Public renting Retired <1,000
T15 83 M 2 Couple NA None Public renting Retired NA
T20 60s F 3 Couple + son NA None Public renting Retired NA
TL1 60s M 3 Elderly + young 
couple
26 None Public renting Retired 4,000+
TL2 60s M + F 3 Couple + daughter 32 WC, Bathroom, 
Kitchen
Renting privately Retired 26,000
TL3 50s F 3 Couple + son 15 None Renting privately Employed 4,000
TL4 67 M 2 Couple 14.5 WC Renting privately Retired 6,000
TL5 50s M 3 Couple + son 50 WC, Bath, 
Kitchen
Renting privately Employed NA
TL6 60s M 3 Couple + son 26 None Renting privately Laid off 4,000
TL7 60s M 3 Couple + son NA NA Renting privately Employed NA
TL8 60 F 3 Couple + son NA None Renting privately Retired 3,000
Notes: Total 16 respondents. Those identified TL are residents who rented out their homes in the gentrification process 
NA = information was not provided by respondent
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Appendix 3: A note on ethical issues
This research is political in nature and relies in part upon interviewing many human 
subjects. A great deal of care regarding ethical issues was applied throughout the 
research process. This extended to issues such as personal consent, confidentiality, 
the storage of information, accurate recording of evidence, and accurate and 
responsible use of research findings.
Personal expression of consent was always the basis for the commencement of an 
interview. The researcher took care to provide details about his identity, research 
interests, and the intended subject matter of the interviews. I answered any 
questions participants had regarding these issues, regarding the usage of the data 
and the independence of this research from any official initiatives. Clarifying queries 
also helped built mutual understanding between the researcher and the participants.
The researcher was conscious to ensure that participation in the study did not 
induce any unacceptable psychological stress, anxiety or cause harm or negative 
consequences beyond the risks encountered in normal life. No questions posed 
threat or distress for the respondents. Nevertheless, sensitive issues in the 
interviews regarded residents own marginal status in housing or economic terms, 
and the contentious issue of real estate development vs. resident displacement, 
government authority vs. individual interest. Throughout all of the interviews it was 
respected that the informants had the right not to answer any questions they did not 
feel comfortable with, and their right to end the interview at anytime, without giving 
reasons.
Care was also taken to protect the anonymity of all respondents. Interviews were 
carried out on a one-to-one basis in the absence of others or gate-keepers. Some of 
the actors involved in the case studies were already public knowledge. Nevertheless 
as much as possible I ensured that all the subjects interviewed remained 
anonymous. Where important details such as addresses, phone-numbers and 
names were provided, the researcher kept these confidential. These and the 
interview recording files were never disclosed to a third party. Each respondent was 
given a separate code name to identify them. Transcripts and recordings of the 
fieldwork were labelled by these IDs rather than names. The role and positions of
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some of the key informants were* described in the thesis, but in a broad way so as to 
prevent identification of specific persons. In light of the above measures, the 
interests of all respondents were respected in the process of interviews, and in the 
storage, analysis and reporting of the data.
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Appendix 4: Case study sample
Table A 5: List of housing renewal project considered for case study selection
Project Name Location
(District)
Site Area 
(Hectares)
Original housing type Redevelopment/
conservation
Key agents
Lianwangcheng Putuo
50
Slum area Redevelopment District government & property 
developer
Shanghai Port International 
Cruise Terminal*
Hongkou
13
Shikumen lilong, new style lilong 
(1910-1930s)
Redevelopment District government & property 
developer
Yuyuan Tourist Mart (phase 
1)
Huangpu
5
Shikumen lilong 
(1900-1920s)
Redevelopment District government & district 
property developer
Taipingqiao
* *
Luwan
52
Shikumen lilong 
(1920s)
Redevelopment District government & HK 
property developer
Sinan Road Villas Luwan
5
Colonial garden villas 
(1940s)
Conservation District government & district 
property developer
New Fukangli 
* *
JingAn
4
Shikumen lilong, new style lilong 
(1920s)
Redevelopment Housing bureau & district 
property developer
International Ladoll City JingAn
4
Shikumen lilong, new style lilong 
(1920s)
Redevelopment Local authorities & district 
property developer
Xinguo Hotel Changning 7 Colonial garden villas 
(1920s)
Conservation and new 
developments
State owned and private hotel 
groups
Duolun Road Hongkou NA Various residential heritage 
(1900-1930s)
Conservation and 
redevelopment proposed
District government & 
developers
Taikang Tianzifang ** Luwan 3 Shikumen lilong, industrial 
heritage (1920~30s)
Conservation (piecemeal) Street office & small businesses
Huaihai Road 1754 Lane Xuhui <2 Colonial garden villas 
(1930s)
Redevelopment Housing bureau and property 
developer
Penglai Rd 252 Lane 
*
Huangpu <2 Shikumen lilong Conservation Housing bureau & work units
44"1 Lane Luwan <2 Shikumen lilong Conservation Housing bureau & work units
ZJZ project JingAn <2 Shikumen lilong Conservation Housing bureau & Dutch 
authorities
Note: * Chosen for pilot study; ** Chosen for final case studies
(Continued next page)
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Table A5 continued, additional project details
Project Name Dates Renewal outcomes Project floor area 
(m2)
Displacement/ retention? Conservation listing/ area?
Lianwangcheng 1998-2004 Up-market apartments NA Displacement 
(in-kind compensation)
-
Shanghai Port International 
Cruise Terminal*
2004- ongoing Cruise terminal and 
commercial offices
400,000 Displacement (in-kind and 
monetary)
-
Yuyuan Tourist Mart (phase 
1)
1991-1994 Tourism and retail 
development
80,000 Displacement (in-kind 
compensation)
Historic City Core Conservation 
area
Taipingqiao ** 1996 -  ongoing Up-market apartments 
and commercial
1.6 million Displacement (in-kind and 
monetary)
Listed building
Sinan Road Villas 2004- ongoing 50+ Up-market villas NA Displacement (in-kind and 
monetary)
Listed buildings & Hengshan- 
Fuxing conservation area
New Fukangli ** 1997-2001 Up-market apartments 100,000 Part retention, part 
displacement
-
International Ladoll City 2001-2004 Up-market apartments 270,000 Part retention, mostly 
displacement
-
Xinguo Hotel 2002- 5-star hotel complex 
(190 guest rooms) and 
28 villas
NA NA Listed buildings & Hengshan- 
Fuxing conservation area
Duolun Road 1997 -  ongoing Leisure and tourism 
complex
NA Displacement Listed buildings & conservation 
area
Taikang Tianzifang ** 1998- ongoing Commercial boutiques/ 
creative offices
70,000 Part community retention -
Huaihai Road 1754 Lane 1999-2001 Up-market private 
houses
56,000 Displacement (monetary) Listed buildings & conservation 
area
Penglai Rd 252 Lane * 1994 Upgraded public 
housing, later privatised
4,700 Community retention Historic City Core Conservation 
area
44tn Lane 1990-1995 Upgraded public 
housing, later privatised
29,000 Community retention -
ZJZ project 1987-1996 Upgraded public 
housing, later privatised
3,500 Community retention
Note: * Chosen for pilot study; ** Chosen for Inal case studies; NA data unavailable
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